


Central Greece and the Politics of Power in the Fourth Century BC

John Buckler
and Hans Beck



CAMBRIDGE

CAMBRIDGE

www.cambridge.org/9780521837057

VISIT...

LANZAROTE
Caliente.COM

This page intentionally left blank

BUCKLER AND BECK: CENTRAL GREECE AND THE POLITICS OF POWER IN THE FOURTH CENTURY BC

The streams of Greek history in the fourth century are highly controversial. Sandwiched between the Classical fifth century and the Hellenistic period, the era has invited various readings, most prominently the verdict of decrepitude and decline. Recent discoveries, however, indicate that the period was not simply illustrative of the political, social, and economic weaknesses of the Greek city-state.

This book examines the fourth century from an area with its own regional dynamics: central Greece, a region often considered a backwater for macropolitics. The authors disclose a vivid tension between regional politics in Boeotia and its adjacent territories and Greek affairs. They provide a meticulous and, at times, microscopic investigation into the region's military and political history, together with detailed analyses of the topography of the places "where history was made." The result is a dazzling account of Greece's power-transition crisis on the eve of the Macedonian conquest.

JOHN BUCKLER, Emeritus Professor of Greek History, specializes in the history of Greece during the fourth century BC. His publications include *The Theban Hegemony, 371–362 BC* (1980), *Philip II and the Sacred War* (1989) and *Aegean Greece in the Fourth Century BC* (2003).

HANS BECK is John MacNaughton Professor of Classics at McGill University in Montreal and has published widely in the field of Greek federalism. He is the author of *Polis und Koinon* (1997).

CENTRAL GREECE AND THE POLITICS OF POWER IN THE FOURTH CENTURY BC

JOHN BUCKLER AND HANS BECK



CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo

Cambridge University Press

The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK

Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York

www.cambridge.org

Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521837057

© John Buckler and Hans Beck 2008

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published in print format 2008

ISBN-13 978-0-511-45726-5 eBook (NetLibrary)

ISBN-13 978-0-521-83705-7 hardback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of urls for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

To Paul Cartledge

Pelopidas Epaminondas greetings

Contents

<i>List of maps</i>	<i>page</i> ix
<i>Preface</i>	xi
<i>Acknowledgments</i>	xiii
<i>List of abbreviations</i>	xv
Prologue: Power politics in fourth-century Greece (by Hans Beck)	i
PART I ALLIANCE	31
1 A survey of Theban and Athenian relations between 403–371 BC	33
2 The incident at Mt. Parnassus, 395 BC	44
3 The battle of Coronea and its historiographical legacy	59
4 The King's Peace, alliance, and Phoebidas' strike (382 BC)	71
5 Sphodrias' raid and the evolution of the Athenian League	79
PART II HEGEMONY	85
6 The re-establishment of the <i>boiōtarchia</i> (378 BC)	87
7 The battle of Tegyra, 375 BC	99
8 Plutarch on Leuctra	III
9 Alliance and hegemony in fourth-century Greece: the case of the Theban Hegemony	127
10 Xenophon's speeches and the Theban Hegemony	140

11	The phantom <i>syndrion</i> of the Boeotian Confederacy, 378–335 BC	165
12	Boeotian Aulis and Greek naval bases	180
13	Epaminondas and the new inscription from Cnidus	199
PART III DOMINATION		211
14	Thebes, Delphi, and the outbreak of the Sacred War	213
15	Pammenes, the Persians, and the Sacred War	224
16	Philip II, the Greeks, and the King, 346–336 BC	233
17	A note on the battle of Chaeronea	254
18	Philip II's designs on Greece	259
Epilogue (by John Buckler and Hans Beck)		277
<i>Glossary</i>		284
<i>References</i>		287
<i>Index</i>		305

Maps

1	Greece and the Mediterranean	<i>page</i> xviii
2	Central Greece	xix
3	Coronea and surroundings	60
4	The valley of the Thespios River	94
5	The battlefield of Tegyra	101
6	The battlefield of Leuctra	113
7	Southwestern Boeotia	184
8	The northern coast of Boeotia	188
9	The plain of Chaeronea	255

Preface

Throughout the twentieth century and now into the twenty-first, Athens and Sparta have largely dominated Classical Greek scholarship. In recent years, however, wider perceptions of the Greek world have become increasingly prominent. While the merits of studying Athens and Sparta remain unchallenged, the critical look beyond them has generated a truly multifaceted picture of Greek political culture. At the same time, interest in, if not obsession with, the *polis* as *the* form of Greek statehood is now being balanced by growing research on the *ethnos*. Scholars explore patterns of constructing collective ethnic identities, expressions of such identities in material and immaterial culture, and their interaction with relation to the rise of urban communities that fostered the development of distinct, and exclusive, city identities. These approaches, in turn, all make their individual contributions to understanding the vexed question of the relationships prevalent in *polis*-politics.

This book reflects both changes. It focuses on a region that we believe decisively shaped Greek affairs of the Classical period. Conceiving of central Greece and its core Boeotia as an area with its own regional dynamics, this collection of essays attempts to examine Greek history in a test tube: while paying particular attention to regional patterns of interstate relations, we also hope to disclose the interaction between regional politics and Panhellenic affairs. This approach should add to the rising interest in a period in Greek history that still widely lacks understanding.

As the title indicates, we emphasize power in its broadest sense. Just as politics and diplomacy play major roles in the discussion, so do military affairs. History does not benefit from narrowly separating one from the others; indeed, any approach that divides them leads only to an imperfect account. Necessity calls for one further note. As can readily be seen, pitched battles played a significant part in this era of Greek history. No battle

receives treatment here without personal investigation of and attention to the battlefields themselves.

Several chapters of this book have been published before, some in standard journals, others in – at times, remote – conference proceedings and collections. As so often, it took much longer than anticipated to collect and rework those articles, to add new ones, and to put them into what is hopefully a coherent perspective. To accommodate the widest audience we also decided to transliterate, whenever possible, the Greek passages for easy reading. For simplicity and convenience, we likewise included a glossary to explain technical terms that lack English equivalents.

An unalloyed pleasure of scholarship springs from the opportunity to thank those who have helped us along the way. Our gratitude, “a gift that is a light and dear one” (*Odyssey* 6, 208), we offer to all those who improved the book. Foremost among them stands Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp who liberally devoted his time and learning to bring the manuscript to press. He freely shared with us his valuable suggestions, and resources, to see this project successfully to completion. Ingo Witzke and Vinzenz Borchert (Cologne), Andreas Schneider (Frankfurt) and Andrew Swidzinski and Connie Galatas (Montreal) lent their efforts to the task of putting the manuscript into publishable form. Caroline Buckler kindly translated the typewritten documents into a form that the computer could read. She always willingly discussed not simply the manner of presentation, but also the content of the material. S. C. Buckler lent his own idiosyncratic help. Since we wholeheartedly believe in William Blake’s sentiment that “He who would do good to another must do it in minute particulars” (*Jerusalem* 55–56), we list those particulars in the accompanying acknowledgements. To all we offer heartfelt thanks.

J. B.
Dry Run Creek, Indiana
H. B.
Montreal

Acknowledgments

It is a distinct pleasure to thank the following for their kindness and generosity in permitting us to reprint here the following articles: Lucia Corsi and Paola Angeli Bernardini, "A Survey of Theban and Athenian Relations between 403 and 371 BC," in *Presenza e funzione della città di Tebe nella cultura greca* (Pisa and Rome, 2000); Susanne Henkel, "The Incident at Mt. Parnassos, 395 BC," in C. P. Tuplin (ed.), *Xenophon and His World* (Stuttgart, 2004); J. C. Gieben, "The Battle of Koroneia and Its Historiographical Legacy," in *Boeotia Antiqua* 6 (1996), and "The Battle of Tegyra, 375 BC," in *Boeotia Antiqua* 5 (1995); E. Badian, "The Re-establishment of the Boiotarchia (378 BC)," in *American Journal of Ancient History* 4 (1979); Lisbeth Solberg, "Plutarch on Leuktra," in *Symbolae Osloenses* 55 (1980); Martin C. J. Miller, "Alliance and Hegemony in Fourth-Century Greece: the Case of the Theban Hegemony," in *The Ancient World* 5 (1982); Emilio Gabba, "Xenophon's Speeches and the Theban Hegemony," in *Athenaeum* 60 (1982); Marianne Alenius and Pernille Flensted-Jensen, "The Phantom *Synedrion* of the Boiotian Confederacy, 378–335 BC," in *Polis and Politics: Studies in Ancient Greek History* (Copenhagen, 2000); Jan Snouck-Hurgronje, "Boiotian Aulis and Greek Naval Bases," in *New Aspects of Naval History* (Baltimore, 1985); Gaby van Rietschoten, "Epameinondas and the New Inscription from Knidos," in *Mnemosyne* 51 (1998); Gilbert Argoud, "Thebes, Delphoi, and the Outbreak of the Third Sacred War," in *La Béotie Antique* (Lyon and St. Étienne, 1985); Marcell St. Restle, "Pammenes, the Persians, and the Sacred War" in *BOIOTIKA. Vorträge vom 5. Internationalen Bötien-Kolloquium zu Ehren von Prof. Dr. Siegfried Lauffer* (Munich, 1989); Gerald M. Browne, "Philip II, the Greeks, and the King, 346–336 BC," in *Illinois Classical Studies* 19 (1994); Albert Schachter, "A Note on the Battle of Chaironeia in 338 BC," in *Teiresias* Supplement 3 (Montreal, 1990); and Robert W. Wallace, "Philip's Designs on Greece,"

in *Transitions to Empire. Essays in Greco-Roman History, 360–146 BC in Honor of Ernst Badian* (Norman, 1996).

Hans Beck provided the inspiration for this project. He realized that many of the papers had first appeared in scattered journals and acts of international congresses not easily available to many Classical scholars. He further saw the value of collecting them and adding other pieces to weave them into a coherent whole. To enhance their usefulness, he divided them into three major interrelated themes, thereby bringing unity to them all. Finally, he saw the whole project through from start to submission to Cambridge University Press. Without his vision and energy, these essays would never have taken the form of a book.

J. B.

Abbreviations


<i>AD</i>	<i>Ἀρχαιολογικὸν Δελτίον</i>
<i>AHB</i>	<i>Ancient History Bulletin</i> . Revue d'histoire ancienne
<i>AJAH</i>	<i>American Journal of Ancient History</i>
<i>AJArch.</i>	<i>American Journal of Archaeology</i>
<i>AJPhil.</i>	<i>American Journal of Philology</i>
<i>Anc. Soc.</i>	<i>Ancient Society</i>
<i>AncW</i>	<i>The Ancient World</i>
<i>ANRW</i>	<i>Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt</i>
<i>Ant. Class.</i>	<i>L'Antiquité classique</i>
<i>Antichthon</i>	<i>Antichthon</i> . Journal of the Australian Society for Classical Studies
<i>Arch. Anz.</i>	<i>Archäologischer Anzeiger</i>
<i>Athenaeum</i>	<i>Athenaeum</i> . Studi periodici di letteratura e storia dell'antichità
<i>BCH</i>	<i>Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique</i>
<i>BICS</i>	<i>Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies</i>
<i>BMCR</i>	<i>Bryn Mawr Classical Review</i>
<i>BSA</i>	<i>Annual of the British School at Athens</i>
<i>CAH</i>	<i>Cambridge Ancient History</i>
<i>Chiron</i>	<i>Chiron</i> . Mitteilungen der Kommission für Alte Geschichte und Epigraphik des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts
<i>CISA</i>	<i>Contributi dell' istituto di storia antica</i>
<i>Cl. Ant.</i>	<i>Classical Antiquity</i>
<i>C&M</i>	<i>Classica et Mediaevalia</i> . Revue danoise de philologie et d'histoire
<i>CPh</i>	<i>Classical Philology</i>
<i>CQ</i>	<i>Classical Quarterly</i>
<i>CR</i>	<i>Classical Review</i>
<i>CSCA</i>	<i>California Studies in Classical Antiquity</i>

<i>DNP</i>	<i>Der Neue Pauly</i>
<i>EA</i>	<i>Epigraphica Anatolica</i>
<i>EMC</i>	<i>Classical Views. Echos du monde classique</i>
<i>Emerita</i>	<i>Emerita. Revista de linguística y filología classica</i>
<i>Eranos</i>	<i>Eranos. Acta Philologica Suecana</i>
<i>FD</i>	<i>Fouilles de Delphes</i>
<i>FGrH</i>	<i>Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker</i> , ed. F. Jacoby
<i>G&R</i>	<i>Greece and Rome</i>
<i>GRBS</i>	<i>Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies</i>
<i>Harv. Stud.</i>	<i>Harvard Studies in Classical Philology</i>
<i>Hermes</i>	<i>Hermes. Zeitschrift für klassische Philologie</i>
<i>Hesp.</i>	<i>Hesperia. Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens</i>
<i>Hist.</i>	<i>Historia. Zeitschrift für die Alte Geschichte</i>
<i>HThR</i>	<i>Harvard Theological Review</i>
<i>ICS</i>	<i>Illinois Classical Studies</i>
<i>IG</i>	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i>
<i>IrAnt</i>	<i>Iranica Antiqua</i>
<i>Jahrb. f. cl. Phil.</i>	<i>Jahrbücher für klassische Philologie</i>
<i>JHS</i>	<i>Journal of Hellenic Studies</i>
<i>JÖAI</i>	<i>Jahreshefte des Österreichischen Archäologischen Instituts</i>
<i>Klio</i>	<i>Klio. Beiträge zur Alten Geschichte</i>
<i>Kodai</i>	<i>Kodai. Journal of Ancient History</i>
<i>LCM</i>	<i>Liverpool Classical Monthly</i>
<i>LSJ</i>	<i>Greek–English Lexicon</i> . Compiled by H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, revised and augmented by H. Stuart Jones
<i>MDAI (A)</i>	<i>Mitteilungen des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts. Athenische Abteilung</i>
<i>Meiggs–Lewis</i>	<i>Meiggs and Lewis 1988</i>
<i>Mnemos.</i>	<i>Mnemosyne. Bibliotheca Classica Batavia</i>
<i>NJ</i>	<i>Neue Jahrbücher für Antike und Deutsche Bildung</i>
<i>Num. Chron.</i>	<i>Numismatic Chronicle</i>
<i>OCD³</i>	<i>The Oxford Classical Dictionary</i> , third edition
<i>PAPhS</i>	<i>Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society</i>
<i>PCPS</i>	<i>Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society</i>
<i>Phoenix</i>	<i>Phoenix. The Journal of the Ontario Classical Association</i>

<i>PSQ</i>	<i>Political Science Quarterly</i>
<i>Pulpudeva</i>	<i>Pulpudeva</i> . Semaines Philippopolitaines de l'histoire et de la culture de Thrace
<i>Quaderni di storia</i>	<i>Quaderni di storia</i> . Rassegna di antichità
<i>RE</i>	<i>Real-Encyclopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft</i>
<i>Rev. Ét. Anc.</i>	<i>Revue des études anciennes</i>
<i>Rev. Ét. Grec.</i>	<i>Revue des études grecques</i>
<i>Rev. Hist.</i>	<i>Revue Historique</i>
<i>Rh. Mus.</i>	<i>Rheinisches Museum für Philologie</i>
Rhodes–Osborne	Rhodes and Osborne 2004
<i>Riv. Fil.</i>	<i>Rivista di filologia e di istruzione classica</i>
<i>SCI</i>	<i>Scripta Classica Israelica</i>
<i>SdA</i>	<i>Die Staatsverträge des Altertums</i>
<i>SEG</i>	<i>Supplementum epigraphicum Graecum</i>
<i>SIG</i>	see <i>Syll.</i> ³
<i>Syll.</i> ³	<i>Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum</i> , ed. W. Dittenberger
<i>Symb. Osl.</i>	<i>Symbolae Osloenses auspiciis societatis Graeco-Latinae</i>
<i>TAPA</i>	<i>Transactions of the American Philological Association</i>
<i>Teiresias</i>	<i>Teiresias</i> . A Review and Continuing Bibliography of Boiotian Studies
Tod	Tod 1949
<i>Wien. Stud.</i>	<i>Wiener Studien</i> . Zeitschrift für Klassische Philologie und Patristik
<i>YCS</i>	<i>Yale Classical Studies</i>
<i>ZPE</i>	<i>Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik</i>



Map 1 Greece and the Mediterranean



Map 2 Central Greece

Prologue
Power politics in fourth-century Greece
(by Hans Beck)

On the next day the ambassadors reported the terms on which the Lacedaemonians were prepared to make peace. Theramenes acted as their spokesman, and he urged [his fellow Athenians] that it was best to obey the Lacedaemonians and to tear down the city walls. While some spoke in opposition to him, the greater number supported him, and so it was voted to accept the peace. After this Lysander sailed into the Piraeus, the exiles returned, and the Peloponnesians began with great enthusiasm to demolish the walls to the music of flute-girls, thinking that that day was the beginning of freedom for Greece.

Xenophon's famous account of the end of the Peloponnesian War (432/1–404) is puzzling, and his underlying message difficult to discern. But the laconic style of his depiction may very well provide a telling clue as to what he wanted to portray. The scene is nothing if not bizarre. Picture hundreds of men eagerly hammering on Athens' great walls, driven by the beat of the music performed by cheering females and, more importantly, a firm belief that their efforts are for an ultimate good: the freedom of Greece.¹

In retrospect, Xenophon may have wondered how naive they must have been. At the time of his writing, in the later part of the 360s and the 350s, it had become clear that their hopes for freedom – and peace – were utterly shattered. Rather than spreading both, the Spartans not only replaced Athens as the villain but also decidedly played the hard game of power politics. In an uncontrolled competition to maximize power and resources as well as their influence on other cities in order to communicate their pursuits,² the Spartans clung to that principle even in rigid terms. Sparta's interest, as king Agesilaus famously put it, set the benchmark for action and became the universal cause for justifying that action.³ What followed was a

¹ Xen. *Hell.* 2, 2, 22–23. Buckler 2003, pp. 1–3.

² See the conceptual approach toward power politics in Eckstein 2003, pp. 757–759, who pays much homage to the renaissance of contemporary (neo-)realism. Standard definitions of power politics include Taylor 1978 and Waltz 1979. A more critical line is offered by Kegley 1995 and Crane 1998.

³ Xen. *Hell.* 5, 2, 32.

growing interstate anarchy: forced to provide for its own security, Greece adopted a power-maximizing attitude that became the dominant feature of state action. Alliances, multilateral obligations, and peace treaties were mostly regarded as means to increase power as much as possible rather than to enforce a stable interstate equilibrium. This ruthless self-seeking, combined with the desire for self-aggrandizement in a fiercely competitive environment, led to another feature that became characteristic of Greek interstate affairs. War, or the threat of war, was always present, and every state was prepared to pursue its own interests through violence. It is not by chance that Thucydides, whose narrative on the Peloponnesian War provides the first in-depth analysis of the fundamental propositions of such a condition of interstate relations and the kind of state action it encourages, is often regarded as the incontestable forerunner of international systems theory and its realist branch in particular.⁴

In the aftermath of the Peloponnesian War, the road to a new system-wide war was paved. Animosities between Thebes and Sparta, victorious but fragile allies before 404, soon led to a major and profound realignment. In an unexpected move, the Thebans reversed their hostile policy toward Athens and entered into a bilateral agreement (*symmachia*) with their former enemies in 395. The Corinthians, longtime Spartan allies, soon followed suit.⁵ But the common ground for the new alliances was precarious. Beyond a shared determination to challenge Sparta's demand for leadership (*hēgemonia*) in Greece, there were few if any mutually desired goals. Instead, each party aspired to maximize the means of achieving its traditional objectives: Thebes to strive for hegemony in central Greece, the Corinthians to win greater influence on the Peloponnese, and Athens to restore its maritime power.

The following decades witnessed attempts by Sparta, Athens, and Thebes to gain the *hēgemonia* in Greece. Spartan odds were favored by a Common Peace treaty, and Persian money, at the end of the Corinthian War (395–386). Even though the treaty did not formally acknowledge the Spartans as guardian (*prostatēs*) of the peace, it *de facto* reinforced their

⁴ See, e.g., M. W. Doyle 1991; Crane 1998. The brilliant analysis of Eckstein 2003 flirts heavily with Thucydidean realism yet relinquishes Thucydides as the author of a monolithically systems-theory explanation of the Peloponnesian War. Instead, Eckstein detects a group of complementary variables in Thucydides' explanation of the war and of the distribution of power across the Greek state system, including human agency and a series of contingent events such as specific decisions made in Athens and Sparta.

⁵ Rhodes–Osborne, no. 6; cf. *SdA* 11, nos. 224–225. Funke 1980, pp. 71–73; Cartledge 1987, pp. 289–293.

leadership.⁶ Entrusted with the implementation of what the Common Peace treaty declared to be the core principle of every Greek state on the mainland and over most parts of the Aegean, the Spartans undertook the promotion of the local autonomy (*autonomia*) of the Greek states. Yet, in many cases, the apology for autonomy was hardly more than a pretext for Lacedaemonian interventionism. By the early 370s Sparta had overstepped the mark. Ongoing breaches of the autonomy clause provided the publicly alleged reason for a revival of Athens' naval league, which grew quickly to become a major rival in the strife for hegemony. Counterintuitively, when the Spartans were defeated, it was not by Athens, but by the Thebans on the battlefield of Leuctra (371). The Peloponnesians' response was prompt. Disaffected with Spartan dominance, which spanned more than two hundred years, many regions revolted. Before the kings were able to assess the full extent of the situation, the uprising had grown into a chaotic, uncontrollable upheaval. The Peloponnesian League, the once proud flagship of Spartan might, collapsed. The emergence of new local powers in Arcadia and Messenia complicated Peloponnesian affairs, which were inexorably driven by shifting alliances, local power struggles, and civil war.⁷

Xenophon witnessed those revolts while living on an estate in Scillus in the western Peloponnese.⁸ From there it was roughly 60 kilometers to Mantinea in eastern Arcadia, which in 362 was host to another battle for hegemony. Again, Xenophon's remarks are telling and, in many ways, resemble his narrative of the end of the Peloponnesian War. Once again Xenophon alludes to a certain gap between common expectations and actual achievements. Since virtually all Greeks had assembled on the battlefield, they were hoping, as Xenophon has it, that the victorious would establish an unchallenged hegemony, but, like so often before, "there was even more confusion and disorder in Greece afterwards."⁹

Order did finally come, but not from where Xenophon and his generation had hoped. In Macedon, Philip II was enthroned in 360. Unlike many of his predecessors, Philip managed to overcome both rival claims and foreign invasions. The secret of his success was a thorough reorganization of Macedonian politics that enhanced the power of the monarchy and profoundly reformed the military. Philip's new army, centred on the great Macedonian phalanx and equipped with pikes (*sarisae*) that allowed for a

⁶ See chapter 4. ⁷ Cartledge 1987, pp. 382–392; Buckler 2003, pp. 296–350.

⁸ Diog. Laert. 2, 52–53; see also Xen. *Anab.* 5, 3, 7–13; Paus. 5, 6, 5–6; Anderson 1974, pp. 165–166; Tuplin 2004b; Badian 2004, pp. 41–44.

⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 7, 5, 26–27.

new and deadly tactic on the battlefield, soon became unmatched. With this superior military force in place, Philip was able gradually to expand the Macedonian sphere of interest to the south. In 346 he forced the Athenians into a peace treaty that is known as the Peace of Philocrates. He also became president of the Amphictyonic Council in Delphi, a position that traditionally was one of prestige with solemn religious overtones, but its political opportunity came within the realm of religious conduct toward Apollo's sanctuary. Only a few years later, the *hēgemonia* to which Sparta, Athens, and Thebes aspired became a reality. Philip's troops crushed a Hellenic alliance mainly of Athenians and Thebans on the battlefield of Chaeronea in 338. The battle itself proved to be a difficult victory, but the outcome was as clear as Xenophon would have hoped. Philip, master of the battlefield and leader of the amphictyony, convened a congress at Corinth to found a new league that formed a Common Peace and appointed Philip *hēgemōn* of the league's forces.¹⁰ Again, a feeling of freedom and liberty spread throughout Greece. This time, however, this spirit was conveyed by a monarch who had just "liberated" the Greeks by making them his subjects.

A SHORT CENTURY

The period from the end of the Peloponnesian War to the death of Philip only two years after Chaeronea prominently figures as "the fourth century." As for any other centennial epoch, for example, the long third century (AD) or the even longer nineteenth century, this designation is both conventional and conceptual. On the conventional level, it indicates the period's rough definition according to the chronology. In this regard, the fourth century is rather brief, even if the Age of Alexander from 335 to 323 were to be included, falling short of the hundred years or the time-span of three generations. The designation's conceptual dimension is likewise problematic. On that level, the terminology implies a specific historical profile that distinguishes the period from its chronological surroundings. But that profile is highly controversial. Sandwiched between the "Classical" fifth century and Hellenism, the era has invited various readings and interpretations. Until recently the fourth century was considered hardly more than an appendix to the fifth century. If anything, fourth-century politics were thought to have added to the confusion that

¹⁰ *IG* 11²236 = Rhodes–Osborne, no. 76 = *SdA* 111, no. 403.

ultimately paved the way for Hellenic unity under the rule of Macedon.¹¹ The period was branded as one of failure and decline. The former allegation accused the Greeks of failing to bring about “national” unity that would have averted monarchy, the latter of a steady decrepitude of the *polis* as economic, social, and political core of Greek affairs.

This view was particularly prominent in, yet far from being confined to, nineteenth-century German scholarship and its strong Hegelian tradition, according to which history follows a grand scheme of coherent categories and events. It prevailed even without the overtones of German unification, which so often accompanied the scholarship of the day. It goes without saying that the repercussions of history’s *Weltgeist* were stronger in some academic cultures than in others. While some have praised Philip as a savior who delivered the Greek world from its endemic evils – political fragmentation and interstate rivalry – and finally brought about the national unity the Hellenes, others have lamented the price of that unity.¹²

Today’s scholarship is not free from contemporary ideologies. In fact, the rising prominence of this epoch in scholarly publications might in part be attributed to a changing environment of foreign affairs, which has shifted from a bipolar structure of international relations to unilateral hegemony and globalization, including its inherent forces of multipolarism and regional dynamism. One need not subscribe to unleashed externalism to grasp that the conceptual content of current scholarly trends is likely to be prefigured by these contexts. The editors of the *Cambridge Ancient History*’s volume VI, which in its second edition (1994) is entitled “The Fourth Century BC,” make this abundantly clear. While the corresponding volume in the first edition (1927) was called “Macedon, 401–301 BC,” a title that reflected the then common belief that the overriding theme of the period was the unification of Greece, the new series bears a decidedly plain designation. The revised title reflects the editors’ belief that the period is “interesting in itself [and] not simply illustrative of the political and other weaknesses of the Greek city states.”¹³

¹¹ In the excellent analysis of Ma 2000 the period figures as “the ‘long fourth century’ ” (p. 353), which is designed to pinpoint the thesis of perpetuated local rivalry and warfare. The point is well taken, but the superstructure of Greek interstate relations changed too dramatically in the course of the 330s to argue for continuity on the macro level. A good discussion of past perceptions of the fourth century as well as some concise remarks on *Wissenschaftsgeschichte* are offered by Tritle 1997, pp. 1–7.

¹² The first edition of *CAH* VI (first published in 1927) was bleak on this. It declared the rise of Philip to be the “coffin of the corpse” (p. 508). A more positive approach was that of Ehrenberg 1965, mainly on the grounds of the Greeks’ overcoming fragmentation and disunity.

¹³ *CAH* VI², p. xvii.

Today, scholarly confidence in the reign of the *Weltgeist* has vanished. Verdicts such as the failure to unite or more general assumptions of decline, decrepitude, or degeneracy have lost their validity in conceptualizations of interstate behaviour, or simply in descriptions of the vexed problem of multilateral rivalries and shifting balances of power in a conflict-prone environment. This is also true for the long-held view that Greek politics underwent a severe crisis after the end of the Peloponnesian War, a view that in many ways served as underlying premise both for scholars who emphasized the transitional character of the period and for those who raised the specter of decline.¹⁴

The crisis paradigm has been revisited over the past twenty years. This new critical assessment offers a valuable point of departure for any further investigation. While earlier scholarship diagnosed a crisis of the city-state's economic development as well as its incapacity to adapt to new military demands, more recent scholarship has identified those criteria as hardly sufficient to understand the underlying changes of fourth-century politics. An elaborate attempt has been made to demonstrate that the Greek city-state would have been unable to survive even without the rise of Macedon, since the *polis* had reached an "evolutionary dead-end."¹⁵ This end was not marked by an inability to effect change in the form of social organization or by processes of cumulative rationalization. Rather, the continuous competition for economic, political, and coercive power, along with strong ideological constraints that prevented the concentration of any of these powers in the hands of an entity other than the citizenry of the *polis* itself, limited the city-state's chances for development and, ultimately, survival. The *real* fourth-century crisis, then, was not so much the outcome of *polis* government as such – for Athens, this thesis has been rejected a long time ago.¹⁶ Instead, the more refined crisis paradigm focuses on the incapability of the *polis* to respond to the needs of the day, especially for what concerns the management of foreign relations and the stabilization of interstate affairs. This view, albeit valid to a point, tends to downplay the actual efforts made after the end of the Peloponnesian War to develop political concepts of interstate security, particularly in the fields of peace making

¹⁴ The crisis paradigm was particularly prominent in 1960s and 1970s scholarship. Its protagonists included scholars from various different intellectual backgrounds such as Hermann Bengtson, Claude Mossé, and Elisabeth Weiskopf.

¹⁵ Runciman 1990; see also Lewis, in *CAH* vi², pp. 589–491, and Davies 1995, who presents a refined concept of crisis.

¹⁶ Most notably by Hansen 1991; see also Harding 1995; Welwei 1999, whose narrative sets the fifth and the fourth centuries *en par*.

and *polis* integration. Before the crisis-paradigm can be re-evaluated, these concepts will need to be examined.

INTERSTATE EQUILIBRIUM AND ITS OBSTACLES: BIPOLARITY,
HEGEMONY, MULTIPLICITY

When the Aegean had become a Hellenic Sea in the decades that followed the Persian Wars, no attempts were made to systematize Greek interstate relations. Greece consisted of hundreds of independent city-states that shared a common material and political culture, religious beliefs, and a strong feeling of ethnic kinship that would separate the Greeks from the “barbarian” world. The allocation of power between *poleis* was determined by access to resources rather than visionary approaches or political attempts.¹⁷ Athens and Sparta outranked the other states by far in natural resources and commanded joint forces of large-scale fighting alliances. Both acquired a distinct civic image that underscored their superiority and secured the recognition of their fellow Hellenes. Second, a handful of states – Thebes, Corinth, Argos, as well as the leading *poleis* in Asia Minor – established themselves as regional powers.¹⁸ Although significantly smaller, they were in a position to alter the power relation between Athens and Sparta at any time. Those regional powers were followed by countless city-states, many of them with an average of only approximately six hundred citizens, many others merely rural settlements gathering around an urban centre. Despite the large differences in terms of population, resources, and political organization – an average *polis* would be governed by an assembly, a council, and a military executive – all of the polities were recognized as independent political units with a right to pursue their internal affairs and to conduct individual foreign policies.¹⁹

Interstate contacts between *poleis* were frequent. Cities had close relations with their neighbours, sometimes even friendly contacts, and engaged in economic exchange. At the same time, they partook in permanent fighting alliances, belonged to tribal federations or federal states, interacted during religious festivals, and had ceremonial ties. Some may

¹⁷ E.g. Isocrates’ visions on Athenian foreign policy as heralded in *On the Peace* (355) and *Areopagiticus* (358 or 355) never translated into politics, nor did his concept of Panhellenism. Turning to eminent figures such as Dionysius, Jason’s sons, Euagoras and ultimately Philip, Isocrates’ letters anticipate the hegemony of a single ruler. Yet, when this was finally brought about, it was due to the new power constellation (and not to Philip’s receiving letters from Isocrates).

¹⁸ See Gehrke 1986 for a classification of Greek city-states according to their economies and resources.

¹⁹ A recent directory of *poleis*, Hansen and Nielsen 2005, lists 1,035 (!) entries of city-states and hundreds of settlements that do not qualify as autonomous *poleis* according to the editors’ definition.

have also been members of the Council of the Amphyctyony at Delphi. Furthermore, many of the smaller *poleis* maintained bonds with a mother-city (*metropolis*) that had acted as their (factual or fictitious) founder, which in turn implied a set of mutual obligations and dependencies that shaped their relations.²⁰

Such an interstate environment is highly susceptible to conflict and disorder. The multiplicity of sovereign polities in a relatively small area with limited economic resources favored an anarchical structure. With little recognition by way of interstate law, city-states had to establish relations with each other largely on their own terms. Throughout the fifth century, the anarchical potential of conflict and disarray was contained and, in fact, absorbed by a much larger process of power transformation. Thucydides' analysis of Greek affairs on the eve of the Peloponnesian War is the *locus classicus* to describe this process. Thucydides believed that the war would be "a great war," an anticipation based on the observation that "the preparations of both the combatants were in every way in the last state of perfection . . . and the rest of the Hellenes taking sides in the quarrel, those who delayed doing so at once having it done in contemplation" (1, 1). In analytical terms, interstate affairs were gradually transformed into a bipolar power scheme that grew to a system-wide scale. Consequently, while the multiplicity of autonomous polities continued to exist, the dynamic potential of this arrangement was channeled into bipolarity.²¹

The Peloponnesian War eliminated that superstructure. With the Athenian Empire dismantled, the autonomy of Athens' allies restored, and the Athenian fleet destroyed, only one of Thucydides' combatants survived for the time being. It fell to the Spartans to develop and promote a political concept that may provide a more stable foreign environment, by means of either hegemony or a more innovative approach that could reach beyond the mere exercise of power. While hegemony went beyond their military and economic resources,²² the latter seems to have been unthinkable at the Eurotas. At the height of Xenophon's discourse on hegemony

²⁰ The current debate on new approaches towards the so-called Great Colonization, initiated by Malkin 1987, also includes a from-scratch evaluation of the relation between *metropolis* and *apoikia*. The most recent contribution to this is Bernstein 2004, whose emphasis rests on religious motifs for sending out colonies and perpetuating ties between mother-city and colony.

²¹ See the volume of Strauss and Lebow 1991, and, in the midst of the Cold War, Fliess 1966.

²² Although Laconia was remarkably self-sufficient in useful rocks and minerals as well as agricultural potential, the lack of transregional trade curbed the advantages of large-scale profit making: Cartledge 1979, pp. 180–182, is still most valuable; see also n. 33 below on *oligantropia*. On the military front, allied contributions were systematized only briefly before the disintegration of the Peloponnesian League. The inscription on contributions to the Spartan war fund (probably dating

and *autonomia* in *Hellenica* 5–6, a Spartan by the name of Prothous is introduced into the narrative of the peace conference of 371 (before Leuctra). Sparta's authorities were determined to steer foreign policy in the way they had done in the past, whereas Prothous argues for a revised policy. He suggests that the assembly demobilize Spartan troops and send embassies to the Greek cities asking for voluntary contributions to the temple of Apollo in Delphi; and if some infringement of *autonomia* appeared to occur, to summon those who wished to react and attack the guilty state. Apparently this was not meant to be ironic. Instead, Prothous was making an effort to apply a refined definition of *autonomia* as well as to establish some sort of protocol that would justify foreign action. If this were achieved, the Spartans would gain new political ground and overcome the political isolation into which they had been driven. In the event, they would direct or maybe even enforce a multipolar redistribution of power which, in turn, would acknowledge their position as *hēgemōn*. It is telling that the Spartan assembly, dominated by Agesilaus, “thought that Prothous was talking rubbish” and mobilized the army against Thebes.²³ Similar decisions were hammered out by the Spartan assembly before on foreign relations in the Peloponnese, in central Greece, and in the north. Hence, Sparta's foreign policy not only strengthened the anarchical inclination of Greek affairs but also provoked widespread disaffection and resistance. Interstate security rapidly decreased under the Spartan hegemony, and foreign affairs on the whole became less predictable.

The Common Peace (*koinē eirēnē*) of 386 was designed to resolve the structural deficits of the state system. Sparta's hegemony had to some extent suffered in the Corinthian War, but on the whole remained intact. A joint alliance of Athens, Thebes, Corinth, and Argos was unable to inflict lasting damage to the forces of the Peloponnesian League. After the battle of Abydus (387) the Athenian fleet had, once again, been vanquished, bringing nine years of fierce fighting to an end. That same year the victorious Spartan general Antalcidas reached an agreement with Tiribazus, the Persian satrap of Sardis, that laid the foundation for a peace treaty under Persian sponsorship. The following year the Spartans assembled the belligerents in Sparta and read out to them a decree that had been dictated by the Great King Artaxerxes. Xenophon presents an epitome of the text:

to 427) famously includes a variety of coinages and the gift of raisins: Meiggs–Lewis, no. 67, with the new fragments in W. T. Loomis, *The Spartan War Fund: IG V.1.1 and a New Fragment*, Stuttgart, 1992, p. 74.

²³ Xen. *Hell.* 6, 4, 2–3; cf. Plut. *Ages.* 28 on Agesilaus' role. Jehne 1994, pp. 273–276; Beck 2001a, pp. 368–369; Bearzot 2004, pp. 109–118.

King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the cities in Asia be his and, of the islands, Clazomenae and Cyprus; the other Greek cities, both great and small, should be left autonomous except for Lemnus, Imbrus, and Scyrus, which should belong to Athens, as in the past. Whichever side refuses the peace, against these I shall wage war with those who agree, both by land and by sea and with ships and money.²⁴

The *koinē eirēnē* of 386 has received much scholarly attention, but only recently historians elucidated its impact on Greek interstate relations. In revisiting the Peace, two closely interrelated provisions are striking. The first is the clause that entailed autonomy for the Greek cities (with the exception of the Greeks in Asia, Sparta's necessary sacrifice to the King). The call for *autonomia* was hardly a new concept; indeed, it can be traced back to the era of the Peloponnesian War.²⁵ In earlier stipulations, however, *autonomia* had been guaranteed by bilateral partners who mutually assured the independence of the other party. With the King's Peace *autonomia* became an obligatory formula that was extended to all Greek cities, great and small. It became the "life principle"²⁶ of Greek statehood. That the demand for autonomy was transformed into a political norm that applied to the Greek state in general leads to the second key provision. Unlike earlier peace treaties, which tended to be bilateral agreements between belligerents who were working toward putting a formal end to warfare, the Peace of 386 stipulated conditions that were thought to be binding for all Greek states, regardless of whether or not they had participated in the Corinthian War or whether or not they had sent delegates to Sparta to hear, and vote for, the King's verdict.

Taken literally, the King's Peace envisioned an unprecedented arrangement of the Greek state system. Its underlying implication, if set in motion, was to endorse fully the principle of interstate multiplicity by articulating and legitimizing the demands of independent city-states. Permanent exposure to the dangers of war meant that the *poleis* needed security and protection. The King's Peace, in theory, provided both. Protection was granted by the *prostatēs* who pledged to wage war on any aggressor "with those who agree, both by land and by sea and with ships and money."²⁷ The reference to financial aid guaranteed the Great King's support to those who fought against the violators of the peace. As shown by the Peloponnesian and the Corinthian Wars, Persian money provided a

²⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 5, 1, 31; cf. Diod. Sic. 14, 110, 3. Jehne 1994, pp. 31–47; Buckler 2003, pp. 167–180. See also chapter 4 below.

²⁵ IG¹127 = Meiggs–Lewis, no. 94: Athenian decree for Samos (from 405/4), lines 15–16: The Samians shall "use their own laws and be autonomous."

²⁶ According to Jehne 1994, p. 44: "Lebensprinzip." ²⁷ See above, n. 24.

decisive asset in large-scale warfare. The prospective allocation of those funds to the *prostatēs* consequently ensured a higher decree of a city-state's security. The most striking innovation was therefore that the peace (again, theoretically) eliminated the structural weaknesses of Greek affairs that resulted from multiplicity and particularity. It did so not by reducing the status of independent polities, but, on the contrary, by endorsing their position and acknowledging their need for autonomy.

The King's Peace was renewed several times over the following decades, which implies widespread support for its general principles. In 375 two clauses were added that secured a *polis'* territorial integrity and stipulated the removal of foreign garrisons. Four years later, in 371, a disarmament of forces currently engaged in battle was voted; the unwillingness of the Spartan king Cleombrotus to do so led to a further battle, Leuctra. After the battle the parties agreed on a mutual assistance clause that provided support against violators of the peace. This regulation seems to have been appended by a symmachial component, the details of which are difficult to determine.²⁸ Again, these developments illustrate the strong commitment to the principle of a Common Peace which gradually became the widely accepted mode of channeling interstate relations. Adhering efforts to clothe the demand for *autonomia* in more concrete and precise terms were remarkable attempts toward a more stable infrastructure of foreign affairs.²⁹

Why did it not work? Why was there, as Xenophon testifies, more disorder in the decades after 386 than ever before? A systematic flaw has been detected. It has been pointed out that the universal demand for autonomy was an overambitious program, fraught with conditions and consequences detrimental to its implementation. Also, the autonomy clause virtually invited the encroachments of leading powers insofar as it provided a legal reference for intervention.³⁰ Although this point is well taken, there is more to be said. In realist terms, clarification is needed as to whether the call for *autonomia* was the intrusion of interstate order in and of itself or if that order had been threatened only by the attempts of

²⁸ On these renewals, see Ryder 1965 and Jehne 1994, pp. 48–137. A brief overview is found in *DNP* 6 (1999), cols. 633–634.

²⁹ The King's Peace does not seem to have provided a positive definition of *autonomia*, nor did the following treaties. At the same time, the renewals of the 370s reveal a tendency towards formalization. *IG* 11²43 (= Rhodes–Osborne, no. 22 from 378/7), lines 20–23, lists a series of legal criteria, such as the freedom from harmosts, garrisons, tribute, and the right to live under one's own laws and customs (which is paralleled in Xen. *Hell.* 6, 5, 6). Ostwald 1982, p. 48; Urban 1991, p. 110; Whitehead 1993, p. 32.

³⁰ This is the main thesis of Jehne 1994 (especially pp. 269–284).

hēgemonēs – Sparta, Athens, Thebes – who used it as a pretext for expansionist goals. The two explanations are not mutually exclusive, but if the *koinē eirēnē* was merely a tool of power politics and hegemonic rivalry, this might imply that another leader with different qualities (e.g. different political goals and military means) would have been able to operate a multipolar *polis*-environment on the grounds of the *koinē eirēnē*. The crucial question is if a multipolar state environment was possible at all, or if it was impossible for the *polis* to survive in such a surrounding. An answer to this question will be decisive for understanding the precise nature of the *polis*-crisis in the fourth century. Before a conclusion is possible, the second major innovation in interstate behaviour needs to be taken into account: the growing prominence and steady expansion of political integration of city-states by the means of federalism.

FEDERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF INTEGRATION

The period after the Peloponnesian War witnessed an important development in Greek politics. In areas such as Arcadia, Thessaly, or the Chalcidice, new federal states were founded or remodeled, while in Acarnania, Aetolia, and Achaea existing federations expanded their scope by granting federal citizenship to *poleis* beyond their ethnic boundaries.³¹ Federalism as such was not new; many federations were already in existence. What was new was the rising prominence of federalism and its growing importance in Greek affairs. This was not so much due to a conscious spreading or an “export of federalism,” as has been suggested by some scholars.³² The main reason for the rise of federal states was the transformation of the Greek interstate system as outlined above. The growing anarchy of foreign affairs allowed federal states such as the Arcadian, Boeotian, or the Chalcidic League to establish themselves as new regional powers. They soon accumulated resources that would match, and even outnumber, the hoplite forces of the Spartans and their Peloponnesian allies. The allied forces of the Boeotian League included 11,000 infantry and 1,100 cavalry. By comparison, in the fourth century Sparta never reached beyond 7,000 hoplites, a figure that was surpassed even by the Chalcidic League. In Thessaly, Jason of Pherae, a man of

³¹ The details are covered by Beck 1997a and Corsten 1999. Freitag 2000 also provides ample evidence on the tribes around the Corinthian Gulf.

³² Hornblower 1983/2002, p. 200. See Beck 2000, for a less emphatic perspective.

staggering wealth, envisioned the rule over a united Thessalian *koinon* that would embrace the largest hoplite and cavalry forces in Greece.³³

Critical understanding of Greek federalism has greatly improved over the past two decades. Many regional studies have become available, and a fair amount of comparative research elucidates both the mechanics of federalism as well as its intellectual foundation in Greek political thought and theory.³⁴ The most striking innovation in scholarship is the motion to relinquish the prolonged *Staatsrecht* approach, intellectually towering as it may be. The narrative exposition of political structures and constitutional law is outdated.³⁵ Instead, research now focuses on the interaction between *polis* and integrated supra-*polis* structures. Attention is also given to the analysis of a federal grammar between city-states and their shared ethnic identities as Achaeans, Aetolians, or Phocians. It has been argued that those branches of the Greek community were essentially flexible, negotiable, changing and, at times, relatively late constructs, rather than remnants of a tribal past. This tribal commonness as reflected in regional myths, heroic genealogies, and a distinct material culture became a major tool of political integration. When federalism emerged in the late Archaic Age and was refined in the remainder of the Classical period, it was a response to the articulation of tribal commonness.

Central Greece, and Boeotia in particular, is in many ways paradigmatic. A recent study on Boeotian ethnogenesis shows how the political integration of the region was practically geared to and, in turn, made possible through a common set of regional cults and foundation myths. The author argues convincingly that integration in Boeotia, despite refined political structures, was driven by a strong belief in a shared ethnic identity, an identity heralded in popular festivals (such as the Panboeotia) or through the promotion of a heroic genealogy that linked the origins of the Boeotian *ethnos* to its foundation hero Kadmos.³⁶

³³ Boeotia: *Hell. Oxy.* 19 (Chambers); Thessaly: *Xen. Hell.* 6, 1, 8–12; the Chalcidians: *Xen. Hell.* 5, 2, 13–14 (on which see Cartledge 1987, p. 269). Sparta's *oligantropia* ('shortage of full citizen soldiers') is notorious: the figures declined from some 8,000 Spartan hoplites in 480 (Hdt. 7, 234, 2) to 1,500 at Leuctra (*Xen. Hell.* 6, 1, 1; 6, 4, 15 and 17) and fewer than 1,000 full citizens by Aristotle's day, i.e. the third quarter of the fourth century. Cartledge 1979, pp. 307–318.

³⁴ For a more comprehensive treatment of modern scholarship on Greek federalism, its trends and perspectives, see Beck 2003. The most recent contributions are Bearzot 2004 and Siewert and Aigner-Foresti 2005.

³⁵ Larsen (1955 and 1968), though outstanding in his day and still widely quoted, is outdated. The new measuring stick is marked by the methodologically refined analyses of Hall 1997, McNerney 1999, and Morgan 2003, who initiated a true paradigm shift from constitutional law to ethnicity.

³⁶ See Kühn 2006. The political implication of the Panboeotia has been demonstrated by Schachter 1994b.

Another tier of integration was Theban imperialism that sought to transform Boeotia into one “superstate.”³⁷ The character of the Boeotian League(s) in the fourth century will be discussed below.³⁸ For the moment it suffices to point out that this claim for leadership of a united Boeotia also provoked widespread opposition. Given their ethnic bonds and Boeotian kinship, city-states such as Orchomenus, Thespieae, or Tanagra willingly shared in a federal polity that promoted their tribal commonness. They were, however, not prepared to accept Theban leadership in this *koinon*, let alone an encroachment on their local affairs. Since Theban politics were accompanied by the quest for hegemony and microimperialism – this means a policy of integration that seeks to unite by the means of domination over one’s neighbours rather than a shared power – any Boeotian federal venture was vulnerable to resistance and rivalry.³⁹ Theban attempts to turn large sections of the federation into a Theban *synteleia* (a domain in which the neighbouring cities were its subordinates) gradually undermined the political coherence of the Boeotian League.⁴⁰ Consequently, many members seized the first opportunity to secede. The dissolution of the Boeotian League on the grounds of the King’s Peace in 386 was hence even welcomed by many Boeotians with rejoicing.

Similar processes can be detected elsewhere. In Arcadia the federal government comprised an elaborate amalgam of direct politics and proportional representation. The underlying goal was to contain rivalries between its most resourceful members, Mantinea and Tegea. Yet the federal government was forced into a lethal power struggle between these cities only seven years after its inauguration.⁴¹ In the north, the history of the Chalcidic League was framed by similar developments.⁴² In many federal states political realities were determined by microimperialistic action and its inherent tensions, rather than the appreciation of the principles of federal government.

However, there were more fundamental arguments against federalism. In opposition to a common share of political life, for which Xenophon introduced the term *sympoliteuein* into historiography,⁴³ it was held by

³⁷ Cartledge 2000, which is the most recent analysis of the Boeotian Confederacy in 395.

³⁸ See chapters 6, 9 and II.

³⁹ Against this dark, Xenophontean perspective (see also Beck 1997a, pp. 208–210), see Bakhuizen 1988, and Buckler 1980a, pp. 15–33 and chapter 6 below, who put more emphasis on the Boeotians’ will to unite.

⁴⁰ The Theban *synteleia*: Diod. Sic. 15, 38, 3–4; 15, 50, 4; Isoc. 14, 8–9. Cf. Bakhuizen 1988 and Beck 1997a, pp. 208–210 on the growth of Thebes’ *synteleia*.

⁴¹ Beck 1997a, pp. 67–83; Nielsen 2002, pp. 474–508; cf. Roy 1971.

⁴² See Zahrtnt 1971; Psoma 2001. ⁴³ Xen. *Hell.* 5, 2, 12; Beck 2001a, p. 361; Bearzot 2004, pp. 48–50.

some that citizens may wish to live in an autonomous *polis*, under their own laws as citizens of their own city. In juristic terms, this desire to be *autopolitai* (“self-citizens”) – another term coined by Xenophon – was supported by the King’s Peace and its provision that all Greek cities both great and small were to be left autonomous. Yet, *autopoliteuein* also had a moral justification of its own. The Arcadian League illustrates the case. During a *stasis* in Tegea in 371, the supporters of Arcadian federalism made it clear that they would accept “that whatever measure was carried out in the common assembly <of Arcadia> should be binding on the several cities as well.” But the followers of the anti-federalists made it their policy “to leave the cities undisturbed” and “to live under the laws of their fathers.”⁴⁴ In Xenophon’s narrative, the establishment of a federal state thus implied a vertical separation of power, since decisions of the member cities were to a certain degree subordinate to laws of the federal government. Federal decrees prevailed over the legislation of the *polis*. This is what the opponents of federalism refused to accept, since their primary objective was autonomy.

The allusion to categories such as one’s own laws or the laws of the fathers implied that the opposite – that is, a common share of political life with others – might have been regarded as harmful to the traditional values of the *polis*. References to the ancestral order may have insinuated that federalism was dangerous or perhaps hostile to the time-honored principles of the ancestors.⁴⁵ On the other hand, supporters of federalism viewed *sympoliteia* as an attractive alternative to *autopoliteia*. They were aware that being fellow citizens beyond a single *polis* would entail the replacement, or, better, the displacement of the exclusive political powers of the city by the federal authorities. To them this disadvantage – if a disadvantage at all – was counterbalanced by the advantages of sympolity.

Federalism was faced with a threefold dilemma: Greek interstate culture was dominated by a discourse on autonomy as conveyed by the Common Peace treaties. Second, the *polis* was considered, both in political thought and theory, as the ideal community that embodied the ancestral traditions and time-honored principles of the citizen community. And third, the political practice was often undermined by microimperialistic action of leading members that sought to transform the federation into their dominion. Their attempts provoked resistance and secession wars in the course of which less powerful members were backed by the provisions of the King’s Peace. They could justifiably claim that the league’s leaders violated their autonomy.

⁴⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 5, 2, 14.

⁴⁵ See Beck 2001a, pp. 361–362, 370–371; see also Bearzot 2004.

CHANGING ENVIRONMENTS: RESOURCES, INTERSTATE
STRUCTURES, HUMAN AGENCY

The *polis* can indeed be described as an evolutionary dead end. The demand for autonomy, deeply rooted in the agenda of the Common Peace treaties and reassured with every renewal of the peace, continued to promote the *polis* as the genuine polity in interstate affairs. Federal attempts to overcome the narrow boundaries of the *polis* hardly widened the city-states' scope. Driven by the desire for what is in the best interest of the *polis* – Tegea, Thebes, or Olynthus – federal affairs were exposed to microimperialistic action of the leading cities. The perpetuation of this pattern proved the city-state incapable of responding to the demands of the day.

But how different were these demands in the fourth century? Was there a significant change in the political culture of the city-states, let alone a radical breakdown of the political environment? It has been noted that Greek military theory and practice underwent severe changes in the aftermath of the Peloponnesian War. The development of highly professionalized weaponry, new fighting techniques, new armour, equipment, and war machines demanded a set of responses. Generals now had to be acquainted with new methods of fighting, and this called for focused energy as well as specialized thinking and training. In consequence, military leadership became more professional. This new degree of professionalism was also true for the soldiers who were now required to use the new equipment and carry out the elaborate maneuvers requested by their generals.⁴⁶ Many city-states responded to this with an increased sophistication of their ephebic programs. In Athens, the best-documented case for such programs, the ephebate soon included hoplite warfare, archery, javelin-throwing, catapult-firing, as well as extra training in rowing.⁴⁷ Another response to the growing demands of professionalization was the more extensive use of mercenaries. The idea was hardly new in the fourth century. Since the late Archaic age aristocratic leaders had relied upon troops whose loyalties had been secured by money rather than political programs. What was new was the sheer quantity with which contingents of mercenaries were used. Recent estimates indicate that citizen contingents in *polis*-armies were not

⁴⁶ A brief, but well-written summary is to be found in Morris and Powell 2006, pp. 370–373; see also Hornblower 1983/2002, pp. 189–197; J. E. Lendon 2005, pp. 91–114.

⁴⁷ As attested in numerous ephebic inscriptions in the Hellenistic period. A remodeling of the program as early as after the Peloponnesian War seems likely though. In general, see Pélékides 1962; Reinmuth 1971; Burckhardt 1996, pp. 26–75, esp. 47–52.

complemented but rather outnumbered by mercenary forces.⁴⁸ At such a ratio the citizen army would not even come close to meeting the demands of combat, let alone of perpetuated warfare. As Demosthenes noted,⁴⁹ mercenary forces were not restricted to fight only “for four or five months in the summer, invade, ravage the countryside, and go home again”; instead, they were able “to campaign summer and winter through,” another novelty in warfare that citizen contingents became increasingly incapable of fulfilling.

Economically speaking, the extensive use of mercenaries made war more costly. The Peloponnesian and Corinthian Wars had been won with Persian money. Economic weakness among the Greek states was, therefore, not simply the outcome of these wars, but the wars did make it more apparent. None of the combatants could ultimately prevail without the financial support of Persia. Even Athens, the most developed trade-oriented economy in Greece, could not survive three decades of fighting after 432. From this point of view, the Corinthian War as well as the Social War were bitter reminders of a structural economic weakness that none of the city-states could overcome. Poverty was being extended by permanent warfare: countryside and agricultural lands had been destroyed and the infrastructures of commerce severely damaged. In many cities the majority of the richer classes who were involved in trade, banking, and overseas affairs had been killed. With them, the human infrastructure as well as the networks of trade crashed. But poverty meant that it was necessary to use even more mercenaries rather than fully furnished citizen hoplites, which in turn led to an increase in public expenses. The city-state was trapped in a poverty spiral that left little room for economic recovery.⁵⁰

Again, federalism could have been an alternative. The accumulation of military and economic resources by the Boeotian League after 447 suggests so much. As noted above, their federal constitution instantly provided the Boeotians with the sky-rocketing figure of 11,000 infantry and an unknown yet corresponding figure of financial resources. In the Peloponnese the forces of the Arcadian League seem to have matched Boeotian drafts in size, while the federal contingents of Thessaly outnumbered any of the traditional *polis*-armies of the fifth century. Yet none of these federal states managed to establish a lasting arrangement that was profitable to all of its members. Prone to civil strife and internal rivalry, most of them disintegrated after only a decade or two.

⁴⁸ Van Wees 2004, pp. 71–77; Burckhardt 1996, pp. 76–153; cf. Hornblower 1983/2002, pp. 192–196; J. E. Lendon 2005, pp. 106–III.

⁴⁹ Dem. 9, 48. ⁵⁰ Cf. the remarks of Hornblower 1983/2002, pp. 184–209.

These changes were accompanied by another development that to date has not received the critical attention it deserves. As noted above, in the fifth century Greek interstate relations were subject to a growing dichotomy. Despite the apparent clarity with which Thucydides presents this, there were certain areas where foreign relations, treaty obligations, and foreign affiliations were not quite so neatly structured. The eve of the Peloponnesian War provides well-known examples. The people of Potidaea on the Isthmus of Pallene regarded themselves as colonists of their *metropolis* Corinth. They had close ties with Corinth, which included the reception of annual magistrates and mutual religious bonds. At the same time, Potidaea was a tribute-paying member of the Athenian Empire. Since both the Athenians and the Corinthians demanded that the Potidaeans comply and act according to their respective obligations, this situation created a set of competing loyalties that eventually paved the way to a severe conflict. Furthermore, while the tripartite relations between Potidaea, Corinth, and Athens connected polities hundreds of kilometers apart, Potidaea was situated in a geographical environment with its own regional history. Several regional powers, among them Perdiccas of Macedon and the Chalcidians, had tried in the past to lay claims on Potidaea and create alliances with its citizen body. Although the Potidaeans were becoming a focal point of macropolitics and were dragged into the growing hostility between Athens and Corinth, their city was also desirable to regional powers. These closely interconnected but antithetical directions made the northern fringes of Greece an extremely complicated terrain of conflicting interests that could easily ignite a war on a system-wide scale.⁵¹

Greece was a notoriously small natural environment. In light of this, regional violence spread quickly from its local origins to the state system in general. Vice versa, ongoing ambitions of superpowers to establish a system-wide hegemony fueled regional conflicts. The permanent collision of near and far relations was omnipresent: in the north, in the west along the coastlines of Acarnania and Epirus, and in the vexed belt of cities and federations in central Greece. In the fourth century this complexity of interstate relations increased yet again. As noted before, the battle of Mantinea in 362 created more disorder than before. Although Xenophon's observation was bleak, the situation was not really better in the three decades before he wrote his opinionated account. Competing alliances and loyalties were the order of the day. Many city-states were crushed between mutually exclusive treaty obligations and forced to juggle their loyalties vis-à-vis military allies, traditional bonds of *metropolis* and *apoikia* and membership of a local federation.

⁵¹ Thuc. 1, 56–65 and Hornblower 1991 *ad loc.* This also applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to affairs on Corcyra.

Regional affairs in Boeotia are again a perfect example. Orchomenus and Thebes shared a common ethnic identity as Boeotians, yet their political rivalry went as far back as the sixth century, when both powers sought to establish a regional hegemony over parts of Boeotia.⁵² The foundation of the Boeotian League in 447 contained their competition for the time being, providing both cities with an equal share in the league's policy. Theban attempts to manipulate the federal constitution led, however, to increasing tensions.⁵³ As disaffection grew, Orchomenus became the natural leader of *poleis* that sought to break away from the federal government. The opportunity presented itself in 395 when Lysander marched into the Cephissus Valley to meet the joint forces of the Corinthian alliance – Thebes, Athens, Corinth, Argos, and others. Orchomenus immediately revolted against Thebes and the Boeotian League, a decision based on regional rivalry and disaffection with the federation.⁵⁴ What might be regarded as a relatively insignificant instance in Greek affairs had major implications for the unfolding of the Corinthian War. In the first three battles of this war, all of them fought in Boeotia and the Corinthia, neither side gained any significant advantage. At Haliartus (in the summer 395) the Thebans inflicted heavy casualties on the Spartan army. Lysander was killed during the campaign. In the following spring the Nemea River witnessed an even greater difficulty to reach a resolution, while the outcome of the battle of Coronea (August 394) is often misunderstood. A Spartan victory, as heralded by Xenophon, was far from what had actually taken place.⁵⁵ Yet Xenophon makes it clear that during these campaigns the Spartans drew heavily on their new allies from “Orchomenus and the other districts in that area.”⁵⁶ According to the league's calculations, this meant the additional support of up to 3,000 hoplites and 300 cavalry. Lysander's decision to rush into Boeotia and provoke battle near Haliartus may very well have

⁵² *SEG* II, 1208 (from c. 540) boasts about an Orchomenian victory over Coronea, which attests claims in western Boeotia. In the eastern section, a prototype of a Boeotian alliance was in place in 519. The Thebans seem to have acted as its leaders: Hdt. 5, 79, 2; 9, 15, 1; see Buck 1979; Beck 1997a, pp. 86–88; Mafodda 2000.

⁵³ While *Hell. Oxy.* 19 (Chambers) testifies four Theban and two Orchomenian federal units around 395, both cities seem to have had an equal share in 447 (i.e. two units each). The Thebans obtained two additional seats for Plataea in the early years of the Peloponnesian War.

⁵⁴ *Xen. Hell.* 3, 5, 6; 5, 1, 29; *Andoc.* 3, 13; 3, 20. Buckler 2003, pp. 145–146.

⁵⁵ The campaigns of Haliartus, Coronea, and Nemea have been covered by Funke 1980, pp. 78–89; Cartledge 1987, pp. 360–361; Buckler 2003, pp. 80–95. See also chapters 2 and 3.

⁵⁶ *Xen. Hell.* 3, 5, 17. The reference to forces from “the other districts” in the area of Orchomenus resembles the description of the Boeotian League according to *Hell. Oxy.* 19 (Chambers), where the district of Orchomenus also includes the village of nearby Hysiae. See also *Hell.* 4, 2, 17 and 4, 3, 15 on the significance of Orchomenian support for Lysander.

been encouraged by the Orchomenians' decision to revolt from Thebes and hence to betray the Corinthian alliance. The Corinthian War would have taken a different turn if Orchomenus had not been disaffected with regional affairs in Boeotia, and if this disaffection had not been embedded in a set of local as well as transregional treaty obligations.

Human agency added yet another dimension to this complexity. It has long been recognized that *stasis* was a driving force in Greek politics. Factionalism and internal strife were often instigated by individualistic interests, most notably the desire to exercise power and prevail over a competing faction.⁵⁷ After the Peloponnesian War, *stasis* was more prominent than ever, as was its impact on interstate affairs. As noted above, the growing prominence of federalism was accompanied by conflicts arising from local rivalry. Integration and fragmentation were simultaneous processes, and there was no league that was immune to this challenge. However, tendencies to break away from a confederacy often disrupted internal *stasis*, with one faction of the citizens deciding to conspire toward secession while their opponents wished to remain in the federation. The obvious alternative for the former was to appeal to the league's enemies and ask for support. Negotiations between Orchomenus and Lysander in 395 were surely accompanied by domestic conflicts, since Xenophon specifies that the Orchomenians were "induced to revolt from Thebes."⁵⁸ As already noted, their decision to betray the Atheno-Boeotian camp was couched in deeply rooted yet conflicting loyalties: ethnic bonds in Boeotia; membership in the regional amphictyony; and active participation in the Boeotian federal state on the one hand; and profound dislike of Theban leadership on the other hand; treaty obligations with Athens and the emerging Corinthian alliance, but also strong support for Lysander's offer to change sides. It is unthinkable that the city-state of the Orchomenians stood solidly united in light of such conflicting issues.

Beyond *stasis*, politics became increasingly personalized. The role model was the just mentioned Lysander who, according to Duris of Samos, was the first Greek ever to establish some sort of a personal cult, as expressed in altars and sacrifices. This is generally seen as an anticipation of honours bestowed later on Philip and his son Alexander.⁵⁹ Lysander was clearly an extravagant general and politician who shaped foreign policy mainly according to his own understanding rather than that of his authorities. The great Theban leaders, Pelopidas and Epaminondas, seem to have

⁵⁷ The standard work of reference is Gehrke 1985. ⁵⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 3, 5, 6.

⁵⁹ Duris *FGrH* 76 F 26 and 71; cf. Plut. *Lys.* 18, 3–4; Paus. 6, 3, 14–15.

embodied similar esteem,⁶⁰ as did more shadowy, but no less stunning, figures such as Jason of Pherae and Lycomedes of Mantinea.⁶¹ While those men were clearly more charismatic and perhaps more extroverted than others, it is worth considering other agents who determined the course of events by imposing their action on the Greek world.

The most eminent examples are the Spartan harmosts Phoebidas and Sphodrias, whom Xenophon credits with (or blames for) individual action that greatly influenced interstate affairs. It will be shown below that it is not credible that Phoebidas' strike against Thebes and the alleged attack on Athens conducted by Sphodrias were completely individual undertakings, unauthorized by the Spartan government. What at a first glance looked like true entrepreneurship seems in fact to have been two commanders carrying out the orders of their authorities, even though both men might have reinterpreted those orders by stretching them beyond their original goal.⁶² The treacherous terrain of rocky Phocis provides another example of the capacity of individuals to shape events. Backed by its alliance with Athens, the Phocian League entered the Sacred War in 355 as a bigger threat than many had anticipated. The Phocians were heavily defeated in the battle at Neon and their charismatic *stratēgos autokratōr* ("commander-in-chief") Philomelus was killed in battle, but this by no means brought an end to the war. Elected by the Phocian primary assembly to succeed Philomelus, Onomarchus ordered the murder of all suspect fellow citizens in an act of sanctioned *stasis*, as it were, fearing their attempt to revolt from the federal government and turn to the Thebans, which would have implied a disintegration of the league. Onomarchus fought successful campaigns in Locris, Boeotia, and Thessaly, until he was defeated and died in the battle of the Crocus Field in 352. From there, accountable Phocian leadership began to deteriorate. Onomarchus' brother Phayllus fought firmly alongside his Athenian and Spartan allies but was defeated in Boeotia, where he died only a year or so after he had gained power. Although young, Onomarchus' son Phalaecus obtained the power of the Phocian League, albeit without authorization. He fought a series of campaigns with dubious success, which is why the Phocian federal assembly deprived him of his powers. Tellingly, Phalaecus did not comply; instead, he continued to consider himself the official representative of the Phocian League. In 347 he actively foiled plans by the federal government to seek peace with the

⁶⁰ The most comprehensive account on both men, their policy as well as the little biographical information available, is Buckler 1980a.

⁶¹ Jason: Sprawski 1999; Mandel 1980. Lycomedes: Beck 1997b. ⁶² See chapters 4 and 5.

Amphictyony, and in the following year he would go so far as to hand over the gates of Thermopylae to Philip of Macedon by negotiating safe passage out of there for himself and his troops. This not only severely undermined Phocian efforts for peace, but it also meant a breach of the lasting Atheno-Phocian alliance that had been the backbone of Phocian politics throughout the Sacred War. Owing to Phalaecus' individual action, the Phocian government lost the means of accountable action and coherent foreign policies. The Phocians' vital interests as a state were eradicated by the action of one man.⁶³

As interstate relations were increasingly exposed to competing obligations, the lack of predictability, coherence, and accountability grew. Two examples will suffice. When the Athenians re-established their naval confederacy in 378/7, the foundation charter stipulated that they would send ambassadors to Thebes "to persuade the Thebans to whatever good things they can." The underlying meaning of this phrase has long been recognized. Couched in diplomatic language, it meant that the Athenians would attempt to make the Thebans comply with the principles of the King's Peace, principles that the foundation charter pays homage to in its opening lines.⁶⁴ The Thebans refused, implying that Athens had entered into an alliance with a state that, from the Athenian point of view, violated – and continued to violate – principles that the Second Athenian League thought to be vital. On a similar note, the Mantinean representatives to the Arcadian federal government sent a memorandum to Megalopolis in 363 lamenting the illegal acquisition of money from Olympia. The federal government, in turn, condemned the Mantinean representatives to death but quickly reversed that penalty and imposed it instead on those who had orchestrated the plundering. This course of action resulted in a severe crisis of the federal government: the newly condemned sought to change from the Spartan to the Theban side. To that end, they concluded a peace with Elis and Olympia (which, according to the federal government, was illegal) and left the league. The result was the battle of Mantinea, with the federal forces joined by the Thebans, and Mantinea joined by Sparta and Athens.⁶⁵ The latter seem to have been eager to accept the Mantinean appeal and

⁶³ See the accounts in Buckler 1989a and McNerney 1999, pp. 205–226.

⁶⁴ *IG* 11² 43 (= Rhodes–Osborne, no. 22 from 378/7), lines 72–74. Cawkwell 1973, pp. 48–49; cf. Buckler 1971b; Cargill 1981, pp. 53–60. The Athenians tried to persuade the Thebans to accept membership of the league as "Thebans" rather than "Boeotians." While the Boeotian League had been dissolved on the grounds of the King's Peace, it was in the process of being relaunched in 378; see chapter 6 below.

⁶⁵ Beck 1997a, pp. 77–79; Buckler 2003, pp. 343–349.

enter the regional Arcadian conflict since it would enable them to jeopardize the continued attempts of the Thebans to gain the hegemony in Greece.

Under such conditions, interstate relations were even more susceptible to conflict and crisis. There was no authoritative mechanism to establish order. Nor was there a widely accepted institution with the necessary resources to achieve this. It is striking that the only institution capable of bringing civil strife to an end, the Amphictyony of Delphi, did not gain sufficient recognition from its members to impose its will; indeed, it even fueled the existing turmoil. Its implication in the event that led to the outbreak of the Sacred War will be discussed below.⁶⁶ For the moment, it is worth noting a structural parallel to the issues discussed in this section: what originated as a purely local affair quickly grew into a conflict on a Hellenic scale and, after a decade of warfare, ended in the triumph of a new power in Greek affairs.

HOW (AND WHY) CATTLE LEAD TO SYSTEM-WIDE WARS

The [previous section](#) traced the transformation of the economic and military stratum and the growing complexity of interstate affairs. In this section it will be argued that the city-state, based on the traditional ideal of a hoplite citizenry and a vivid ideology of self-governance, did not respond to the demands of this changing environment. This view will be derived from the observation that the motives for interstate action were similar in the fourth century to those of the previous era. Warfare continued to be instigated by border disputes and competition for pastureland and agricultural resources. Internal strife was another factor in the initiation of warfare, as was, at times, the aim to exercise power over neighbouring villages and gain control over their resources. With relatively few obstacles to warfare, city-states readily engaged in military conflicts. Even petty disputes often led to raids and seizures. Predictably, once war broke out, more grievances were generated, giving rise to a deadly ethos of revenge that required the disadvantaged *polis* to retaliate more forcefully. Retaliation sometimes entailed effecting an alliance with a more resourceful power.⁶⁷

⁶⁶ Chapters 15 and 16.

⁶⁷ A structural analysis on this aspect is needed. Amit 1973 presents three case studies but is mainly concerned with narrative expositions of political history rather than an in-depth analysis of interstate behaviour.

Local warfare was hence a political process with its own dynamics.⁶⁸ Regardless of what instigated a conflict (competition over a few acres of land, small-scale raids on cattle, or more political motives such as the unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of one's neighbour), local warfare occasioned great potential to expand local boundaries and to escalate into transregional conflicts. As the reasons for *polis*-wars fell along a whole spectrum of possibilities that were mostly local in nature, the ramifications of local warfare cannot easily be discerned from its implications on a macro level. The outlined spiral of grievances and revenge, as well as the willingness of the leading states to respond to the appeals of debilitated parties in order to expand their *hēgemonia*, created a dangerous coexistence and interconnection between local rivalries and great warfare.

The outbreak of the Corinthian War again provides a perfect example. Regardless of how justified the grievances between the Phocians and Locrians were (and, ironically, no matter whether the Locrians involved were eastern or western),⁶⁹ the true significance of this border dispute lay not in cattle, but rather in its potential to initiate a war on a system-wide scale. Xenophon's narrative of events, no matter how trustworthy, explicitly addresses the intricacy of interstate affairs and the far-reaching implications of local warfare (*Hell.* 3, 5, 3–5). The passage is so remarkable that it deserves quotation in full:

In Thebes the leading men were aware that the Lacedaemonians would not break their treaties with their allies unless someone began war first. They therefore induced the Opuntian Locrians to levy money from the territory which was in dispute between the Phocians and themselves, for they thought that if this was done the Phocians would invade Locris. And they were not disappointed, for the Phocians did at once invade Locris and seize property worth much more than what the Locrians had taken. Androcleidas and his party now persuaded the Thebans to come to the help of the Locrians on the grounds that the Phocians had invaded not a piece of disputed territory but Locris itself, which was admitted to be a friendly and allied state. And when the Thebans made a counter-invasion into Phocis and laid waste the land, the Phocians straightway sent ambassadors to the Spartans and asked them to aid them, setting forth that they had not begun war, but had gone against the Locrians in self-defence. The Spartans were glad to seize a pretext for undertaking a campaign against the Thebans.

⁶⁸ See on this Ma 2000, pp. 349–353, who offers striking insights into the coexistence of large-scale warfare and local conflict in Hellenistic Asia Minor.

⁶⁹ See chapter 2.

In analytical terms, the Thebans knew that the Spartans would not accept a diminishment of their sphere of interest, so it was relatively easy to stage a conflict that involved Sparta. Given the small topographical differences in the borderlands between Phocis and Locris, lands for pasture were always disputed. If one party raided such lands or levied money from them, the other would resort to arbitration or, more commonly, exact revenge by counter-raiding. From the Theban perspective, all that was needed to break the peace was a Phocian appeal to their Peloponnesian allies, couched in a pseudo-legalistic argument that the Phocians were merely acting in self-defence. While the Locrians served as “useful idiots” in this plot, the Spartans were by no means fooled. Whether the Spartans were aware of the Thebans’ underlying intentions or not, in their matrix of determining foreign policy the Phocian appeal provided a welcome opportunity to defend, and expand, their *hēgemonia*. The central focus of Xenophon’s account is not the discord over cattle pastures,⁷⁰ nor that the Thebans had induced the Locrians to levy money from a disputed territory, nor that the Spartans eagerly responded to their strategic maneuver. Instead, Xenophon emphasizes an intricate state where a crisis as marginal as the levy of some disputed pastures could actually degenerate into a conflict on a system-wide scale.

Under such circumstances, efforts to maintain an environment based on a multiplicity of autonomous governments were futile, mostly for two reasons. First, the multiplicity of independent city-states and tribes (some of which included cities) implied an increased risk of local disputes. Embedded in a dense network of interstate relations, those disputes were directly linked to regional affairs and to the macro level of Greek politics. Consequently, any given conflict had the potential to trigger a war on a system-wide scale. This, in time, put the survival of the interstate system as a whole at risk. Second, a multipolar state environment enabled, and actually legalized, the expansionist aims of powerful city-states such as Athens, Sparta, or Thebes in their struggle for hegemony. The Common Peace treaty of 386 promoted an arrangement that fueled the uncontrolled competition among states in their attempts to maximize power. Its proclamation of autonomy as an ideal condition of the Greek state was a valuable tool of power politics. It encouraged those states to conduct their foreign policy under the pretense of implementing the terms of the peace. Encroachments upon autonomous cities were often presented as justified action: the examples of Mantinea, Olynthus and Thebes suffice to

⁷⁰ Or, in this instance, sheep: *Hell. Oxy.* 21, 3 (Chambers).

illustrate how Spartan interventions in autonomous cities were validated with recourse to the King's Peace. By 378 the Foundation Charter of the Second Athenian League reveals harsh competition over the sovereignty of interpretation of the *koinē eirēnē* – and over the question as to who was (and who was not) to be regarded as the true protector of autonomy.⁷¹ Ironically, none of the pretenders' interstate behaviour was guided by an implementation of autonomy, but rather by a self-serving drive to maximize power.

The crisis of the Greek interstate system thus came about because multiplicity, which was promoted as an ideal state of affairs, was not sustainable and the demand for it was actually counterproductive to interstate stability. In terms of resources, no single state was able to establish itself as *hēgemōn*, wielding the power and authority to effect order. Furthermore, no system of interstate alliances was secured, nor was there an unwavering balance between competing alliances. The result was a permanent state of indecisiveness. City-states continued to seek a maximum share in power and to exert influence on their neighbours in order to communicate their pursuits, while the dynamics between local and regional warfare only served to accelerate this. In the course of this process, Greece slipped into what political scientists call a power-transition crisis. This means a configuration in which a state-system is caught in a deadlock of development. Despite the impact of a changing political and military environment, polities find themselves unable to modify their cultures of determining and shaping foreign affairs. Since resources are allocated in a stalemate and provide none of the powers with enough force to dominate the system, the crisis is perpetuated. Power-transition crises are not only highly prone to conflict but also oftentimes accompanied by great violence. This is true for the way they unfold and are fought over, as well as for the way in which they are resolved. Such a crisis is usually brought to an end by the emergence, or establishment, of a new power that induces a violent transformation of the interstate system.⁷²

Political scientists often cite the Peloponnesian War as a classic example of a power-transition crisis, with Sparta as the declining state whose action was determined by the goal of regaining hegemony.⁷³ Attractive as this view may be, it tends to be too focused on the fifth century, underscoring the

⁷¹ Note *IG* 11² 43 (= Rhodes–Osborne, no. 22), lines 8–14, which turns the table against Spartan pleas for freedom and autonomy: "So that the Spartans shall allow the Greeks to be free and autonomous, and to live at peace occupying their own territory in security . . . be it decreed by the people."

⁷² Gilpin 1981; Kugler and Lemke 1996; cf. Lemke 2004, pp. 55–58 on power transition theory in a post-cold war environment.

⁷³ E.g. Gilpin 1981, p. 191; see also Eckstein 2003, pp. 758–759, who provides further examples.

historical development of the Greek state system in the Classical period. It might be argued that Greek affairs on the eve of the Peloponnesian War were not in a crisis of power transition simply because no transition took place. The Peloponnesian War did shake the Greek world, but it neither altered the political landscape of Greece nor changed the interstate behaviour of states. If anything, the Greek world was subject to a power-transition crisis *after* the Peloponnesian War. Sparta's temporary hegemony did not replace the bipolar structure of the fifth century, and, as noted earlier, no other attempt would be suited to achieve this. A solution to the power crisis finally came, but it did not come from within the system.

Philip of Macedon represented a power with unique qualities. His military forces and economic resources differed significantly from those of the city-states, and so did the patterns of foreign-policy making in Macedon.⁷⁴ Philip's predecessors were notorious for their ongoing efforts to present themselves as members of the Hellenic *koinē*. Claims to hellenicity were raised already by Alexander I, who in a famous episode entered the Olympic Games (probably in 476), where only Greeks were allowed to compete. Philip shared this goal of seeking acceptance from his southern neighbours, yet in power-relation terms his outlined qualities made him a distinct outsider to the Greek state system. More significantly, this position as an outsider, with a different background in political culture and patterns of interstate behaviour, made him immune to the crises notorious for Greece's conflict-prone environment. *Stasis* had no impact on Macedonian foreign policies, the closest experience probably being the machinations of pretenders to the throne from within the royal family or noble clansmen. As a large territorial kingdom Macedon was not exposed to the network of conflicting alliances, bonds, and treaty obligations characteristic of the Hellenic city-states. Also, within its genuine sphere of interest, Macedon soon prevailed over potential rival states that had competed with it for hegemony in the northern hemisphere.

Philip represented a power that comprised the necessary criteria to bring about a fundamental change in the Greek state system. His political background was distinctively different from that of the Greeks and his position was unaffected by the endemic evils of *polis*-affairs; but, at the same time, he did whatever he could to seek affiliation and gain Hellenic recognition.

⁷⁴ An anecdote will suffice to illustrate the different political cultures and patterns of policy making: when confronted with the Athenians' potential to recruit ten excellent military commanders per year in a democratic process, Philip praised their good fortune and replied that he had found only one outstanding commander throughout his life: Parmenion (Plut. *Mor.* 177c).

The latter may well provide an explanation of why Philip drew so strongly on the structural features of the very interstate system that he attempted to overthrow. The League of Corinth, inaugurated during the winter of 338/7 to combine Greek military forces under the king's rule, was deliberately modeled along federal principles.⁷⁵ Also, its design paid a meaningful homage to the Common Peace treaties of the previous generation, which subtly implied that the league stood in a lasting tradition of Greek interstate arrangements.⁷⁶ This, as well as the promotion of a Hellenic dream such as war against the Persian Empire, ultimately helped to accommodate the Greeks to the view that their traditional state environment was still in place, even though it no longer was.

The articles in this volume focus on a relatively small and tightly structured region, the vexed world of Boeotia and its neighbouring territories in central Greece. This area is in many ways paradigmatic for the outlined development of Greek interstate relations after the Peloponnesian War. Central Greece possessed rich natural resources, but it also comprised a high density of polities (city-states, leagues, tribal federations) that competed for those resources.⁷⁷ Despite the treacherous, often impenetrable physical environment, the region is by no means isolated. On the contrary, it fulfilled a central function. Its natural lines of communication connected both the Peloponnese and Attica to the Hellenic mainland.⁷⁸ In addition, the impact of Delphi, its fantastic imaginary of the world's *omphalos*, the authority of its oracle, and its captivating games underlined the importance of central Greece. Throughout the fourth century the Delphic Amphictyony played an ever-growing role in Greek affairs which, in turn, highlighted the strategic importance of the Mt. Parnassus region. When Philip became a member at the end of the Sacred War, he had literally arrived in Greece. Finally, the policy of Thebes and the Boeotian League put the region in the centre of attention. Theban attempts to challenge Spartan and Athenian claims and to establish hegemony over the Greek mainland

⁷⁵ *IG* 11²236 (= Rhodes–Osborne, no. 76, from 338/7). The numerals indicated in lines *b*, 1–12, are usually considered to refer to the number of units assigned to a member state, and probably also its representation in the council as well as its military obligation in proportion (contra Jehne 1994, pp. 187–192, who sees their purpose as purely military). In this regard, the League was organized along the lines of the Boeotian Confederacy.

⁷⁶ See chapter 18.

⁷⁷ See McNerney 1999, whose vivid description of Phocis (pp. 40–119) is in many ways typical of central Greece.

⁷⁸ For lines of communications and roads in Boeotia see Buckler 1980a, pp. 4–14.

developed their own dynamism that altered interstate relations everywhere from central Greece to the periphery of the Hellenic world.⁷⁹

The following studies provide detailed and at times microscopic investigations into Greek military and political history as well as topographical analyses of the physical setting of politics, without which Greek politics can never be fully understood. At the same time, they disclose the underlying assumptions of politics and its operating norms. In this sense, they reflect the key patterns of Greek interstate behaviour and underline priorities, and limits, in shaping the foreign affairs of the Classical *polis*. The first section of articles, entitled “Alliance,” illustrates efforts to alter the dissatisfactory outcome of the Peloponnesian War by creating multilateral alliances and shifting obligations (chapters 1–2); it also exemplifies the interrelation of local affairs and events of system-wide importance (chapters 3–5). The second set, “Hegemony,” sheds light on Theban microimperialism in Boeotia. It highlights the ambitions of a Greek city-state to maximize its resources and establish itself as a leading power. While chapter 10 illustrates the political discourse on this attempt, chapter 13 assembles recently discovered epigraphical evidence that demonstrates how Theban ambitions actually translated into an Aegean foreign policy. Finally, the “Domination”-sequence traces Philip’s relations with central Greece and the rise of Macedon. Chapters 14 and 15 illustrate a deadlock between regional affairs and macropolitics as well as the inability of Greek states to solve the crisis resulting from this. The solution came from outside: the final chapters show how the power-transition crisis of the Greek states in the fourth century steered inexorably toward a climax, until it was solved by Philip and his designs for a new Greek world.

⁷⁹ Note especially chapter 13.

PART I

Alliance

*A survey of Theban and Athenian relations
between 403–371 BC*

The end of the Peloponnesian War saw the beginning of animosity between Thebes and Sparta, as so often happens between victorious allies after a bitter war. The first incident occurred after an acrimonious disagreement over the treatment of the defeated.¹ The Thebans, joined by the Corinthians and many other Greeks, demanded the destruction of Athens, which the Spartans refused because of past Athenian services in the defense of Greece. The Thebans further angered the Spartans when they, alone of the allies, demanded a tithe of the spoils of war.² The quarrel between the Thebans and Spartans held unexpected results for the Athenians, for the Thebans totally reversed their hostile policy towards Athens. They began by giving refuge to Thrasybulus and his followers after their exile by the Thirty Tyrants.³ When Thrasybulus seized the Piraeus, the Spartans ordered a campaign to dislodge him, but both the Thebans and Corinthians refused to participate (Xen. *Hell.* 2, 4, 30; 3, 5, 5). This sudden change of policy was based only on mutual hostility toward Sparta, apart from which Thebes, Corinth, and Athens shared no other joint interests. The Thebans strove to maintain their political hegemony in Boeotia, the Corinthians to win greater independence from Spartan leadership of the Peloponnesian League, and the Athenians to restore their maritime power. For the moment, however, these aspirations were hardly discordant, for success in each area would curtail the power of Sparta, the common goal.

In 395 the Persians provided the Thebans, Corinthians, Argives, the traditional enemies of Sparta, and Athenians with the possibility of realizing their individual and common ambitions. The satrap Tithraustes sent Timocrates of Rhodes to them with large sums of money in order to

¹ Xen. *Hell.* 2, 2, 19–20; Plut. *Lys.* 15, 3–4; Funke 1980, pp. 1–26.

² Xen. *Hell.* 3, 5, 5; *Hell. Oxy.* 20, 4 (Chambers); Dem. 24, 128; Plut. *Lys.* 27, 4; Justin 5, 10, 12–13; Parke 1933, pp. 42–43; Bommelaer 1981, p. 152.

³ Xen. *Hell.* 2, 3, 42; Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 37, 1; Diod. Sic. 14, 6, 32; Plut. *Lys.* 27, 5–8; Meyer 1902/1975, pp. 32–40; Lotze 1964, pp. 62–71; Lewis in *CAH* VI², p. 36.

finance a war with Sparta.⁴ The coalition proved a natural one. The course of the ensuing Corinthian War is mercifully beyond the realm of this discussion, but Athens duly sent military aid to the Thebans when they defeated the Spartans at Haliartus in 395 (Xen. *Hell.* 3, 4, 7–22). Although the Athenians arrived too late to influence the course of action, owing to a quick Theban victory, their response nonetheless proves that they had actually and in good faith marched to the aid of their Theban allies. They likewise stood with them at the battle of the Nemea River (Xen. *Hell.* 4, 1, 13; 4, 1, 23), and at the battle of Coronea in 394 (Xen. *Hell.* 4, 3, 16–23). These actions are irrefragable evidence of the firmness of the alliance between Thebes and Athens. It is also pertinent that Conon, the veteran Athenian commander then in Persian pay, used his fleet to win the islanders and some other Greeks in Asia to the Athenian side. He also took the opportunity to employ it to rebuild the walls of Athens. The Athenians also enjoyed the help of Boeotian volunteers in the effort.⁵ All went well with the allies until Artaxerxes changed his policy and threw his support to Sparta. His reasons were largely fear of nascent Athenian power in the Aegean and to a lesser extent the increase in Theban might. The result was the King's Peace of 386, which dissolved the Boeotian Confederacy and stripped Athens of its fleet and Aegean political connections.⁶ Once again, Sparta had thwarted Theban and Athenian ambitions; but, as in the case of Lysander earlier, only with Persian support.

Under the leadership of Agesilaus, Sparta proved the greatest enemy of the King's Peace, despite being its acknowledged guarantor. Xenophon (*Hell.* 5, 2, 15) states that in 382 ambassadors from Acanthus and Apollonia arrived in Sparta requesting help against Olynthus. Already strong and expanding its strength, Olynthus had opened diplomatic relations with Thebes and Athens (Xen. *Hell.* 2, 3, 15–16). The ambassadors also asked for help with all possible speed (Xen. *Hell.* 5, 2, 23). The Spartans accordingly sent a vanguard of 2,000 troops and authorized Phoebeidas to lead the main force against Olynthus.⁷ These were, according to Xenophon, the official

⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 3, 5, 1–2; *Hell. Oxy.* 10; Diod. Sic. 14, 81, 6–14, 82, 1; Paus. 3, 5, 8; Polyae. 1, 48, 3; Bruce 1967, pp. 97–102; Urban 1991, pp. 44–48. Although Xenophon claims that Athens did not accept Persian money, his statement is nothing more than pious hypocrisy. Other sources, none of them Athenian, agree that the Athenians were bought along with the others. Nor had they earlier objected to Persian financing of a fleet commanded by Alcibiades, a clear analogy to Conon's position during the Corinthian War. For Alcibiades, see Ferguson in *CAH* v, pp. 321–323; Tomlinson 1972, pp. 126–141; Ellis 1989, *passim*.

⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 4, 8, 9–12; Tod, no. 135.

⁶ *SdA* 11, no. 242; Jehne 1994; Urban 1991, pp. 117–123; Badian 1991; Orsi 1974; Bakhuizen 1994.

⁷ For further details, see chapter 4.

Spartan orders to Phoebidas: to reinforce the vanguard with all speed. Yet, according to Xenophon and many modern scholars, Phoebidas took it upon himself to disobey the authorities to make an unnecessary detour from the foot of Mt. Cithaeron to Thebes. He then took the opportunity to camp outside the city and intrigue with the pro-Spartan faction to overthrow the legitimate government of the city. Diodorus (15, 20, 2) and Plutarch (*Ages.* 24, 1–2) aver that Phoebidas acted under the advice of Agesilaus. No one has convincingly explained why a field commander who was ordered to come to the immediate relief of a distant and endangered vanguard took it upon himself to disobey orders. Disobedience to ostensibly official instructions can be proven by topography and a re-examination of Xenophon's testimony.

An easy, open, and direct road led from Mt. Cithaeron past Plataea to the foothills of Mt. Helicon.⁸ Moreover, few Spartan officers had the audacity or the independence of thought to disobey official orders.⁹ That leads to the conclusion that Phoebidas followed Agesilaus' admonition in the confidence that the king would shield him for his actions. In the event, the stroke against Thebes proved successful, and Phoebidas arrived in the north in time to support the vanguard. Xenophon's reticence about the affair is in all probability the result either of his desire to shield Agesilaus from the scandal or less likely from his ignorance of the king's participation in a deed that was decried throughout Greece (*Xen. Hell.* 5, 2, 32; 4, 1). At any rate, Xenophon was loath to disapprove of the man who was instrumental in having given him his estate at Scillus.¹⁰

As a result of Phoebidas' coup, 300 Theban exiles fled to Athens, where they received refuge. In effect, the Athenians repaid these Thebans for the aid that their countrymen had earlier given Thrasybulus and his followers.¹¹ The Athenian response was at the same time a symbolic act of defiance of Sparta. No one in Greece could doubt where Thebano-Athenian sympathies lay.

⁸ For the route, Buckler 1980a, pp. 11–12 (personal observations of 30 January 1971). Tuplin 1993, p. 99 n. 35, has perhaps not viewed the terrain from the crest of Cithaeron, from which it is obvious that the main road northwards bypassed Thebes. His suggestion that Phoebidas may have made his detour to Thebes in order to procure provisions overlooks the fact that he could more easily receive such aid from Plataea and Thespieae, both Spartan friends and both situated along the main road northwards.

⁹ De Ste Croix 1972, pp. 135–136; see also Cartledge 1987, p. 156.

¹⁰ *Xen. Anab.* 5, 3, 7–13; Manfredi 1980, pp. 225–226; Manfredi 1986, pp. 231, 258; Lendle 1995, pp. 315–318; Paus. 5, 6, 4; Hitzig and Blümner 1886–1910, vol. 11.1, pp. 301–302; Frazer 1898, vol. 111, pp. 481–482; Strabo 8, 3, 14; Steph. Byz. s.v. Scillus; and in general Geyer, *RE* 11 3.1 (1927), col. 526, s.v. Skillus.

¹¹ Buckler 1980a, p. 281 n. 3.

In December 379 a small event led to great consequences. In the waning days of the year a band of Theban exiles set out from Athens to topple the Theban puppet government installed by the Spartans. They received material support from two Athenian generals stationed at the border of Attica.¹² The plot succeeded with surprising ease, but the Spartan response was swift. King Cleombrotus immediately led an expeditionary force to Thebes, but his march was hindered by Chabrias and a band of Athenian peltasts, who guarded the road through Eleutherae.¹³ The Athenians obviously had every right to protect passage through their own territory, but at the same time Chabrias' assignment indicated Athenian support of the Theban uprising. Only after Cleombrotus had established Sphodrias as harmost in Thespieae did the Athenians take alarm (Xen. *Hell.* 5, 4, 15). They put the two generals who had aided the Theban exiles on trial, putting one of them to death and exiling the other (Xen. *Hell.* 5, 4, 19).

Cleombrotus' actions in his campaign, although incapable of reducing Thebes, nonetheless succeeded in isolating it from Athens. So things stood until the spring of 378, when Sphodrias made his hapless attempt to seize the Piraeus.¹⁴ Sphodrias led his troops over Mt. Cithaeron in a vain attempt to capture the port, the walls of which lacked gates to their portals. Despite the length of darkness at that time of year, the road between Thespieae and Piraeus was either snow-covered or muddy, and the length of the march too long under the circumstances to ensure success.¹⁵ Dawn caught the Spartans at Thria, far distant from Athens. Instead of concocting some lame excuse for his uninvited presence in Attica, he began to plunder the countryside before retiring. Travelers had already alerted the Athenians to their danger, so that Sphodrias would have met with overwhelming resistance, had he advanced further.¹⁶

This episode may never be properly understood on the basis of the existing evidence.¹⁷ If the raid were an official act of state, the Spartans had absolutely no reason to acknowledge it as such. It was a blatant breach of the King's Peace, and any knowledge of it was best denied. Nor are Sphodrias' motives entirely clear. The possibilities are several. Sphodrias could have been loyally following orders, which conforms with the testimony of Diodorus, who asserts that Cleombrotus ordered the attack. Or he

¹² Xen. *Hell.* 5, 4, 9–12; Diod. Sic. 15, 25, 1–15, 27, 2; Plut. *Pel.* 6–13; *Mor.* 594e; Nep. *Pel.* 2–4; Polyaeus. 2, 3, 1.

¹³ Xen. *Hell.* 5, 4, 14; Munn 1993, pp. 136–137. ¹⁴ A fuller account can be found in chapter 5.

¹⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 5, 4, 20–24; Diod. Sic. 15, 29, 5–7; Plut. *Pel.* 14, 1; *Ages.* 24, 4; MacDonald 1972, pp. 38–44; Seager in *CAH* vi², pp. 166–167; Buckler 1980a, p. 17, and personal observations of 30 January 1971.

¹⁶ Buckler 1980a, p. 181. ¹⁷ See n. 15 above.

could have genuinely, but stupidly and mistakenly, thought that he could reach the Piraeus in time to effect the surprise. Historians should never rule out the stupid and the irrational in human conduct, and incompetence was the very conclusion that Callisthenes drew from Sphodrias' conduct (*FGrH* 125 F 9). Xenophon (*Hell.* 5, 4, 20) and Plutarch (*Pel.* 14, 3–4) claim that the Thebans persuaded Sphodrias to provoke a war with Athens. That claim has long been disputed, but a possible explanation lends it some plausibility. The ancient Greeks generally enjoyed a rich sense of larceny. There was no better way to pursue Theban goals than by bribing Sphodrias to do what he had already been ordered to do. The Thebans knew the distances involved and knew as well that he could never reach Athens in time. By abetting Sphodrias' folly, they could hope to forge a new alliance with Athens, with Sparta as the common enemy. The possibility of Theban implication certainly cannot be denied, and Plutarch provides details not found in Xenophon.¹⁸

The most substantial argument against all of these interpretations is that no one could have predicted the Athenian response to the raid. Spartan ambassadors then in Athens denied any knowledge of the surprise attack, and their sincerity was such that the Athenians released them from custody (*Xen. Hell.* 5, 4, 22). The Athenian response was mild considering the provocation. The Athenians asserted that Sphodrias' punishment would of itself satisfy them and thus end the crisis. That would be proof enough that he had acted alone and without the permission of Spartan officials. Instead, Agesilaus successfully, if misguidedly, defended Sphodrias, and thus turned the raid into a *casus belli*.¹⁹

The affront and the threat galvanized the Athenians into further action, especially in the pursuit of a policy begun in 384. At that time the Athenians and the Chians made a bilateral defensive alliance, in which both parties stressed that their actions were in accordance with the King's Peace and all other existing treaties (*IG* 11² 34–35). The Athenians made similar treaties with Mytilene and Byzantium, and after Sphodrias' raid extended them to Thebes, Methymna, and Rhodes.²⁰ In each case, these alliances were defensive in nature, all members being equal in status, and no *hēgemōn*

¹⁸ Kallet-Marx 1985, p. 150, rejected by Munn 1993, p. 146 n. 24, with earlier bibliography. Munn returned to this incident in Tritle 1997, p. 78, without, however, discussing the problem of motivation.

¹⁹ *IG* 11² 43, lines 9–12; Cargill 1981, pp. 57–59; Cartledge 1987, pp. 136–138.

²⁰ *IG* 11² 40; 41; 42; 43; 44; Cargill 1981, p. 32; Kallet-Marx 1985, pp. 127–151. Precedence of Chios, Mytilene, and Byzantium to Thebes is proven by *IG* 11² 40, lines 1–13; 41, lines 4–6. Equal terms of the original allies later extended to others: *IG* 11² 43, lines 23–25. The very blossoming of this network of alliances may very well have been the factor that provoked Sphodrias' raid.

legally acknowledged. In 377 this core of allies expanded its ranks to form the Athenian League.²¹ The original members were islanders, which meant that Thebes was an anomaly among them (*IG* 11² 43, lines 78–90). Thebes was a land power too strong to be dominated by Athens and without either maritime ambitions or significant naval resources. These factors, plus Theban hostility to Sparta, made it a welcome ally, especially so long as Sparta was ascendant on the mainland. The aims of the Athenians become immediately obvious. They were once again aggressively pursuing their policy of reaffirming their political position in the Aegean.

In the spring of 377 the Spartans responded to these novel conditions by sending Agesilaus to attack Thebes. The Thebano-Athenian response was twofold. The Thebans and Athenians defended Boeotia from invasion, while the Athenians pushed forward at great speed the expansion of their naval league. With the lack of the imagination of Archidamus in the early years of the Peloponnesian War, Agesilaus stumbled around the countryside without accomplishing anything of note.²² The campaigning season of 376 saw a repetition of these desultory operations. The successful defense of Thebes not only protected Boeotia but also isolated the pro-Spartan cities of Plataea, Thespieae, and Orchomenus. It also allowed the Thebans to restore the Boeotian Confederacy, albeit in truncated form.²³ Meanwhile, Athens extended its influence beyond the Aegean into the Adriatic Sea.²⁴ The combined effect was the re-establishment of Athenian authority in both the Aegean and Adriatic Seas and, together with Thebes, security in the central Greek mainland.

The combined successes of Thebes and Athens led the Athenians in 375 to send envoys to Sparta to seek a renewal of the King's Peace.²⁵ The reasons were several. Both Thebes and Athens had largely succeeded in realizing their goals. The two allies had diminished the threat of Sparta, but did not wish to endanger their achievements by arousing the animosity of Persia. The King would be pleased by knowing that his decree was at least being formally respected, even though political reality in 375 was far from that of 386. For the King the important factor was that he lost nothing in the renewal of the Peace. An important aspect of this peace treaty was that

²¹ *IG* 11² 43; Cargill 1981. ²² Buckler 1972; Munn 1993.

²³ Xen. *Hell.* 6, 1, 1; Diod. Sic. 15, 33, 4–15, 34, 2; 15, 37, 1–2; Buckler 1971a; Buck 1994, pp. 95–103; and for a broad view, see González 1986, pp. 393–396.

²⁴ *IG* 11² 96 and 97; Cargill 1981, 68–74, 99–105.

²⁵ *SdA* 11, no. 270; Jehne 1994, pp. 57–64; Buckler 1994, p. 120. It has been suggested that the King was involved in this treaty. Certainty is impossible, but it can at least be said that with a balance of power in Greece coming into effect, the King would presumably welcome a peace in the hope of curtailing growth of Athenian power.

Theban participation was accepted without question, even though it had begun to rebuild the Boeotian Confederacy. All evidence indicates that Thebes signed the treaty in its own name. As a free ally of Athens and its other allies, Thebes retained its autonomy and freedom and thus could sign in its own right. The question of Plataea, Thespieae, and Orchomenus was a moot point, one that those seeking peace chose to ignore. The three cities were still free from Theban domination, and the clauses of the treaties of 386 and 375 protected their autonomy. No one raised the question of the status of the other Boeotian cities.

The Peace of 375 was short-lived, for the Spartans immediately declared that the operations of Timotheus in the Adriatic were a breach of the treaty.²⁶ Difficulties between Thebes and Athens also occurred in 374 over the status of Oropus. The problem remains far from clear and perhaps ultimately intractable on the basis of the present evidence. The dispute was also an old one. Thebes and Athens had long laid claim to the city and its region, although geographically both were part of Boeotia. In 412 the Boeotians had captured the city with the help of the Eretrians and some Oropians.²⁷ The Eretrians, however, retained control of the city. In 402, owing to *stasis*, a group of Oropians asked Thebes to solve the points at issue (Diod. Sic. 14, 17, 3), after which the Thebans gave them Boeotian citizenship. The problem reaches its most bewildering point at this time. Sometime between 402 and 374 Oropus reverted to Athenian hands. No one knows precisely when and how this change took place.²⁸ The most likely time for the event was the King's Peace of 386, when Oropus should have become autonomous, just as Plataea, Thespieae, Orchomenus, and, for that matter, all other Greek states had done, except for those in the Persian Empire. Having used that peace to dismantle the Boeotian Confederacy, Sparta possessed an excellent opportunity further to use it either to allow Oropus its autonomy or to permit it to rejoin the Athenians. Thebes was then in no position to object, and Athenian possession of the area could well act as a divisive element in their future relations.

Some scholars suggest that the correct time for the Athenian re-occupation of Oropus came in 378/7, when many Euboean cities joined the Second Athenian Confederacy (*IG* II² 43, lines 80–81, 83). Yet the name of Oropus never appears on the stele, which indicates that it was already an Athenian

²⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 6, 2, 2–39; Jehne 1994, pp. 57–64; Munn 1993, pp. 239–240; Ryder 1965, pp. 124–126, provides an older, but nonetheless still valuable, discussion of the peace.

²⁷ Thuc. 8, 60, 1–2; cf. Diod. Sic. 13, 34, 3; 36, 4; Steph. Byz. *s.v.* Oropos.

²⁸ Isoc. 14, 8; 14, 20; 14, 37; cf. Xen. *Hell.* 6, 1, 1; 6, 1, 21; Judeich 1927, p. 181, and for the best bibliographical account of the controversy, see Knoepfler 1986, p. 91 n. 97.

possession. It clearly was not autonomous, as were Chalcis and Eretria. The history of the period presents other and possibly more serious problems. Those who argue that the Athenians regained Oropus at the same time that they established their maritime confederacy have not explained why the Thebans should submit to the loss of Oropus to the state with which they were becoming allied. If that were true, Athens would have done nothing different to them in 377 than had Sparta in 386. Another difficulty with the view is that it lacks a plausible explanation for an Athenian decision to alienate a new ally, when the Spartans were at the time still a great and direct threat to Athens itself. It was one thing to support a new ally, but quite another thing to rob it of some of its territory in the time of its peril. In such a case, the Thebans would have had very little reason to trust Athenian intentions or commitments. The problems involved would have created such tension between Athens and Thebes that a united front against Sparta would have perhaps been impossible. If, however, Athens had obtained Oropus at or after the King's Peace, one can readily understand the Theban recognition of political realities, all the more so since *IG* II² 43, lines 7–25 proclaim that the new alliance was made in accordance with the King's Peace.

That much said, it is nonetheless true that by 374 the Thebans wanted the return of Oropus from Athens. The issue was clearly a source of strain between the two allies, one that was settled only after the dissolution of the alliance in 369. In 366 the Thebans seized it by force of arms.²⁹ The instructive aspect of this and the later episodes of Theban treatment of Plataea and Thespieae is clear proof of heightened tensions between Thebes and Athens.

Relations between the two states rapidly deteriorated. In 373 the Thebans reduced Plataea and expelled the population, who took refuge in Athens.³⁰ The Thebans destroyed the city, with the exception of the sanctuaries. Theban aggression was clearly a violation of the peace treaty, for the Plataeans had done nothing to provoke their neighbours. The episode distinctly soured relations between the two powers. They were not improved when the Thebans attacked and overwhelmed Thespieae in the same year.³¹ This action too was an obvious and unwarranted violation of the Peace of 375. Yet the Athenians should not really have been surprised

²⁹ Buckler 1980a, pp. 193–195; Cargill 1981, p. 166; Knoepfler 1986, pp. 91–93.

³⁰ Buckler 1980a, p. 282 nn. 15 and 17, with earlier bibliography.

³¹ Xen. *Hell.* 6, 3, 1; 6, 3, 5; 6, 4, 10; Isoc. 6, 27; Diod. Sic. 15, 46, 6; Buckler 1977a; Tuplin 1986b; Buck 1994, pp. 104–105.

by these events, which were traditional elements of Theban policy. The Thebans better than others realized that if Boeotia were not to be the “dancing-floor of war,” in the alleged words of Epaminondas, a strong and united federation of *poleis* was necessary.³²

The Thebans also invaded Phocis, a traditional Athenian ally, but this too was nothing new.³³ The Thebans had done the same thing in 375 without Athenian protest. The real reason for the rising Athenian antipathy to Thebes was jealousy of the growth of Theban power in central Greece. Now that the Athenians had re-established their maritime ascendancy and had won Spartan acceptance of its legitimacy, they had no desire to see a strong and independent Thebes on their border. In short, Athens had begun to fear Thebes more than Sparta. Although relations between Thebes and Athens had definitely cooled, the two states nonetheless maintained their formal alliance, as witnessed by an Athenian inscription of 372 which testifies that a Theban served as the president of the synod of the Athenian Confederacy in that year.³⁴

The growth of Theban and Athenian power and the usual turmoil of Greek politics prompted the King in 372/1 to demand the renewal of his Peace.³⁵ The Athenians were receptive, and they sent a curt message to the Thebans informing them that they intended to make peace, and invited them to agree (Xen. *Hell.* 6, 3, 2; Plut. *Ages.* 28). The subsequent peace conference at Sparta is so well documented that only one aspect of it need be repeated here. At the outset of the congress, as members of the Athenian Confederacy, the Thebans agreed to the treaty in their own name alone. Over the night, however, Epaminondas persuaded his colleagues to claim the right to sign as Boeotians.³⁶ He obviously realized that the Spartans and now the Athenians could use the peace treaty to dismantle the Boeotian Confederacy, as Agesilaus had successfully demanded in 386. Only when his fellow ambassadors grasped the full implications of their circumstances did the situation give them reason to pause and reflect. They had presumably expected a repetition of the Peace of 375, but when it became obvious that the Athenian Confederacy would survive but the Boeotian would not, they gave their support to Epaminondas. The delegation, however, could not now simply walk out of the congress, nor could they revoke their oaths to the gods. They were legally bound to accept the new peace accord. The

³² Plut. *Marc.* 21, 3; *Mor.* 193c. ³³ Xen. *Hell.* 6, 1, 1; 3, 1; Polyæn. 2, 38, 1; Schober 1924, p. 68.

³⁴ Oliver 1936.

³⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 6, 3, 1; 6, 3, 12; Ps.-Dem. 49, 6–21; 49, 48–50; Polyæn. 3, 9, 30; *SdA* 11, no. 269; Buckler 1980a, pp. 49–51; Jehne 1994, pp. 65–74.

³⁶ Buckler 1980a, pp. 51–53; 289 n. 12, with full citation of the sources; see also Keen 1996.

only solution to this dilemma was to make an improper demand that would automatically exclude them from the treaty. On the following day, Epaminondas stepped forward to demand the change from "Theban" to "Boeotian." Agesilaus was both delighted and outraged, delighted by the opportunity to seek revenge on the Thebans and outraged by his verbal duel with Epaminondas, in which he was publicly embarrassed.

The Thebans were technically in the wrong, so Agesilaus had every right to ban them from the treaty. Epaminondas' strategy thus proved successful. The Athenians refused to come to their ally's defense. They could reasonably do so on the grounds that they had made an alliance with Thebes but not with the other Boeotian cities. Athens and Sparta had come to an agreement that suited them perfectly. Athens would neither take action against Thebes nor henceforth protect it. What Sparta chose to make of the issue was not Athenian business. The situation in 371 was very different from that of 375, because of the simple fact that the Athenians refused any longer to support Theban ambitions in Boeotia. Another difference is that whereas in 375 various Boeotian cities had voluntarily joined Thebes, Thebes had in the meantime forcibly suppressed Plataea and Thespieae. The Spartans and Athenians saw the Theban use of military force against them as a violation of their autonomy and as such not to be accepted. The Athenian position was correct and convenient. Epaminondas, indeed, made no objection to it. Rather he pointed out that the King's Peace had called for all of the Greek states to be autonomous, and that under those terms the Spartans had no more right to speak for the Messenians and the *perioikoi* in the Peloponnesus than the Thebans had for the other Boeotians. If Thespieae, for example, should be autonomous, so should Elis, which the Spartans had subjugated in 398 (Xen. *Hell.* 3, 2, 23–31). The logic of Epaminondas' argument is undeniable.

In response to Epaminondas' stance, Agesilaus threatened punishment, and in the summer of 371 a Spartan army marched to its doom at Leuctra. By not rendering any help to the Thebans, the Athenians had reneged on their treaty obligations to come to the defense of one of the members of their naval league (*IG* 11² 43, lines 46–51). Their disappointment at the Theban victory was made obvious by their petulant dismissal of the Theban herald who had come to Athens with the news of the victory.³⁷ This incident marks the symbolic end of friendly Atheno-Theban relations.

³⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 6, 4, 19; Bauslaugh 1991, p. 201.

The real end of the alliance came with Epaminondas' first invasion of the Peloponnesus, when the Athenians entered into a formal alliance with Sparta against Thebes.³⁸ The moment is worthy of note. The Thebans had violated not one of their treaty obligations to Athens and the other members of their maritime league. Despite their aggressive conduct in Boeotia and Phocis, no city in either region was a member of the Athenian League. The most that the Athenians could plausibly say was that by refusing to agree to the Spartan Peace of 371 the Thebans had put themselves outside the Confederacy. Even that argument is specious because of the clause that states would remain autonomous and thus allowed to pursue their own private policies. The Athenians had technically violated two of their own treaties (*IG* II² 40, 43).

The reasons for the disintegration of the Atheno-Theban alliance are immediately apparent. With Sparta removed as a threat, the Thebans and Athenians pursued diverse policies that eliminated the need for the original alliance. Spartan willingness to acknowledge the formal existence of the Athenian League meant that Athens had nothing to fear from Laconia. The growth of Theban power on the northern border of Attica was another matter. It is obvious that the Athenians took the opportunity of the Theban refusal to accept the Peace of 371 to assert that Thebes had not complied with its original treaty obligations. At the real heart of the matter, however, is that Athens and Sparta had come to fear Thebes more than they did each other. In Athenian eyes the disparate goals of the Thebans made alliance dangerous and unwelcome. The blame for this shortsighted view can reasonably be laid to Athens, for a conflict with Thebes was anything but inevitable. To repeat in conclusion, the Thebans had broken no sworn treaties with the Athenians or their other allies. Thus, the myopia of Athenian politicians can be blamed for the collapse of Atheno-Theban relations.

³⁸ *SA* II, no. 274; Buckler 1980a, pp. 49–54.

The incident at Mt. Parnassus, 395 BC

Since its discovery the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* has spawned considerable work on several popular topics, including the identity of the author,¹ political groups and their policies in various states,² the battle of Sardis,³ and the constitution of the Boeotian Confederacy.⁴ Yet one subject has been largely ignored, namely the curious events that ignited the Corinthian War. Not only of interest in themselves, they also require scholars to confront frankly such basic questions as the reliability of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* and its relationship to previously known sources. What is more specifically important is that they demand a resolution of the several significant points where the testimony of the Oxyrhynchus historian directly contradicts that of Xenophon, the other contemporary and authoritative recorder of these events. In the instances where each author differs from the other, which are several, both cannot be right and their differences cannot be glossed over.⁵ One approach to this problem taken by many modern scholars is to pick and choose details from them as if their two accounts were some sort of historical smorgasbord concocted of ingredients of equal estimation. The soundest method, however, is to determine as far as possible which historian provides the more accurate and

¹ A convenient survey of positions on this question comes from Chambers 1993, pp. XXVIII–XLIV. Cratippus (*FGrH* 64) is the most favored current choice for authorship of the work, but Jacoby's three authentic fragments of him amount to merely 43 lines, whereas the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* runs to 773 lines in length. From this alone one might argue that the author of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* wrote Cratippus. Bleckmann 1998, pp. 23–31 and 188–198, has recently made a forceful case for Theopompus, the argument resting on several parallel passages. His brief for Theopompus is far stronger than anything that can be marshaled for Cratippus. Yet the striking differences between the two authors remain, despite Bleckmann's learned and fresh discussion of the problem.

² Bruce 1960; Perlman 1964; Andrewes 1971; L. M. Cook 1988; J. W. Lendon 1989.

³ Cornelius 1933; Nellen 1972; Anderson 1974, pp. 27–53; Gray 1979; DeVoto 1988.

⁴ Botsford 1910; Larsen 1968, pp. 26–40; D. P. Orsi 1974; Salmon 1976; Beck 1997a, pp. 83–106.

⁵ Busolt 1908, p. 260; J. W. Lendon 1989 p. 312; Urban 1991, pp. 50–51; Bauslaugh 1991, p. 173; Krentz 1995, p. 197. McKay 1953, pp. 6–7, suggests that the Historian and Xenophon, having heard incomplete accounts of the intrigue, each filled out their versions with what he thought necessary. Yet see Buck 1994, pp. 30–35.

dependable evidence. The results of this pursuit amount to an exercise in both history and historiography.

The *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, Xenophon, Pausanias, and Plutarch agree on the following points, although, as will become obvious, they differ on a host of details. The Persians sent Timocrates, a Greek agent, to Greece with gold to bribe prominent politicians in several of the leading cities to instigate a war with Sparta. The reason for this intrigue was to cause the Spartans so much trouble in Greece that they must abandon their military operations then underway in Asia Minor. Many of these Greeks agreed, and the Thebans fomented a crisis between neighboring Phocians and Locrians that soon drew Sparta into the Corinthian War with Athens, Thebes, Argos, and Corinth.

To identify the discrepancies between the various accounts a brief synopsis of the major narratives forms the necessary background to the discussion. The Oxyrhynchus historian (10, 2; 10, 5; 20, 1; 21, 1 Chambers) states that Pharnabazus sent Timocrates with the gold and that the Athenians Cephalus and Epicrates received part of it, as did Polyanthes and Timolaus among the Corinthians, and the Thebans Hismenias, Androcleidas, and Antitheus. He adds (20, 1) that Thebes was beset by *stasis*, with Hismenias' anti-Spartan followers in the ascendancy. These men earnestly plotted to involve Corinth, Argos, and Athens in a war with Sparta that would destroy its rule of Greece. Not daring to incite war openly, they conspired to seduce certain Phocians to invade Hesperian Locris (21, 2) over some disputed land (21, 3). Many Phocians drove off Locrian sheep as plunder, such rapine being fairly common and the quarrels usually settled by arbitration. The Locrians counterattacked, stealing as many sheep as they had lost, which prompted the Phocians whom the Thebans had suborned to persuade the rest of the Phocians to retaliate in force. A Locrian appeal to the Thebans formally brought the Thebans into the dispute. When the Phocians heard of the Theban decision, they retired from Locris and immediately appealed to Sparta for support (21, 4). Although the Spartans listened to the Phocian ambassadors in disbelief, they nonetheless sent envoys to the Thebans ordering them to explain themselves before the Spartans and their allies. The Thebans dismissed the embassy and invaded Phocis, concentrating on the land of the Parapotamioi (21, 5).

Xenophon (*Hell.* 3, 5, 1) relates the same incident with different and often contradictory details. He states that Tithraustes sent Timocrates to Greece with gold to bribe prominent political figures in Athens, Thebes, Argos, and Corinth. Among those who took the money he lists (3, 5, 2)

Hisменias, Androcleidas, and Galaxidorus of Thebes, Cylon of Argos, and Polyantes and Timolaus of Corinth. Only the Athenians refused the gold. The leading men in Thebes realized (3, 5, 3) that they must somehow foment war, which they did by persuading the Opuntian Locrians to levy a fine on some land claimed by the Phocians themselves. The fine imposed, the Phocians retaliated by invading the disputed territory and then Locris itself, whereupon the leading Theban politicians persuaded their countrymen to invade Phocis in retaliation (3, 5, 4). The Phocians responded by appealing to Sparta for help, and found the Spartans eagerly receptive because of recent Theban public affronts, which he enumerates (3, 5, 4–5). The ephors called out the ban and sent Lysander to Phocis (3, 5, 6), which prompted the Thebans to appeal to the Athenians for an alliance (3, 5, 7).

Although Plutarch, Diodorus, Nepos, and Polyaeus add brief mentions and various details of the incident, only Pausanias offers a coherent but concise account of these events. He states (3, 9, 8) that Tithraustes sent Timocrates of Rhodes with money to Greece to stir up war against the Spartans. Those who shared the money included the Athenians Cephalus and Epicrates, the Thebans Androcleidas, Hisменias, and Amphithemis, the Argives Cylon and Sodamas, and the Corinthians with Argive sympathies, Polyantes and Timolaus (3, 9, 9). The Phocians sent a delegation to Sparta to denounce the Thebans for their depredations, to which the Spartans responded by deciding to wage war against the Thebans. They were all the more eager to do so because of recent hostile actions of the Thebans, which Pausanias rehearses (9, 3, 10). When the Athenians learned of the crisis, they sent an embassy to the Spartans asking them not to begin war without first having decided the matter in court (3, 9, 11). The Spartans angrily dismissed the Athenians and then (9, 5, 3) sent an army against Thebes.

The discrepancies in the evidence are many. Not in doubt, however, is the origin of the Persian money. The Oxyrhynchus historian (21, 1) and Plutarch (*Artax.* 20, 4; *Lys.* 27, 3; *Ages.* 15, 8) state that King Artaxerxes provided the funds, and Plutarch even credits him with the conception of the scheme. Neither Xenophon nor Pausanias directly addresses this point. All sources agree that Timocrates of Rhodes actually delivered the sum to various Greek politicians (*Hell. Oxy.* 10, 2; *Xen. Hell.* 3, 5, 1; *Plut. Artax.* 20, 4–5; *Mor.* 211b; *Paus.* 3, 9, 8; cf. *Polyaen.* 7, 16, 2). There agreement ends. The Historian (12, 3) knows that Pharnabazus and Conon had some official dealings with the King, and Xenophon (4, 8, 1) is likewise aware that the two had operated together. Yet Xenophon (3, 5, 1) and Pausanias (3, 9, 8) assert that Tithraustes gave the gold to Timocrates. D. M. Lewis blames the

confusion on the conflicting rumors circulating at the time, but a more substantial explanation can be offered.⁶ There is ample reason to suspect that Xenophon has not been as precise as possible in this instance and has not told the whole truth. Tithraustes replaced Tissaphernes as *karanos* in 396.⁷ As earlier with Tissaphernes (Xen. *Hell.* 3, 2, 13; 3, 2, 20), Pharnabazus discussed and agreed upon policy with his new superior, both of whom financed Conon's operations (*Hell. Oxy.* 22, 1). Under these circumstances it is easy to understand how Pharnabazus formulated the plan that Tithraustes subsequently presented to the King. When Xenophon claims that Tithraustes was responsible for the money, he is technically correct, even though Pharnabazus himself doubtless dealt with Timocrates. The reason for this nicety of detail is simple. In a previous meeting Agesilaus and Pharnabazus had established a bond of personal respect, with the Persian promising the Spartan friendship and alliance should he again be passed over for *karanos* (Xen. *Hell.* 4, 1, 37). The touching way in which Xenophon draws this scene demonstrates his admiration for Pharnabazus and his cordial, frank, and manly dealings with Agesilaus, Xenophon's own friend and mentor. So, rather than implicate Pharnabazus personally in the mission of Timocrates, Xenophon names Tithraustes instead, Pharnabazus' superior. This is not an outright lie, inasmuch as Tithraustes had ultimate responsibility for this policy; but Pharnabazus was the one most closely involved in it, and indeed the entire plan was surely his.⁸

Some discrepancies in detail exist about who received Persian money, but the sources for the most part agree, at least regarding the principals, though some names vary among the lists. The Oxyrhynchian, Xenophon, and Pausanias fully agree about the complicity of Androcleidas, Hismenias, and Timolaus. The Historian and Pausanias agree on Epicrates and Cephalus, the absence of Xenophon's testimony in this instance being explained by his denial of Athenian collusion. Xenophon and Pausanias agree on Polyantes and Cylon, but Pausanias' inclusion of the Athenians, Epicrates, and Sodamas proves that he also consulted a source independent

⁶ Lewis 1989.

⁷ Xenophon only once (*Hell.* 1, 4, 4; cf. *Anab.* 1, 1, 2) uses the word *karanos*, probably derived from Old Persian *kara*, or army, of Cyrus the Younger's military command. He translates it as *kyrion*. The position denotes a superior military commander specifically appointed by the King who held superior rank over the local satraps in the area where he operated. Both Tissaphernes (Xen. *Hell.* 3, 1, 3; 3, 2, 13) and Tithraustes (Xen. *Hell.* 4, 1, 37; cf. 3, 4, 25–26; Diod. Sic. 14, 80, 7) held that very position, but Greek writers avoided the foreign word, preferring to use Greek terms instead. It is, however, curious that they did not equate *karanos* with *stratēgos autokratōr*.

⁸ Graf Stauffenberg, *RE* 11 6.2 (1937), cols. 1522–1523, s.v. Tithraustes (1).

of Xenophon. The Oxyrhynchus historian's inclusion of the two Athenians and his omission of Polyantes, Cylon, and Galaxidorus, among many other obvious things, prove that his account is independent of Xenophon's. The intriguing information comes from those men mentioned only once. The Argive Sodamas proves that Pausanias relied upon a source other than or in addition to the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* and Xenophon, for neither of them mentions him. The man or men known as Antitheus to the Historian, Amphithemis to Pausanias, and Amphitheus to Plutarch (see also *Mor.* 557d; 586f; 594d; 598b) add their own uncertainty to the problem, but it nonetheless proves Plutarch's use of a source independent of Xenophon. None of these names appears in *IG VII*, and none of these Thebans was well known. Nonetheless, justifiable suspicion remains that all three authors refer to the same man, which, if true, would provide a link between them. The only certain conclusions to be drawn from the above are that the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* and Xenophon knew of two very different versions of this incident, though they share some rare common details. Plutarch and Pausanias certainly knew of Xenophon's version, but nothing substantial suggests that they also knew of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, unless all three refer to the same obscure Theban. Nonetheless, the inclusion of Amphitheus in his list proves Plutarch's use of sources additional to Xenophon, and Pausanias' list likewise proves that he also relied upon another unrecognized and unsuspected source, one apparently unknown to Plutarch. In all, the later writers simply had more information at their disposal than has survived. These details warn that the search for sources and derivations calls for caution, and that it is ill-advised automatically to assume the reliance of one source on one other source alone. Pausanias certainly proves that a single author could and did draw upon several different sources for one event.

With that warning in mind, one can turn to the details of the incident. All sources agree that the Thebans were responsible for the events that led up to the declaration of war. Theban motives, like those of the others involved (*Hell. Oxy.* 10, 2), were hatred and fear of Sparta. Concurrence ends there, followed by abundant discrepancies and contradictions. Four immediate points at issue include (1) who was involved in the imbroglio, (2) what the complaint was, (3) who was responsible for the provocation, and (4) how the various parties involved reacted to it.

The question of who was involved in the incident immediately involves that of where it happened. Plutarch's testimony (*Lys.* 27, 3) that the Thebans ravaged some Phocian land is so vague that it offers no help. The Historian puts the disputed land in Hesperian or Ozolian Locris near

Mt. Parnassus, as does Pausanias (3, 9, 9), who specifically places it in the vicinity of Amphissa. Geographical candidates in this region are few and uncertain.⁹ F. Schober was the first to eliminate the sacred land of Crisa, the northern extent of which he considered unknown.¹⁰ Although the Greek Civil War in 1946–7 prevented L. Lerat from exploring this area in detail,¹¹ G. J. Szemler in his careful study of the region places the northern boundary of the sacred precinct not far south of Amphissa on a line between the ridges of Koutrouli and Likouvouni on the east and the easternmost spur of Mt. Ghiona on the west.¹² One can add that the small valley of Elaion should be eliminated as a possibility. Though topographically suitable, it borders on sacred land, which makes it an unlikely candidate. His own candidate is the Vinianni valley, some eleven kilometers northwest of Amphissa. He concludes that the Ozolian Locrians held the western part of the valley and that Phocian settlements stood across it on the western slopes of Parnassus. Personal investigation of the area north of the village of Prosilion on 3 July 1996 revealed that Vinianni is one large valley into which juts a steep ridge, which does not, however, separate it into two distinct parts. This ridge is significant enough to serve as a partial dividing line, but still leaves abundant room for a tract of land that could easily be claimed by the inhabitants of the valley. Vinianni is also close enough to Amphissa to satisfy Pausanias' testimony.

Xenophon (*Hell.* 3, 5, 3), however, states that the Phocians and the Opuntian Locrians were the protagonists in this dispute, though he gives no further details. His testimony is particularly valuable because he and Agesilaus passed through this area on their way to the battle of Coronea in 394, not more than a year after the events took place.¹³ Furthermore, after the Spartan defeat, he accompanied the wounded king to Delphi (*Hell.* 4, 3, 21; Diod. Sic. 14, 84, 2; Plut. *Ages.* 19, 1–4; cf. Xen. *Anab.* 3, 1, 5–6;

⁹ *Syll.* 3 826 E; 827 CD; Strabo 9, 3, 1; 9, 3, 3; Paus. 10, 38, 1.

¹⁰ Although Busolt 1908, p. 278 and Meyer 1909, pp. 65–80, opposed by Walker 1913, pp. 114–115, associate the Sacred Wars with the events of 395 BC, nothing in any of the sources connects this quarrel with Apollo's land, which makes these conflicts irrelevant. For the first Sacred War, see Parker 1997; for the Second, Hornblower 1992; for the Third, Buckler 1989a; and for the Fourth, Londey 1990. Also to the point, neither Busolt, Meyer, nor Walker suggests a site in western Locris for this incident.

¹¹ Lerat 1952, vol. 1, p. 81. ¹² Szemler and Kase *et al.* 1991, pp. 32–38; Szemler 1996, p. 99.

¹³ Plut. *Ages.* 18, 2; see Xen. *Hell.* 4, 3, 16; *Ages.* 2, 9; Diog. Laert. 2, 51. Agesilaus' route can confidently be surmised because of the fact that he returned to Greece at great speed (Xen. *Ages.* 2, 1; *Hell.* 4, 2, 8) and that he attached Orchomenian troops before the battle (*Hell.* 4, 3, 15). That rules out the easy but longer coastal route from Thermopylae to Opus, indicating instead the route south of Herakleia Trachinia through the Cephissus valley: see Buckler 1989a, pp. 33–34, personal observations of 15–17 August 2000; Szemler *et al.* 1996, pp. 92–95.

Paus. 10, 5, 3–5),¹⁴ thereby passing through western Phocis and also having the opportunity to become personally acquainted with Ozolian Locris. Although no one knows where the Oxyrhynchian historian found his topographical information, Xenophon, better than anyone else, was in a position to see all of the areas that could have been involved in these events and to learn details shortly after the fact. His association with Agesilaus gave him access to information not privy to others. Perhaps even more importantly, Xenophon could also have learned the details of these events, or at least one side of them, from the Phocians themselves, who had joined Agesilaus at Coronea (Xen. *Hell.* 4, 3, 15). Here was first-hand information still fresh a year after the event, a source not obviously available to the Oxyrhynchus historian. Since he elsewhere (4, 2, 17) clearly distinguishes Ozolian from Opuntian Locris, Xenophon is unlikely to have confused the two districts. Accepting Xenophon's testimony, Lerat places the land in question between Opuntian Locris and Phocis at Daphnus,¹⁵ the modern Aghios Konstantinos.¹⁶ The pleasant resort of today was in 395 a small harbor town situated at the mouth of a narrow valley rather isolated from the interior. Lerat advances no topographical and very little historical evidence to support his case,¹⁷ but R. J. Buck accepts his conclusions, which he bolsters by one incident mentioned by Thucydides (5, 32, 2) and Diodorus (12, 80, 4). Personal examination of the area on 16 July 1996 revealed that Mt. Cnemis and its foothills approach the sea in such a way as to sharply divide the strand between them, so sharply that Xenophon's comment about disputed territory in that location does not easily apply.¹⁸ One lives either on the northern or the southern side of the mountain, and the coast between Point Cnemis and the promontory of Calamus marks a well-defined position on the coast. Moreover, Parnassus is so far removed from Daphnus that it cannot be seen from it. If Daphnus were in dispute, the reasons were political, not geographical.

All three major sources, supported by the brief statement of Plutarch (*Lys.* 27, 3) state that after the incident the Thebans intervened militarily to support the Locrians. Geography alone immediately eliminates Ozolian Locris as the scene of the episode. Standing between western Locris and Boeotia was all of Phocis, Mt. Parnassus alone being a sufficiently daunting obstacle to invasion from the east. The terrain in the south is mountainous

¹⁴ Cf. Nielsen 1997, pp. 81–89. ¹⁵ Lerat 1952, vol. 11, p. 43.

¹⁶ See Philippon, *RE* 4.2 (1901), cols. 2148–2149, *s.v.* Daphnus (4); Pritchett 1965–92, vol. 1V, pp. 149–151, who does not address this point, and McInerney 1999, p. 195.

¹⁷ Lerat 1952, vol. 11, p. 43. ¹⁸ Buck 1994, p. 33.

and hard, the roads few and easily blocked, and stout defense could easily have prevented any Theban force from fighting its way through to Amphissa and its environs. Nor are separate but co-ordinated campaigns by the western Locrians and the Thebans very likely, as Demosthenes learned in somewhat similar circumstances in 427, when he planned an invasion of Boeotia through the west (Thuc. 3, 95–98). Widely separated, complicated operations of this sort, staged over difficult terrain by two armies that had never before campaigned together, promised only failure or worse, especially for the weaker force. In short the Thebans could not in fact have brought direct military aid to the Hesperian Locrians, which removes Vinianni from consideration. Furthermore, these geographical challenges undercut the testimony of the Oxyrhynchian and Pausanias that Ozolian Locris was the scene of the incident and its immediate repercussions.

The Historian states (21, 5), however, that instead of attempting anything of the sort, the Thebans devastated the Phocian part of the Cephissus valley. It is impossible to see how operations here could have helped people on the other side of Parnassus, even as a diversion. On the contrary, this invasion argues forcefully in favor of Xenophon's statement that Opuntian Locris was the scene of these events, for only then does the reason for it make any sense. In this valley a Theban army was actually on the scene capable of intervening on the disputed land, of punishing the Phocians who were directly involved in the incident, and indeed of striking at the economic heart of Phocis.¹⁹ Here the Thebans could immediately help the Locrians who were in real danger. That does not, however, mean that the somewhat remote Daphnus was the scene of the original dispute. Rather, a nearer and much more suitable candidate is readily at hand, one that fits perfectly all of the topographical requirements, which include proximity to Parnassus, lack of geographical features that could provide a territorial boundary, and the capacity to sustain sheep and cattle. Between the Locrian city of Opus, the modern Atalanti, and the Phocian cities of Hyampolis and Abae – some seventeen kilometers – the land rises gradually between the slopes of the ridges to a rolling upland valley with Parnassus clearly visible in the background. The route lacks noticeable natural obstacles and any significant geographical features that could serve as a boundary. The traveller does not know that he has walked from Locris to Phocis until he reaches the sanctuary of Artemis and Apollo at Calapodion. The land is suitable for sheep and cattle, and the entire area is so lacking in

¹⁹ Buck 1994, p. 33.

distinguishing physical features that disputes over ownership of parts of it are readily understandable. From Calapodion the way runs easily into the Cephissus valley. The upper reaches of this shallow valley are the best candidate for the disputed land, and they in turn support Xenophon's testimony.²⁰

Regarding the second point, the three major sources provide differing accounts of the ruse and its circumstances, principal aspects of which include its nature, who was responsible for implementing it, and what actually happened. The *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* (21, 2–4) presents five details: (1) Theban suborning of some Phocians to invade disputed territory, (2) their theft of some Locrian sheep, (3) a Locrian refusal to arbitrate the dispute, as was customary, (4) a Locrian appeal to Thebes, and (5) Phocian retreat from Locris and appeal to Sparta. The Historian's account is easily the most curious of them all and is in fact riddled with improbabilities. First, it is not immediately apparent why Hismenias and Androcleidas who held power in Thebes and enjoyed wide support throughout the rest of Boeotia (20, 1–2) found it necessary to resort to a ruse to ignite the war. The plot, as he describes it, is especially suspicious in several of its fundamental parts, beginning with the seduction of "certain Phocians." Even disaffected Phocians, no matter what their internecine differences, were unlikely to trust the Thebans, their traditional enemies (*Hell. Oxy.* 19, 1; 20, 1–2; *Xen. Hell.* 5, 2, 33). This, above all else, casts doubts upon the Oxyrhynchian's accuracy. E. M. Walker counters this objection by saying that Hismenias could readily have found partisans in Phocis, for two parties had long existed there. The question, however, becomes what sort of parties.²¹ The examples that he produces reveal evidence of pro- and anti-Persian groups before the battle of Plataea (*Hdt.* 9, 17–18), and for Phocians being friendly both with the Spartans and Athenians during the Peloponnesian War (*Thuc.* 2, 92; 3, 95, 1; 4, 76, 3; 89, 1). He could have added a case closer to that of 395 by citing *Thuc.* 4, 89, 1, where a Phocian betrayed Athenian plans to the Spartans, who passed the news on to the Boeotians. Yet that proves Phocian loyalty to the Spartans rather than friendship with the Thebans. In short, Walker cannot prove the existence of a pro-Theban group in Phocis. He continues by adding that the Thebans could have used venal Phocians, for such men exist in all states. That is obviously true, but even knaves can be intelligent, or at least

²⁰ Personal observations of 29 May 1983; 20 October 1998; 22 August 2000; see Fossey 1990b, end-map. Kalapodion: Felsch *et al.* 1980; Buckler 1989a, p. 112.

²¹ Walker 1913, p. 129.

cunning enough not to be duped, especially by men whose kind feelings towards Phocis they could hardly believe. Moreover, these Phocians had assurances neither of success in their attempt nor of protection if they failed. Other Phocians, especially those in official positions, could always have disavowed their actions as the unauthorized conduct of private individuals who did not represent the official policy of the state. Neither the “certain Phocians” nor the Thebans had any guarantee that the rest of the Phocians would permit themselves to be dragged into a problem not of their own making and not directly affecting them. Besides, the other Phocians could easily have demanded arbitration, as was customary, thus deflating the entire crisis. Nor could anyone guarantee that the plot would automatically provoke the Locrians to war. They too could instead have resorted to arbitration, as so often before. Even were the certain Phocians successful, it is not easy to see what they themselves stood to gain. They could not reasonably expect the Thebans to put them securely in power in the face of the strong bond between Phocis and Sparta. The even more obvious question is why the Thebans needed the Phocian provocateurs, who could not necessarily be trusted in the first place. The Locrians would surely have made more dependable, willing, and eager conspirators than they for the job. In short, Hismenias could more easily have found knaves in Locris than in Phocis. The Historian has the Thebans going to a great deal of needless trouble, and his elaborate and risky subterfuge was superfluous.

By contrast, Xenophon’s account of the provocation is simple, straightforward, and far more satisfactory, but modern abuse of the text has needlessly complicated matters. Xenophon (*Hell.* 3, 5, 3) states that the Thebans merely persuaded the Locrians to levy a fine on the Phocians over the disputed land. The manuscripts read *kai heautois chrēmata telesai*, and they exhibit neither corruption nor variant readings at this point. Nonetheless R. Schneider emends the text to read *chrēmata elasai* in the light of Pausanias’ testimony (3, 9, 9).²² Yet it is poor method to base an emendation, especially a superfluous one, of one text on the authority of another from a different and later author simply to obtain a meaning compatible with that of the second text. This approach in fact distorts Xenophon’s meaning, a distortion made all the more unnecessary because the phrase as it stands in the manuscripts of Xenophon makes perfectly good sense and moreover is in good Attic idiom. Hence, G. E. Underhill interprets it as “to levy money upon the debateable land claimed both by the Phocians

²² Schneider 1860; cf. Marchant 1900 and Hude 1969 (*ad loc.*).

and themselves [i.e. the Locrians],”²³ with which G. Sauppe and L. Breitenbach agree.²⁴ In short, Xenophon meant to write *telesai*. Yet it is only Underhill’s assumption that the Locrians levied the fine in money. Since *chrēmata* also means goods, they could easily have levied it in kind, in this case sheep. That also corresponds with the Phocian response in which they *pollaplasia chrēmata elabon*. This solution harmonizes in this detail Xenophon’s account with those of the Historian and Pausanias.

Xenophon’s version enjoys the advantage of explaining satisfactorily how Hismenias and Androcleidas could successfully and easily bring their plot to fruition. Distinguished leaders, men of authority who were in a position to back their words with deeds, they could do in reality for the Opuntian Locrians what they could only promise certain Phocians. Their approach to the Locrians was natural given the traditional friendship between the two peoples. They also shared the same animosity towards the Phocians. The Theban temptation simply gave the Locrians the opportunity to harass their old enemies, all the while safe in the knowledge that the Thebans supported them fully. Opuntian Locris, Boeotia, and Phocis were all geographically propinquitous, which made military operations across nearby borders readily feasible. The fine was an artless and unremarkable provocation, with no harm done if it failed. When the Phocians nonetheless played into Locrian hands by invading not merely the disputed land but also Locris itself, they committed an act of aggression, the results of which were predictable. The Thebans invaded Phocis in the Cephissus valley, and the Phocians appealed to the Spartans, their traditional allies. Thus presented with this golden opportunity to humble a proud enemy and to punish them for recent acts of public arrogance, the Spartans eagerly called out the ban and declared war. There is not one detail in this sequence of events that is unusual, curious, or surprising. Each state had its customary ties of friendship and alliance, its own grudges against known antagonists, and each acted according to them. Nothing is odd or out of place.

Pausanias’ representation of the offense and its perpetrators knows nothing of the Oxyrhynchian’s Phocians or Xenophon’s Opuntians. His reference to the Amphissans can be dismissed from serious consideration for the geographical reasons noted above.²⁵ According to his version, the

²³ Underhill 1900, p. 112. ²⁴ Sauppe 1869, s.v. *telein*; L. Breitenbach 1876, p. 73.

²⁵ Hitzig and Blümner 1886–1910, vol. 1, p. 762, cite Immerwahr 1889, p. 45, who suggests that Pausanias was misled by Strabo 6, 1, 7 into confusing Opuntian with Ozolian Locris. The argument is ingenious, but Strabo is an unlikely source for Pausanias, see Frazer 1898, vol. 1, pp. LXXXIII–LXIV, XC–CIII, and Habicht 1985, p. 96. Furthermore, it is very difficult to understand how the traveller Pausanias could have misplaced Amphissa.

western Locrians cut ripe grain in the disputed area and drove off booty. The other sources agree that such depredations were parts of the episode. Apart from naming the Amphissans and the otherwise unknown Sodamas, and omitting Galaxidorus, Pausanias' details agree entirely with those found in Xenophon. The differences must come at least in part from Pausanias' use of an unknown source, presumably the one in which he found Sodamas' name. Yet at the same time his account has nothing in common with that of the Historian.

A major discrepancy between the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* (21, 4) on the one side and Xenophon (*Hell.* 3, 5, 5) and Pausanias (3, 9, 10) on the other is the Spartan response to the news from Parnassus. According to the Historian, when a Phocian embassy informed them of the incident and the threat of Theban military intervention, the Spartans, despite their disbelief, sent ambassadors to the Boeotians warning them not to invade Phocis. They added that if the Boeotians felt wronged, they must put their case before a meeting of the Spartans and their allies. Xenophon, however, states that the Spartans greeted the Phocian report with delight, for they considered it good reason to punish the Thebans, which they had long desired. He next rehearses the various reasons for Spartan anger, which he repeats (5, 2, 33) in connection with Hismenias' later trial. Pausanias echoes Xenophon's version, but adds (3, 9, 11) that in an effort to avoid hostilities the Athenians sent an embassy to the Spartans urging them to decide the matter peacefully. The Spartans angrily rejected the suggestion.

A fundamental matter demands clarification at the outset. Although several modern scholars interpret the testimony of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* and Pausanias to mean arbitration, such legal proceedings would instead have been a trial, not arbitration.²⁶ The only true arbitration mentioned in connection with this incident is that normally invoked by the Locrians or Phocians over the disputed land, but in this case neither side resorted to it. Both the Historian and Pausanias describe a summons for the Thebans to justify themselves before a Spartan and allied court that assumed the right to sit in judgment of them. J. W. Lendon comes closest to grasping this point, but seems not to realize that the Thebans confronted an ultimatum, not arbitration.²⁷ Nothing suggests that the Thebans would have recognized the legitimacy of this court any more than had the

²⁶ Walker 1913, p. 126; Perlman 1964, p. 66; Bruce 1967, p. 120; L. M. Cook 1988, p. 80. For cases of true arbitration, see that of Corinth between Thebes and Athens over Plataea: Hdt. 6, 108; Thuc. 3, 55; 68, 5, and the Spartan between Elis and Lepreon: Thuc. 5, 31, 3-4, and in general Tod 1913.

²⁷ J. W. Lendon 1989, pp. 312-313.

Athenians in 432 (Thuc. 1, 73, 1). This verdict would surely have been a foregone conclusion. With respect to Pausanias' testimony, there is no obvious reason why the Athenians should have wanted anyone to settle the dispute when the war that they wanted was within their grasp. Nor would the Spartans necessarily have trusted the good faith of the Athenians. They had recently caught them red-handed in the Demaenetus affair (*Hell. Oxy.* 9, 1 – 10, 2; 11), and rumors of Timocrates' mission were already circulating (Xen. *Hell.* 4, 2, 1). Nothing even suggests that the Athenians sent an embassy to Sparta, much less one that appealed for arbitration.

Arbitration, however, lives a curious life and has not yet died in modern scholarship. S. Accame states that arbitration was conceivable before the Thebans had invaded Phocis but not afterwards,²⁸ a view that Lendon finds convincing but without explanation.²⁹ Accame continues by positing an actual Spartan attempt at arbitration but one that failed miserably. Since, in his view, Xenophon felt the outcome of this situation to be very embarrassing to Sparta, he suppressed all mention of it. An obvious explanation stems from the possibility that Xenophon omitted it because it did not occur. I. A. F. Bruce and C. D. Hamilton put a different interpretation on these events when they link arbitration with two Phocian appeals to Sparta, the one as found in *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* and the other as in Xenophon.³⁰ Bruce maintains that the success of the Phocian appeal to Sparta "must be recorded by P [*Hell. Oxy.*] after the end of the London papyrus," and then uses it to verify the authenticity of the Athenian embassy to Sparta, which would also have been recorded later. Regarding the Athenian legation Bruce assumes what he has not proven. That is not an argument from silence but rather from speculation. Hamilton's approach is similar. He rightly states that the Historian's narrative ends with the Theban withdrawal from Phocis after their having ravaged the land. Xenophon then, according to his view, provides a sequel that includes a second appeal to Sparta that appeared in a section of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* that has not been preserved. Bruce's and Hamilton's reconstruction of events is based on a text that the Oxyrhynchian did not write. In sum, none of the arguments of Accame, Lendon, Bruce, and Hamilton prove that the Athenian call for arbitration took place or that two Phocian embassies were sent.

Finally, Plutarch (*Lys.* 27) provides a set of reasons for the Spartan decision to declare war that agrees substantially with those of Xenophon and Pausanias, including the bribery of Greek leaders with Persian gold, the role of the Thebans as the architects of the provocation, the Theban

²⁸ Accame 1951, p. 25. ²⁹ J. W. Lendon 1989, p. 312.

³⁰ Bruce 1967, p. 120; C. D. Hamilton 1979, p. 193.

invasion of Phocian territory, and Theban obstruction of Spartan policy after the Peloponnesian War. All three of these writers agree on the essential details of the entire episode, and all argue against the accuracy of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* with its incredible story of Theban enticement of certain Phocians and Spartan reluctance to wage a war against Thebes that some of them had wanted for years.

A survey of these narratives demonstrates that Xenophon's portrayal of events prevailed among the extant authors, with the Oxyrhynchian being distinctly in the minority. In fact, with the exception of a few names and the sheep nothing in the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* recurs in the later versions of the episode. Instead, it presents a series of unnecessarily complex and improbable details that makes it irreconcilable and incompatible with the others. It raises more questions than it answers and presents more problems than it solves. Above all, it lacks the coherence, clarity, and plausibility of Xenophon's account. With regard to the outbreak of the Corinthian War, it simply did not win general acceptance in antiquity. Yet one aspect of it is now frequently advanced in its favor. Many scholars have praised it for being more circumstantial and detailed than Xenophon's and that of the others.³¹ Nonetheless, too many of the Historian's embroidered details are wrong or unlikely. Instead of clarifying and satisfactorily explaining events, they serve only as fustian. Loquacity does not equal veracity. Regarding the incident at Mt. Parnassus, Xenophon gives the most trustworthy account of all.

Nonetheless, one unresolved problem with Xenophon's narrative remains, namely his treatment of the Athenian role in these events. The outbreak of the Corinthian War unpleasantly and permanently disrupted Agesilaus' career, coming at the point where he – and Xenophon – thought that he was about to conquer all of Asia (*Hell.* 4, 1, 29; 2, 3, and especially *Ages.* 1, 36). The complicity of the Athenians in the plot to foment war in Greece made them partly blameworthy for foiling Agesilaus' ambitions, a fact clearly unpalatable to Xenophon. Furthermore, he did not want to admit that by taking Persian money Athens had betrayed Greece to the King.³² He could not suppress Athenian participation in these events, for he could not treat the Corinthian War without including that fact. Yet he

³¹ In that respect, it is ironic that Dugas 1910, pp. 85 and 90–93 prefers the Oxyrhynchian version of Sardis to Xenophon's because the former's brevity and dryness seem closer to the truth than Xenophon's literary and dramatic depiction of events.

³² Note how Isocrates in the *Panegyrikos* continually condemns Sparta for its role in the King's Peace as an example of the opprobrium attached to becoming a tool of the King. Athens, however, stands forth as the champion of Greece, precisely the role that Xenophon and Lysias (2, 20–57) proclaim. For a full discussion of Isocrates' views, see Mikkola (1954) and Buchner (1958).

could deny the Athenians' acceptance of Persian gold and attribute their conduct to other and nobler motives. In the narrative (*Hell.* 3, 5, 2) he claims that the Athenians eagerly embraced the war because they felt it their right to rule Greece. Here is where the Theban speech (3, 5, 8–15) to the Athenians before the establishment of their alliance finds its place in his historical narrative. In it the Thebans answer the Athenian complaints against past Theban conduct and emphasize their services to Athens after their defeat. They point to the weakness of the Spartan position and the ease with which Athens could topple the Spartans from their ascendancy. They not only proclaim the Athenian right to hegemony but also expound upon the glory of Athens' being the *hēgemōn* both of Greece and of the King himself.

This speech is clearly a rhetorical effusion rather than a reasoned discussion of policy. Xenophon could have found no better way in which to defend Athens' right to hegemony than by putting the arguments for it into the mouths of the Thebans, who appear almost as suppliants. The speech could be dismissed entirely as Xenophon's invention were it not for Andocides' statement (3, 24) that on the day of the speech the Athenians felt themselves invincible. Yet Andocides' testimony does not prove that the speech he heard was that given by Xenophon, who was not in Athens at the time. Xenophon's is not a genuine speech actually delivered in the hour of crisis. It contains not one concrete proposal on how to wage war against Sparta. Hence, it is impossible to understand how one can claim that this speech meets the needs of the situation.³³ Instead of a plan of action, it is an *enkōmion* of Athens.³⁴ By asserting the justice of Athenian hegemonic ambitions, Xenophon's speaker deftly avoids the Athenian acceptance of Persian gold. The Athenians were too lofty and noble-minded to be bribed, whereas in fact Athenian hands had never winced at the touch of Persian gold (Thuc. 2, 7; 8, 53; 8, 56; 8, 82). This speech is little more than Xenophon's propaganda, his assertion that the Athenians' role in the plot was not venal but rather part of their duty to all Greece.

In conclusion, Xenophon has left the most reliable account of this incident. It accounts satisfactorily for nearly all of the major reasons for the outbreak of the Corinthian War and explains accurately how events unfolded. If his efforts fail to exonerate Athens from complicity in the plot, the wonder is that he came so close to accomplishing it.

³³ Seager 1967, pp. 96–98; see also Accame 1951, pp. 43–44 and Perlman 1964, p. 72.

³⁴ Gray 1989, pp. 107–112.

CHAPTER 3

The battle of Coronea and its historiographical legacy

In 395 BC the Corinthian War erupted between Sparta and its allies and an alliance of Thebes, Athens, Corinth, Argos, and others. At the time the Spartan king Agesilaus and a veteran force pursued a desultory campaign in the western satrapies of the Persian Empire. After Spartan armies had suffered defeat at the battle of Haliartus and fought the indecisive battle at Nemea River, the home government recalled Agesilaus and his force to defend Spartan interests in Greece. Spartan naval weakness compelled Agesilaus to make a long overland march back to Greece. Upon the king's entry into Boeotia on 14 August 394, he encountered a defending force of Thebans and their allies at the plain of Coronea in central Boeotia.¹ The ensuing battle between these forces has more than marginal significance, for it can be demonstrated that larger developments stemmed from this event. To understand it all properly one must locate the actual site of the battle, correctly interpret the course of it, and then realize the historiographical implications of it and the merits of the ancient historians who recount it.


THE BATTLEFIELD

The sources for the location of the battlefield and for the course of the battle itself are abundant but of varying quality. The best, but perhaps the most refractory, is Xenophon, himself a field commander and a participant in the fighting.² Diodorus of Sicily later epitomized the account of the fourth-century historian Ephorus, who was not especially esteemed, even in antiquity, for his knowledge of military affairs.³ Neither Ephorus nor

¹ In general, see Grote 1846–56, vol. IX, chap. 74, p. 373; Curtius 1868, pp. 173–174; Underhill 1900, pp. XLV–XLVII; Beloch 1912–27, vol. III.1, pp. 73–74; Meyer 1902/1975, p. 233.

² Xen. *Hell.* 4, 3, 15–21; *Ages.* 2, 6–16; *Anab.* 5, 3, 6.

³ Polyb. 12, 25–26; Barber 1935/1993, pp. 140–141; Meister 1975, pp. 72–77.



Map 3 Coronea and surroundings

Diodorus is known to have visited the battlefield. Among later sources Plutarch is particularly important both for the facts of his broad knowledge of historical literature and for his personal familiarity with the region.⁴ The last major source for these events is Pausanias, well read and much traveled, who had also examined the terrain himself.⁵ The remaining sources are derivative and of dubious importance.⁶

Despite the wealth of sources, they provide few topographical details necessary to identify the precise location of the battlefield. Pertinent are the remarks of T. R. Holmes: "It is of no use to visit battle-fields, unless it is certain that battles were fought upon them."⁷ Seen in this light, it is difficult to understand why W. K. Pritchett gives the contour lines of the now drained Lake Copais but not those of the adjacent landmass.⁸ The

⁴ Cartledge 1987, pp. 144–150; Buckler 1992. ⁵ Paus. 9, 34, 1; cf. Frazer 1898, vol. v, pp. 169–170.

⁶ *Nep. Ages.* 4, 5–6; *Front. Strat.* 6, 6; *Polyaen.* 2, 1, 19. ⁷ Holmes 1911, p. xvi.

⁸ Pritchett 1965–92, vol. 11, p. 92, fig. 10.

battle of Coronea was not, after all, fought in the middle of the lake. Even worse is not to examine the terrain at all. The apparent lack of topographical exploration weakens C. J. Tuplin's evaluation of military events in this period.⁹ For a participant in the action, Xenophon gives very little information about the terrain. In some instances more must be surmised from his silence than from his text – not the best method to be followed. He says specifically that the battle was fought on the plain of Coronea and that the Spartans entered it marching eastwards from the Cephissus valley. Given the fact that there is still only one major route between the foothills of Mt. Helicon and the margin of the now drained Lake Copais, Agesilaus could only have entered the still well-defined plain roughly along the course of the modern motor road. Thanks to the findings of J. Knauss and his colleagues, one now knows the normal level of the lake in antiquity.¹⁰ Xenophon is unclear about the Theban route of approach. He says only that the Thebans and their allies marched from Mt. Helicon. That statement is unnecessarily vague because all of the high ground in this area is a continuation of the mountain. The heights are nothing more than foothills of the massif. There was and still is an excellent road below the modern Pétra, one that was defended in antiquity. Topography allows for no road suitable for a large army other than that below Pétra.¹¹

The plain itself is level, although that is doubtless due in part to modern deep ploughing. Nevertheless, there are no marked or significant differences in the elevation of the plain. The ridge upon which the acropolis of Coronea is situated divides the plain into two parts, without its reaching the margin of Lake Copais.¹² The plain below the ridge provides ample room for a battle between two strong forces. Pausanias and Strabo report the existence of three streams flowing from Mt. Helicon into the plain, and each can still be traced today.¹³ At the foot of the acropolis they are shallow, but then quickly cut deep beds, the banks of which are quite steep, often offering a horizontal drop of some three to five meters, thus posing a virtually impossible obstacle even to a walker who travels light. Despite modern hydraulic works, all three rivulets still carry a trickle of water in the summer. Furthermore, their banks are lined with dense foliage of trees and undergrowth that effectively block visibility across the plain. In short, in

⁹ Tuplin 1986a. ¹⁰ Knauss 1990, pp. 49–60; personal observations of 18 July 1994.

¹¹ Fossey 1990a, pp. 169–184; personal observations of 18 July 1980.

¹² Frazer 1898, vol. v, p. 170; Wallace 1979, pp. 114–115; Lauffer 1986, pp. 60 and 81; Fossey 1988, pp. 324–330; personal observations of 18 July 1994.

¹³ Paus. 9, 34, 4–5; Strabo 9, 2, 29.

their nether reaches these streams cannot be crossed by hoplites nor can anyone see anything beyond them.

The last salient piece of evidence for the location of the battle is the sanctuary of Itonian Athena, where some eighty opponents of the Spartans took refuge after the battle. Xenophon and Polyaeus simply refer to the site as “the temple,”¹⁴ the definite article denoting that the sanctuary was well known;¹⁵ Strabo (9, 2, 29), who never saw the site, places the sanctuary in the plain before the city. Pausanias (9, 34, 1), who did see it, mentions that it stood along the line of the main road, as one approached Coronea from Alalcomenae.¹⁶ He observes that it was dedicated to Itonian Athena.¹⁷ Some dispute over the precise location of the sanctuary has arisen among modern archaeologists and historians. J. G. Frazer places the temple at the modern chapel of Metamorphosis, where there are indeed numerous ancient remains consistent with those of a small sanctuary.¹⁸ Although P. W. Wallace suggests a location between Coronea and the foot of Pétra, he advances no evidence for it, and my exploration of the area brought none to light, despite the deep ploughing.¹⁹ Th. Spyropoulos found an unidentified sanctuary due north of Coronea; a view accepted by P. Roesch and M. Sordi.²⁰ Although P. Krentz has also claimed that the complex of buildings is that of Itonian Athena, neither he nor anyone else can provide satisfactory identification of it.²¹ The candidate proposed by Spyropoulos and Krentz not only does not correspond to Xenophon’s account of the battle but instead contradicts it. In Xenophon’s description of the action there is literally no room for a famous sanctuary dedicated to Athena so close to the walls of Coronea. Given the literary, epigraphic, and archaeological evidence, Frazer’s identification of the site remains the only satisfactory one.

This conclusion is strengthened by what is not found in the accounts of Xenophon and the other sources. First, there is no mention of the *polis* of Coronea, only the plain. Next, nothing is said of the three streams, which would have been a prominent feature of any battle fought in the eastern part of the plain. Had fleeing soldiers tumbled into the beds of these rivulets, they would have been helpless, immobilized, and subject to

¹⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 4, 3, 20; Polyaeus. 2, 1, 4. ¹⁵ Underhill 1900, p. 132.

¹⁶ Paus. 9, 34, 1. ¹⁷ Nep. *Ages.* 4, 6; Schachter 1981–94a, vol. 1, pp. 117–127.

¹⁸ Frazer 1898, vol. V, pp. 169–170; Pritchett 1965–92, vol. 11, pp. 85–95; Fossey 1988, pp. 330–331; Schachter 1981–94a, vol. 111, pp. 5–6; personal observations of 25 July 1980, 13 July 1986, and 18–19 July 1994.

¹⁹ Pace Wallace 1979, pp. 115–116. ²⁰ Roesch 1982, pp. 220–221; Sordi 1985, p. 265.

²¹ Krentz 1989, p. 317, who demonstrates no familiarity with the hydraulic details of the battlefield.

slaughter.²² Yet nothing of the sort happened. Furthermore, the Thebans could see the Argives regrouping on the foothills of Mt. Helicon. That means that the usual foliage found along the river beds could not have impeded their sight. The Thebans reached the Argives on Helicon without having encountered any natural obstacle. Moreover, if the Thebans and Argives had sought refuge on the eastern side of the plain of Coronea, nothing would have prevented Agesilaus from advancing unopposed into central and eastern Boeotia. That also did not happen. The only logical conclusion that can be drawn from this information is that the battlefield was bounded on the north by the limit of Lake Copais, or more precisely to the north of the modern Alalcomenae, on the east by Pétra, on the south by the foothills of Mt. Helicon, and on the west by the easternmost of the three streams.

THE BATTLE

The battlefield having been located, one can turn to what occurred there. Although the general course of the battle is clear, many details of it are not. Xenophon apparently had no intention of giving a full account of the action, which makes it all the more difficult properly to interpret later evidence. He writes that Agesilaus and the Spartans held the right wing of their phalanx and that the Orchomenians were stationed on the extreme left wing of the battle line. His allies were thus put into the centre of the phalanx.²³ They consisted of contingents from Phocis, certain Ionians, Aeolians, Hellespontines, and the remnants of the mercenaries of Cyrus who had accompanied him from Asia.²⁴ Although neither Xenophon nor any other source specifically mentions the deployment of the allies, his account of Herippidas' charge and rout of enemy hoplites other than those of the Boeotians and Argives supports this interpretation. Against him the Thebans occupied the right of their line and the Argives the left. Theban allies, including other Boeotians, Argives, Corinthians, Aenianians, Euboeans, and Locrians thus held the centre. Regarding the numbers involved, speculation is useless. Xenophon did not know the numbers involved. The important point is that he reports that in his opinion the opposing lines seemed evenly matched, but that Agesilaus enjoyed a superiority in the number of peltasts.²⁵ Thucydides (5, 68) commented

²² Thuc. 3, 98, 1; Gomme *et al.* 1945–70, vol. II, p. 406. ²³ Xen. *Hell.* 4, 3, 15–16.

²⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 4, 3, 16; Ages. 2, 6, II.

²⁵ Meyer 1902/1975, p. 38; Lazenby 1985, pp. 143–144; Krentz 1989, p. 316.

on a similar situation at the battle of Mantinea in 418,²⁶ when he evaluated the strength of the armies involved simply by observation.²⁷

Xenophon states that the two armies approached each other during a long silence. At about a *stadion* (some 200 m), the Thebans attacked on the run.²⁸ At the range of three *plethera* (about 100 m), the troops under Herippidas rushed to counterattack. That means that the Spartan centre thrust itself forward from its own flanks to grapple with its opponents in its immediate front. Xenophon's account makes it certain that Herippidas' adversaries could have been neither the Thebans nor the Argives. How long this aspect of the battle lasted is unknown. Yet Diodorus (14, 84, 1) and Plutarch (*Ages.* 18, 3) add that the first part of the battle was short.²⁹ In order not to create a gap in his line, Agesilaus apparently followed immediately by charging the Argives, who did not await the attack but fled to the foothills of Mt. Helicon. That means in short that the left of the Theban line dissolved at the outset of the battle, and the centre was hard pressed. Things were as lively on the Theban side of the line, where the Thebans, having inflicted heavy losses on the Orchomenians, broke through to the Spartan baggage train, which they plundered.³⁰ Upon seeing the Argives on Mt. Helicon, the Thebans regrouped, tightened their formation, and attacked Agesilaus' wing itself, a move earlier used in the Peloponnesian War by the Corinthian Aristeus.³¹ Further evidence for the efficacy of this maneuver comes from Thucydides, where the Thebans in 431 drew themselves up in close order against the Plataeans.³² Despite some modern arguments to the contrary, it is clear that the hoplite phalanx was most effective, when it was densely formed.³³

The concluding part of the battle, brief but bloody as it was, held consequences graver and broader than is obvious at first sight.³⁴ Instead of opening ranks in order to attack the Thebans on their exposed side, as was customary, Agesilaus decided to meet them in frontal combat. For the king the decision was not only foolish but also nearly fatal. The Thebans broke through the Spartan line and in the process wounded the king badly.³⁵ They also reached Mt. Helicon after having suffered what Xenophon calls serious losses. While his wounds were being tended, Agesilaus learned from some of his cavalry that about eighty of the

²⁶ Thuc. 5, 68. ²⁷ Cf. Gomme *et al.* 1945–70, vol. IV, pp. 110–117.

²⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 4, 3, 17; *Ages.* 2, 10–11. ²⁹ Diod. Sic. 14, 84, 1; Plut. *Ages.* 18, 3.

³⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 4, 3, 18; *Ages.* 2, 11; Diod. Sic. 14, 84, 1; Plut. *Ages.* 18, 3, and Shipley 1997, pp. 226–240.

³¹ Thuc. 1, 63, 1. ³² Thuc. 2, 4, 1. ³³ Hanson 1989, pp. 171–184.

³⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 4, 3, 19; Plut. *Ages.* 18, 4; Nep. *Ages.* 4, 5; Justin 4, 4, 13.

³⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 4, 3, 20; *Ages.* 2, 12; Plut. *Ages.* 18, 6.

enemy, still armed, were in the temple.³⁶ With great piety and magnanimity Agesilaus ordered these men to be allowed to depart wherever they wished. On the next day the Spartans drew themselves up for battle under the command of the *polemarchos* Gylis, after they had erected a trophy. The Thebans in response sent heralds asking permission to take up their dead under truce. Thereupon, Agesilaus and his army retreated to the Peloponnesus by way of Delphi.³⁷

This brief sketch of the battle leaves at least three immediate problems to be solved. First is the number of casualties that resulted from the fighting; second is the alignment of the phalanxes, already noted; and lastly the identity of those who found sanctuary at the temple of Itonian Athena. Diodorus states that the Boeotians and their allies suffered more than 600 dead and the Spartans 350.³⁸ The round numbers are typical in ancient narratives of battle scenes. Since Xenophon, who describes so vividly the scene of the battlefield after the conflict, gives no figures, one can only say that Diodorus' numbers are possible but cannot be proved.³⁹ Given the fact that so much damage was done to the combined Spartan army, the ratio is implausible. Plutarch's testimony strengthens that conclusion.⁴⁰ Nothing more definite is immediately obvious.

The literary sources and the topographical evidence presented above indicate that the axis of the battle was roughly northwest by east-southeast, astride the high road between Thebes and Lebadea, and not east-west, as supposed by Pritchett.⁴¹ His theory raises some serious questions, not all of them easy to answer. The first is how Agesilaus allowed himself to become trapped with his back to Lake Copais. That is admittedly a weak point, for mistakes are all too common in war.⁴² Nor is it immediately obvious why the Thebans, upon seeing the Argives taking refuge on the foothills of Helicon, did not simply retrace their path through the flank that they had broken. The need to make a circuit of the battlefield and unnecessarily engage the victorious Spartans is not readily explicable. It would have made better sense for them to have kept possession of the booty and to have cut their way again through the remnants of their fleeing opponents. There was nothing to stop them. Indeed, they would have enjoyed to the east such a position that they would have possessed ample room for unhindered maneuver. Yet nothing of the sort took place.

³⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 4, 3, 20; *Ages.* 2, 13; Plut. *Ages.* 19, 2; Paus. 3, 9, 13; cf. 9, 6, 4.

³⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 4, 3, 21; *Ages.* 2, 16; Plut. *Ages.* 19, 4.

³⁸ Diod. Sic. 14, 84, 1-2. ³⁹ Xen. *Ages.* 2, 14.

⁴⁰ Plut. *Ages.* 18, 9. ⁴¹ Pritchett 1965-92, vol. 11, p. 93. ⁴² Cf. Xen. *Hell.* 6, 5, 17-19.

The last piece of evidence that bears upon this question is the identity of the eighty suppliants who took refuge at the sanctuary of Itonian Athena. Although most modern scholars consider these defeated soldiers to be Thebans, it is not immediately clear how they could have been. Xenophon says nothing about their ethnics. Pausanias avers that they were Boeotians.⁴³ If Pausanias is correct, they could have been defeated Orchomenians. That is in fact quite unlikely, for they would have no reason to fear any reprisal from the Spartans. As allies, even as defeated allies, they had no reason to plead for clemency. It is no easier to explain how a significant number of victorious Thebans, who had overwhelmed their opponents and reorganized their formation to face the Spartans, could have found themselves in the vicinity of the sanctuary.

A solution to the problem comes from Polyaeus, whose testimony poses some problems of its own.⁴⁴ Polyaeus states that the eighty were Athenians. The problem becomes a bit more complicated by textual confusion that must be confronted. Although both Wölfflin and Melber print *Thēbaious* in the Teubner text, the manuscripts H, F – which is the archetype – and M read *Athēnaious*. Some historical support for Polyaeus' testimony comes from the Athenian rhetor Lysias, himself a contemporary of these events, who admits that there was general fear among the Athenian contingent.⁴⁵ The most obvious solution to this problem is that Wölfflin and Melber emended a palaeographically sound text for poor historical reasons. This method of philology causes a host of problems. First, the manuscripts prove that Polyaeus meant to write *Athēnaious*, and without due cause for emendation editors only do harm by needlessly emending the text. What such editors do is decide what an author should have written instead of printing what he actually wrote. The custom does justice neither to the ancient author nor to the modern reader. It complicates an effort fairly to comprehend the reliability of the source. Among other things it hinders any attempt to identify the author's sources. In this case Polyaeus may merely have mistaken his facts, or he could equally have provided evidence garnered from a source independent of Xenophon. One admittedly hesitates to accept the testimony of such later writers, but in this case Polyaeus at least makes sense. It is difficult to see how the Athenians, advancing from the south and having been defeated or at least hard pressed, could have reached the temple in the north. According to Pritchett's reconstruction, they could more easily in their flight have joined the Argives on the foothills of Mt. Helicon. One must ask how, according to

⁴³ Paus. 3, 9, 13. ⁴⁴ Polyaeus. 2, 1, 5. ⁴⁵ Lys. 13, 16.

Pritchett's view, the defeated broke through victorious or obstinate enemy lines. Yet had the Athenians been stationed on a roughly north-south axis, they could easily have reached the sanctuary in their flight. Furthermore, Lysias' testimony about the poverty of Athenian morale readily explains why some sought sanctuary at the temple of Itonian Athena rather than join the Argives at Mt. Helicon. They had simply seen enough of the fighting for their tastes.

From these factors one can conclude that the phalanxes of the two armies were drawn up along a line running northwest and southeast roughly from the position of the sanctuary of Itonian Athena to the foothills immediately west of modern Pétra. No other setting can account for the fact that some of the allies of Thebes reached the sanctuary, while the Thebans and Argives themselves gained the lower reaches of Mt. Helicon.⁴⁶

HISTORY AND HISTORIOGRAPHY

It remains to make sense of the tactics and strategy of the campaign, the history and historiography of these events, for a small matter may lead to larger results. Most modern scholars claim that the battle of Coronea was a Spartan victory in terms of both tactics and strategy.⁴⁷ It is impossible to understand this verdict. In terms of tactics the Thebans had broken both wings of the Spartan line. In the process the Spartans and Orchomenians had suffered heavy casualties, and Agesilaus himself had been wounded. The centres of both lines likewise saw heavy fighting but without achieving significant gains. Agesilaus' decision to confront the Thebans frontally instead of attacking their unshielded right flank was a major blunder, which will be discussed below. For different reasons Agesilaus had failed to destroy the two most powerful contingents of the enemy's phalanx. It is true that Xenophon states that after Agesilaus had been wounded, the Spartans finally opened ranks and fell upon the Theban rear, inflicting severe casualties upon them. Given the subsequent course of events, skepticism of Xenophon's testimony in this instance is justified. Plutarch (*Ages.* 18.9) relates that the Thebans were cheered by the results of the battle and considered themselves victorious.⁴⁸ The usual reason for considering

⁴⁶ Contra Pritchett 1965-92, vol. 11, p. 93.

⁴⁷ Anderson 1970, pp. 153-154; Ferrill 1985, p. 158; Strauss 1986, p. 125; C.D. Hamilton 1991, pp. 106-108; Buck 1994, p. 47.

⁴⁸ Plut. *Ages.* 18, 9; Shipley 1997, p. 235.

the battle a Spartan victory is that the Thebans requested permission to gather their dead, and that Agesilaus erected a trophy, a sign of victory. Those two factors are inconsiderable, when compared to the damage wreaked upon the Spartan line. Coronea was for the Spartans undeniably a tactical defeat.

Coronea was also unquestionably a strategic victory for the Thebans. At the end of the battle they were so situated that they barred any further Spartan efforts to penetrate central and eastern Boeotia.⁴⁹ Their position at Pétra demanded that the wounded Agesilaus or his *polemarchos* Gylis fight a battle of attrition with a Spartan army that had suffered much during the battle. Although the survivors dutifully formed a phalanx on the next day, one wonders whether they would have been willing to undertake offensive operations. A modern analogy may help to answer the question. J. Shay, a psychiatrist who had treated Vietnam veterans suffering from combat trauma, comments upon the lack of trust of soldiers in officers when they feel that their commanders have betrayed them through errors of judgment, incompetence, or cowardice.⁵⁰ In this connection Xenophon (*Hell.* 3, 5, 22–23) both in his description of the battle of Haliartus and that of Leuctra lends support to this observation.⁵¹

One indication that Agesilaus had no serious intention of renewing the conflict is his release of the eighty suppliants at the sanctuary. Although Xenophon attributes the decision to the king's piety, Agesilaus had other honorable and conventional options open to him. He could either have held them for ransom or sold them into slavery. His gesture could also have been a small sign to the Athenians that he had no quarrel with them and that instead he preferred to maintain peace with them. If successful, he could thus dissolve the cohesion of the alliance. His decision to release them may even have been a signal to the Thebans that his campaign against them was over. There is also the possibility, admittedly beyond proof, that the Thebans took advantage of their herald's mission to negotiate with Agesilaus about terms of his withdrawal. They had done something analogous with the Athenians at the battle of Delium.⁵²

The situation clearly favored the Thebans. Caught in hostile territory, a shaken Spartan army could either attack the victorious Thebans and the virtually uninjured Argives or retreat. Given these considerations, one can reasonably ask why the Thebans did not themselves counterattack. The most obvious answer is that they had already achieved their primary goals

⁴⁹ Contra Pritchett 1965–92, vol. 11, pp. 94–95; Fine 1983, p. 549; Hammond 1986, p. 458.

⁵⁰ Shay 1994, pp. 6 and 170. ⁵¹ Xen. *Hell.* 3, 5, 22–23; 6, 4, 15. ⁵² Thuc. 4, 97–99.

and had no need of further combat. A similar situation later confronted the Union General George Meade after his victory at the battle of Gettysburg in 1863. Having won a magnificent victory over General Robert E. Lee's Confederate army, Meade had absolutely no desire to risk his gains by counterattacking Lee.⁵³ The Thebans, like the American Federal forces, had won. In the process, the Thebans had dealt their local rivals, the Orchomenians, a severe blow, thus tightening the Thebans' hold on the hegemony of Boeotia. Nor could Agesilaus with his battered army long maintain his position. Even though the Argive contingent was still intact, it had proven itself unreliable during the battle and could promise no surer dependability in any future engagement. The Thebans could afford to allow Agesilaus to save face by permitting him honorably to retreat, just as Meade allowed Lee quietly to retire to northern Virginia. In effect, Agesilaus had failed to achieve any of his military goals: the Thebans and their allies were nearly as strong after Coronea as they were before and the Spartans somewhat weaker. If Coronea constitutes a Spartan victory, one shudders to think what qualifies as a Spartan defeat.

It remains to explain why Xenophon, himself a veteran officer accustomed to lead a large army, called Coronea a Spartan victory. He knew that Agesilaus had blundered. He also knew that the king should have opened his ranks instead of confronting the enemy. In at least four other instances he had approved of such tactics that allowed the enemy through, so that those fleeing could be hit on their exposed side.⁵⁴ It is difficult, then, to understand Tuplin's opposition to the wisdom of the maneuver not taken.⁵⁵ P. Cartledge posits a "misplaced, chivalric" notion to Agesilaus,⁵⁶ yet a simpler solution offers itself. Xenophon's personal admiration of Agesilaus was immense, as witnessed by his representation of him in the *Hellenica* and his *enkōmion* of him.⁵⁷ Xenophon realized that Agesilaus' failure was strategical as well as tactical. In short, Agesilaus was responsible for having lost perhaps the best Spartan chance of winning the Corinthian War at its outset. He also understood why the king, a good soldier, had thrown away discretion. Agesilaus had portrayed himself as the new Agamemnon at the gaudy spectacle at Aulis, but the Boeotians justifiably disrupted the sacrifice.⁵⁸ According to the evidence, the Spartan government was also angered by Theban conduct after the Peloponnesian War.

⁵³ McPherson 1988, pp. 662–663.

⁵⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 4, 2, 22; 4, 11; 5, 13; 5, 2, 42; see also Shay 1994, p. 212 for a modern example.

⁵⁵ Tuplin 1986a, p. 53. ⁵⁶ Cartledge 1987, p. 221.

⁵⁷ Breitenbach, *RE* 11 9.2 (1967), cols. 1574–1575, s.v. Xenophon; Proietti 1987, p. 91.

⁵⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 3, 4, 3–4; Plut. *Ages.* 6, 6–11.

Xenophon avers (*Hell.* 3, 5, 1; *Ages.* 1, 8) that Agesilaus wanted to destroy the empire that had earlier attacked Greece.⁵⁹ These ambitions were dashed, when the Thebans conspired to ignite the Corinthian War, which required his return to Greece.⁶⁰ Xenophon continues the image by comparing Agesilaus' march through Greece with that of Xerxes.⁶¹ At Coronea Agesilaus at last had the opportunity to exact personal revenge on those who had thwarted his ambition. He tried and failed.

There was still another irony waiting in the future: the Peace of Antalcidas. Xenophon, having in a small way dabbled in Persian politics, and Agesilaus, wishing to destroy Persia, both watched helplessly as Artaxerxes imposed his own peace terms on the Greeks, the Spartans included, in 386.⁶² Although modern historians of Classical antiquity should not pretend to be prophets and thus to say that Agesilaus' defeat was the single most important factor in Sparta's inability to win the Corinthian War unaided, no one can reasonably deny that at Coronea Agesilaus threw away the best opportunity for the Spartans to win the war at the outset. When Xenophon claims that Agesilaus won the battle, he was simply covering over unpleasant facts for the sake of an old friend.

⁵⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 3, 5, 1; *Ages.* 1, 8. ⁶⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 3, 5, 3–4; *Ages.* 1, 36; Plut. *Ages.* 15, 8.

⁶¹ Xen. *Ages.* 2, 1; Plut. *Ages.* 16, 1–20.

⁶² *SdA* 11, no. 242; Ryder 1965, pp. 25–36; Jehne 1994, pp. 48–56.

*The King's Peace, alliance, and
Phoebidas' strike (382 BC)*

The great battles of the Corinthian War admirably served the Persian king's purposes. Those Greek states opposed to Sparta had won some of the big encounters but not the war. In the process all of Greece weakened and distracted itself. Nonetheless, Thebes had re-established its authority in most of Boeotia, and Athens threatened to rebuild its fifth-century empire. The astute Spartan Antalcidas realized that some sort of victory remained possible only when his countrymen abandoned their anti-Persian policy. With Spartan blessing and indeed encouragement he arranged with King Artaxerxes a solution that for them both promised a satisfactory end of the war. In 386 the King sent his satrap Tiribazus to present the Greeks with his peace demands. The Spartans duly summoned all of the belligerents to send delegates to Sparta to hear and ratify the document. The number and identities of the Greek embassies that thereby convened are unknown. Yet in addition to those of the major powers, many other Greek states had good reason to participate not only because to some extent all had become involved in the nine-year conflict but also because the entire outcome would affect them all. Territorial disputes would surely arise, and no significant party would wish to remain voiceless in an assembly intended to resolve these matters.¹

When Agesilaus as king, not Antalcidas despite his diplomatic success, convened the session at Sparta, Tiribazus presented the King's seal and read his message. Only an epitome of it exists, but it stated (Xen. *Hell.* 5, 1, 31):

King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the cities in Asia be his and, of the islands, Clazomenae and Cyprus; the other Greek cities, both great and small, should be left autonomous except for Lemnus, Imbrus, and Scyros, which should belong to Athens, as in the past. Whichever side refuses the peace, against these I shall wage war with those who agree, both by land and by sea and with ships and money.

¹ Beloch 1912–27, vol. III.1, pp. 93–95; vol. III.2, pp. 224–226; Ryder 1965, pp. 34–35; Cartledge 1987, p. 369; Urban 1991, p. 102; Jehne 1994, pp. 31–37; Shipley 1997, pp. 274–276.

The decree also included other clauses, including the removal of garrisons and the implied disarmament of the Greeks. Normal parts of peace-making, these stipulations fell under the rubrics of autonomy and holding one's own possessions. They aimed at peace, security, and defense, not aggression. The most controversial clause, quite surprisingly, proved to be the one entailing autonomy for all Greek cities, both great and small. Hardly a new concept, it can be traced back at least to 418, when Sparta and Argos included it in their treaty. In 386 the King simply extended it to all Greeks, whether or not they had participated in the Corinthian War. He consequently stood as the guarantor of a Greek peace that he intended to prevail as the normal political condition of Greece, Asia Minor, and the Aegean basin.²

The autonomy clause merits a further word. It by no means forbade free alliances of its members so long as they remained defensive in nature. Mutual security helped to ensure the clause giving the Greeks the right to hold their own possessions, as a means of both avoiding war and seeking help in the face of aggression. The right to this diplomatic instrument was normal and time-honored, its terms specifically stated and normally officially published. Nonetheless, Agesilaus now used it as the weapon with which to dissolve the Boeotian Confederacy, despite the fact that most Boeotian cities had joined it voluntarily. They did so for at least three reasons. First, union provided them with a greater voice in broader political affairs than they could ever have enjoyed alone. Next, it included them in a federal organization capable of maintaining their security. Lastly, they actively participated in the functioning of the league, as the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* so ably demonstrates. For all that, the Thebans and other Boeotians acceded to Agesilaus' demands, which of itself set a precedent for subsequent Spartan attitudes towards the very nature of federalism.³

So, for the first time in eighteen years Greece enjoyed a general peace, but the question remained whether it would endure. History has often taught that it is easier to win a war than a peace. Although peace supposedly resolved the disputes that the battles had settled, thus allowing all states to return to normal, stable relations, the very meaning of these ideas lay beyond Agesilaus' comprehension. From 386 to 378 he used the treaty to

² *SDA* II, no. 242, to which add Plut. *Artax.* 21, 5; schol. *Dem.* 20, 54 (Dilts); cf. Olmstead 1931, p. 614. Lewis 1977, p. 147, echoed by Badian 1991, p. 37, sees this treaty primarily as the "settling of a bilateral war" between the King and the Spartans. Neither unfortunately realizes the full significance of the clause *tas de allas Hellenidas poleis kai mikras kai megalas autonomas afeinai* (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1, 31). Ending a bilateral war formed only a part of this treaty.

³ *Hell. Oxy.* 19 (Chambers); see also Bruce 1967, pp. 102–109; Hansen 1995; Keen 1996; Beck 1997a.

seek revenge upon old rivals, to discipline allies whom he considered recalcitrant, and to interfere in the aspirations of others who had honored their treaty obligations. Proof of this dire verdict comes readily from his treatment of the Mantineans. The Spartans had made various complaints about their disloyalty during the Corinthian War.⁴ The King's Peace should have resolved all such issues. Spartan intervention in the affairs of Phlius poses a somewhat different problem, but some similarities echo the experience of Mantinea. Torn by years of internal strife among the oligarchy, one faction appealed to Sparta for help against its opponents. The suppliants included among their arguments that while they were in power during the Corinthian War, they had shown undeniable loyalty to Sparta. Their opponents, however, had refused to follow Sparta's lead. Even if true, the King's Peace should also have put that problem into the past. The King, or by delegation the Spartans, should also have dealt with the current situation according to the terms of the treaty.⁵ Yet Agesilaus prevailed upon the Spartans to intervene, which in itself violated the Peace. Agesilaus, above all others, had realized that the Peace could serve as an excellent tool to forge Spartan ascendancy in Greece.

The Spartans cannot bear any responsibility for the origins of the next pertinent incident. In 382 events in the north forced them to turn their attention to the Chalcidice. Affairs in the north had long been unsettled, but the Olynthians had embarked upon the creation of the Chalcidian League, a bold and original federal government. Not all of their neighbors agreed with their plans. Acanthus and Apollonia, two of the largest cities in the Chalcidice, sent envoys to Sparta bearing complaints that Olynthus attempted to destroy both their ancestral constitutions and their autonomy. They also painted a picture of the danger that Olynthian power posed to the Spartans themselves. They included as part of their warning that even then ambassadors from Thebes and Athens were present in Olynthus, to which the Olynthians had responded by voting in return to send them ambassadors. These envoys had the duty to negotiate an alliance.⁶

Some of these allegations receive support from independent sources. The Thebans had indeed co-operated with the Olynthians to overthrow

⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 5, 2, 1–7; Diod. Sic. 15, 5, 1–5; 12, 1–2; Plut. *Pel.* 4, 5–8; Paus. 8, 8, 6–9; 12, 7; Polyæn. 2, 25; Fougères 1898, pp. 415–416; Cartledge 1987, pp. 259–260; Tuplin 1993, pp. 87–90; Georgiadou 1997, pp. 80–82; Stylianou 1998, pp. 188–191.

⁵ From this incident, when included with that of Mantinea, it becomes obvious that the King cared very little about who enforced his peace in Greece, or how, so long as it was done effectively.

⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 5, 2, 11–19; Diod. Sic. 15, 13, 1–3; 19, 2–3; Aelian, *VH* 6, 1, 7; Zahrnt 1971, pp. 80–97; Hammond and Griffith 1972–9, vol. 11, pp. 172–175.

Amyntas, the king of Macedonia.⁷ Contemporary epigraphy suggests that Athens at this time had also concluded a formal treaty with Olynthus.⁸ The details remain. The Apollonians and Acanthians had treaty rights on their side in that no one could legally require them to abandon their preferred constitutions. In its relations with them Olynthus clearly stood in the wrong, but that constituted only part of the problem and not necessarily the most important part. Instead it can reasonably be argued, as the ambassadors stressed, that the heart of the case involved the growth of Olynthian power. The new relations among Olynthus, Thebes, and Athens constituted a palpable and distasteful threat to Spartan interests. As early as 384 Athens had taken the first step to retrieve its status in the Greek world, when it concluded an alliance with Chios.⁹

The clauses of the treaty specifically state that they adhered to all of the agreements and treaties of the Greeks then in existence sworn to by the King, the Spartans, and all other Greeks. The alliance supported these ideals and professed good intentions toward all. The Athenians and the Chians took great pains to emphasize that their actions supported the existing Peace, and yet no one could reasonably doubt that Athens had begun to play a larger role in Greek affairs.

The greatest import of these Chalcidian speeches, as Xenophon has summarized them, lay in their several integral parts. The ambassadors emphasized their right to autonomy, which the King's Peace protected. They next pointed out the danger to Sparta of a Chalcidian federation that would create a great power in the northwestern Aegean. Its very concentration of strength, they claimed, threatened Spartan interests without, however, explaining how distant Olynthus could harm Sparta. They did not define the nature of this vague and undefined threat except in its relation to Thebes and Athens. Nor had the Olynthians violated any treaty by negotiating with them. That accusation was fustian. The very subject was irrelevant to a Thebano-Olynthian alliance. Their reference to Spartan

⁷ Although Grenfell and Hunt, the original editors of the papyrus, opine that the fragment proves that the Thebans had already concluded an alliance with Olynthus, that verdict collides with the evidence of Xen. *Hell.* 5, 2, 15. The evidence suggests that formal negotiations were in progress at the time without indicating that any formal treaties had as yet been concluded. See also Busolt and Swoboda 1926, p. 1504; Zahrnt 1971, pp. 122–127.

⁸ *IG* 11² 36 = *SdA* 11, no. 250. On the inscription “the Chalcidians” can confidently be read (line 2) but no mention of Olynthus itself can reasonably be restored. The exact date of the treaty has been disputed.

⁹ *IG* 11² 34 = *SdA* 11, no. 248 = Rhodes–Osborne, no. 22. The wording *kai boi allo[i Hellēnes]* (line 12) again argues against Lewis’ and Badian’s notion (see above n. 2) that the peace governed only the belligerents of the Corinthian War.

efforts to prevent Thebes from reuniting Boeotia proved far closer to the mark. Nor were the two related, yet the ambassadors adroitly linked Olynthian federal aspirations to those that they associated, without proof, with Thebes. The long tradition of Boeotian federalism gave life to their implication, but in fact nothing even suggests that the Thebans had acted in any way contrary to the Peace or to ordinary Greek diplomatic practices. The emphasis of the ambassadors on Atheno-Olynthian relations proved equally poignant. They insisted upon the abundance of timber in the Chalcidice, the raw material of shipbuilding, and the wealth of the area that could finance a fleet. They warned that this new consolidation of power, if realized, would endanger Sparta by land and by sea. Yet they could point to no actual Athenian increase in naval strength. Athenian dealings with Olynthus had by no means violated the Peace.

The speeches as given exhibit a splendid Machiavellian spark. The subject of Thebes and Boeotia was irrelevant, but it constituted a delicate subject in Sparta. The very topic of federalism, whether Olynthian or Boeotian, did not automatically relate to the Peace. Agesilaus' desire to disband the Boeotian Confederacy in 386 reflected his desires, but nothing can be found in the extant version of the treaty to support his demand. Individual states can voluntarily agree to cede some of their autonomy to a federal government for a variety of reasons. The very fact that they do so of their own accord reflects their autonomy. The point about federalism applied only to Olynthus, which had supposedly demanded that some of its neighbors embrace the principle against their wishes. The subject of ample timber and Athenian interests in it likewise proves irrelevant, except that it also aroused Spartan fear. The Athenians and Olynthians had every right to arrange mutually agreeable terms concerning any commodity that they desired. That too accorded with the Peace. The recent Atheno-Chian alliance may have fuelled Spartan concerns, but nothing legally prevented the Athenians from buying or the Olynthians from selling wood. In this respect, however, the envoys' allusion to this unconsummated possibility was inspired. It raised the spectre of a new Athenian naval empire, which the Spartans greatly feared. They could have devised no better way of goading Sparta into action against its erstwhile enemies. They also effectively avoided the legalities of the situation. Nothing in the Peace prohibited free alliances among the Greeks. All sovereign states that faithfully adhered to the Peace enjoyed the right to make any treaty, commercial or political, that did not violate it. Only the Olynthian suppression of the autonomy of some of its neighbors constituted a breach of the Peace. On these terms neither Thebes nor Athens was at fault. Yet the issue of free

alliance would figure prominently in the subsequent illegal actions of Phoebidas and Sphodrias, both of whom enjoyed the misguided support of Agesilaus and the Spartan government itself.

The Spartans and their allies duly endorsed the Chalcidian request, whereupon the latter emphasized the urgency for a quick, indeed immediate, response. They repeatedly appealed to the Spartans to act with all speed. This fact assumes great importance. They insisted that the Olynthian threat posed such an immediate danger that no time should be lost in thwarting it.¹⁰ The Acanthian delegates recommended that the Spartans send a vanguard to the north, while the main field army mustered. They suggested that this show of force would solidify local resistance to Olynthus and cause its allies to hesitate. The Spartans agreed by sending Eudamidas and 2,000 men immediately to Thrace. They next instructed Phoebidas speedily to bring the rest of the army to Eudamidas' support. No source indicates how long it took Phoebidas to discharge his orders. In the meantime, however, Eudamidas had reached the north, and Phoebidas had assembled the main army. Perhaps not even two weeks elapsed before Phoebidas left Laconia. He could have taken several routes from the Megarid to Boeotia, but the evidence suggests that he marched through the modern Megalo Vathychori overland to a point above Plataea. At the crest of the mountain the landscape spreads below, providing a clear view of a road from Plataea past Thespieae to the foot of Mt. Helicon in the distance. The route still runs straight across the Boeotian plains as it did in antiquity. The land offers no impediment to the free movement of a single walker or a large army. To the right, or the east, stretches another road, this one to Thebes, hidden from view by a ridge. With the direct road to the north and to the relief of Eudamidas open to him, Phoebidas nevertheless turned aside to Thebes. He arrived there at the time of the Thesmophoria, a religious festival in which the Theban women celebrated the proper rites in the Cadmea, while the men relaxed in the lower city.¹¹ Local politics then stood between the pro-Spartan faction of Leontiades and the pro-Athenian and anti-Spartan followers of Hismenias. Leontiades and Phoebidas immediately devised a plan to seize Thebes during the religious festival and subsequently hold it as a Spartan subject. The plot succeeded admirably. Phoebidas occupied the Cadmea, arrested Hismenias, and

¹⁰ The appearance of *tachu* ("fastly," "quickly") three times in four lines Xen. *Hell.* 5, 2, 23 proves the point.

¹¹ Menelaus *FGrH* 384 F 4; Plut. *Mor.* 773c; Paus. 9, 2, 1–7; Grundy 1894, p. 7; Frazer 1898, vol. V, p. 7; personal observations of 30 January 1971 and 10–11, 16 October 1998. For the Thesmophoria, see Schachter 1981–94a, vol. 1, pp. 165–168.

put Leontiades into power. Thebes had by afternoon become a Spartan captive.¹² Although a number of pious Spartans expressed outrage at Phoebidas' conduct, Agesilaus successfully defended the culprit from criminal charges, but they apparently relieved him of duty; and Teleutias, brother of Agesilaus, assumed command of the expedition against Olynthus.

Such are the alleged facts of this incident. No one should reasonably conclude from them that any of this happened by chance. The first fact tells much. Phoebidas had no need to make the detour to Thebes. An easy and direct road toward the destination where he was so anxiously expected awaited him. Along it at Plataea and Thespieae he could find all of the provisions that he might have needed. Nothing stood in his way; and if speed were so urgent, logic demanded that he take this route. The Spartans also knew of the factions in Thebes and could depend upon Leontiades to assist them in a mutually profitable venture. He could thereby enjoy autocratic rule in Thebes, while keeping his countrymen in the Spartan camp. He could also do so in a way not open to him and his Spartan friends by the clauses of the King's Peace. The recent and public relations of the Thebans, Athenians, and Olynthians provided another incentive to action. The Thesmophoria itself added another advantage. The timing of this public festival was generally known, as was its ritual. It provided the ideal opportunity to strike. The subsequent career of Phoebidas adds its own curiosity. If he ever reached Olynthus, he did so not as commander of the Spartan forces. As noted above, Agesilaus' brother assumed that command. Perhaps Phoebidas served as a junior officer or held a lesser command elsewhere. Neither Xenophon nor any other source mentions him until his posting as harmost at Thespieae in succession to Sphodrias.¹³ There he remained safely away from Sparta but in a responsible position. The benefits of his deed are likewise obvious. It removed Thebes as a danger to Sparta. Occupation of the city also meant that the Thebans could not block the main road from Megara to Olynthus. No longer would any Spartan commander need fear an attack on his eastern flank. Spartan occupation of Thebes also isolated Athens from immediate military and diplomatic support. Phoebidas' seizure of the Cadmea obviously and effectively sealed the end of any diplomatic ties between Thebes, Athens, and Olynthus. If Attica were to become a fortress, it must now stand alone.

¹² Xen. *Hell.* 5, 2, 27–31; Plut. *Pel.* 5; *Ages.* 23; *Mor.* 575f; Diod. *Sic.* 15, 20; Androton *FGrH* 324 F 50.

¹³ Xen. *Hell.* 5, 2, 24–32; 5, 4, 41–46; Diod. *Sic.* 15, 19, 3; 20, 1–3; 33, 5–6; Stylianou 1998, pp. 217–218; Plut. *Ages.* 34, 7; *Pel.* 5, 2–5; Nep. *Pel.* 12; Polyæn. 2, 3, 1; Beloch 1912–27, vol. III.1, pp. 104–105; Cartledge 1987, pp. 147–148; Georgiadou 1997, pp. 91–94.

The last remaining question involves the identity of the architect of this incident. Phoebidas alone can too easily be blamed for it. Yet Spartan commanders rarely received praise for their initiative, and Phoebidas never suffered punishment for his actions. Agesilaus instead stands as the villain of the piece. He successfully defended an officer who was guilty of perfidy, one who had violated the King's Peace by destroying Theban autonomy, and who broke the oaths to the gods, thereby committing sacrilege. Even Xenophon, no friend of Thebes but an avid admirer of both Agesilaus and Sparta, stood appalled by these events. Those who see Agesilaus as a devout man must account for his cynical disregard of religion. He explained it himself in terms of expediency by openly admitting that he would do everything possible to advance Spartan power.¹⁴ Only Agesilaus could have ordered Phoebidas to make his apparent detour, only he could have persuaded the Spartans to accept the outcome, only he could have saved his officer from punishment, and only he could have subsequently obtained for him a command in Thespieae well away from Sparta yet near the major scene of operations at Thebes.¹⁵ The last remaining question regarding Phoebidas' adventure pertains to its purpose. A reasonable conclusion points to the verdict that Sparta did not intend Phoebidas to reach Olynthus at all, or at least not in the position of commander-in-chief. Teleutias would do that for him. Agesilaus so arranged it that Phoebidas' sole target was Thebes, not Olynthus. Once Phoebidas had set the main army in motion and reduced the immediate target, a far more important officer would assume command of the larger operations with enhanced expectation of success.

¹⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 5, 2, 32; 4, 31–32; Cartledge 1987, pp. 296–297; Stylianou 1998, pp. 217–218.

¹⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 5, 4, 38; 5, 4, 42; Diod. Sic. 15, 21, 2; 33, 6; 16, 29, 2; Plut. *Pel.* 15, 6; Rice 1974, p. 178; Rice 1975; Cartledge 1987, p. 271; Buckler 2003, pp. 198–199.

*Sphodrias' raid and the evolution of the
Athenian League*

Sometime between April and May at the latest in 378 BC occurred a bizarre and seemingly minor event that held momentous consequences for the rest of the fourth century. One night the Spartan officer Sphodrias led his troops from the Boeotian city of Thespieae across Mt. Cithaeron onto the Attic plain of Eleusis. There he ravaged the land in time of peace before retracing his steps. The outrage infuriated the Athenians, who demanded satisfaction from the Spartan authorities. They too expressed anger and mortification at the incident that they professed not to have authorized and certainly did not condone. Not wishing a confrontation with Sparta, the Athenians announced that they would consider punishment of Sphodrias to be satisfactory compensation for the wrong. The Spartan government duly indicted the culprit, who nonetheless refused to budge from Thespieae. He did so under the protection of his friend king Cleombrotus, but the Spartan government, undeterred, brought him to trial in his absence. Sphodrias received during the proceedings the surprising and unexpected support of king Agesilaus, who won his acquittal. Stunned and enraged, the Athenians declared that the Spartans had broken the King's Peace and began openly to build the Athenian League, which would play a prominent role in Greek affairs until Philip's victory at Chaeronea in 338.¹

Everything about this incident appears strange and resistant to explanation. Questions abound, such as why Sphodrias launched this raid, what he hoped to achieve, whether he acted alone or under orders, and why Agesilaus successfully defended him. If in antiquity the truth was known, the literary sources do not satisfactorily record it. Yet other contemporary sources, namely Athenian inscriptions, provide the best explanation of this odd affair.

¹ Xen. *Hell.* 5, 4, 20–24; Callisthenes *FGrH* 124 F 9; Diod. *Sic.* 15, 29, 5–6; Plut. *Pel.* 14, 2–6; *Ages.* 24, 4–9; MacDonald 1972; Cawkwell 1973; Rice 1974, pp. 111–119; Kallet-Marx 1985; Cartledge 1987, pp. 136–137; C. D. Hamilton 1989; Shipley 1997, pp. 283–291; Georgiadou 1997, pp. 137–138.

Thespieae literally provides the place to start. After a desultory invasion of Boeotia in January 378, king Cleombrotus left Sphodrias and a garrison at Thespieae, located some fifteen kilometers from Thebes, sixty from Athens, and seventy from the Piraeus.² According to the sources the Thebans bribed Sphodrias to invade Attica for the purpose of seizing the Piraeus, which was then without gates. Successfully wooed, Sphodrias led his troops southwards at nightfall, planning to reach the Piraeus before daybreak. Dawn actually caught him in the plain of Thria, near Eleusis. Instead of quietly withdrawing, he ravaged the countryside. Nothing about these events makes sense as the ancient sources present them. One should admittedly never rule out the element of stupidity in human affairs, but several factors argue that in this case Sphodrias was not a complete fool but instead acted under orders.

Even though no one today can accurately assess Sphodrias' intelligence, he certainly knew enough from personal experience to realize that he could not reach the Piraeus from Thespieae in even twelve hours. As a member of Cleombrotus' army he had marched from the Megarid over Mt. Cithaeron in January 378. He knew at first hand the distances and the nature of the terrain involved. He could reasonably expect the roads to be obstructed either by snow or mud.³ The nature of the route involved dispels any notion that Sphodrias acted from ignorance. Although from Thespieae to Plataea the road runs across gently rolling land, Mt. Cithaeron next stands as a considerable impediment. It daunts the walker with a long and steep ascent of some 4,500 meters before reaching the summit. Afterwards the road leads past a col along a way that is somewhat narrow, but not confined, through an easy, pleasant, and gentle upland route. The descent onto the Thriasian plain is less steep than the ascent before reaching sea level. Having already accompanied Cleombrotus along this route a few months earlier, Sphodrias obviously knew it, its surrounding terrain, and the physical conditions that he could expect. He knew that over it he could never reach the Piraeus before sunset. Furthermore, when modern scholars compute the linear distances involved, they seem to ignore a simple fact that should be obvious to everyone. Cithaeron is a mountain over which a traveller, or in this case a harmost and his troops, must ascend and descend instead of walking a straight, level line. In short, the entire length of this

² See Talbert 2000, map 57.

³ Xen. *Hell.* 5, 4, 14–17. Gomme 1937, p. 22, comments that snow frequently blocks the road between Eleutherae and Eleusis. Personal experience of 30 January 1971 proved that even without snow, mud would have made walking bad enough.

route stretches far longer than even the approximate forty-seven linear kilometers of a flat plain.⁴ He knew also that his march would not go unobserved, for he used main roads that merchants travelled.⁵ Once at Thria he could have covered himself, when detected, by offering any number of excuses that no one would necessarily have believed but might have accepted.⁶ Yet he plundered the countryside, a flagrant and unprovoked act of aggression. Viewed dispassionately, he seemed to have courted detection and then acted intentionally and unnecessarily to antagonize the Athenians. Rather than his episode being a random act by an officer beyond the control of logic and his authorities, he acted with a purpose and under orders.

Contemporary Athenian inscriptions provide the purpose and the answer. Since 384 Athens had begun to restore its power within the limits of the King's Peace. The Atheno-Chian alliance (*IG* 11² 34 = Rhodes–Osborne, no. 20; *IG* 11² 35) began the sequence. Concluded in 384, it stipulated adherence to the King's Peace and all current treaty obligations (34, lines 6–8; 35, lines 2–6). Athens and Chios promised each other *autonomia* and *eleutheria* ("autonomy" and "freedom"), the terms of the accord being inscribed on a stone to be erected on the Athenian acropolis (lines 20–21). The pact created a bilateral defensive alliance within the framework of the Peace. The next document, *IG* 11² 36 = Tod, no. 119, records an Athenian alliance with Olynthus, or more accurately with the western Chalcidians of Thrace. Little of it survives, but nothing connects it with the Chian treaty, nor does it include a synod. In its wake comes the curious *IG* 11² 40, an alliance between Athens and Thebes with some odd but instructive details. Line 1 mentions seventeen oath receivers, which strongly indicates that twelve Athenians and five of their allies had entered into this agreement.⁷ Lines 15–16 refer to a "stele of the allies," which can be compared to *IG* 11² 41, line 7 ("according as the Chians"), a reference to *IG* 11² 34, lines 20–21. Proof comes from line 17, which mentions the stele of the Atheno-Chian alliance on the acropolis. This clause proves that the Thebans swore on the same terms as the Chians to harmonize with the previous agreements. Line 11 supports the idea that

⁴ Menelaus *FGrH* 384 F 4; Plut. *Mor.* 773c; Grundy 1901, pp. 446–447; Hammond 1954; Pritchett 1965–92, vol. 111, pp. 99–101; Gray 1989, pp. 306–326; Ober 1985, pp. 118–126; van de Maele 1989; Munn 1993, p. 146; personal observations of 30 January 1971 and 10–11, 16 October 1998.

⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 5, 4, 21; Plut. *Pel.* 14, 6.

⁶ A modern analogy comes from the Japanese sinking of the USS Panay in China in November 1937. Everyone knew that the attack was intentional, but a formal apology from the Japanese government averted war: Morison 1954, vol. 111, pp. 16–18.

⁷ Buckler 1971b.

Athens had already begun to build a group of allies, for a Mytilenean was invited *epi deipnon* (“to an official meal for citizens”), and not *epi xenia* (“to an official meal for foreigners”). Once again, no allusion to a synod yet appears. The mason carved the stone hastily, as witnessed by the fact that many of the *hastae* of the letters were not inscribed. That suggests that still greater events were even then underway. Despite the mention of five others in addition to the Athenians, no reference to a synod appears on the stone.

Next comes the Athenian alliance with Byzantium (*IG* II² 41 = Tod, no. 121), wherein lines 5–7 state that “the people of Byzantium shall be allies of the Athenians and the other allies . . . according as the Chians.” Reference to other allies proves that more than the Chians were involved, but the *stoichēdon*-count does not allow any restoration of an allied *synedrion* or *synodos*. There emerges the picture of a group of like-minded allies who agreed upon a common goal according to a common principle.⁸ Yet still nothing suggests a formal institutional bond between them. Matters change when Methymna (*IG* II² 42 = Rhodes–Osborne, no. 23) joined “the *synedroi* of the allies.” The inscription provides instructive details about the course of this diplomatic evolution. First, the Methymnaeans were already Athenian allies (lines 4–6, 6–8, 13–15). Having concluded certain treaty obligations to the Athenians, they next bound themselves to the same terms with the other Athenian allies. They were thus obviously not the first to join the union. Their agreement is to be inscribed as are those of the others, who are to swear the same oaths to the Methymneans. Lines 20–21 mention *synedroi* aboard the ships, confirmation that even then they were all building a league by attracting other states to the alliance. Additional weight for this conclusion comes from the fact that the stonemason who carved *IG* II² 42 also inscribed *IG* II² 43 from 377.⁹ Line 8 confirms the foundation of a general alliance in agreement with the provisions already sworn by other allies. Lastly, in *IG* II² 43 lines 43–46 there stand “before the *synedroi* of the allies” and “the other half [of the money] shall belong to the *koinon* of the allies.” The allies have now created a formal *synedrion* not found earlier; and as *IG* II² 44 = Tod, no. 124, lines 25–26 testify, the allies had already begun to pass *dogmata*. The Chalcidians of Euboea entered into this treaty with Athens and its existing allies shortly after the creation of the Athenian League. They concluded the pact in the same year, when the Athenian Aristoteles was still secretary. Proof of their

⁸ See also Pritchett 1972, pp. 164–169, for an inscription of 379/8 mentioning (line 8) unidentified allies.

⁹ Tod, p. 59.

later inclusion comes from the fact that a mason other than the one who produced the original text of *IG* 11² 43 carved their names.

These documents prove two stages in the evolution of the Athenian League, in the first of which individual states allied themselves with Athens on the same terms as had the Chians and Thebans. Next, a number of other states created their broad alliance on equal terms (*IG* 11² 43 lines 24–25) to create a formal league that provided them with rights, responsibilities, and an organ for joint consultation independent of Athens itself.

The rapid coalescence of this League explains Sphodrias' conduct. From nearby Thespieae he watched the creation of a new bloc of power within the Aegean world, one not necessarily friendly to Sparta but one that remained within the stipulations of the King's Peace. Only naivety demands the conclusion that he acted alone and without authority, for personal initiative was not the hallmark of Spartan officers, no matter how ambitious they were. The sudden growth of Athenian naval power and new diplomatic agreements provide the key to these events, and thus the emphasis on the Piraeus. Sphodrias' goal was not to seize the harbor, which was physically impossible, but to create an incident, which succeeded beyond expectation.¹⁰ Someone needed to do something to halt or at least curtail Athenian efforts to rebuild its power in the Aegean. Only a desperate measure might succeed. Here Cleombrotus finds his place in the incident. Alarmed by this burst of Athenian diplomatic activity, he decided to curb it, and only Sphodrias could serve as his agent. Having traversed the ground himself, he knew that whatever the conditions, his harmost could never reach the Piraeus in time to seize it. Instead he ordered Sphodrias to make a demonstration to illustrate the striking power of the Spartan army and to remind the Athenians of its proximity. Such a move also reminded the Athenians that the Piraeus in the absence of gates remained vulnerable to attack by land. Thus, Sphodrias' raid can most reasonably be seen as an act of intimidation.¹¹ Yet the whole attempt to cow the Athenians failed in the worst way for several reasons. First, the Piraeus with its stout walls presented a formidable obstacle to landward attack, all the more so with armed Athenians within hailing distance. Only a thrust by sea held any hope for success, as Teleutias had already demonstrated and Alexander of

¹⁰ A philological consideration also strongly indicates that Sphodrias himself never intended to attack the Piraeus. Xenophon often uses *pros poieō* (as in *Hell.* 5, 4, 20) to mean to pretend to go to one place but actually to go elsewhere: *Hell.* 5, 4, 48; *Anab.* 1, 3, 14; 4, 3, 20; *Eq.* 5, 12, and often to mean to pretend: *Hell.* 5, 2, 29; *Cyr.* 2, 2, 5; 2, 2, 12; 5, 3, 12; 6, 1, 39; *Eq.* 5, 15; *Hier.* 2, 16, which disproves Badian 1995, pp. 89–90, who claims that no ancient source doubts Sphodrias' stated intention.

¹¹ Cawkwell 1973, pp. 55–56; Shipley 1997, pp. 288–291.

Pherae would do later.¹² Cleombrotus found it easier to order Sphodrias than to muster the fleet. Next, the newly concluded treaty with Thebes provided the Athenians with a much-needed land power excellently situated to lend immediate support against any further Spartan incursions.

In the event Cleombrotus had miscalculated. Instead of intimidation, Sphodrias' raid provoked Athenian defiance. Today the tangible result is the stone bearing the "Charter of the Athenian League" (*IG* 11² 43). On its face the Athenians explained why they legitimately began to rebuild a league so that the Greeks could find protection from Spartan abuse of the King's Peace. They and their allies, not the Spartans, promised liberty, autonomy, and security to the Greeks. The Thebans and the Athenians could now defend their land borders, and the islanders could contribute their strength to an Athenian fleet capable of challenging the Spartan navy.

Agesilaus provides the last problem to this curious event. Well known as an opponent to Cleombrotus' policies, he nonetheless threw his entire prestige into the defense of Sphodrias, his rival's known friend. Although Plutarch (*Ages.* 5, 1–2) comments upon Agesilaus' willingness to forgive enemies, thereby winning their support, any reasonable explanation demands more than political expediency and sentiment. Here Thebes provides the clue. Though doubtless innocent of the affair, Agesilaus found Sphodrias' actions an excellent justification for the renewal of the war against his hated Theban enemies. In the campaign that he soon led, Agesilaus struck not at Athens, despite its success in building a strong league, but at Thebes.¹³ He helped to acquit Sphodrias to mollify Cleombrotus and to forge a united front finally to crush the Thebans. Sphodrias' exploits provided him with an excuse to do precisely what he had long desired.

Sphodrias' raid proved to be a much more colossal diplomatic catastrophe than a military one. It provoked the resistance of many Greeks not so much to the King's Peace, but rather to Sparta's enforcement of it. After Sphodrias' escapade the Spartans never again successfully used the cloak of the Peace to cover their imperial designs on Greece. Moreover, the raid accelerated the growth of the Athenian League and the re-establishment of the Boeotian Confederacy. It proved to be a blunder that Sparta never corrected. One result was the vibrant Athenian League that flourished during much of the remaining years of the fourth century; another was Leuctra.¹⁴

¹² Xen. *Hell.* 5, 1, 21–22; Polyae. 6, 2, 2; Garland 1987, pp. 40–42.

¹³ Xen. *Hell.* 5, 4, 38–58; Plut. *Ages.* 26; *Pel.* 15; Munn 1993, pp. 152–172; Shipley 1997, pp. 300–305.

¹⁴ Busolt 1873–5, pp. 853–866; Accame 1941, pp. 143–225; Cargill 1981, pp. 189–196; Beck 1997a, pp. 244–249.

PART II

Hegemony

The re-establishment of the boiōtarchia (378 BC)

In 386 Agesilaus used the autonomy clause of the King's Peace to justify the dissolution of the Boeotian Confederacy.¹ Or, in the words of Xenophon, who was hardly an admirer of Thebes, the Spartans "made the Boeotians autonomous from the Thebans." One need not, however, take Xenophon's wording as evidence against the existence of a Boeotian Confederacy before the King's Peace. Since Xenophon was quite reluctant to acknowledge the federal principle in Boeotian politics, he routinely refers instead to Theban domination of Boeotia.² Perhaps the closest he comes to admitting the existence of federalism in Boeotia is in a speech which he ascribes to Cleigenes of Acanthus (*Hell.* 5, 2, 16), in which the ambassador in 383 reminded the Spartans of their care not to allow Boeotia to be united. Xenophon's interpretation of the Boeotian Confederacy as a Theban Hegemony is tendentious, as is proven by the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, which gives a less biased and more detailed picture of the Boeotian federal government and the state of political affairs in Boeotia before 386.³ Furthermore, the Oxyrhynchus historian indicates that the constitution that he describes no longer existed when he composed his work, and thus he provides evidence not only for the (temporary) end of Theban

¹ For the terms of the King's Peace, see Xen. *Hell.* 5, 1, 31, 35–36; Diod. Sic. 14, 110, 3; Plut. *Artax.* 21, 5; Justin 6, 6, 1; *SdA* 11, no. 242, to which add schol. Dem. 20, 54 (Dilts). The most pertinent modern discussions are Cloché 1952, p. 112; Ryder 1965, p. 41, cf. 48; Roesch 1965, pp. 36, 43–44; Larsen 1968, p. 175; Hack 1978, pp. 210–216; Sinclair 1978, pp. 37–43; Urban 1991; Jehne 1994.

² Cf. *Hell.* 4, 8, 15; 5, 1, 33; 5, 2, 34. Xenophon's use of the word *boiōtarchoi* at 3, 4, 4 (cf. 3, 5, 5) is unique in his works: see Sturtz 1801–4, s.v. *boiōtarchos*. Xenophon is equally reluctant to acknowledge the federal principle of the Boeotian Confederacy established in the 370s (e.g. *Hell.* 5, 4, 63; 6, 1, 1; 6, 4, 3); cf. Beck 2001a, pp. 355–356.

³ *Hell. Oxy.* 19 (Chambers). According to Head 1881, pp. 30–60, Boeotian coins similarly point to the disruption of the Confederacy at this time. Nonetheless, one hesitates to rely too heavily on evidence drawn from Boeotian numismatics. Head's study suffers from two defects: (1) Head made no die-study of the coins, and (2) he often indulged in circular argument: numismatic material to support literary sources and vice versa. See also Cahn 1970, pp. 173–174.

pre-eminence in Boeotia but also for the dissolution of the Boeotian federal government.⁴

Naturally, the dissolution of the Boeotian Confederacy in 386 entailed the abolition of the *boiōtarchia*, the chief executive magistracy of the federal government. Thereafter, each Boeotian *polis*, through the agency of its own magistrates, pursued its own policy. The only local government about which anything is known is that of Thebes, but at least here Xenophon and Plutarch, the two principal sources for this period of Boeotian history, are in agreement. Xenophon consistently refers to the executive officials at Thebes in the years 386–379 as *polemarchoi* and a secretary.⁵ He relates that the *polemarchoi* had police powers which included the right to arrest and to arraign criminal suspects, and that they conducted business in a public building, the *polemarcheion*.⁶ In his account of Phoebidas' seizure of the Cadmea and its aftermath, he mentions that Leontiades and the pro-Spartan faction made no change in Theban institutions, but that they contented themselves with selecting another *polemarchos* to replace Hismenias, who was bound over for trial.⁷

In his *Life of Pelopidas* Plutarch also maintains that the executive functions of local Theban government were in the hands of three *polemarchoi* and a secretary in the years between the King's Peace and the liberation of the Cadmea in 379/8.⁸ So too in the *Life of Agesilaus* (24, 2), where he states that although Leontiades and Archias were *polemarchoi* in name, they were tyrants in deed. This sentiment is also found in Xenophon (*Hell.* 7, 3, 7), who ascribes a speech to one of the assassins of the Sicyonian tyrant Euphron, in which the assassin accused the followers of Archias and Hypates as endeavoring to act as tyrants.⁹ In *Pelopidas* (6, 2) Plutarch states that as a result of Phoebidas' coup the Thebans were deprived of their ancestral constitution. Clearly, in the opinion of Plutarch and Xenophon, then, the ascendancy of Leontiades' faction entailed only a change of

⁴ Note especially the introductory words of 19, 2: "At that time the situation in Boeotia was as follows," with Bruce 1967, p. 103. See also Tod, no. 101; for other evidence for the existence of the Boeotian Confederacy before 386 see Andoc. 3, 24; Diod. Sic. 14, 81, 2. Cf. Buck 1994, p. 59; Salmon 1976, pp. 226–230; Beck 1997a, pp. 86–97.

⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 5, 2, 25; 5, 2, 32; 5, 4, 2; 5, 4, 7–8; see also Nep. *Pel.* 3; Salmon 1976, pp. 148–158.

⁶ Police powers: Xen. *Hell.* 5, 2, 30; Plut. *Pel.* 9, 8; 10, 1–4; *Mor.* 598a; *polemarcheion*: *Hell.* 5, 4, 6; see also Schaefer, *RE* Suppl. 8 (1956), cols. 1109–1110, s.v. *Polemarchos*. The site of the *polemarcheion* has not yet been located: Symeonoglou 1985, p. 138.

⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 5, 2, 25–32.

⁸ *Pel.* 7, 4; 9, 4; 9, 8; 11, 4; cf. *Mor.* 577b; Georgiadou 1997, p. 104; Shipley 1997, p. 284.

⁹ On this speech, see also Arist. *Rhet.* 2, 23, 3. Moreover, Xenophon attributes to Leontiades and his followers nothing more ideological than a desire to rule as tyrants (*Hell.* 5, 4, 1); cf. Gray 1989, pp. 134–136.

leadership and not a change in the Theban constitution or a curtailment of the *polemarchia*.¹⁰

Although there is virtually no evidence to corroborate Plutarch's assertion as to the nature of the Theban ancestral constitution before 382, the view that the *polemarchia* was a venerable office has been defended by H. Swoboda, P. Cloché, H. Schaefer, and P. Roesch, all of whom freely admit that Theban *polemarchoi* are first mentioned only in the fourth century.¹¹ Schaefer suggested that originally the *polemarchoi* were the king's assistants, entrusted with the military leadership of the citizen levy, a hypothesis which is at least consistent with political developments elsewhere in the Greek world.¹² From their first appearance in the sources of the fourth century down to the imperial period, boards of three *polemarchoi* and a secretary are regularly found in the role of chief local executive magistrates in Thebes and in other Boeotian cities.¹³ In periods when the Boeotian Confederacy was in existence, the *polemarchoi* and secretary of the individual cities were inferior in status and power to the federal boeotarchs.¹⁴

In their accounts of the liberation of Thebes in 379/8, Xenophon (*Hell.* 5, 4, 2–8) and Plutarch (*Pel.* 8–11; see also *Mor.* 597a–598c) agree that Pelopidas and his companions, with the connivance of the secretary Phillidas, assassinated the *polemarchoi* and others of their coterie. That done, the next step was to rally the Theban people behind the liberators and to expel the Spartan garrison from the Cadmea. Xenophon (*Hell.* 5, 4, 9) mentions that the liberators called the Thebans to arms and that at dawn hoplites and horsemen came to their aid. Plutarch too records (*Pel.* 12, 1–7; see also *Plut. Mor.* 598c–e) the proclamation of Pelopidas and his followers, and he states that at dawn the liberators convened an assembly of the people. Plutarch relates (*Pel.* 13, 1; cf. *Ages.* 24, 6) that at this session the Theban demos elected Pelopidas, Melon, and Charon to the *boiōtarchia*,

¹⁰ Schaefer, *RE Suppl.* 8 (1956), col. 1108, argued that the only change in the *polemarchia* under Leontiades and his coterie was an unprecedented extension of the powers of the office.

¹¹ Busolt and Swoboda 1926, pp. 1440, 1446; Cloché 1952, p. 74; Roesch 1965, p. 162; Schaefer, *RE Suppl.* 8 (1956), col. 1110.

¹² On the situation at Athens: Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 3, 2; Ehrenberg 1964, p. 66; Buckler 1980a, p. 24.

¹³ *Polemarchoi* in Hyettos: *IG VII* 2809–2832; Acraephea: 2178–2180; Orchomenus: 3179; Copae: 2782–2789; Chaeronea: 3292–3293; Lebadea: 3070, 3072; Tanagra: *Syll.* 1185; Halae: *AJArch.* 19 (1915), 444, no. 3; Thespieae: *Plut. Demet.* 39, 5; see also Bussmann 1912, pp. 14–18; Busolt and Swoboda 1926, p. 1438; Roesch 1965, pp. 162–176.

¹⁴ Bussmann 1912, pp. 15, 38; Cloché 1952, p. 74; Roesch 1965, p. 162; Georgiadou 1997, pp. 134–135. This is most clearly seen during the third century in the list compiled by Feyel 1942, pp. 307–308, which indicates the incompatibility of the two offices. During the Theban Hegemony the need for local magistrates in addition to federal officials became all the more pressing, as the duties of the boeotarchs (e.g. Epaminondas' extensive campaigns in the Peloponnesus and Pelopidas' missions in northern Greece) took them beyond the borders of Boeotia.

and in the *Life of Pelopidas* (14, 2) he mentions that Gorgidas was boeotarch that same year. After the elections the Thebans stormed the Cadmea and forced the Spartans to depart under a truce (Plut. *Pel.* 13, 1–3; Plut. *Mor.* 598f; cf. Xen. *Hell.* 5, 4, 10–12).

Even though Plutarch, whose narrative agrees substantially with that of Xenophon, has been careful of his terminology, and even though he consistently, both in the *Lives of Pelopidas* and *Agésilas*, speaks of *polemarchoi* before the liberation of Thebes and of boeotarchs afterwards, Swoboda¹⁵ and G. L. Cawkwell¹⁶ have rejected his testimony about the re-establishment of the *boiōtarchia* in 378.¹⁷ They argued instead that all four men were local Theban officials, specifically that Pelopidas, Melon, and Charon were *polemarchoi* and that Gorgidas was a *hipparchos*. Hence, they ignored the fact that the normal board of local magistrates (as noted above) consisted of three *polemarchoi* and a secretary. They based their opinion on two pieces of evidence. The first is Isocrates' statement that after the liberation of their city the Thebans sent ambassadors to Sparta to show their willingness "to alter in no respect their former agreements" (14, 29). The second is Polyaeus' account of a raid which Gorgidas led on Thespieae (2, 5, 2).

Yet one should not rely on Isocrates without having first taken the entire passage into consideration. This speech purports to be an account of Theban relations with Sparta and Athens from the King's Peace to the liberation of Thebes (14, 27–29). Written after the Theban destruction of Plataea in 373, Isocrates' pamphlet is patently and virulently anti-Theban in tone, and it contradicts the testimony of better sources.¹⁸ In brief, Isocrates claims (27) that after Athens had put an end to the Corinthian War (*sic!*), the Thebans allied themselves with Sparta against Athens.¹⁹ He asserts (28) that the Thebans swore a solemn oath to follow Sparta against Athens. The gods punished the Thebans for their perfidy by the loss of the Cadmea (28). Even after the Athenians had liberated Thebes from Spartan domination, the Thebans were prepared to become slaves of Sparta once again and to remain true to the oaths that they had sworn (29). Virtually no

¹⁵ *RE* 7.2 (1912), col. 1620 *s.v.* Gorgidas. ¹⁶ Cawkwell 1972, pp. 275–276.

¹⁷ Clöché 1952, p. 119 and Roesch 1965, pp. 44, 100, accept the accuracy of Plutarch's statement without, however, arguing the point or answering the objections of those who reject it.

¹⁸ For the date of the *Plataicus*, see Momigliano 1936, pp. 27–32; and for Isocrates' persistent hatred of Thebes, Clöché 1942, pp. 277–296. Previously unrecognized, indeed somewhat obscure, evidence also refutes Isocrates' claim. The Thebans minted a rare issue of coins immediately after the uprising: Classical Numismatic Group, Inc., *TRITON IX*, Lancaster, 2006, p. 19, 95–96. This coinage stands as a public declaration of Theban intentions to defy Sparta.

¹⁹ Cf. *SdA* 11, no. 243; Cartledge 1987, pp. 194–199.

aspect of Isocrates' testimony will bear careful scrutiny.²⁰ Isocrates' entire account is simply anti-Theban propaganda, a rhetorical display-piece, written at a time when Athenian anger over Theban activity in Boeotia was white-hot.²¹

Cawkwell, who accepted the truth and the accuracy of Isocrates' allegations, nonetheless thought that Isocrates' allusion to the Theban oaths was really a reference to the King's Peace. This view cannot stand. The alleged oaths (14, 29) refer back to those addressed before (27–28), which Isocrates claims were sworn by the Thebans when they became allied with Sparta. They have nothing to do with the Theban oaths sworn in ratification of the King's Peace. For the basis of the Common Peace was the concept of the autonomy of all Greek states (no matter how much the ideal, as articulated in the stipulations of the treaty, might be ignored in practice); and no treaty enjoined on participants the requirements or the obligations of alliance with the *prostatēs* of the Peace.²² Accordingly, the Thebans would have been no more obliged to follow Sparta than was Athens or any other signatory of the Peace. Thus, there is no reason to accept Cawkwell's view that the oaths were in any way connected with the King's Peace. Furthermore, since there is no reason to believe Isocrates' testimony of a Theban–Spartan alliance after the King's Peace, there is no reason to believe that after the liberation of Thebes the Thebans wanted to renew it. Isocrates' account of these years must be dismissed as worthless, except as an exercise in rhetoric.

Nor can the testimony of Polyaeus prove that Gorgidas was a *hip-parchos* rather than a boeotarch in 378. Polyaeus, whose ultimate source was probably Ephorus, states that Gorgidas raided the territory of Thespieae, where he encountered stiff resistance from peltasts under the command of Phoebidas, the Spartan *harmost*.²³ Gorgidas ordered his command to retreat, being pursued all the while by Phoebidas; but when the Thebans reached an open plain, Gorgidas gave the signal for a counter-attack. Phoebidas' peltasts gave way before the Theban cavalry attack; and despite a *lacuna* in the text, it is clear that they suffered casualties. Nevertheless, Phoebidas and many survivors reached the safety of Thespieae.

²⁰ See Buckler 1980b for the details.

²¹ See Xen. *Hell.* 6, 3, 1; 5, 13. Although some terms, which figure prominently in Isocrates (*akolouthein*, *summachidas*, and *summachois*), recur in Xen. *Hell.* 6, 3, 7–9, all that Autocles says is that the Spartans had used the autonomy clause of the King's Peace as a pretext for leading their allies (among whom he does not number Thebes) against independent states, one of which was Thebes.

²² Even those later Common Peace treaties which included enabling clauses aimed at disciplining recalcitrant states did not entail alliance: see Ryder 1965, pp. 71–74, 131–133; Jehne 1994.

²³ Polyaeus. 2, 1, 2; excerpta 17, 1; Buckler 1972; on Polyaeus/Ephorus, see Melber 1885, pp. 550–551.

Polyaenus has in fact garbled an incident which Xenophon (*Hell.* 5, 4, 42–44) describes in greater detail. According to Xenophon, who does not mention Gorgidas,²⁴ the Thebans advanced on Thespieae *pandēmei* (“in full force”), which of course included hoplites as well as cavalry. In Xenophon’s version of the episode, Phoebidas and his force of peltasts, supported by a phalanx of Thespian hoplites, interrupted the Thebans while they were plundering the countryside. The Theban foragers were being covered by a contingent of cavalry, which was deployed beyond the front of its own phalanx. When Phoebidas pressed home his attack, the entire Theban force – foragers, hoplites, and cavalry – turned to flight. In the ensuing panic of the Theban army, Phoebidas and his peltasts out-distanced their heavy-armed support. When the Theban cavalry, obviously in the rear of the van, reached a glen,²⁵ in desperation it faced about and attacked Phoebidas’ men.²⁶ Phoebidas and some of his peltasts were killed, the rest fled to the protection of the Thespian hoplites, and the entire force, peltasts and Thespians alike, fled to Thespieae.

The differences between these accounts might suggest at first glance that Xenophon and Polyaeus are depicting two different engagements, which is not impossible in view of Diodorus’ testimony that the Thebans twice attacked Thespieae. According to Diodorus (15, 27, 4), the Thebans made their first attempt after Cleombrotus had retired from their territory in the aftermath of the Theban recovery of the Cadmea. In the second, which Diodorus (15, 33, 6) treats with few details, the Thebans killed Phoebidas and routed his army, which agrees substantially with the testimony of Xenophon.²⁷ Yet it is quite unlikely that Gorgidas’ exploit, as described by

²⁴ As Underhill 1900, p. xxviii, long ago pointed out, Xenophon was not in the habit of naming Theban commanders.

²⁵ Since Xenophon states that the muleteers were fleeing along the road to Thebes, the ravine can only be the bed of the Thespios (the modern Kanavari) River, which is often marked by steep banks, and which flows along the road to Thebes. The Kanavari runs eastwards from Thespieae along the foot of the southern line of hills, but at one point towards Thebes it cuts northwards at a point where the northern line of hills draws near the southern. Here today only a narrow bridge provides a crossing: personal observations of 6 August 1980.

²⁶ Cavalry was often expected to cover a retreat: see Hdt. 9, 68; Thuc. 6, 70, 3; Diod. Sic. 15, 71, 6; Plut. *Pel.* 17, 3; Worley 1994, pp. 57–58.

²⁷ Although Diodorus places these two raids in different *archon*-years, they nonetheless belong in the same campaigning season, as is made clear by Xenophon’s account. In the *Hellenica* the sequence of events is the following: the recovery of the Cadmea and the expedition of Cleombrotus during the winter (5, 4, 3–18); the raid of Sphodrias before the campaigning season (5, 4, 19–33); Agesilaus’ invasion of 378 (5, 4, 34–41); and the subsequent Theban raid, which resulted in Phoebidas’ death, before the next campaigning season (5, 4, 42–47). The *archon*-year, which Diodorus relied upon in part for his chronology, interrupted the campaigning season in mid-summer; see Samuel 1972, p. 64; Parke 1977, p. 29.


Polyaenus, took place in the earlier encounter. Diodorus says specifically that the Thebans were unsuccessful in their first attack, which certainly does not correspond with what one reads in Polyaeus. Rather one should look to the second Theban attack for the solution of the problem.

The great number of similarities between the two accounts (including Xenophon's emphasis on Phoebidas and the Theban cavalry) suggests that Polyaeus has singled out part of a larger engagement for inclusion in his *Strategemata*. Since in Xenophon's narrative the Theban heavily armed troops stayed entirely in the background, there was no reason for him to pay them much attention, which is consistent with his version of the story. Routinely in raids of this sort, the phalanx, which was the least mobile component of the entire force, lagged behind the cavalry and provided a line of safety in the event of a repulse (precisely the thing that the Thespian phalanx failed to do).²⁸ The Theban cavalry, as customary, skirmished in the open plain between its own phalanx and that of the enemy. In this case the cavalry defeated Phoebidas before the Theban hoplites could enter the fray. In addition, Xenophon dwells on the conduct of Phoebidas' peltasts because of his own views on the handling of peltasts. As he makes clear in the episode of Teleutias before Olynthus, Xenophon feels that a peltast commander should not attack rashly and that peltasts should not be overly bold in their pursuit of cavalry.²⁹ Xenophon uses the story of Phoebidas to underline his points and to illustrate the wisdom of his views. Thus, since even in Xenophon's detailed account of this incident the Theban hoplites played no significant role in the skirmish, the focus being instead on the Theban cavalry and Phoebidas' peltasts, it is easy to see why the un-military Ephorus would have tended to ignore them or to give them little space. These factors also explain why Polyaeus, who was primarily interested in clever ruses, concentrated only on this aspect of the action.

Yet it remains to explain the differences between the two accounts, especially since there are serious problems with both. Xenophon emphasizes the panic of the Theban army, and he claims that the cavalry confronted Phoebidas when terrain gave them no alternative. By that time, however, the rest of the Theban force had disappeared. Since only the cavalry had not yet crossed the glen, it is obvious (despite Xenophon's silence on the matter) that they had successfully covered the retreat of the phalanx and muleteers, and that their tactics had permitted the escape of

²⁸ This is seen most clearly in Xenophon's narrative (*Hell.* 6, 5, 30–31) of Epaminondas' advance into the southern suburbs of Sparta in 369; Buckler 1980a, pp. 83–84.

²⁹ See *Hell.* 5, 3, 4; 5, 4, 54, and for a general discussion of Xenophon's views, see Best 1969, pp. 110, 122–126.



Map 4 The valley of the Thespis River

the slower elements of the Theban army. This itself indicates that Xenophon has given a distorted account of the incident. Far from being a disorganized rabble, the cavalry apparently retired in good order, perhaps even feigning flight to lure Phoebidas on. This further suggests that the blunder of the horsemen may well be an invention of Xenophon, who was frequently reluctant to acknowledge the military prowess of the Thebans.³⁰

Polyaenus' testimony about Gorgidas' signal is evidence that the Theban counterattack was intentional,³¹ but his account suffers from topographical problems. In the *Strategemata* Gorgidas faces about only when his horsemen had arrived *en platuterō chōriō*, which is impossible, regardless of whether one wishes to take the comparative *platuterō* in the sense of in the "broader" or "flatter" countryside. According to Xenophon, the Theban cavalry retired toward Thebes. The valley of the Kanavari River from Thespieae to Thebes actually narrows instead of opening, and the surface remains slightly rolling for the entire distance. This is a mistake far more likely to have been made by Polyaeus than by his source. Beginning with the innovations of Philip and Alexander the Great, cavalry played a much more aggressive and prominent role in warfare than it had in the Classical period.³² Perhaps in view of Hellenistic and Roman use of cavalry, Polyaeus did not understand why Gorgidas waited until he reached the ravine to oppose Phoebidas and therefore substituted for the glen a level area where Gorgidas, in accordance with later military practice, could have deployed his horsemen for a concerted attack.³³

Another difference between the two accounts is that in Polyaeus Phoebidas escaped with his life, while Xenophon states that the *harmost* fell with some of the foremost peltasts. This, like the topographical confusion, is a mistake attributable to Polyaeus. Diodorus (15, 33, 6), who also epitomized Ephorus' work, agrees with Xenophon that Phoebidas was killed

³⁰ This point has been stressed by Cawkwell 1979, pp. 37, 198, 343, 399; see also Buckler 2003, p. 238.

³¹ Ephorus, who preferred to apply a single formula to battles (see Barber 1935/1993, pp. 140–144; Farrington 1947, p. 58), is not likely to have invented the signal.

³² See Tarn 1930, pp. 57–92; Adcock 1962a, pp. 48–53; Gaebel 2002, pp. 174–183.

³³ Other examples of Polyaeus' carelessness include 2, 3, 1, a version of the liberation of the Cadmea. Here Polyaeus portrays Phoebidas, who guards the Cadmea, being lured through lust for Epaminondas' wife (*sic!*) to attend a dinner at the house of Epaminondas, and there being struck down by a band of young conspirators. Compare 2, 4, 3, another version in which Pelopidas in the company of some *hetairai* strikes down an unnamed garrison commander in the Cadmea, and the more reliable accounts of the episode by Xen. *Hell.* 5, 4, 2–10, and Plut. *Pel.* 11. At 2, 1, 14, Polyaeus has confused the topography of Sparta, when he calls the Issorion a "sacred hill," whereas Plut. *Ages.* 32, 6–10, describes the spot as "well fenced and hard to overrun." A far more serious error occurs in 2, 1, 19, in which Polyaeus claims that at the battle of Coronea in 394 Agesilaus allowed the Theban hoplites to penetrate his phalanx in order to fall upon their rear. Xenophon, however, in a vivid account of the action, describes how the Spartan king met the Thebans head-on (*Hell.* 4, 3, 18–20). Still other examples could be easily adduced.

in his rash attack on the Thebans. Thus, Ephorus could not have made the mistake. Plutarch too (*Pel.* 15, 6) alludes to the death of Phoebidas at Thespieae; and although he gives no date for the event, he places it between Sphodrias' raid on the Piraeus of 378 and the battle of Tegyra in 375.

Earlier in 378 Gorgidas had commanded hoplites. Polyaeus tells how, during Agesilaus' first invasion of Boeotia, Gorgidas and Chabrias showed their scorn for Agesilaus by ordering their troops to meet the Spartan king's show of bravado with a show of indifference.³⁴ While a *hipparchos* could not command infantry, a boeotarch could and regularly did.³⁵ Accordingly, at Leuctra the seven boeotarchs commanded the entire levy, mounted and foot, of the Boeotian Confederacy;³⁶ as did the boeotarchs during the first invasion of the Peloponnesus,³⁷ and during the second invasion;³⁸ as did the boeotarchs Hypatos and Cleomenes in Thessaly in 367;³⁹ and as Epaminondas did in the Mantinean campaign of 362.⁴⁰ Therefore, it is only reasonable to conclude that Gorgidas was not simply a *hipparchos* in 378, but rather a boeotarch, the only officer who habitually commanded both infantry and cavalry.

Hence, not only does Plutarch carefully distinguish between the offices of *polemarchoi* and boeotarchs in his account of these years, but the testimony of Isocrates and Polyaeus also fails to prove him wrong. After the re-establishment of the *boiōtarchia*, the *polemarchoi* at Thebes reverted to their traditional role, namely that of exercising the executive functions of local government, including the duty to maintain public security with its concomitant police powers.⁴¹ They next reappear in connection with the assassination of Euphron of Sicyon at Thebes in 366 (Xen. *Hell.* 7, 3, 4–6; see chapter II). Xenophon mentions that the assassins of Euphron were arraigned before the *boulē* by certain *archontes*. Swoboda pointed out that

³⁴ Polyaeus. 2, 1, 2; cf. Diod. Sic. 15, 32, 5; Nep. *Chabrias* 1, 2; Buckler 1972, pp. 466–467.

³⁵ See Salmon 1976, pp. 133–145. Nor is there any evidence to suggest that the *lochagos* of the Sacred Band had the right either to command cavalry or to lead Theban forces *pandēmei*. When Pelopidas led the Sacred Band and a contingent of cavalry at Tegyra, he was both *lochagos* of the Band (Plut. *Pel.* 16–17; Diod. Sic. 15, 37) and boeotarch (Diod. Sic. 15, 81, 2); so too at Plut. *Pel.* 16, 1, where Plutarch speaks of Pelopidas' victory at Tegyra surpassing the exploits of his fellow commanders, whereby he means the other boeotarchs; cf. *Pel.* 29, 1, where he refers to the Theban commanders of 367, who were boeotarchs (Paus. 9, 15, 1–2), as *stratēgoi*; see also Xen. *Hell.* 7, 4, 40; Diod. Sic. 15, 82, 3.

³⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 6, 4, 6ff.; Diod. Sic. 15, 52, 1ff.; Plut. *Pel.* 20, 3ff.; Paus. 9, 13, 6ff.; Salmon 1976, p. 179–185; Stylianou 1998, p. 38.

³⁷ Diod. Sic. 15, 62, 14–15, 66, 5; Plut. *Pel.* 24–25; Paus. 9, 14, 5; cf. Xen. *Hell.* 6, 5, 22–52; Buckler 1980a, p. 74; Georgiadou 1997, pp. 179–190; Stylianou 1998, pp. 422–426.

³⁸ Diod. Sic. 15, 68, 1; Paus. 9, 15, 4; Stylianou 1998, p. 457. ³⁹ Diod. Sic. 15, 71, 3; Paus. 9, 15, 1–2.

⁴⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 7, 5, 4 *ad fin.*; see also Polyaeus. 2, 3, 14, where Epaminondas ordered his *hipparchos* to launch a diversion; Buckler 1980a, pp. 217–218.

⁴¹ See n. 6 above and chapter II.

the police powers of these *archontes*, notably the right to arrest an individual for a crime and to bind the felon over for trial, are normal prerogatives of the *polemarchoi*.⁴² Added weight is given to Swoboda's arguments by the fact that there was no federal *boulē* in the Boeotian Confederacy of the Theban Hegemony, its place having been taken by a primary federal assembly.⁴³ Thus, the *boulē* in question, as Swoboda also suggested, could only have been that of the city of Thebes. After the liberation of Thebes, never again in the fourth century are the *polemarchoi* and the secretary found active in the broader areas of interstate affairs.

The election of four boeotarchs in 378 admits of an easy and simple explanation: it was the declaration of Theban intentions to restore the Boeotian Confederacy.⁴⁴ The obvious officials to bring Theban designs to fruition were boeotarchs, not *polemarchoi*. At first, the duties of the boeotarchs were principally military, as they strove to make the Theban declaration a political reality by driving Spartan garrisons out of Boeotian cities and by defending Boeotia from Spartan invasions. As early as 378 the Thebans set out to implement their designs. In early 378, after the withdrawal of Cleombrotus from Boeotia, the Thebans attacked Thespieae.⁴⁵ Again in 378, after Agesilaus' first invasion, the Thebans raided Thespieae and managed to kill Phoebidas.⁴⁶ Xenophon states that this victory so heartened the Thebans that they undertook operations against other neighboring cities as well (*Hell.* 5, 4, 16). Sometime between 377 and 375

⁴² See n. 11 above and chapter 11; accepted by Bonner and Smith 1945, pp. 20–21, and Schaefer, *RE* Suppl. 8 (1956), col. 1110.

⁴³ *IG* VII 2407–2408; *SEG* 1, 101; Diod. Sic. 15, 80, 1–2; see also Larsen 1968, p. 178.

⁴⁴ See Thiel 1926, pp. 21–22. Similarly, Larsen (1968, p. 31) suggested that at the time of the Persian Wars the boeotarchs may have been nothing more than "Theban officials whose title proclaimed the desire to rule all Boeotia." On the connection between the number of times that Pelopidas was boeotarch and the date of the re-establishment of the *boiōtarchia*, see Bersanetti 1949, pp. 89–93; Buck 1994, p. 150 n. 78; Georgiadou 1997, pp. 127–128. Although Diodorus (15, 81, 4) states that Pelopidas held the *boiōtarchia* every year from the return of the exiles to his death in 364, he has forgotten that Pelopidas was not a boeotarch in 371. Plutarch, on the other hand, states (*Pel.* 34, 7) that Pelopidas died in 364 during his thirteenth *boiōtarchia*, and at 20, 3 he mentions that Pelopidas did not hold the *boiōtarchia* in 371. From this evidence, Bersanetti rightly concluded that 378 is the only date possible for the revival of the office.

⁴⁵ Diod. Sic. 15, 27, 4; cf. Xen. *Hell.* 5, 4, 14–18. Plut. *Pel.* 15, 2 also alludes to numerous engagements in these years. Diodorus' chronology of these years is awry. This is obvious from his placing of the formation of the Second Athenian League under one year (15, 28; 15, 29, 7–15, 30; see also *IG* 11² 34 and 5, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44; Cawkwell 1973, p. 48); his placing of Persian attempts to recover Egypt in one *archon*-year (15, 29; cf. Beloch 1912–27, vol. 111.2, pp. 229–230); his confusion over the Common Peace treaties of 375 and 371 (15, 38; 15, 50, 4–6; cf. Lauffer 1959); and his confusion over the unrest in the Peloponnesus (15, 40; cf. Roy 1973; Cawkwell 1976, p. 77). It is therefore preferable to follow Xenophon, who at least takes note of the campaigning seasons of the years 378–375 (378: 5, 4, 13–46; 377: 5, 4, 47–57; 376: 5, 4, 58–61; 375: 5, 4, 62–66).

⁴⁶ See above, chapter 4.

the Thebans expelled the Spartan garrison from Tanagra.⁴⁷ In 375 Pelopidas raided Orchomenus,⁴⁸ and Charon won a cavalry battle before Plataea.⁴⁹ Xenophon asserts that by 375 Thebes had recovered the cities around it.⁵⁰ Indeed, by that time only three of Thebes' rivals still held out; and even though Orchomenus did not capitulate until 371,⁵¹ Plataea and Thespieae fell to Thebes before Leuctra.⁵²

The restored Confederacy which the boeotarchs led has recently been the subject of some debate. Although it has been claimed by some scholars that once there were *Boiōtoi*, there was, technically, no longer a state called Thebes. The nature of the new Confederacy has often been misconstrued.⁵³ Diodorus calls the new government both *synteleia*⁵⁴ and *koinon*,⁵⁵ and Hypereides likewise speaks of the Boeotian *koinon*,⁵⁶ as do Boeotian inscriptions.⁵⁷ Perhaps the most conclusive evidence is an inscription of the Boeotian *koinon*, which dates to the mid fourth century (*SEG* 25, 553). In its final, damaged lines 13–15 the inscription lists the names of boeotarchs from Thespieae and Tanagra. Hence, the evidence from the fourth century, both literary and epigraphical, indicates that the Boeotian Confederacy was truly a federal government, that is, one in which individual cities, even while their populations enjoyed federal citizenship,⁵⁸ retained their political identity and the right of local jurisdiction.

Thus, from 378 until Leuctra removed the specter of Spartan intervention, Thebes worked relentlessly to rebuild the Boeotian Confederacy. The tyranny of Leontiades and his followers, supported by a Spartan garrison, demonstrated to the Thebans what they could expect at the hands of Sparta, and it made them realize that only a Boeotia united under their leadership offered them any hope of security. The election of four boeotarchs in 378, in the first exuberance of victory and freedom, was also the first declaration of Theban ambitions in Boeotia.

⁴⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 5, 4, 49; Isoc. 14, 9; Plut. *Pel.* 15, 6; cf. *IG* VII 1903 and 1904; Georgiadou 1997, p. 142.

⁴⁸ Diod. Sic. 15, 37, 1–2; Plut. *Pel.* 16–17. ⁴⁹ Plut. *Pel.* 25, 8.

⁵⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 5, 4, 63; Judeich 1927, pp. 180–181. ⁵¹ Diod. Sic. 15, 57, 1; cf. Buckler 1977a, pp. 77–78.

⁵² Xen. *Hell.* 6, 3, 1; 6, 3, 5; Paus. 9, 2, 8.

⁵³ See Larsen 1968, pp. 175–180; Beck 1997a, pp. 100–105 and Beck 2000, pp. 332–338, who discuss this question at length.

⁵⁴ 15, 50, 4; 70, 2. ⁵⁵ 16, 85, 3; cf. 15, 80, 2; 16, 25, 1. ⁵⁶ (*Against Demosthenes*) fr. 4, col. 18.

⁵⁷ See Michaud 1974, pp. 644–645, which dates a little after 338. Although Hammond 1986, p. 570, has claimed that Philip dissolved the Boeotian Confederacy after Chaeronea, which would require the redating of this inscription, earlier Ellis 1976, pp. 201 and 296 n. 92, and Cawkwell 1978a, pp. 168, 205 n. 7, have demonstrated that Philip left it standing.

⁵⁸ See n. 43 above and see Beck 2000, pp. 334–335 for a modified view.

The battle of Tegyra, 375 BC

The battle of Tegyra has seldom received systematic treatment, with the notable exception of W. K. Pritchett's study.¹ That is hardly surprising, for it was little more than a skirmish that goes unmentioned even in Nepos' sketch of Pelopidas' life. Nevertheless, other scholars have used the episode to determine the sources used by Plutarch, the major authority on it, in his composition of the *Life of Pelopidas*.² More voluminous is the literature on the site of the battle and the topography of the battlefield. The battle, despite the small numbers involved, also provides an additional point of interest regarding what Plutarch could add from his own knowledge to his narrative. He had himself seen Tegyra and thus enjoyed the opportunity to compare his observations with the testimony of earlier historians.³

The history of Boeotia between the liberation of the Cadmea in 378 and the battle of Tegyra in 375 is one of innumerable and sometimes desultory campaigns and raids.⁴ For the most part, the Spartans placed garrisons in strategically important cities, notably Tanagra, Plataea, Thespieae, and Orchomenus, from which the Thebans attempted to dislodge them. Orchomenus was the most dangerous point because of its natural strength, the hostility of its inhabitants to Theban hegemony of Boeotia, its easy communications with neighbouring Phocis, and the facility with which the Spartans could push reinforcements across the Corinthian Gulf to Cirrha and thence to Orchomenus. Aware of these dangers, Pelopidas long awaited the opportunity to assail Orchomenus at a moment's notice (Plut. *Pel.* 16, 2). In the spring of 375 the Spartan garrison in Orchomenus, which consisted of two *morai*, offered him his chance.⁵

¹ Pritchett 1965–92, vol. IV, pp. 103–122; see also Knauss 1987, pp. 182–193.

² Ziegler 1968; Prandi 1985, pp. 40–42; Sordi 1989; Georgiadou 1997, pp. 142–153.

³ Buckler 1992, pp. 4800–4805.

⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 5, 4, 35–6, 1, 1; Diod. Sic. 14, 28, 1; 15, 32, 1–15, 34, 2; Plut. *Pel.* 15; Munn 1987; Munn 1993, pp. 129–180.

⁵ Buckler 1971a, pp. 356–359; Georgiadou 1997, pp. 142–144.

The garrison launched a foray into Locris, whereupon Pelopidas led a picked army against what he considered a vulnerable city. Unbeknownst to him, the Spartans had reinforced Orchomenus with another garrison before Pelopidas could deliver his blow. When he realized that the Spartans had forestalled him, he marched his army back again along the foothills to Tegyra. He could not retreat across the plain, for the Mélas river had flooded it. At Tegyra he unexpectedly encountered the first Spartan force returning from Locris, whereupon ensued the battle of Tegyra.

Thus reads the bare outline of events. The problems involved in understanding them include locating the battlefield and determining whether Plutarch, the best and almost the only ancient source for the event, has given a correct account of the battle. A native of Chaeronea, Plutarch had himself seen Tegyra, perhaps on a journey to Hyampolis to observe the festival of Elaphebolia.⁶ Furthermore, he relied upon the *Hellenica* of Calisthenes, a good fourth-century historian, as his source for the battle; and he made extensive use of the famous fourth-century historian Ephorus for the events of this period.⁷ Hence, Plutarch enjoyed the opportunity to judge the accuracy of his sources in the light of his autopsy of the site, just as Polybius had earlier done of Ephorus' account of the battle of Mantinea in 362.⁸

In addition to Plutarch there is Diodorus, who offers a few details.⁹ Not himself an original scholar, Diodorus nonetheless epitomized the history of Ephorus.¹⁰ For his strike, according to Plutarch (*Pel.* 16, 3), Pelopidas mustered the Sacred Band, which consisted of 300 elite troops (*Pel.* 18, 1) and not many cavalry. Diodorus (15, 37, 1) claims that Pelopidas led 500 picked men, and that they attacked and defeated twice their number. Diodorus could be correct, but it is equally possible that his statement may be nothing more than rhetorical exaggeration or simple error. Ephorus, his source, put the strength of the Spartan *mora* at 500 men, so Diodorus possibly simply increased the size of Pelopidas' force to exactly half that of the enemy (Ephorus *FGrHist* 70 F 210). A problem occurs because the strength of the *mora* is variously given over the course of time, as Plutarch notices.¹¹ Two questions arise immediately, the first being the site of Tegyra, and next whether the topographical details of the site support Plutarch's testimony.

⁶ Plut. *Mor.* 412b; 414b; 660d–664a.


⁷ Buckler 1980a, pp. 75–76; Helmbold and O'Neill 1959, p. 27.

⁸ Polyb. 9, 8, 1–10; 12, 25, 5; Walbank 1967a, pp. 127–128, 394–395; Meister 1975, p. 73.

⁹ Plut. *Pel.* 16–17; *Mor.* 412b; Diod. Sic. 15, 37; 81, 2; Steph. Byz. s.v. Tegyra; see also Xen. *Hell.* 6, 4, 10.

¹⁰ Barber 1935/1993, pp. 35–41; Sacks 1990, pp. 236–237.

¹¹ Plut. *Pel.* 17, 4; see also Lammert, *RE* Suppl. 16 (1933), cols. 251–252 s.v. Mora.



Map 5 The battlefield of Tegyra

TOPOGRAPHY

The translation of Plutarch provides a number of indications for the location of Tegyra (*Pel.* 16, 5–8):¹²

A little below (*mikron d'hypo*) the marshes is the temple of Apollo Tegyraeus, and an oracle abandoned not long ago. It had flourished until the beginning of the Persian Wars. Echecrates held the position of prophet. Here according to the legends the god (*scil.* Apollo) was born and the neighboring mountain is called Delos. Opposite it the Melos river stops spreading; behind the temple two springs, sweet and plentiful and cold, break forth with wonderful water, which until now we call Phoenix and the other Elea. There according to the legends the god was born, not between two trees. Rather the god was brought forth between the two streams. And indeed Ptoum is nearby, from which they say she (*scil.* Leto) was frightened by a boar that suddenly appeared, and the stories about Python and Tityus are associated with the birth of the god in these places. I shall leave aside most of the stories about the evidence. For local tradition about them does not change this god from the immortals to those who are born and inferior to divine, as with Heracles and Dionysos. In their changing, enjoying excellence, they cast off death and suffering, but entered the world of the august and unborn, if it is

¹² Georgiadou 1997, pp. 145–149.

necessary to judge from the opinion of the wisest and oldest who discuss these matters.

The passage is complicated by philological problems. As D. Wyttenbach noticed long ago, there is here a problem with Plutarch's use of *hypo* ("below") and *hyper* ("above"). Although U. von Wilamowitz emended *hypo* to *hyper*, not on the grounds of personal investigation of the site, K. Ziegler prints the former. Since the manuscripts show no signs of corruption, one must conclude that Plutarch intended to write *hypo*. Emendation remains an easy but unsatisfactory way in which to deal with the text and rewrite history. Although today the scanty remains of the temple stand above the now-drained marsh, that situation did not exist earlier. When H. Bulle visited the site shortly after the turn of the twentieth century, he drew a sketch-map of the area that clearly shows that Polygyra stood in the midst of the marshes.¹³ Drainage of Lake Copais had only just successfully begun.¹⁴ Plutarch had himself seen the site at least twice on his journeys between Chaeronea and Hyampolis.¹⁵ As he travelled along the main road, the temple remained slightly below him on the right but obviously above the surrounding marsh. This simple explanation for his usage is preferable to an unjustified emendation of the text.

Only topographical scrutiny can solve the problem. At the spot stood a temple and a famous oracle that flourished as late as the Peloponnesian War.¹⁶ They stood at the base of a mountain named Delos, where the Mélas River ceases to spread out. Behind (Plut. *Pel.* 16, 5) or beside (Plut. *Mor.* 412b) the temple flowed two springs, one called Palm and the other Olive. Plutarch adds that at Tegyra was a pass at which Pelopidas suddenly and unexpectedly encountered the Spartan force returning from Locris (see below).

The keys to the location of Tegyra, then, are four: remains of a temple, two streams significant enough and so obviously distinguishable as to possess separate names, all of them near a mountain. A. Schachter has suggested that Strovíkion, much to the east of Pyrgos, is the site of Tegyra.¹⁷ Yet the remains there do not precisely fit the criteria of Plutarch's text. Strovíkion cannot be the ancient Tegyra. Nevertheless, knowledge of the topography of the region, including the lake and the settlements around it, comes from a new series of studies.¹⁸ Other modern

¹³ Bulle 1907, p. 116.

¹⁴ See Frazer 1898, vol. v, pp. 110–120, esp. 119 for fluctuations of the water level of the lake.

¹⁵ Buckler 1992, pp. 4804–4805, 4813.

¹⁶ Schachter 1981–94a, vol. 1, p. 75.

¹⁷ Schachter 1967, pp. 1–6; Schachter 1981–94a, vol. 1, p. 75.

¹⁸ Knauss 1984, 1987, 1990.

topographers and historians have limited the candidates to two: the modern village of Pyrgos and the abandoned spot of Polygyra, but the problem has been greatly complicated by the modern drainage of Lake Copais (personal observations of 28 July 1980). Furthermore, the two places are quite close to each other, separated only by an easy walk of some one hour and thirty minutes. Each site has recently had its champions. In 1988 J. M. Fossey concluded that Tegyra was located at Pyrgos. S. Lauffer, who had also long explored the area of the Copais, had earlier determined that Tegyra was to be found at Polygyra.¹⁹

For most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries most scholars equated Tegyra with Pyrgos for a variety of understandable reasons.²⁰ One reason to explain the early identification of Pyrgos with Tegyra is the remains of the tower there, hence giving the site its modern name and proving ancient habitation of the site. Nothing so dramatic exists at Polygyra. The best evidence for the identification of Pyrgos with Tegyra comes from the extensive investigations of Bulle, who, in 1907, published the following observations. At the Magoúla of Pyrgos, a small, rocky hill in the plain immediately west of Pyrgos, Bulle found two springs, one on its southern side and the other on its western.²¹ Atop the western edge of the hill are located the remains of Classical buildings and a sacred area with a temple. Neither were Classical sherds found anywhere on the hill nor could the purported temple be excavated, owing to the lack of topsoil. In his more recent examination of the site, Fossey found some Classical black-glazed sherds. Personal observations of July and August 1980 and June 1983 revealed several cist graves and the building that Bulle assumed to be a temple, which is in all probability correct, given its plan. It was constructed of rough, medium-sized grey limestone blocks. On the western side of the Magoúla no trace of the spring noted by Bulle and Fossey can be found, but there is ample evidence that the area had been drained in recent years. A bit more can be said of the spring on the southern side. In 1980 personal observations noted there a dry ditch, leading toward a larger and equally dry ditch. The channels were unmistakable proof of flowing water within recent years on this side of the Magoúla. Hence, there is no reason to doubt the accuracy of Bulle's and Fossey's observations.

¹⁹ Fossey 1988, pp. 367–373; Lauffer 1971; Lauffer, *RE* Suppl. 14 (1974), cols. 325–328 s.v. Orchomenos; Lauffer 1986, pp. 151–153.

²⁰ Ulrichs 1840, pp. 196–197; Bursian 1862, p. 211; Vischer 1875, p. 583.

²¹ See also Knauss 1987, pp. 68–79; Knauss 1990, pp. 96–99.

Despite the presence of a structure that was probably indeed a temple and two springs that flowed on either side of it, serious discrepancies suggest that the Magoúla was not Plutarch's Tegyra. First, the gap between the Magoúla and the ridge upon which the village of Pyrgos is built is considerable, about half a kilometer. Those approaching Pyrgos from either direction could easily have observed each other in ample time to react to the situation described by Plutarch. The element of surprise, which figures so prominently in Plutarch's account, would hence be largely lacking. The second aspect is by far the more significant. Plutarch emphasizes the point that Lake Copais was flooded at the time of the battle, which perforce led Pelopidas to choose a circular route along the surrounding foothills. Under these conditions the Magoúla of Pyrgos would have been an island in the Copais.²² Since modern travellers note that the main road passed north of the village, the Magoúla would not have been appreciably near the scene of the battle.²³

Owing to Lauffer's long and fruitful research, Polygyra is now generally considered to be the site of Tegyra. Other scholars have independently arrived at the same conclusion, the earliest being P. W. Forchhammer, who recognized the significance of the site.²⁴ Less certain is R. J. Buck, but his work displays no personal investigation of the sites involved.²⁵ At Polygyra Lauffer found a spring-fed pool and the remains of a temple. Personal examination of the area on 27 July 1980 and 3 June 1983 likewise revealed a scattering of isolated blocks on the southeastern foot of Polygyra. They were large, squared ashlar blocks of light-coloured grey limestone with quarry facing, apparently those seen by Forchhammer in 1837. In the surrounding fields sherds, pieces of roof tiles, and a rounded stone, now semicircular, with a drafted edge on top, were discovered. The ridge of Polygyra, upon which are the visible remains of ancient habitation, juts southward into the Copais basin. The ridge drops precipitously to the modern road, which German travellers called "eine Art Felsentor" because it lies between the ridge and the curious outcrop of rocks above the lake. The space for the road is quite narrow, and can by any definition be called *ta stena* ("the narrow pass," see below). The temple itself, even in ruins, would have further impeded visibility through the "Felsentor." When one enters the bottleneck, through which one can walk in two minutes, it is

²² Bulle 1907, p. 123; Forchhammer 1837, p. 177; Fiedler 1840, p. 127; Sprawski 2004, p. 21.

²³ Forchhammer 1837, pp. 177–178; Ulrichs 1840, p. 197; Vischer 1875, p. 582.

²⁴ Forchhammer 1837, p. 176; cf. Burr 1944, p. 29; Kirsten 1951, p. 476; Michaud 1974, p. 643.

²⁵ Buck 1979, p. 8.

impossible to determine whether anyone else has at the same time entered it from the opposite direction. A large pool, then filled with tall reeds, lies immediately at the foot of these rocks and was full of water even at the height of summer. Plutarch comments that the neighbouring mountain was called Delos, for which Polygyra serves as well as any other candidate in the vicinity suggested, all the more so since he admits that he is dealing with mythology (*Pel.* 16, 6).

For all that, there is one impediment to Lauffer's identification of Polygyra with Tegyra significant enough to merit renewed attention. When Bulle examined the site, he observed that on the northern side of the cliff to the left of the road flowed a strong stream that ran in part to a large artificial basin, from which it watered the neighbouring land.²⁶ He also noted that little of the artificial basin still existed in 1905, and that the winding water of this stream gave rise to the toponym Polygyra. There is, however, no mention of two springs. In his earliest investigations Lauffer described the situation of the point thus: "Auch haben die Hügel von Polygyra an ihrem Fuß eine kräftige Quelle, das Kephalaria."²⁷ The significant point in these two accounts is the use of the singular in describing the spring. In 1971 Lauffer reported the existence of two springs at Polygyra, which he subsequently repeated in other works.²⁸

Examination of the site in 16–28 July 1980 and again on 3 June 1983 provided no evidence for the existence of springs there. Continued uncertainty prompted subsequent visits on 17 July 1996 and 18 October 1998. These repeated ventures revealed that the basin remained dry. They also exposed on the northeastern side of the desiccated pool, below a coarse wall composed of some ten blocks of worked stone, clear evidence of moisture from the soil. That suggests the existence of one spring on the eastern side of the basin. The rest of it was as dry as observed earlier. Further inspection revealed nothing to indicate the existence of a second spring there. Two additional factors mark the enquiry. When Lauffer had inspected the pool, it was full of water that supported tall reeds and abundant wildlife. No one could under those circumstances see traces of any spring. Yet eastwards along the road to Pyrgos on 3 June 1983 examination revealed a farm equipped with a pumping station used to irrigate the surrounding fields. The farmer insisted that the pump drew its water from a natural spring. He also said that the spring had always been there. J. Knauss, a master of hydrology and of the topography of the area, independently examined the area in May 1987, and he has offered the best and most scientific solution to

²⁶ Bulle 1907, p. 117.

²⁷ Lauffer 1986, pp. 153–154.

²⁸ See Lauffer 1989, p. 652.

the problem. He states, "I visited the farmer's pumping station within the center of a small bay in 1987. I cannot believe that there once existed a spring. I think it is a groundwater offtake thus disturbing the natural springs on the foot of the Tegyra-rock and making them dry" (personal communication of 23 June 1992). The farmer's pumping had thus lowered the water level of the basin. Hence, modern disturbances of the natural water systems are responsible for the present state of the pool. Individual investigations of the terrain have thus revealed the existence of a spring at the farm and another at Polygyra roughly opposite each other. Within the small semicircular bowl between them lie the scant remains of what was in all probability a small ancient temple.²⁹

These facts satisfy the requirements of Plutarch's description of the place. The blocks of the temple, which are presumably *in situ*, prove that the two springs could be described as running behind the temple (Plut. *Pel.* 16, 6) or running past it (*Mor.* 412b). They are likewise close enough to be readily associated with the sanctuary yet distinct enough to have separate names.

THE BATTLE

Although both Plutarch (*Pel.* 16, 1) and Diodorus (15, 81, 2) consider Tegyra to be something of a prelude to Leuctra, those two battles actually had little in common. More apposite is Tegyra to Pelopidas' victory at Cynoscephalae in 364. Here also Pelopidas faced his enemy with cool, bold decision, proving himself once again a master of tactics in his combined use of cavalry and hoplites.³⁰ In neither case was the action specifically planned. Rather, Pelopidas and his opponents independently responded to an unexpected situation. The most illuminating description of the battle comes from Plutarch (*Pel.* 17, 1–10):

The Thebans entered the territory of Tegyra, retiring at that time from Orchomenus, and the Spartans clashed with them face-to-face (*ex enantias*), approaching them from Locris. As they first saw each other coming through the narrow pass (*ta stena*) [. . .] Pelopidas at once ordered all of his cavalry to move up from the rear (*proemballousan*) in order to charge the enemy. He himself drew together his few three hundred hoplites into a tight formation. He hoped thereby that wherever they attacked, they would cut through their numerous enemy. The two Spartan *morai* [. . .] under the command of Gorgoleon and Theopompus confidently marched against the Thebans. The attack developed with great fury

²⁹ Buckler 2003, pp. 241–242.

³⁰ Buckler 1980a, pp. 175–182.

where the commanders on each side stood. First, the *polemarchoi* of the Spartans clashed with Pelopidas and were killed, whereupon fear seized the rest of their army. They opened a lane for the Thebans, thinking that they would pass through and escape. When that happened, Pelopidas led his troops against those still holding their formation, and then slew them and passed through the slain, so that the survivors all turned and fled. The pursuit did not continue over much ground, for the Thebans also feared the nearby Orchomenians and the remainder of the Spartans.

Thus Plutarch notes that the Thebans were returning through Tegyra from Orchomenus, when they encountered the Spartans marching back from Locris. *Ex enantias* denotes that the two forces encountered each other face-to-face, a regular feature of Plutarch's literary usage.³¹ He further emphasizes the point that the two armies encountered each other quickly and unexpectedly as the Spartans debouched from a pass. Lastly, combat ensued immediately. These points bear repetition, all the more so since Pritchett has argued that the Spartans approached Tegyra along the road from Hyampolis and Abae.³² The existence of a road between Orchomenus and Abae is not in doubt, but closer inspection reveals that it has nothing to do with the events of 375.³³ Pritchett correctly cites Plutarch (*Pel.* 16, 3) as evidence that the plain lying between Orchomenus and Tegyra was flooded at the time of the battle. The plain indeed being flooded, Pelopidas must have taken the circuitous route along the rim of Lake Copais. Furthermore, the early travellers, before the lake was drained, testify that this track clung to the foothills above the flooded plain. Thus, Forchhammer in 1840 describes the way as through the upper city of Orchomenus along the ridge of Akontion to the other side of the Mélas thence to Polygyra. He mentions that this road is much higher than the lake could at any time rise.³⁴ The testimony of Bulle and K. G. Fiedler, the latter a German engineer who made a special study of Lake Copais for a mining company, corroborates that of Forchhammer.³⁵ Indeed, H. N. Ulrichs and J. G. Frazer give excellent descriptions of the differences between the roads in this area in winter and summer.³⁶ Likewise, M. L. Kambanis observes that one can very easily and conveniently follow the border of the lake, which presents terrain very suitable for a line of communication.³⁷ Furthermore, once the road from Abae reaches Tegyra, it continues on the same line to

³¹ Georgiadou 1990. ³² Pritchett 1965–92, vol. IV, p. 109. ³³ Buckler 1989a, pp. 33–34.

³⁴ Forchhammer 1837, pp. 174–176.

³⁵ Bulle 1907, pp. 116–117, also citing Lolling's *Urbaedeker* (H. G. Lolling, *Reisenotizen aus Griechenland 1876 und 1877*, new edn. by B. Heinrich, Berlin, 1989); Fiedler 1840, pp. 127–128.

³⁶ Ulrichs 1840, pp. 191–197; Frazer 1898, vol. V, p. III. ³⁷ Kambanis 1892/3, p. 123.

Orchomenus as that described by these travellers, but which Pritchett claims was flooded. Hence, as presented, it is literally impossible to explain, much less to accept, Pritchett's conclusions.

The second point unappreciated by Pritchett is the element of surprise. Independent inspection of the road from Abae to Tegyra on 2 June 1983 led to the observation that from the time that a walker catches his first sight of Orchomenus to his first glimpse of Polygyra is twenty-three minutes and another fifteen minutes to reach the Pyrgos–Orchomenus road immediately to the west of Tegyra, and it must be remembered that a lone walker can always cover ground more quickly than even a small military contingent, especially one impeded by its equipment. In short, instead of the abrupt clash of Plutarch, each army would have had over thirty minutes at least in which to observe the movements of the other.

A simpler solution does far better justice to the evidence. Eastern Locris was divided into two parts: Epicnemidian in the north and Opuntian in the south.³⁸ One branch of the road from Orchomenus to the latter ran past Polygyra, and precisely at the point between the foot of the hill and the singular rock formation one finds the place necessary to the element of surprise. Two armies coming upon each other unexpectedly would have had a matter of minutes in which to form from line of march into line of battle. To gain the time needed for this maneuver Pelopidas must order his cavalry from the rear to attack in an effort to prevent the Spartans from deploying successfully. Although the Theban horsemen interfered with Spartan dispositions, they did not prevent the enemy from forming a phalanx. These considerations place the battle at the remains of the temple of Apollo: and since the Thebans saw the Spartans already marching through the pass from Opuntian Locris, the battlefield is to be found in the level area immediately to the west of this pass. The area there is more than level and spacious enough for the deployment of cavalry and the clash of a small number of infantry.

The field of battle determined, one can turn to Plutarch's account with greater certitude. Pelopidas retreated from Orchomenus with his cavalry covering his withdrawal, as was standard procedure in Classical Greek warfare. When he saw the Spartans already coming through the pass, he ordered his cavalry to advance from the rear and attack.³⁹ Just as his fellow countrymen had earlier banded together at the battle of Coronea in 394 (see chapter 3), so now Pelopidas put his men in close formation to cut his

³⁸ Bursian 1862, pp. 186–187; Fossey 1990a, p. 264; Fossey 1990b, p. 152.

³⁹ For this use of *proemballō*, see Diod. Sic. 15, 81, 2. See Sprawski 2004, pp. 18–19.

way through the enemy. Although some have argued that hoplites were normally deployed in loose formation, the ancient evidence, often provided by veteran officers, is against the notion.⁴⁰ Upon observing Pelopidas' force, the Spartan *polemarchoi* Gorgoleon and Theopompus ordered their men to rush against the Thebans. The attack being aimed at the positions of the rival commanders, the two armies clashed, and the Spartan *polemarchoi* fell at once in hard fighting. With casualties mounting and now in panic and virtually leaderless, the Spartans opened their phalanx in the hope that the Thebans simply wanted to escape. The Spartans thereby created a lane through which the Thebans could pass, the same maneuver that Xenophon thought that Agesilaus should have used at the battle of Coronea (*Hell.* 4, 3, 19; *Ages.* 2, 12). Xenophon himself actually saw a Greek hoplite phalanx open ranks in this fashion at the battle of Cunaxa (*Anab.* 1, 8, 20). The reason for this maneuver was to allow the hoplites to strike those fleeing on their unprotected side and to close up again to assail them in their rearmost ranks. Refusing to be enticed by this strategem, Pelopidas instead led his men against those Spartans who still maintained their tight order, and thus broke through the enemy. At this onrush those still resisting in order broke and fled toward Orchomenus. Pursuit was short; and having erected a trophy, Pelopidas retired to Thebes.

Plutarch's description of the action is clear and consistent with the topography of Polygyra. The Spartan decision to open a lane for the Thebans, a novelty at first sight, had its precedents, as described by an eye-witness of an earlier battle. There remains the question of the Theban cavalry. In his discussion Pritchett claims that Pelopidas' cavalry cut through the Spartan phalanx, just as Epaminondas' horsemen were later to do at Mantinea in 362.⁴¹ Plutarch actually says nothing of the sort, nor does he mention an *embolon* of Theban cavalry, a serious error on Pritchett's part. Instead, a better explanation of the meaning of the *embolon* can be found elsewhere.⁴² An analogy comes from Pelopidas' command of cavalry at Cynoscephalae, where again he deployed his horsemen first and in conjunction with his hoplites.⁴³ Plutarch (*Pel.* 17, 3) says without any possibility of misunderstanding that at Tegyra Pelopidas relied upon the Sacred Band to discomfit the Spartans. Theban cavalry hindered the Spartans from bringing their superior numbers to bear in good order

⁴⁰ E.g. Thuc. 1, 63; Xen. *Hell.* 4, 3, 18; 7, 4, 23; Wyttenbach 1843, s.v. *synagō*; Wheeler 1987, p. 169; Hanson 1989, pp. 172–173; Sprawski 2004, p. 20.

⁴¹ Pritchett 1965–92, vol. 1V, p. 120; Buckler 1980a, pp. 218 and 64, for the Theban cavalry at Leuctra.

⁴² Buckler 1985a, pp. 134–143. ⁴³ *Pel.* 32, 3; Buckler 1980a, pp. 176–179.

against Pelopidas. Afterwards, they doubtless harried the Spartans who were in disorder, a function traditional in Greek warfare, while Pelopidas massed his hoplites for the main blow against the Spartans who had formed into line of battle. Plutarch uses Pelopidas' victory to explain why members of the Sacred Band were not again distributed among other military units. Instead, thereafter the Band was brigaded together as an integral unit until its destruction at the battle of Chaeronea.⁴⁴ The significance of Pelopidas' victory at Tegyra is its success in the co-ordination of cavalry and infantry, with the latter striking the decisive blow against a numerically superior army. In sum, Plutarch's description of the battle of Tegyra does justice both to the terrain of Polygyra and to the information gleaned from his fourth-century sources. There is nothing implausible or unusual in Plutarch's account, and every reason to consider it one of the best of his battle pieces.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ See chapter 17 below.

⁴⁵ See Buckler 1992, 4801–4805.

Plutarch on Leuctra

The 1970s saw renewed interest in the battle of Leuctra and its place in the history of Greek warfare. In 1970 J. K. Anderson published a detailed study of the battle, the first since 1926,¹ and in 1972 G. L. Cawkwell emphasized the revolutionary aspects of Epaminondas' tactics.² Both scholars have given greater credence to Plutarch's testimony in the *Life of Pelopidas* than the standard treatment of J. Wolter, who flatly claimed that Plutarch's account was "sachlich unmöglich."³ Wolter's scepticism had been adumbrated by H. Delbrück, the eminent student of military history, who concluded that Plutarch's narrative on Leuctra was "unbrauchbar."⁴ It seems appropriate, then, to re-examine Plutarch's account of the battle to determine how he envisaged the action and whether he correctly understood it.

The first step is to determine the source from which Plutarch derived his information. On this point Wolter confessed ignorance, but H. D. Westlake has suggested that Plutarch drew upon Callisthenes' *Hellenica* for some parts of the *Pelopidas*.⁵ A good case can be made for Plutarch's reliance on Callisthenes, especially for military affairs, specifically for Sphodrias' raid on the Piraeus in 378, and the battles of Tegyra, Leuctra, and Mantinea.⁶

In his account of Sphodrias' ill-conceived raid, Plutarch comments on Sphodrias' character, describing him as "rather weak in judgment and full of vain hopes and senseless ambition" (*Pel.* 14, 2). This is obviously a paraphrase

¹ Anderson 1970.

² Cawkwell 1972. Similarly, Pritchett 1965–92, vol. 1, pp. 49–58, has given fresh attention to the topography of the battlefield, and Beister 1970, pp. 35–51, to movements before the battle.

³ Wolter 1926, p. 306.

⁴ Delbrück 1920, p. 161; see also Hanson 1988; Hanson 1999, p. 46; and the observations of Buckler 2003, pp. 293–294.

⁵ Westlake 1939; see also Peper 1912, pp. 35–38, and Fuscagni 1975.

⁶ Even though Polybius (12, 17–22) criticizes Callisthenes' depiction of battles, he limits himself to a critique of Issus, which Callisthenes described in his *Deeds of Alexander*. In antiquity, however, the *Hellenica* enjoyed a better reputation than the *Deeds* (see *FGrH* 124 T 26), and even Polybius admits that Leuctra was a simple battle. For Plutarch's use of Callisthenes for battles from other periods, see *FGrH* 124 F 15 and 37; cf. Meister 1975, pp. 81–91.

of Callisthenes' verdict: "he was very simple-minded and empty-headed in comparison with what was expected of him" (*FGrH* 124 F 9). Also, as part of his description of Pelopidas' victory at Tegyra, Callisthenes digresses to discuss the mythological connections of the place (F 11), which prompted Plutarch to mention the present state of the oracle of Apollo at Tegyra and to relate local traditions about the place (see chapter 7).

As for Leuctra, Plutarch was quite familiar with Callisthenes' narrative, although, as in the case of Sphodrias' raid, he does not refer explicitly to the *Hellenica*. In the *Life of Agesilaus* he alludes to certain omens which foretold the Spartan defeat (28, 6). He does not enumerate them because he says that he has discussed them fully in his *Life of Epaminondas*. Although the *Epaminondas* is no longer extant, Plutarch repeats some omens in his treatise *De Pythiae oraculis* (*Mor.* 397e–f), where he draws attention to two particular omens, both involving dedications of Lysander. Despite the fact that Xenophon (*Hell.* 6, 4, 7) and Ephorus (to judge by Diod. Sic. 15, 53, 4–15, 54, 4) recounted a number of ominous portents, these two are not among them. Although one might assume that, as a priest at Delphi, he is drawing upon local tradition for these prodigies (as he did for the oracle at Tegyra), he has in fact drawn them from Callisthenes.⁷ Lastly, Plutarch (*Ages.* 34, 4) consulted Callisthenes' *Hellenica* on Epaminondas' Mantinean campaign as a supplement to Xenophon's account.⁸ Thus, there is ample reason to conclude that Plutarch has relied on Callisthenes, a good fourth-century source, for his information in the *Life of Pelopidas*, and that this source was independent of Xenophon.⁹


With Plutarch's source established, one can turn to the *Life of Pelopidas* itself to determine three things: (1) where Pelopidas and the Sacred Band were stationed in the Boeotian formation, and how they delivered their attack against the Spartans, (2) what maneuvers Cleombrotus attempted before he actually engaged Epaminondas, and (3) whether Plutarch's testimony is compatible with that of Xenophon.

PELOPIDAS' POSITION

Neither Plutarch nor any other extant source states specifically where Epaminondas stationed Pelopidas and the Sacred Band. In *Pelopidas*

⁷ *FGrH* 124 F 22; cf. Cicero's discussion of omens (*Div.* 1, 74–76; 2, 54). ⁸ Cf. *FGrH* 124 F 26.

⁹ In the face of those who, like Stern 1887, pp. 62–69, have considered Callisthenes to be under the influence of a "Boeotian historical tradition," Pearson 1960, p. 32, has argued that at most the fragments show a "strong personal admiration for Pelopidas and his Sacred Band."



Map 6 The battlefield of Leuctra

Plutarch describes the course of action only after Epaminondas had ordered the advance of the Boeotian line. While the Spartans were still maneuvering, he says, “Pelopidas . . . darted forth from his position (*proexedrame*) and with his Band of 300 on the run came up (*phthanei*)” before the Spartans could complete their evolutions (*Pel.* 23, 2).

H. Köchly and W. Rüstow long ago interpreted Plutarch’s words to mean that Epaminondas had ordered Pelopidas and his force to take station at the rear of his column so that Pelopidas could take in flank any turning action which the Spartans might attempt.¹⁰ Anderson has revived their interpretation, and has argued that Pelopidas and his men broke out from the tail of Epaminondas’ column after the two armies had come to grips.¹¹ While Epaminondas’ men pinned the Spartan phalanx, in this view, Spartan units on the right of Cleombrotus’ line attempted to encircle Epaminondas; but before they could do so, Pelopidas’ troops rolled up their flank.

¹⁰ Köchly and Rüstow 1852, pp. 173–174. ¹¹ Anderson 1970, pp. 218–219.

Delbrück, challenging the interpretation of Köchly and Rüstow, suggested that their reconstruction would be more credible had Pelopidas been stationed on the extreme left of the Boeotian line, not behind Epaminondas' striking column.¹² Instead, Delbrück insisted that Pelopidas and the Sacred Band fought at the head of Epaminondas' column. Wolter too argued that Epaminondas deployed Pelopidas' Sacred Band as a tactical corps stationed in the first five ranks of his column,¹³ as did W. Judeich, even though he was otherwise critical of Wolter's work.¹⁴

The view of Delbrück, Wolter, and Judeich that Pelopidas and his men formed the cutting edge of Epaminondas' column possesses considerable merit. Yet the Sacred Band should not be envisaged as having been distributed along the entire front of Epaminondas' column. Rather, Pelopidas' troops were brigaded together as an integral fighting unit, occupying a position at the head of the Theban column in accordance with Epaminondas' desire to crush Cleombrotus' position. The hypothesis of Köchly and Rüstow and Anderson ignores the practical problem of explaining how Pelopidas could have observed Spartan movements while behind a massive formation, which Xenophon says was not less than fifty-shields deep (*Hell.* 6, 4, 12). Nor would Epaminondas have found it easy (especially in view of the depth of his formation and the tumult of battle) to relay quickly and easily to the rear a verbal order for Pelopidas to break away.

Plutarch himself indicates that Pelopidas stood at the head of Epaminondas' column. At *Pelopidas* 19, 4 he states that after Tegyra Pelopidas treated the Sacred Band "as a unit and put them into the forefront of the greatest conflicts." How the Sacred Band could be considered to be in the forefront of danger while ranked behind a very deep formation is difficult to understand.

At *Pelopidas* 23 Plutarch also indicates that Pelopidas' force stood in the forefront. To describe Pelopidas' charge he uses the verbs *proexedrame* and *phthanei*. In the *Life of Coriolanus*, the only other instance where Plutarch employs *proektrechō*,¹⁵ he recounts an action similar to Pelopidas' at Leuctra. According to Plutarch, Coriolanus asked to be posted in line opposite the enemy's best troops: "As soon as spears began to fly, Marcius darted out (*proekdramontos*) before the lines, and the Volscans who faced him could not withstand his attack" (9, 5). In this scene, Coriolanus and his men simply dart forward from their position to engage

¹² Delbrück 1920, pp. 158–159. ¹³ Wolter 1926, pp. 314–315. ¹⁴ Judeich 1927, pp. 195–196.

¹⁵ See Wyttienbach 1829–30, s.v. *proektrechō*. Cf. Xen. *Hell.* 4, 3, 17, where Herippidas' men, *synek-dramontōn* from their own advancing line, drove off the enemy opposite them.

the enemy. There is no reason, on the basis of what Plutarch actually says, to assume that *proektrechō* in the *Pelopidas* is being used any differently. Plutarch uses the term in both places to mean “to run forward from,” not “to run out from behind.”

The use of *phthanō* is consistent with and complementary to *proektrechō* and the testimony of other ancient sources. Its basic meaning is “to be beforehand with,” “to come” or “act first.”¹⁶ Plutarch frequently employs the verb to denote a person reaching a place first or before someone else.¹⁷ So too in the *Life of Pelopidas*: Plutarch means that Pelopidas and the Sacred Band reached the Spartan line before Cleombrotus could complete his evolutions. In the process, the Sacred Band was the first Theban unit to engage the Spartans. Furthermore, this interpretation of Plutarch’s use of *proektrechō* and *phthanō* receives independent support. In his eulogy of Pelopidas, Diodorus states that he “commanded the Sacred Band in the battle of Leuctra, with which he charged the Spartans first and thus was the primary cause of the victory” (15, 81, 2). Thus, according to Diodorus, Pelopidas’ Sacred Band was the first Theban unit to attack the Spartans and its attack paved the way for the Theban victory.

The most reasonable interpretation of Plutarch’s account is that Pelopidas and the Sacred Band were stationed as a unit at the head of Epaminondas’ wing. When Pelopidas saw the Spartan line in a vulnerable position (on which, see below), he ordered his men to break out from the column and to charge upon the Spartans before they could complete their evolutions.¹⁸

Anderson objected, however, that “Pelopidas’ speed and dash would not have called for special praise, if he had been acting merely as an officer of the phalanx under Epaminondas’ command.” More than that, he claimed that “to have trained the men who formed the front ranks and led on the rest”¹⁹ would not have been an achievement worthy of the honor which Pelopidas received. This misses the point. The true significance of Pelopidas’ conduct was that upon seeing his opportunity he ordered – entirely on his own initiative – the Sacred Band forward in time to interrupt Cleombrotus’ attempt to deploy his force, and thus baffled the king’s intentions. Had Pelopidas not acted, Cleombrotus might have been able to carry out his designs or at least to restore order to his line before action was joined.

¹⁶ LSJ *s.v.* *phthanō*.

¹⁷ See Wyttenbach 1829–30, *s.v.* *phthanō*. See also, for instance, *Mor.* 144a; 227a; *Nic.* 17, 1; *Thes.* 19, 10; *Cleom.* 1, 1; *Demetr.* 50, 4; *Arat.* 44, 4; cf. *Thuc.* 7, 36; *Xen. Hell.* 7, 2, 14; *Anab.* 6, 1, 18.

¹⁸ Sallies of this sort were common enough in Greek warfare: e.g. *Xen. Hell.* 3, 4, 23; 4, 3, 17; 4, 6, 10; cf. *Thuc.* 4, 125, 3.

¹⁹ Anderson 1970, p. 217.

CLEOMBROTUS' MANEUVERS

The maneuvers of Cleombrotus before the actual engagement of forces have provoked as much discussion as has Pelopidas' role in the battle. Plutarch does not tell precisely how Cleombrotus originally drew up his formation. All that he says is that when Epaminondas began his attack by "drawing his phalanx obliquely towards the left, in order that the right wing of the Spartans might be separated as far as possible from the other Greeks," Cleombrotus recognized his intentions and began to change his formation (*Pel.* 23, 1). From this it is clear that in Plutarch's view Cleombrotus' line consisted of a Spartan right wing and a left wing composed of "the other Greeks," a view that receives support from other sources.²⁰ In order to change their formation, the Spartans "stretched out (*aneptysson*) their right wing and made an encircling movement (*periëgon*), to surround (*kyklôsomenoi*) Epaminondas and envelop (*peribalountes*) him with their numbers." At this point Pelopidas' Sacred Band attacked the Spartan line, striking it "before Cleombrotus had either extended his wing (*anateinai*) or brought it back again (*synagagein*) into its old position and had closed up (*synkleisai*) his battle-line" (*Pel.* 23, 2).

Anderson,²¹ again turning to the reconstruction of Köchly and Rüstow, interpreted the passage to mean that Cleombrotus ordered his wing to face right and then led it around. Even though, in Anderson's view, Epaminondas struck the line before Cleombrotus could complete the movement, part of the Spartan line was actually engaged in a circling movement when Pelopidas took it in flank. Yet grammar seems to be against this reconstruction of events. The imperfects *aneptysson* and *periëgon* indicate actions which were not completed, especially in view of Plutarch's specific statement that Cleombrotus was interrupted before he could either complete his movements or regain his original position.²² Had the king in fact been able to lead part of his army (three-quarters of it in Anderson's view)²³ around Epaminondas' wing, one would expect aorists instead of imperfects. Because of the imperfects, it is impossible to determine how advanced Cleombrotus' maneuvers were when Pelopidas put a halt to

²⁰ Although Anderson 1970, p. 201, suggested that the Spartan formation had two Spartan wings and one allied wing, the ancient testimony and most modern work is against his view: Xen. *Hell.* 6, 4, 16; Diod. Sic. 15, 55, 1; Stern 1884, pp. 136–137; Delbrück 1920, p. 157; Beloch 1912–27, vol. III.1, p. 168; Wolter 1926, pp. 315–316; Meyer 1902/1975, p. 401.

²¹ Anderson 1970, p. 211.

²² The force of the imperfects is strengthened by Plutarch's statement that the Spartans "began to change their formation" (*Pel.* 23, 1).

²³ Anderson 1970, p. 218.

them. So too with *kyklōsomenoi* and *peribalountes*. The use of the future middle participle in connection with an imperfect main verb signifies a movement intended but not actually carried out. On the basis of grammar alone there is no evidence that any part of the Spartan line succeeded in launching a flanking attack or that Cleombrotus' troops had actually succeeded in encircling Epaminondas' column.

Delbrück, convinced that Plutarch's narrative was rhetorically embellished to enhance the stature of Pelopidas (a view that ignores the corroborating evidence of Diodorus and Cornelius Nepos that Pelopidas played a decisive part in the battle), put no faith in it.²⁴ Wolter, who discussed the verbs in this passage in the light of Hellenistic military terminology, found Plutarch's testimony so improbable that he too discarded it.²⁵ Yet rather than postulate rhetorical embroidery, or bring arguments against Plutarch's account based on the usage of Hellenistic tactical writers and then dismiss it out of hand, one ought first to ask how Plutarch normally uses the verbs in this passage and determine the meanings that he usually gives them. Only then can one hope to understand what Plutarch claims Cleombrotus was doing at Leuctra and to decide whether he gives an intelligible account of the Spartan king's evolutions.

Plutarch's use of the verbs in this passage is simple, untechnical, and rarely military – much less tactical – in nature. None of them reflects the precise meanings which Hellenistic tactical writers often gave to terms, whereby specific words were employed to denote specific maneuvers. The only possible exception here is *kykloō*, which Plutarch frequently employs to mean "to encircle" or "to wheel in a circle."²⁶ For the most part, however, he uses the other verbs descriptively. Thus, the most common meanings of *periballō* in Plutarch's writings are "to clothe oneself," "to embrace," and "to surround."²⁷ Apart from in the *Life of Pelopidas*, *periballō* in Plutarch carries no military meaning at all.²⁸ In the *Pelopidas* Plutarch uses the word simply to mean "to surround" without saying anything about the tactical disposition by which Epaminondas was to be enveloped.

²⁴ Delbrück 1920, pp. 159–161. ²⁵ Wolter 1926, pp. 302–306.

²⁶ See Wytténbach 1829–30, s.v. *kykloō*. Although the term "to wheel" is variously used, I mean it solely to indicate an operation in which the line pivots on one man or unit and moves in a circular motion through an unbroken arc; cf. *United States Infantry and Rifle Tactics*, Philadelphia 1861, pp. 67–68.

²⁷ See Wytténbach 1829–30, s.v. *periballō*; "to clothe oneself": *Mor.* 42d; 99d; 146c; *Ant.* 80, 4; "to embrace": *Mor.* 67e; 149e; *Eum.* 10, 5; *Cleom.* 22, 6; "to surround": *Phil.* 17, 2; *Crass.* 4, 1; *Sert.* 7, 7.

²⁸ The closest that Plutarch comes is *Alc.* 17, 3.

The use of *anateinō* is similarly descriptive rather than tactical. “To stretch upwards” is the most common meaning in Plutarch, as can be seen in the *Life of Romulus*, where Plutarch says that Romulus “stretched (*anateinas*) his hands towards heaven” (18, 6) in his prayer to Jupiter for celestial support. In other cases, *anateinō* in Plutarch means “to stretch out.”²⁹ In the *Life of Demetrius* Plutarch describes “headlands that jutted out (*anateinousin*) into the sea” (16, 2). Although Plutarch nowhere else uses *anateinō* in a tactical sense,³⁰ he clearly employs the verb ordinarily to mean “to reach up” or “out,” and it is only reasonable to conclude that the same general sense is intended in his account of Cleombrotus’ movements. Moreover, this meaning of *anateinō* is paralleled in the writings of Xenophon.³¹ In the *Cyropaedia* Chrysantas is asked whether he can see the enemies “pushing forward (*aneteinon*) their phalanx” (7, 1, 6), just as a promontory might be said to jut out from the land into the sea. Although the *Cyropaedia* is admittedly a historical novel, Xenophon provides evidence that a movement like that portrayed in the *Cyropaedia* could actually take place on the battlefield. In his narrative of the battle of the Nemea River he tells how the Spartans led their phalanx obliquely toward the right until their own right wing overlapped the Athenian line opposite them. Then the Spartans stopped when only a stade away from the Athenians.³² Just as Croesus in the *Cyropaedia* halts his line and bends part of it around a fixed point so that it can attack the enemy’s flank, so the Spartans at the Nemea River, once they were in position, moved against the Athenians “to encircle them with their stretched out wing” (*Hell.* 4, 2, 20). Similarly, there is every reason to conclude that in Plutarch’s view Cleombrotus intended to bring his wing into a position from which it could reach forward towards the enemy in order to fall upon Epaminondas’ flank.

Synagō in Plutarch normally carries the meaning “to bring together” and “to collect.”³³ When found in military contexts, it generally signifies “to assemble” the soldiers, a usage common also to Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon.³⁴ Only once, apart from in the *Pelopidas*, is *synagō* employed in a tactical sense (*Crass.* 25, 2); and even here the term means nothing more than to gather units together for a charge. This sense is also

²⁹ See *Cam.* 12, 4; *Alex.* 30, 11; *Mor.* 105b. ³⁰ See Wyttchenbach 1829–30, s.v. *anateinō*.

³¹ See Sturtz 1801–4, s.v. *anateinō*. ³² Xen. *Hell.* 4, 2, 19–20; cf. *Cyr.* 7, 1, 5.

³³ See Wyttchenbach 1829–30, s.v. *synagō*. Plutarch often employs the verb to describe a person knitting his brows (i.e. bringing his brows together): *Mor.* 16d; 202b; 412f; 715c.

³⁴ Plutarch: *Brut.* 22, 3; 28, 4; *Mor.* 206a; 209b; 232a. Herodotus: Powell 1938, s.v. *synagō*. Thucydides: 1, 9, 3; 120, 1; 2, 60; 3, 34, 4; 8, 10, 3; 27, 4. Xenophon: Sturtz 1801–4, s.v. *synagō*.

found in Thucydides (I, 63, 1), but it does not carry any specific military connotation.³⁵

Only once, in his description of the battle of Marathon, does Herodotus employ *synagō* to describe military activity. At 6, 113 he tells how, when the Athenian center gave way before the Persian attack, the Athenians and Plataeans, who had been victorious on the wings, “drew together (*synagagontes*) their two wings,” fell upon the Persian center and routed it. In this case, the wings may have wheeled to re-form an unbroken line.³⁶ Yet Herodotus does not specifically say so, and *synagō* is perhaps the most general term that he could have used. Significantly, Herodotus is more interested in conveying the fact that the Athenians and Plataeans re-established contact with each another than in telling precisely how they accomplished it.

The most common meanings of *synkleiō* in Plutarch are “to shut in” and “to close.”³⁷ In the *Life of Crassus*, the only other place in Plutarch’s writings where the verb is used in a military context,³⁸ Plutarch tells how the beleaguered Roman soldiers at Carrhae, “closed with their shields (*tois thyreois synkleisantes*),” faced the Parthian attack. Thucydides twice employs the verb in this sense (40, 35; 5, 71, 1), and in his account of the battle of Mantinea in 418 he uses it to mean “to close a gap” (5, 72, 1–3). In the *Pelopidas* Plutarch in all probability uses *synkleiō* merely to mean “to close up” the line, without indicating the movements necessary to do so.

The verbs *anaptyssō* and *periaō* are the crucial terms in this passage, for these were the only movements in progress when Pelopidas’ attack stopped Cleombrotus in mid-stride. Plutarch regularly uses *anaptyssō* to mean “to fold back” and “to unfold.”³⁹ Typical is his picture of the manner in which Spartan women wore their chitons: “For in fact the flaps of their chitons worn by their women were not sewn together below the waist, but would unfold (*anepityssonto*) and lay bare the whole thigh as they walked.”⁴⁰ At *Moralia* 979b he states that fish swim against the current so that the pressure from behind would not “fold back (*anaptyssomenē*) their scales

³⁵ Thus, at 4, 125, 2 Thucydides says that Brasidas, *xynagagōn kai autos es tetragōgon taxin tous hoplitas*, began to withdraw from the enemy. In this case *synagō* means “to bring together” preparatory to the forming of the square.

³⁶ Cf. Gomme 1962, p. 33; Hammond 1968, pp. 29–30; Burn 1962, pp. 250–251.

³⁷ For the former see *Mor.* 426b; *Dion* 30, 5; *Arat.* 6, 3; for the latter *Mor.* 681d; 980b; *Brut.* 53, 5; cf. *Thuc.* 4, 67, 4; *Xen. Anab.* 7, 1, 12.

³⁸ *Crass.* 25, 10; see Wytttenbach 1829–30, s.v. *synkleiō*. ³⁹ See Wytttenbach 1829–30, s.v. *anaptysssein*.

⁴⁰ *Comp. Lyc. and Num.* 3, 4. Similarly, “to unfold” garments: *Demetr.* 42, 5; *Brut.* 20, 4; *Mor.* 149c.

and expose and roughen their bodies.”⁴¹ Even when Plutarch uses the verb figuratively, it never loses this basic meaning.⁴² Since in all these cases *anaptyssō* carries the notion of folding back, one can expect the same in the *Life of Pelopidas*. Furthermore, since Plutarch’s use of the other verbs in this passage is consistent with that obtaining in the fifth and fourth centuries, as one would expect of a writer drawing upon a fourth-century source, it follows that *anaptyssō* in the *Pelopidas* reflects fourth-century usage.⁴³

Among extant writers Xenophon is the first to use *anaptyssō* in a tactical sense,⁴⁴ and in each of the two passages where it is found it has a different meaning. In the *Anabasis* Xenophon describes how the Ten Thousand after the battle of Cunaxa feared that the enemy opposite them would move against their right wing (the original left wing of the line), outflank it, and cut it to pieces. To answer this threat “they thought it best to draw the wing back (*anaptyssein to keras*) and get the river in their rear” (1, 10, 9), a movement which they never actually carried out. R. Bünger argued that *anaptyssō* here means that the Greeks intended to refuse the wing by withdrawing it or folding it back.⁴⁵ This disposition could only be used by a stationary phalanx to withstand an attack. Bünger further pointed out that in Xenophon’s day *anaptyssō* had not yet become a technical expression.

The second instance occurs in the *Cyropaedia*, where Cyrus, whose line is too long and shallow, decides to double the depth of his formation. Cyrus gave orders “that the hoplites should fold back the phalanx (*tous hoplitas anaptyssontas tēn phallanga*) and move toward each other behind the main body, which had been halted, until each of the wings should meet in the centre” (7, 5, 3). Although Bünger argued that *anaptyssō* here indicates the same sort of movement as that in the *Anabasis*, and although Delbrück took it to mean “to turn” or “to wheel,”⁴⁶ L. Breitenbach suggested that the men on both wings faced towards the center (after having first stepped clear of the line), marched behind the rest of the line which stood facing ahead, and then faced back toward the front after

⁴¹ See also *Mor.* 567b, where the meaning is to pull the skin back.

⁴² See *Mor.* 503b and 715e–f, where Plutarch says *ho oinos . . . anaptyssēi tēs psychēs*, in which the sense of the verb is reminiscent of the American colloquialisms “to unbend” or “to unwind.”

⁴³ Indeed, there is no reason to assume that Plutarch has given the verb the meaning usually found in Hellenistic tactical writers, if only because he seems never to have read them. At least he never quotes them; see Helmbold and O’Neil 1959.

⁴⁴ Herodotus employs it in the sense of unrolling a book (see Powell 1938, s.v. *anaptyssō*), while Thucydides and Aeneas the Tactician do not use it at all: Essen 1887; Barends 1955.

⁴⁵ R. Bünger, *NJ* 131 (1885), pp. 262–263. ⁴⁶ Delbrück 1920, p. 215; cf. Anderson 1970, p. 324.

meeting in the center. This maneuver could be executed by moving successive files or larger units such as *lochoi*.⁴⁷

The strongest argument in favor of Breitenbach's view is that parallels to the movements that he suggested abound in classical Greek warfare. A situation quite similar to the one in the *Cyropaedia* actually took place in 373. In the *Hellenica* Xenophon states that the Spartan commander Mnasippus, having drawn up his men in a phalanx eight deep, went into action. But the troops on the extreme end of his line, when faced with formidable opposition, "held the end of the phalanx as too weak and therefore tried to turn back (*anastrechein*)" (6, 2, 21). Xenophon means that the hoplites at the end faced about to march clear of their comrades next in line, who stood facing ahead. Once clear of the line, they would face right, march behind the protection of their fellows, and fall in behind them.⁴⁸ In this case, Xenophon suggests that larger units than the file (perhaps *lochoi*) attempted to execute the maneuver, which, however, failed when the enemy fell upon those attempting it, and prevented them from completing it. Nevertheless, Xenophon here uses *anastrephō* to describe a movement which is quite similar to that which Breitenbach suggested to explain the action in the *Cyropaedia*.

At *Hellenica* 6, 5, 18 Xenophon employs *anastrephō* in his detailed account of the way in which Agesilaus extricated his army from danger in Arcadia in 370. Once again, the actual movements of the Spartans are quite similar to those portrayed in the *Cyropaedia* and *Hellenica*. In the Argon Plain, east of Mantinea, Agesilaus found himself trapped, with the enemy holding the high ground above the rear of his column. To prevent them from falling upon his back, Agesilaus "ordered the rearmost ranks to turn around their spears and to lead them around the phalanx towards his position." Thus, Agesilaus presented his front to the enemy, thereby turning his men from column into phalanx. Then he ordered the men on his left to turn about, march clear of the line, face to the right, and march toward him behind the standing phalanx. In this instance, those who

⁴⁷ L. Breitenbach 1878, p. 109. F. Reuss, *NJ* 127, 1883, p. 821, claimed that *anaptyssō* could only be understood as "eine Verlängerung der Front durch deployment," and that it is equivalent to the Latin term *explicare*. Yet it is hardly felicitous to interpret *anaptyssō* in *Pel.* 23 in the light of Roman military practices.

⁴⁸ See L. Breitenbach 1876, p. 113. That *anastrephō* had not yet gained a technical meaning is obvious from *Hell.* 6, 2, 20, where Xenophon uses it to mean "to turn around." The notion of *anastrephō* ("to turn back": LSJ) and the basic meaning of *anaptyssēin to byblion* ("to unroll [by turning] a book") is quite similar.

remained facing the enemy on the heights fixed their attention and prevented them from interrupting the maneuver.⁴⁹

In his description of the battle of Mantinea in 362 Xenophon tells how Epaminondas, in the face of the enemy phalanx, built up his striking wing before attacking the Spartans. Standing on the left of his own line, Epaminondas led the advance (*Hell.* 7, 5, 22). According to J. Kromayer, Epaminondas thus created “durch den Aufmarsch der nach der Flanke marschierenden *lochoi* . . . eine wuchtige Kolonne.”⁵⁰ Once again, a Greek commander marched units, in this case *lochoi* rather than files, from one wing behind a line that stood facing ahead. This maneuver is identical to that of Agesilaus in the Argon Plain and the unsuccessful evolutions of Mnasippus’ troops. Since the same maneuver could be described in a number of different ways, there was obviously no technical term for it in the fourth century. Nonetheless, the movement in each case involved troops marching from a wing behind a stationary phalanx.⁵¹

In view of Plutarch’s use of *anaptyssō*, which always carries the notion of turning back, and the frequency with which classical Greek commanders moved troops behind the phalanx, one can only conclude that Plutarch means the same thing in the *Life of Pelopidas*. According to Plutarch, Cleombrotus at Leuctra was attempting to fold back the right, that is, Spartan, wing by withdrawing elements (perhaps *enōmotiai* or even *lochoi*) from the left of the right wing and moving them behind the line, which remained facing ahead. Instead of concentrating them on the wing, as did Agesilaus in 370 and as Epaminondas would do in 362, Cleombrotus, in Plutarch’s view, was trying to march them around (*periēgon*) the men on his extreme right wing. The stationary units provided protection for those in motion, and once the line by its deployment had reached a position from which it could outflank Epaminondas’ wing, it could then wheel (*kykloō*) and envelop (*periballō*) the enemy. But Pelopidas charged the Spartan line when it was vulnerable, with some units in no position to resist the attack, and thus prevented the Spartans from reaching a point from which Cleombrotus could move the wing forward (*anateinō*) for the encirclement. Moreover, Pelopidas’ attack made it impossible for Cleombrotus to bring his troops back together (*synagō*) and thereby close up (*synkleiō*) the

⁴⁹ L. Breitenbach 1876, p. 162; Fougères 1898, pp. 441–442; personal observations of the plain on 13 September 1971.

⁵⁰ Kromayer 1905, p. 12; cf. L. Breitenbach 1876, p. 248.

⁵¹ The danger of simply turning and marching away in the face of the enemy is amply demonstrated by Cleon’s fate at Amphipolis: Thuc. 5, 10, 3–4, with the comments of Gomme *et al.* 1945–70, vol. 111, pp. 647–648, and Gomme 1962, p. 117.

line. There is nothing here to suggest that Cleombrotus was attempting any novel or extraordinary evolutions – nothing in fact that had not actually been done on the battlefield before – and still less to suggest that Plutarch has misunderstood Callisthenes' account of the battle.

This interpretation also helps to explain Plutarch's statement (*Pel.* 23, 3) that the Spartans were in confusion. He observes that in their disorder "they made an uproar (*thorybeō*)," which further made it difficult for anyone to hear orders. Diodorus uses the same verb when he writes of the troops of the Thirty Tyrants at Athens, who at one crucial point lost their nerve and "made the uproar that is known as panic" (14, 32, 3). At Leuctra confusion and panic descended upon the Spartan army, making it impossible to hear orders, much less to obey them, or to remedy an unexpected situation. Plutarch says as much when he wrote that they "were not standing in array but moved confusedly about amongst each other when Cleombrotus' orders reached them" – those in motion were especially hard put either to join the fray or to render effective support to those already engaged or about to be engaged. This may also be the meaning behind Xenophon's statement that when Cleombrotus started his attack, the cavalries had engaged in battle already, before the army had actually heard the command to move forward (*Hell.* 6, 4, 13). Those still maneuvering behind the line would have found it extremely difficult to hear the word of command or to detect any last-minute change of plan.

PLUTARCH AND XENOPHON

Anderson has argued cogently that Plutarch's testimony can be used to complement Xenophon's narrative, which he described as "a list of reasons for the Spartan defeat."⁵² Although Xenophon is clearly the most reliable source for the battle, he has left a very imperfect picture – indeed hardly more than a sketch – of the action. On the other hand, Plutarch, who in accordance with his usual method concentrates his attention on the exploits of his hero, has omitted the cavalry engagement, which figures so prominently in Xenophon's account.

When Cleombrotus drew up his army before the battle, he could reasonably expect two things of the Thebans. First, he could expect them to station their hoplites in an unusually deep formation. As early as the battle of Delium in 424, the Thebans had ranked their hoplites twenty-five shields

⁵² Anderson 1970, pp. 198–199; see also pp. 209–210. As Cawkwell 1973, p. 57, has demonstrated, any argument based on the silence of Xenophon is very weak.

deep (Thuc. 4, 93, 4), and at the battle of the Nemea River in 394 they were "quite deep" (Xen. *Hell.* 4, 2, 18), which in this case means at least more than sixteen shields deep. Secondly, Cleombrotus could assume that the Thebans themselves would hold the right wing of the Boeotian line, as they had at Delium, the Nemea River, and Coronea. Indeed, Xenophon claims that the Thebans at the Nemea River refused to join battle so long as they were stationed opposite the Spartans. Cleombrotus might also suspect that the Thebans would move obliquely to the right, as they had done with such success at the Nemea River.

Cleombrotus' intentions are not entirely clear. He may have originally planned to repeat the Spartan tactics of the Nemea River, which would have consisted of his leading the phalanx to the right until it was beyond the left wing of the enemy. The only evidence in support of this hypothesis is Cleombrotus' decision to station his cavalry in front of his phalanx. Since the usual position of Greek cavalry was on the flanks, Wolter and Anderson argued that Cleombrotus placed his horsemen in front of the phalanx to provide cover for the advance of the main line.⁵³ Epaminondas later used this stratagem to good effect at Mantinea, where the dust cloud raised by his cavalry prevented the Spartans from correctly interpreting his intentions. Furthermore, Anderson argued persuasively that had Cleombrotus planned nothing more elaborate than a typical straight advance against the enemy, his own cavalry would have been caught between the two phalanxes, to the impediment of his attack. It seems very likely that Cleombrotus originally planned for his cavalry to distract the Thebans; and that when he had reached the position that he desired, he would have recalled his horsemen to cover his flank.

Nonetheless, Cleombrotus had to revise his thinking as he observed the Boeotians prepare for battle. It must have been with something of a shock that he watched the massive Theban column forming up on the left opposite his own position, not on the right as he had expected. Only then, according to Plutarch, did Cleombrotus realize that Epaminondas' plan was to meet strength with strength rather than repeat the experiences of the Nemea River and Coronea. Epaminondas had determined that the Thebans could expect decisive results only by overwhelming the Spartans themselves in the first shock of battle.⁵⁴ According to Polyaeus, Epaminondas, in an address to his men before the battle, likened the

⁵³ Wolter 1926, pp. 311–312; Anderson 1970, pp. 213–215.

⁵⁴ See Xenophon's comment that the Thebans thought that if they were capable of crushing the wing of the king, the rest would be an easy match (*Hell.* 6, 4, 12). Thus, Epaminondas stationed Pelopidas and the Sacred Band at the head of the Theban column principally so that they could confront the picked troops ranked around Cleombrotus.

destruction of the Spartans to the crushing of the head of a snake. The body of the snake, he pointed out, like the allied contingents of the Spartan army, would be harmless without the Laconian head (2, 3, 15).

Two other of Epaminondas' innovations were integral parts of this plan: the oblique attack to the left and the refused right wing.⁵⁵ Since Epaminondas planned to decide the battle with his own column, he had to counter the usual Spartan advance to the right. The oblique attack to the left ensured that the Thebans would meet Cleombrotus head to head. The role of the other Boeotian troops was subsidiary to this objective. By holding his right wing back, Epaminondas kept it away from the enemy, so that it would engage them only if he were unable to break through on the left. At the same time, the presence of these Boeotians prevented the Spartan allies from attacking the right flank of Epaminondas' column. There was nothing in past military experience to prepare Cleombrotus for these innovations, which alone nullified the Spartan's plan of battle. Instead of executing an enveloping action against a line of hoplites eight or twelve deep as customary – hoplites inferior in quality and experience to the Thebans – he had to deploy his men far enough to his right to encircle the entire Theban column or risk being overwhelmed himself.

Cleombrotus' solution to his dilemma, as Plutarch says, was to change his formation. He could not, like the Spartans at the Nemea River, make a long, slow advance to the right to correct the situation because the field of Leuctra is rather narrow.⁵⁶ Even without contending with Epaminondas' oblique advance to the left, he would probably have been unable, before encountering Epaminondas, to lead enough troops to the right to grapple with the entire Theban column. Instead, he was forced to deploy his men laterally, and to do so successfully he needed time.⁵⁷ He ordered his cavalry

⁵⁵ Plut. *Pel.* 23, 1; Diod. *Sic.* 15, 55, 2; Wolter 1926, p. 314; Adcock 1962a, p. 25. Cawkwell 1972, pp. 261–262, spoke of Epaminondas' right wing as a reserve, but it can more properly be described as refused: cf. Delbrück 1920, p. 156; Tarn 1930, p. 8.

⁵⁶ Although Pritchett 1965–92, vol. 1, pp. 49–58, has discussed the topography of the battlefield, Frazer 1898, vol. v, pp. 50–51, gave the best concise description of the plain; cf. Kromayer and Veith 1922, *Griechische Abtheilung* no. 5. The distance from the restored monument to the line of hills upon which the Boeotians encamped is roughly a mile. On one of my visits to the battlefield, I covered this distance, at an admittedly leisurely pace, in a half-hour. Troops marching with any speed could easily have covered it in less time; Buckler 1980a, p. 61.

⁵⁷ Since Pritchett 1974, pp. 252–253, has demonstrated that Greek trophies were erected at the spot on the battlefield where the vanquished turned to flight, since the trophy at Leuctra stands nearly at the foot of the hills upon which the Spartans had encamped, and since both Xenophon and Plutarch agree that Cleombrotus had not advanced far before he was engaged by the Thebans, one must conclude that there was not enough room for an entire wing to be wheeled through ninety degrees, whereas movements by individual *enomotiai* (Xen. *Hell.* 6, 4, 12), by combinations of them, or by entire *lochoi* would have been quite feasible. Lastly, one might add that extensions of the line by

into the plain to fix the attention of the Thebans and to provide cover, while he moved elements from the left of his wing to a position on the right from which they could wheel against Epaminondas. He thereby opened a gap between his wing and that of his allies which the allies were no doubt expected to close.⁵⁸

The advance of the Spartan cavalry, instead of delaying action, signaled the opening of the battle. Epaminondas' horsemen quickly routed their Spartan counterparts, thus spoiling Cleombrotus' bid for time. The defeat of their cavalry came as no surprise to the Spartans, who considered it an inferior arm, fit only for the weak and the cowardly.⁵⁹ What Cleombrotus again could not have anticipated is the conduct of the Boeotian cavalry. Instead of pursuing the fleeing Spartans around the flanks, as was usual in hoplite battles, the Boeotian cavalry deliberately drove the survivors back onto their own line (see Xen. *Hell.* 6, 4, 13). Far from accidental, this was another of Epaminondas' innovations.⁶⁰

The flight of the Spartan cavalry proved crucial, for it gave Pelopidas his opportunity. First, by using the gap in the Spartan line as their escape route, the horsemen prevented either Cleombrotus or his allies from closing up the line.⁶¹ Secondly, and more importantly, the fouling of the main line and the interruption of Cleombrotus' deployment permitted Pelopidas to strike his blow before the Spartans could restore order, and thus he was able to pin the Spartan phalanx until Epaminondas could bring the full weight of the striking wing to bear. Unable to maneuver further, Cleombrotus faced the Theban mass and fell fighting at the head of his troops.

Plutarch's account of Leuctra is by no means a confused tale nor rhetorically elaborated. Plutarch transmitted in the *Life of Pelopidas* what he had read in Callisthenes without embellishment, misunderstanding, or anachronism. His narrative is coherent and plausible, and goes far to complement Xenophon's testimony.

moving troops from one wing behind a stationary line beyond the other wing were common as late as the American Civil War: see Grant 1885–6, vol. 11, pp. 228, 235, 253, 264; Sherman 1875, vol. 11, p. 107.

⁵⁸ See Anderson 1970, pp. 217–218. ⁵⁹ Cf. Xen. *Hell.* 6, 4, 10–11; Plut. *Mor.* 210f.

⁶⁰ Cawkwell 1972, p. 263, argued persuasively that Leuctra was not a hastily conceived plan, yet one need not believe, with Lévêque and Vidal-Naquet 1960, that Epaminondas' deliberations were influenced by Pythagorean doctrine: Buckler 1993. Although Hanson 1988 denies that Epaminondas introduced anything new at Leuctra, he writes of "novel tactical innovations" (Hanson 1999, p. 46).

⁶¹ Tarn 1930, pp. 62–63, emphasized the use cavalry habitually made of gaps in the phalanx. Lazenby 1985, pp. 158–162, inadequately appreciates the significance of the gap opened by Cleombrotus.

*Alliance and hegemony in fourth-century
Greece: the case of the Theban Hegemony*

The year 371 BC, when the Thebans crushed the Spartan army at Leuctra, was a turning point for all of Greece as well as for Thebes and the Boeotian Confederacy. Until that time Sparta, no matter how Isocrates and other Athenians might have wished otherwise,¹ was the generally recognized leader of Greece, a position first acknowledged in deed as early as the Persian War.² The Peloponnesian War and the Spartan victory over Athens underscored Sparta's position of leadership. By the instrument of surrender in 404 Athens itself became a subject-ally of Sparta, and in the words of Xenophon, the Athenians were required "to count the same people friends and enemies as the Lacedaemonians did and to follow them both by land and sea wherever they should lead the way."³ Although challenged by a formidable coalition of Greek states in the Corinthian War, Sparta emerged triumphant, largely owing to Persian support.

The entry of Persia into the political and diplomatic affairs of Greece was a complicated factor of enormous significance. After the King's Peace of 386, leadership in Greece, though still the purview of Sparta, was intimately connected to the favor and policies of the Persian Empire. The precise nature of that connection is disputed. G. L. Cawkwell has argued that the King formally recognized Sparta as the *prostatēs* of the Peace,⁴ while D. M. Lewis has disputed his conclusion.⁵ On the basis of present knowledge, the dispute is perhaps insoluble, simply because the sources remain uniformly silent on the point.⁶ The dispute, though important, is irrelevant to the course of actual events. When Antalcidas

¹ E.g. Isoc. 4, 18.

² Hdt. 7, 159; 7, 161; Hampl 1938, pp. 69–71; Clauss 1983, pp. 34–39; Cartledge 1987, p. 16.

³ *Hell.* 2, 2, 20. A discussion of these treaty obligations can readily be found in de Ste Croix 1972, pp. 108–110; Cartledge 1987, pp. 280–282.

⁴ Cawkwell 1973, p. 53. ⁵ Lewis 1977, p. 147 n. 80; see also Seager 1974, p. 38.

⁶ Neither Xenophon nor any other ancient source has preserved a complete account of any treaty or a complete description of the protocol involved.

and Tiribazus operated against Athens in the Corinthian War,⁷ and when the terms of the King's Peace were presented, there was no doubt in anyone's mind whom the King championed.⁸ In 386 Sparta was in fact *prostatēs* of the Peace, and the states of Greece clearly recognized that fact.⁹ From 386 to 371 Sparta, with the consistent support of Persia, retained its traditional position as leader of Greece.¹⁰

In this area, too, Leuctra provided a turning point, the first time that any Greek state had successfully defied Sparta's implementation of a Common Peace treaty.¹¹ Thus, the ascendancy of Thebes marks a new departure in the diplomatic and political history of Greece, and it remains to explore the nature of that departure. The Theban Hegemony is significant for an understanding of the very concept of hegemony in the fourth century. Directly related is the evolution of the Common Peace and the Persian role in maintaining that Peace. Of equal importance for the diplomatic history of Greece are the aims of Thebes and the means by which the Thebans attempted to maintain their ascendancy.

THE COMMON PEACE AND HEGEMONY

The Common Peace, the role of the *prostatēs*, and the question of hegemony in the fourth century have long been bound together. For instance, in 1938 F. Hampl studied the relationship between hegemony and the Common Peace on the one hand and the hegemony of Greece as a political concept on the other.¹² Much of Hampl's work is still valuable, though few today would necessarily use Diodorus' *epitome* as a faithful reflection of Ephorus' practice and usage.¹³ Diodorus looked at the history of fourth-century Greece from the standpoint of his own day; and although the notion of the hegemony of Greece was as familiar to him as it is today, it is

⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 5, 1, 25; Graefe 1935; Buckler 2003, pp. 139–140.

⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 5, 1, 30–33; Diod. Sic. 14, 110, 3–4; *SdA* 11, no. 242; Jehne 1994, pp. 31–47.

⁹ See Isoc. 4, 127, where he describes the Spartans as “the leaders (*tois proestōtas*) of the Greeks.”

¹⁰ Plut. *Artax.* 22, 1–7; Ryder 1965, pp. 39–81.

¹¹ Also pertinent is the fact that Persia made no effort to retrieve the Spartan disaster at Leuctra or to enforce its will on the recalcitrant and victorious state, a fact too frequently overlooked by scholars such as Starr 1974, p. 75, who emphasize the role of Persia as the arbiter of Greek affairs. Starr and others have failed to realize that even the King's reach was limited. Otherwise, he would have had no need, whether in fact or in law, of a *prostatēs*.

¹² Hampl 1938, pp. 15–16, 80–85; see also H. Schaefer 1963, pp. 120–135; Jehne 1994, pp. 42–47.

¹³ E.g. Hampl 1938, p. 82, where he cites Diod. Sic. 15, 19, 4 in his discussion, even though here *hēgemonia* is an emendation, not generally accepted, for *dynasteia*, cf. Vogel's Teubner text *ad loc.* Furthermore, throughout his history Diodorus habitually uses *hēgemonia* to mean ascendancy: cf. 12, 54, 3; 13, 34, 1; 14, 10, 1; 16, 1, 4; 18, 9, 1; 19, 53, 8. At 15, 60, 1 he describes *hēgemonia* as “a sort of prize for valour open to those strong enough to contend for it.”

worthwhile to ask whether that concept had reached maturity during the Theban ascendancy.

Hēgemonia figures prominently in Isocrates' works, and he was instrumental in expanding the application of the term from its traditional meaning of the military leader of an alliance to the notion of general political ascendancy within Greece.¹⁴ In the *Panegyric*, one of his earliest works, he repeatedly uses the term to indicate the military leadership of a general Greek alliance against the Persian Empire,¹⁵ a theme to which he reverts briefly in the *Antidosis* (15, 57–60). Clearly, the leadership of this alliance is tantamount to the leadership of Greece itself. Furthermore, in the *Panegyric* (4, 22) he claims that *dynamis* alone is an insufficient qualification for the leadership of the Panhellenic alliance. In this same work Isocrates also applies *hēgemonia* to the Athenian position within the Delian League,¹⁶ a usage which recurs in several later works.¹⁷ His terminology in these instances is readily understandable, inasmuch as the League was originally established as an alliance under the leadership of Athens.¹⁸

Isocrates' most frequent use of *hēgemonia* in the sense of political ascendancy comes from several of his later works, the earliest being the *Archidamus*. At 6, 110 Isocrates' Archidamus urges his countrymen to regain "the leadership (*dynasteian*) among the Greeks which we ourselves received from our fathers" – to regain in fact the position that they had lost as a result of Theban victories. Other examples of this usage all date towards the end of Isocrates' life, between c. 355 and 342.¹⁹ In this period he commonly uses *hēgemonia* as a synonym for *dynamis*,²⁰ *archē*,²¹ and *dynasteia*.²² Obviously, by this time the extended sense of the word had

¹⁴ See Preuss 1904, s.v. *hēgemonia*. Although Bétant 1843, s.v. *hēgemonia*, considers six passages of Thucydides to mean "principatus," perhaps only once (5, 69, 1) is the term used in the sense of ascendancy. This is a reference to the Argives' ancient hegemony, probably an allusion to the time when Agamemnon led the alliance of Greek heroes against Troy, so Gomme *et al.* 1945–70, vol. IV, p. 117; cf. Mathieu 1925, pp. 65–80; Mikkola 1954, p. 44 n. 1; Buchner 1958, pp. 156–158.

¹⁵ Isoc. 4, 20; 4, 22; 4, 25; 4, 66; 4, 71; 4, 98–99; 4, 166. The allusion at 4, 128 to the Spartans' considering themselves worthy of *hēgemonia* refers back to 4, 18–20, where Isocrates introduces the topic of the leadership of the Panhellenic crusade; Perlman 1969.

¹⁶ Isoc. 4, 100; 4, 103; 4, 122.

¹⁷ Isoc. 8, 30; 8, 42; 8, 102; 12, 52; 12, 67; 15, 307; cf. Mathieu 1925, pp. 51–64; Baynes 1955, pp. 144–167; Buchner 1958.

¹⁸ Thuc. 1, 95–97; Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 23, 5; Plut. *Arist.* 24–25, 1. In addition to the works cited in n. 66 below, see Rawlings 1977; de Ste Croix 1972, pp. 298–307; Meiggs 1972.

¹⁹ Isoc. 7, 17; 8, 102; 8, 135; 8, 142; 8, 144; 12, 115. For Isocrates' steadfast refusal to acknowledge the dominant position of Thebes, see Cloché 1942, and in general Shrimpton 1971.

²⁰ Isoc. 5, 60–61; 8, 102; 12, 115. ²¹ Isoc. 5, 60–61; 8, 142.

²² Isoc. 8, 135; 8, 142; 15, 307; cf. also 7, 2–3; 7, 7; 8, 101; 8, 126; 12, 14. In other instances Isocrates applies the term to military leadership of an alliance (8, 138) and political leadership within the *polis* (12, 143).

passed into general currency. Hence, in the course of his career Isocrates applied the term *hēgemonia* to the state of political primacy within Greece, regardless of ties of alliance or support from the King.

Xenophon, who also employs *hēgemonia* in a general sense, is important both because of his contemporary testimony on the political notions of the day and because of his application of the term specifically to the goals of Thebes during its ascendancy. His most frequent use of *hēgemonia*, like that of other fourth-century writers, describes the military leadership of an alliance.²³ He also employs it to indicate military command²⁴ and guides.²⁵ Yet he also applies the term specifically to Theban efforts during the hegemony to sponsor a Common Peace (*Hell.* 7, 1, 33).

Xenophon begins with the comment that “the Thebans, who were continually planning how they might obtain the leadership (*hēgemonia*) of Hellas, came up with the idea that if they should send to the King of the Persians, they would gain some advantage.” Perhaps no other episode demonstrates so clearly Xenophon’s fury at Theban attempts to replace Sparta in Greek affairs. The Thebans, even according to Xenophon’s own testimony, sent ambassadors to Susa only in response to a Spartan delegation, headed by Euthycles, which had already traveled to the Persian court.²⁶ At Susa Pelopidas proposed clauses for a new Common Peace, and won Persian support for the new treaty, thus replacing Sparta as *prostatēs* of the Common Peace.²⁷ Artaxerxes sent a Persian ambassador to Thebes to present the rescript to the Greeks, but the Thebans, in a chaotic and stormy meeting of delegates assembled from the Greek states, failed to win its acceptance. In closing his account of this affair Xenophon comments that “the attempt by Pelopidas and the Thebans to gain leadership (*archē*) had thus come to an end (*dielythē*)” (*Hell.* 7, 1, 40).

Four aspects of Xenophon’s account of these incidents pertain to his conception of hegemony. First, according to Xenophon the Thebans in 367 had still not attained the hegemony of Greece, even though they had by that time smashed the Spartan army at Leuctra, ravished Laconia, liberated Messene, and attacked Corinth in a second Peloponnesian invasion. In this passage hegemony means more than mere victory in the field. Secondly, at *Hell.* 7, 1, 40 *archē* is equated with the *hēgemonia* of *Hell.* 7, 1, 33. If

²³ Xen. *Hell.* 7, 1, 2; 7, 1, 11–13; 7, 1, 22; 7, 1, 24; *Mem.* 4, 4, 17; *Ways and Means* 5, 5, 7; see also Sturtz 1801–4, s.v. *hēgemonia*.

²⁴ Xen. *Anab.* 4, 7, 8; *Ages.* 2, 28. ²⁵ Xen. *Cyr.* 4, 5, 11.

²⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 7, 1, 33–40; Plut. *Pel.* 30, 1; Buckler 1977b, pp. 140–142; Mosley 1979, pp. 192, 201 n. 50; Cartledge 1987, pp. 311–312.

²⁷ For a discussion of Pelopidas’ speech at Susa, see chapter 10.

Xenophon is to be taken literally, he considers hegemony and dominion synonymous. While he often applies *archē* in a general sense to government or rule,²⁸ empire,²⁹ and dominion,³⁰ on two other occasions he also uses *archē* and *hēgemonia* synonymously: once in the debate over the conclusion of the Spartan–Athenian alliance of 369 (*Hell.* 7, 1, 1–14; see also Isoc. 4, 100) and again in the *Ways and Means* (5, 5–7), where *hēgemonia*, *archē*, and *prostatēs* are virtually interchangeable.

Closer to Xenophon's usage at *Hell.* 7, 1, 33–40 is his estimation of the Spartan position in Greece in 379. At 5, 3, 27 he observes that Spartan rule (*archē*) at that time seemed well and securely established, the result of the Spartans' use of the King's Peace as an instrument of foreign policy.³¹ The significance of the peace in this instance is underlined by the fact that this passage is a partial restatement of *Hell.* 5, 1, 36, where Xenophon describes the aftermath of the peace. At 5, 3, 27 he emphasizes Spartan success in eliminating, at least temporarily, enemy opposition. *Archē* here includes Sparta's effective, if ruthless, imposition of the King's Peace on the Greek states. In that respect, it is analogous to 7, 1, 33–40, where *hēgemonia* and *archē* are synonymous, and both are bound up with the Common Peace. In the latter passage, however, Xenophon employs *hēgemonia* in a far broader sense than simple military leadership of an alliance. Furthermore, this usage is unique in Xenophon's works.

The third aspect of Xenophon's account of the abortive peace of 366 is his use of the aorist passive: "had thus come to an end" (*dielythē*). Accordingly, Theban attempts at hegemony ended with the failure of the Common Peace in 366.³² This is long before Epaminondas' death at Mantinea, and for that matter before the Theban system of alliances had begun to come apart. In 366 Thebes, its power intact, was still undefeated in the field. Hence, hegemony, in Xenophon's view, seems to have little to do with military ascendancy alone. Lastly, for Xenophon *hēgemonia* is defined not only as Persian support for a Greek state, but ultimately as successful implementation of the King's rescript. According to *Hell.* 7, 1, 33–40, since Thebes failed to win the adherence of the Greek states to this peace, it failed to win hegemony. Thus, for Xenophon the concept of

²⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 2, 3, 19; *Mem.* 1, 1, 16; *Lac. Pol.* 15, 1; see also Sturtz 1801–4, s.v. *archē*.

²⁹ Xen. *Cyr.* 8, 1, 13.

³⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 3, 5, 10; 7, 5, 18; on the latter compare 7, 5, 1, where Xenophon claims that the Thebans wanted to enslave the Peloponnesus; *Ways and Means* 5, 6; cf. Ps.-Xen. *Ath. Pol.* 2, 16, where *archē* refers to Athens' fifth-century naval command.

³¹ See Isoc. 4, 128; 15, 57; Diod. Sic. 15, 23, 3–5; Jehne 1994, pp. 54–56; Stylianou 1998, p. 228.

³² Against the view of Cawkwell 1961a and 1972, p. 269 n. 4, that this peace was subsequently ratified, see Buckler 1980a, pp. 251–255; Cartledge 1987, p. 200; Jehne 1994, pp. 82–90.

hegemony, as outlined in this passage, was inextricably bound to the successful establishment of the Common Peace.

There is, however, no indication that other fourth-century historians defined hegemony in Xenophon's strict and peculiar fashion. Anaximenes once uses *hēgemonia* to contrast the leadership of an alliance to tyranny, and he twice applies the noun *hēgemōn* to individual military commanders.³³ Likewise, Theopompus most frequently uses the term to designate military commanders,³⁴ as does Callisthenes, who in addition employs it to mean guides rather than military officers.³⁵

The usage of Ephorus is, unfortunately, less simple and clear-cut.³⁶ One problem of dealing with his fragments, as W. R. Connor has pointed out in connection with Theopompus, is the difficulty in distinguishing the writer's actual statements and wording from the epitomizer's paraphrase.³⁷ While Ephorus too employs *hēgemonia* both as a noun and a verb to designate guides (F 1, 115), an *oikistēs* (F 18), to believe (F 9, 109, 139), and to order (F 216), in four fragments (F 115, 118, 119, 196) the term is found in the broad sense of leadership or ascendancy. Three fragments derive from Strabo and one from Diodorus. Both authors date to a period when the concept of hegemony in its extended sense was familiar, and both seem to paraphrase Ephorus freely. Furthermore, these are the only occasions on which the term is used in this broader sense.³⁸ Of these instances perhaps only one can safely be attributed to Ephorus. In F 119 Strabo reports that Ephorus remarked that Boeotia "naturally tended towards *hēgemonia*."³⁹ If Strabo, as it appears, is preserving Ephorus' phraseology, Ephorus, the student of Isocrates, may also have played a part in extending the meaning of *hēgemonia*.⁴⁰ Twice thereafter in F 119 Strabo uses the term in its broader sense, once immediately after its first appearance, to refer to the loss of

³³ FGrH 72 F 11.

³⁴ FGrH 115 F 103, 249, 344. Moreover, he uses *hēgeomai* both for one who ruled an area (F 129) and to indicate supposition or belief (F 225, 335).

³⁵ FGrH 124 F 14, 24, 35; cf. F 5 where he states that Rhodes led (*hēgoumenos*) Cyrene in coloring but that in dissoluteness there was no difference between the two.

³⁶ FGrH 70. Wallace 1979 does not explore the ways in which Strabo used Ephorus. For a discussion of books 8–10, see Aly 1957, pp. 331–371.

³⁷ Connor 1968, pp. 185–186; see also Brunt 1980, pp. 481–483.

³⁸ Although F 191 is printed as a fragment of Ephorus, see Badian and Buckler 1975, p. 234 n. 20.

³⁹ Yet see 6, 4, 1, where Strabo, possibly under Ephoran influence, applies this same expression to Italy. Likewise, it is unclear whether Diodorus (14, 92, 2) is repeating Ephorus' language when he says that Corinth was suited for the hegemony of Greece primarily because of his frequent use of the phrase and the concept; see n. 13 above.

⁴⁰ Some weight may be given this conclusion by Diodorus' statement (15, 60, 5 = Ephorus F 214) that Jason was elected *hēgemōn* of the Thessalians, the only instance of Diodorus' using this term of the fourth-century *tageia*. Diodorus normally refers to Jason and his successor Alexander of Pherae as

Theban hegemony after the death of Epaminondas.⁴¹ In this same fragment he says that the Thebans, under the leadership of Epaminondas, “demanded the leadership (*archē*) among the Greeks,” a phrase reminiscent of Xenophon’s usage (*Hell.* 7, 1, 40). Yet according to this fragment, even though Thebes held hegemony, it merely attempted to win dominion. Even though one can be less certain of the last two examples, it is quite possible that Ephorus used *hēgemonia* in the sense of ascendancy. Ephorus did not, however, link hegemony to the Common Peace or to the support of the King.⁴²

In sum, there is no reason to conclude on the basis of existing evidence that anyone else in the fourth century shared Xenophon’s particular definition of hegemony, nor is it certain that Xenophon applied it consistently. Rather, there are several indications that in the course of the century the concept of hegemony in the sense of ascendant power became common and that the development was linked to the *aristeia* of Thebes.

HEGEMONY IN FACT

Turning from the evolution of political concepts to practical politics, one can justly say that the way in which Thebes exercised its authority from 371 to 362 was a mixture of the traditional and the novel. The novel aspect was Thebes’ refusal to follow the example of others in its pursuit of hegemony. Unlike Sparta in the Peloponnesian League and Athens in the Delian League, Thebes made no effort either to create an empire or to bind its allies in any sort of permanent and stable organization. Indeed, after Leuctra Thebes devoted its attention to diplomatic efforts in central Greece rather than schemes of domination further afield. Even those efforts were made easier only by the assassination of Jason of Pherae.⁴³ Although generally paid scant attention, the dealings of Thebes with its neighbors after Leuctra constitute the precursor of its relations with Thessaly and Macedonia on the one hand and with the Peloponnesian powers of Argos, the Arcadian Confederacy, and Elis on the other.

tyrant (15, 57, 2; 60, 1; 67, 3; 71, 2; 75, 2; 95, 1; 16, 14, 1) or as *dynastēs* (15, 80, 1; 95, 2; see also 15, 61, 2) and once as ruler (15, 61, 2). See also Xen. *Hell.* 6, 4, 32; 6, 4, 34 on the *tageia* becoming a tyranny. See also Sprawski 1999, pp. 101–102.

⁴¹ Xen. *Hell.* 7, 1, 33–40 notwithstanding, Xenophon too felt that the battle of Mantinea marked the end of the Theban ascendancy, as he makes quite clear by ending his history with this episode. See also Shrimpton 1971, p. 311; Buckler 1980a, pp. 220–221.

⁴² The terms used in F 115, 118, 196 may as easily be the wording of Strabo and Diodorus as of Ephorus.

⁴³ Xen. *Hell.* 6, 4, 29–32; Diod. Sic. 15, 60, 5; Val. Max. 9, 10 ext. 2; Buckler 1978b, pp. 90–91; Sprawski 1999, p. 124.

In 371/0 Thebes concluded alliances with many states, large and small, in central Greece, including the Phocians, Locrians, Euboeans, Aetolians, and Thessalians.⁴⁴ Although many of them accompanied Epaminondas on at least his first and last Peloponnesian campaigns, all of these alliances were probably defensive in nature to judge by the Theban treaty with Phocis. Here, as so often, the issue is clouded by Xenophon's notorious prejudice against Thebes. Although Xenophon claims that the Phocians had become Theban subjects in 370/69, when they participated in Epaminondas' first invasion (*Hell.* 6, 5, 23), he admits in connection with the preliminaries of Epaminondas' last campaign that the Theban–Phocian alliance was purely defensive (*Hell.* 7, 5, 4). Hence, his earlier statement is far more likely to be an attempt to depict the Thebans as arrogant and oppressive overlords than evidence of the Phocians being subject-allies of Thebes. The participation of these allies in Epaminondas' operations may well have been due less to Theban military compulsion than either the lure of booty⁴⁵ or the wish to remain on good terms with Thebes. Also pertinent is the Theban refusal in 362 to coerce the Phocians to send a contingent to Epaminondas' army.

The only exceptions to this method of dealing with allies form a distinct pattern. Between 369 and 364, after initial Theban activity in the north, Thebes confronted several rulers who were virtually powers unto themselves, specifically king Alexander II and the regent Ptolemaeus of Alorus in Macedonia and the tyrant Alexander of Pherae in Thessaly. All of these dynasts were free from the constitutional constraints of the normal Greek *polis*; each was able to act on his own initiative; and each could summon a considerable political and military following loyal to no one but its leader. For all these rulers the price of Theban recognition was acceptance of the status of subject-ally. Even this burden was light. There is no evidence to indicate that either Alexander II or Ptolemaeus ever contributed levies to Theban armies, and good reason to conclude that Thebes left both rulers a free hand.⁴⁶ Alexander of Pherae was required only once to answer a call to arms.⁴⁷ The status of subject-ally was the simplest means of retaining some measure of direct control over powerful and independent rulers.

Another significant factor to be recognized about Theban activity in the north is the refusal of Thebes to organize its allies into any sort of corporate body similar to the Peloponnesian League or the Second Athenian League

⁴⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 6, 5, 23; Ages. 2, 24; Diod. Sic. 15, 57, 1; 62, 4. Only the treaty with Phocis is included in *SdA* 11, no. 271; Buckler 2003, pp. 306–307.

⁴⁵ Cf. Xen. *Hell.* 6, 5, 30; 6, 5, 50. For comparison, see Xen. *Hell.* 3, 2, 26, in which the Arcadians and Achaeans joined the Spartan invasion of Elis simply to participate in the plundering.

⁴⁶ Buckler 1980a, pp. 122–123. ⁴⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 7, 5, 4; Buckler 2003, p. 345.

(see chapter II). The ties of individual allies were solely with Thebes, and they lacked both the right and the opportunity to deliberate on or to plan allied activity.

Consequently, when in 370 a joint delegation from Argos, the Arcadian Confederacy, and Elis arrived in Thebes seeking alliance, they found a state already enjoying ties with a large number of other states. On the urging of Epaminondas and others, the Thebans concluded an alliance with the Peloponnesian states, but one that did not include Thebes' northern allies.⁴⁸ Never, for instance, did the Thebans call upon the Peloponnesians to contribute troops to their numerous northern ventures.⁴⁹ Although, as just mentioned, many northerners saw service in the Peloponnesus, their participation was in fact voluntary rather than the result of treaty obligations. In law the Thebans preferred to keep the two sets of alliance separate.

The alliance with the Peloponnesian states was probably defensive in nature, at least formally, as was Athens' arrangement with the members of the Second Athenian League.⁵⁰ Additional weight is given to this view by an alliance of several of Thebes' Peloponnesian allies with Pisa, a treaty which dates to the time of the Arcadian–Eleian war (365–362).⁵¹ While the name of Thebes does not appear on the stone, the Thebans supported the Arcadian Confederacy during the conflict and they may have been a party to the pact.⁵² Although the inscription is badly damaged, extant is the allied pledge of mutual support in the event of an attack on any one of them. In practice, however, the Boeotian–Peloponnesian alliance aimed at reducing the power of Sparta, as Diodorus recognized.⁵³ Accordingly, the allies readily took offensive action against Sparta and its allies.

The terms of the alliance did not designate a *hēgemōn*, the party who would lead the allied forces in the field. This was a serious weakness, one that eventually caused considerable trouble within the alliance. In actual practice, Epaminondas led every major allied expedition, but no clause of the treaty specifically gave Thebes the prerogative of leadership.⁵⁴ At first, of course, it was unthinkable that anyone but the victors of Leuctra should take command. In the years following the Thebans justified their position.

⁴⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 6, 5, 19; Diod. Sic. 15, 62, 3; *SdA* II, no. 273; Roy 1971, pp. 594–595.

⁴⁹ See n. 44 above.

⁵⁰ *IG* II² 43 = Rhodes–Osborne, no. 22, lines 48–51; *IG* II² 34/5 = Rhodes–Osborne, no. 20, lines 26–30; Accame 1941, p. 30; Cargill 1981, pp. 150–152.

⁵¹ *SdA* II, no. 285a; cf. Roy 1971, pp. 594–595; Nielsen 1996, pp. 97–98. ⁵² Buckler 1980a, p. 314 n. 38.

⁵³ Diod. Sic. 15, 62, 3; see also Xen. *Hell.* 7, 4, 34; 7, 4, 39. Stylianos 1998, pp. 423–426 unfortunately does not address this point.

⁵⁴ Plut. *Pel.* 24, 5; Georgiadou 1997, p. 182. See also chapter II below.

They ran up a remarkable string of victories – the first invasion of Laconia, which wreaked wholesale destruction on the Spartan homeland and ended with the liberation of Messene, and a second blow against Corinth, which stunned Sparta's remaining allies in the Peloponnesus. These victories yielded two results: the first was a significant reduction in Spartan power and the second was increased security for Thebes' Peloponnesian allies. Both factors led some allies, notably the Arcadians, to consider themselves a match for Sparta, and both quickly fuelled a growing resentment over Theban leadership of the alliance.⁵⁵

The Arcadians, especially, became dissatisfied, both because of the growth of Theban power and because Thebes at first supported Elis against Arcadia in the Triphylian dispute.⁵⁶ At the peace conference at Thebes in 366, the Arcadians openly challenged Theban leadership of the alliance. Speaking for the Arcadian delegation, Lycomedes declared that the entire proceedings should have been held at the seat of the war, not in Thebes.⁵⁷ In their retort the Thebans ignored the sabotage of their peace efforts and the public embarrassment of having the peace rejected by one of their own allies. Instead, they accused Lycomedes of disrupting the alliance, whereupon the Arcadians stormed out of the conference.⁵⁸ Obviously, in their immediate response the Thebans were more concerned about the maintenance of the Boeotian–Peloponnesian alliance and their position in it than about the proposed peace. Even though the Thebans successfully reasserted their claims to leadership in Epaminondas' third invasion, and though many Arcadian cities and other Peloponnesian allies supported Thebes during the Mantinean campaign, the failure to designate formally a *hēgemōn* was a significant disruptive factor in the Boeotian–Peloponnesian alliance.

The obvious problem is how to account for this flaw – to determine if possible whether it was deliberate or resulted from oversight, ignorance, or inexperience. There is virtually no reason to conclude that a body of people, faced with the threat of war, would have overlooked a matter as important as the command of armies.⁵⁹ Neither were any of the new allies dealing with a novel or unusual situation. A simple determination of

⁵⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 7, 1, 22; Plut. *Pel.* 24, 5–8; Georgiadou 1997, pp. 182–183.

⁵⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 7, 1, 26; Diod. Sic. 15, 77, 2; Paus. 10, 9, 5; Ryder 1965, p. 136; Buckler 1980a, pp. 105–106; Buckler 2000, pp. 317–318.

⁵⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 7, 1, 39.

⁵⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 7, 1, 39–40; L. Breitenbach 1876, p. 201; Dusanic 1971, pp. 294–295; Buckler 1980a, pp. 158–159.

⁵⁹ Danger of war: Xen. *Hell.* 6, 5, 4–10. See also chapter 11.

hegemony in a large alliance had long been common, a determination with which these very Peloponnesian states were quite familiar. As early as 420 Argos, Elis, and Mantinea had concluded a defensive alliance with Athens in which hegemony was to be held by the state in whose territory the military operations took place.⁶⁰ Elsewhere all allies were to share the command equally.⁶¹ Thus, Lycomedes in 366 was ostensibly harking back to a traditional view of hegemony. Nor was this a unique situation. When Athens concluded an alliance with Mantinea in 362, immediately before Epaminondas' last campaign, hegemony was the province of the party in whose territory the armies operated.⁶² After the battle of Mantinea, when the Athenians extended their pact to Achaea, Elis, and Phlius, hegemony was defined in this same way.⁶³

It is certainly possible that in 370 the Peloponnesians proposed this definition of hegemony, but found the Thebans unwilling to accept it. Gaining Theban adherence to their cause was no easy matter, even after the Eleans had promised to underwrite the expenses of any campaign.⁶⁴ Some Thebans felt that they stood more to lose than to gain in the Peloponnesus, and they refused to entrust the army that had carried the day at Leuctra to anyone else's command.⁶⁵ Rather, they insisted on an alliance with the Peloponnesians quite similar in nature to the ones they had made with their northern neighbors. Their caution is understandable, if shortsighted. In the year before they had confronted single-handed the combined might of the Peloponnesus, and the memory of their peril was too fresh for them to risk hazardous and possibly unprofitable adventures far afield. Even so, it is remarkable that they did not demand the formal recognition of their hegemony as the price of their acceptance of the alliance. The only explanation for this seems to be their desire to rely on their prestige as the victors of Leuctra and on their redoubtable army to maintain their ascendancy. Consequently, it is impossible to assign the fault for this lack of formalized leadership anywhere but to the Thebans.

A second flaw in this alliance was as serious and as needless as the question of hegemony. As in the case of the northern allies, the Thebans refused to create a central organization, like the *synedrion* of the Second Athenian League, which could draft plans, marshal allied resources, and set new goals for the alliance. Once the primary aim of the Boeotian-Peloponnesian

⁶⁰ *IG* 1² 86, lines 24–26; Thuc. 5, 47, 7; *SdA* 11, no. 193; Gomme *et al.* 1945–70, vol. 1v, pp. 56–57.

⁶¹ See Xen. *Hell.* 7, 1, 24, where Lycomedes urged that hegemony be held by turns, precisely what the Spartans and Athenians agreed to do in 369 (*Hell.* 7, 1, 14).

⁶² Xen. *Hell.* 7, 5, 3. ⁶³ *IG* 11² 112, lines 35–36; *SdA* 11, no. 290; Rhodes–Osborne, pp. 210–213.

⁶⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 6, 5, 19; *IG* 11² 112. ⁶⁵ Buckler 1980a, p. 72.

alliance – the reduction of Spartan power – had largely been achieved, the Thebans had nothing else with which to replace it. At that point the alliance found itself without an organ or corporate body capable of setting new goals for its members. This defect also is directly attributable to the Thebans.

Thebes had long experience as a member of large and enduring alliances, most notably in the Peloponnesian League in the fifth century and in the Second Athenian League in the fourth. A prominent feature of both organizations was a central body in which allies could voice their opinions on matters of policy.⁶⁶ Thebes had participated in an even simpler and more flexible organization during the Corinthian War, one that could readily have served as a model for the Boeotian–Peloponnesian alliance. In 395, in the initial stages of the Corinthian War, Thebes joined with Athens, Corinth, and Argos to form a common council to which each ally sent delegates.⁶⁷ This *synedrion* was designed as a forum for allied planning of military operations and for the drafting of diplomatic policies. Had the Thebans erected such a central body in 370, it could easily have served these as well as other purposes. It would have been an ideal organ for settling – or at least airing – disputes among allies, an arena, for instance, where the Arcadian–Eleian dispute over Triphylia could perhaps have been settled without disrupting the entire alliance. It could also have provided the alliance with a body able to shape new goals for the alliance once the anti-Spartan policy had lost much of its potency. Such central planning could have entailed the mustering of allied resources in men and material to achieve long-range, common aims. Yet with all their experience in large-scale alliances, the Thebans never made an effort to establish such a body.⁶⁸

The simplest explanation for Theban conduct is, once again, that the Thebans preferred to exercise their authority through their prestige as the conquerors of Sparta and through the wisdom of their leaders. In the background, as always, stood the army of the Boeotian Confederacy. The Thebans used their alliances, unsuccessfully as it happened, as the implements of their will without trying to create either an empire or an organizational basis for their ascendancy. In that respect, the Thebans,

⁶⁶ On the Peloponnesian League, see Meiggs 1972, pp. 461–462; de Ste Croix 1972, pp. 115–118. On the Second Athenian League, see Cargill 1981.

⁶⁷ Diod. Sic. 14, 82, 2; 14, 82, 10; see also C. D. Hamilton 1979, pp. 211–212. Diodorus calls this body *synedrion koinon*, the same phrase that he uses of the synod of the Second Athenian League: 15, 28, 3; compare 11, 47, 1; 15, 59, 1; 80, 2. Similarly in 393 Sicilian Greeks joined in alliance and created a *synedrion* for the prosecution of the war with Dionysius: Diod. Sic. 14, 91, 1.

⁶⁸ Beck 1997a, pp. 213–219.

unlike the Spartans and Athenians, never once imposed tribute on the other Greeks, and even the few Theban garrisons established in the Peloponnesus were largely intended to defend the allies from external danger.⁶⁹ Nor could the Thebans install a line of garrisons like those of Philip after Chaeronea.⁷⁰ A system of garrisons, whether in the Peloponnesus or in the north, was beyond Theban resources in manpower and wealth. Thebes was simply unable militarily to hold an unwilling Greece. Even the Theban army was to be used cautiously and only when other means had failed. When the army tried to retrieve the situation, it was never able to achieve decisive results, as witnessed by the battle of Mantinea. Mantinea, like Cynoscephalae in the case of Pelopidas, also demonstrates the risks involved, for the Theban victory proved less important than the death of Epaminondas.

In short, the Thebans did not attempt to convert their authority and their many ties with other states into something permanent, something that could change with the times and meet new situations without coming apart. They even refused to build a league whose machinery could continue to function even in the hands of competent, if not necessarily brilliant, men. Instead, the Thebans relied on a handful of individuals to shape their policies and to deal with their allies. This fragile, personal, and unorganized guidance could hardly endure. With the rupture of the Boeotian–Peloponnesian alliance in 362 and the deaths of Pelopidas and Epaminondas, the Theban Hegemony came to an end. That scarcely comes as a surprise. Its singular aspect is the ability of Epaminondas and Pelopidas to translate purely military victory into political ascendancy for as long as they did.

⁶⁹ For a discussion of Theban garrisons, see Buckler 1980a, pp. 192–193; cf. Beck 1997a, p. 216.

⁷⁰ Momigliano 1934, p. 162; J. R. Ellis 1976, pp. 199, 202–203; Cawkwell 1978a, pp. 167–168.

Xenophon's speeches and the Theban Hegemony

The battle of Leuctra and the humiliation of Sparta were not only turning points in the history of fourth-century Greece; they were also milestones in the life of Xenophon. Compelled to abandon his estate at Scillus, he found refuge at Corinth, where he observed at first hand many of the major events of the Theban Hegemony.¹ As a friend of Agesilaus and a man of some standing, he enjoyed access to some of the leading political and military figures of the day.² In view of Xenophon's singular position during these years, the Theban Hegemony offers an excellent and clearly defined period in which to explore the question of Xenophon's use of speeches in this portion of the *Hellenica*³ and to determine whether they possess any basis in fact or whether they are nothing more than free inventions.

Just as Xenophon does not say specifically that he is continuing Thucydides' history, so neither does he tell his readers how he will deal with the speeches in the *Hellenica*. One can assume that he is following Thucydides' famous pronouncement at 1, 22, but because of his silence on the topic that must clearly remain an assumption. Therefore, it is preferable to examine the situations in which Xenophon inserts speeches in his narrative to establish their function in this portion of the *Hellenica*, and secondly to determine whether the speeches correspond to those actually delivered at the time.

¹ Xenophon at Scillus and Corinth (in the latter of which he probably died: Demetrius of Magnesia apud Diog. Laert. 2, 56; *Anth. Pal.* 7, 98): Xen. *Anab.* 5, 3, 7–13; Diog. Laert. 2, 52–56; Paus. 5, 6, 5–6. See also Manfredi 1986, p. 231; Lendle 1995, pp. 315–322. Even though some have argued (without evidence) that Xenophon eventually returned to Athens, no one doubts that he resided at Corinth during these years: cf. Delebecque 1957, pp. 212–341; Anderson 1974, pp. 192–193; Cawkwell 1976, p. 65; Cawkwell 1979, pp. 13–14; Higgins 1977, p. 128.

² See Cawkwell 1976, pp. 63, 74.

³ The limits of this investigation are Xen. *Hell.* 6, 3, 1–7, 5, 27. Although Soulis 1972 has discussed many of the speeches in the *Hellenica*, his reliance on superficial stylistic similarities between Xenophon and Thucydides has resulted in an extreme and generally untenable theory that virtually nothing in the *Hellenica* is original, and that instead Xenophon derived everything significant from Thucydides' work. His approach (e.g. pp. 161–166) is so remarkable that it need not be refuted in detail.

XENOPHON AND COMPOSITION

The first problem is to determine when and why Xenophon interrupts his narrative to give speeches or excerpts from conversations. Inspection of the table on page 142 shows at a glance that Xenophon employs speeches and quotations primarily in diplomatic situations. Of the twenty-nine examples eighteen are speeches delivered to a foreign assembly, to the representatives of another state, or to assemblies of envoys gathered to renew the Common Peace. Second in importance are military situations. Seven of the twenty-nine examples (nos. 5, 6, 7, 14, 20, 21, 26) are the words of warriors on campaign. Two (nos. 23 and 24) are speeches delivered in court, and two more (nos. 4 and 13) are speeches on foreign policy delivered to the local assembly.

In the area of diplomacy Xenophon uniformly uses speeches to set forth the main issues under consideration or the basic line of policy advocated by the speaker's state. Seven of these speeches (nos. 1, 2, 3, 15, 16, 17, 18) are those of ambassadors negotiating the renewal of a Common Peace treaty. Another four (nos. 8, 9, 10, 22) are pleas from one state to another for military support, and three (nos. 11, 12, 29) deal with the conclusion of an alliance. One of the best examples of Xenophon's insertion of speeches to explore and to elucidate a diplomatic issue is the series of speeches (nos. 1, 2, 3) given by the Athenian envoys Callias, Autocles, and Callistratus at Sparta in 371. At a meeting of Greek ambassadors convened to ratify the Common Peace, the three Athenians, besides outlining Athenian conditions for acceptance of the treaty, went so far as to open the way to a Spartan-Athenian rapprochement.

Callias (no. 1) begins the series by emphasizing the desirability of reconciliation between Athens and Sparta. He indicates Athenian displeasure with Thebes, a major ally, for its destruction of Plataea and Thespieae. Callias asks why the Spartans and Athenians should be hostile towards each another when they both felt the same about Theban policy in Boeotia. Declaring that Sparta and Athens should be friends, he finishes his speech by pointing out the community of interest between Sparta and Athens, which he reinforces with mythological examples.

To some extent the next speaker, Autocles (no. 2), strikes a jarring note, but he too speaks in favor of peace. At the outset he warns the Spartans that he will say some unpleasant things. Yet only by airing and resolving grievances can the two states establish enduring friendship. He considers Spartan unwillingness to maintain the autonomy of the Greek states the primary cause for the war, an accusation which he supports by outlining

No./Date	Passage	Speaker	Ethnic	Audience	Purpose	Category	In-/direct speech
1/371	6, 3, 3–6	Callias	Athenian	Greek envoys	Common Peace treaty	diplomatic	direct
2/371	6, 3, 7–9	Autocles	Athenian	Greek envoys	Common Peace treaty	diplomatic	direct
3/371	6, 3, 10–17	Callistratus	Athenian	Greek envoys	Common Peace treaty	diplomatic	direct
4/371	6, 4, 2	Prothous	Spartan	Spartan assembly	foreign policy	political	indirect
5/371	6, 4, 4–5	officers	Spartan	officers	decision to fight	military	direct
6/371	6, 4, 23	Jason	Thessalian	Theban officers	dissuasion from further fighting	military	direct
7/371	6, 4, 24	Jason	Thessalian	Spartan officers	dissuasion from further fighting	military	direct
8/369	6, 5, 33–35	envoys	Spartan	Athenian assembly	military assistance	diplomatic	indirect→direct
9/369	6, 5, 37	Cleiteles	Corinthian	Athenian assembly	military assistance	diplomatic	direct
10/369	6, 5, 38–48	Procles	Phliasian	Athenian assembly	military assistance	diplomatic	direct
11/369	7, 1, 2–11	Procles	Phliasian	Athenian assembly	alliance	diplomatic	direct
12/369	7, 1, 12–14	Cephisodotus	Athenian	Athenian assembly	alliance	diplomatic	direct
13/369	7, 1, 23–24	Lycomedes	Arcadian	Arcadian assembly	discussion of foreign policy	political	indirect→direct
14/368	7, 1, 30	Archidamus	Spartan	Spartan army	military harangue	military	direct
15/367	7, 1, 34–35	Pelopidas	Theban	Great King	Common Peace treaty	diplomatic	indirect
16/367	7, 1, 37	Leon	Athenian	Great King	Common Peace treaty	diplomatic	direct
17/366	7, 1, 38	Antiochus	Arcadian	Arcadian assembly	Common Peace treaty	diplomatic	indirect
18/366	7, 1, 39	Lycomedes	Arcadian	Greek envoys	Common Peace treaty	diplomatic	indirect
19/369	7, 1, 44	Euphron	Sicyonian	Argives, Arcadians	Common Peace treaty	diplomatic	indirect
20/366	7, 2, 20	warrior	Phliasian	Chares	revolution in Sicyon	diplomatic	indirect→direct
21/366	7, 2, 21	warrior	Phliasian	Chares	exhortation to combat	military	direct
22/366	7, 3, 2–3	Euphron	Sicyonian	Pasimelus	military assistance	diplomatic	indirect→direct
23/366	7, 3, 6	<i>archontes</i>	Theban	Theban <i>boulē</i>	punishment of crime	judicial	direct
24/366	7, 3, 7–11	assassin	Sicyonian	Theban <i>boulē</i>	punishment of crime	judicial	direct
25/365	7, 4, 8	envoys	Corinthian	Spartan assembly	conclusion of peace	diplomatic	direct
26/365	7, 4, 25	warrior	Spartan	Arcadian army	conclusion of truce	military	direct
27/362	7, 4, 39	officer	Theban	Mantineans	justification of policy	diplomatic	indirect
28/362	7, 4, 40	Epaminondas	Theban	Mantinean envoys	foreign policy	diplomatic	indirect→direct
29/362	7, 5, 2	unknown	Arcadian	Arcadian assembly	foreign policy	diplomatic	indirect→direct

the various ways in which the Spartans had violated Greek autonomy. Concluding by specifically accusing the Spartans themselves of having violated the King's Peace of 386 when they seized the Cadmea, he warns that respect for the autonomy clause of the Common Peace was a prerequisite for Athenian friendship.⁴

The last speech of the series, that of Callistratus (no. 3), strikes a balance between the two preceding ones, while incorporating aspects of both. Callistratus reverts to the topic of reconciliation raised by Callias, and like Callias he insists on the common interests of Sparta and Athens. He too alludes to Athenian discontent with Thebes. Yet in support of Autocles' position, Callistratus repeats the warning that no amelioration of relations between the two powers was possible unless the Spartans were prepared to honor the autonomy clause. Callistratus concludes his address by reiterating the Athenian desire to conclude friendship with Sparta on the basis of the King's Peace.

Thus, according to the speeches found in the *Hellenica*, Athenian policy regarding ratification of the peace and improved relations with Sparta was based on (1) the community of interest of the two states, (2) mutual displeasure with Theban activity in Boeotia, and (3) strict adherence to the autonomy clause. All three speeches, regardless of their tone, express a consistent desire for Athenian friendship with Sparta. These speeches also serve to explain the motives behind Athenian policy. The importance of Athenian-Spartan reconciliation and co-operation, which these speeches emphasize, is a major theme of this portion of the *Hellenica*, one which is taken up by a second series of speeches, the one given in *oratio obliqua* by the Spartan envoys (no. 8), the concise address of Cleiteles (no. 9), and the longer one of Procles (no. 10).⁵

⁴ Although Autocles' speech is often seen by scholars, specifically Mosley 1973, p. 60; Adcock and Mosley 1975, p. 155; and Ryder 1963, p. 240, as anti-Spartan and pro-Theban and as contradictory in tone to those of Callias and Callistratus, it is in reality not a declaration of pro-Thebanism but a demand that the autonomy-clause be honored, as Seager 1974, pp. 51–52, points out. In that respect it is in total conformity with one of the main points of Callistratus' speech although it obviously takes a stiffer line with the Spartans. By demanding that the autonomy-clause be rigorously observed, Autocles, who was well aware of recent Theban conduct, was also demanding that the Thebans allow the Boeotian cities to be autonomous. As in 386 (Xen. *Hell.* 5, 1, 31–36), this stipulation could easily have led to the dissolution of the new Boeotian Confederacy. See also Gray 1989, pp. 123–131; Dillery 1995, pp. 243–246.

⁵ To spare Spartan pride Xenophon has neglected to mention one of the key links in the chain: the Spartan ratification of the peace sponsored by Athens later in 371 (Xen. *Hell.* 6, 5, 1–3; *SdA* 11, no. 270; cf. Seager 1974, pp. 54–55) wherein Sparta recognized Athens as the *prostatēs* of the Peace. In effect, Athens had usurped Sparta's role as patron of the Common Peace. As is so often the case, Xenophon suppresses or minimizes what he finds distasteful, see Cawkwell 1976, pp. 64–65; Gray 1989, pp. 112–114; Jehne 1994, pp. 74–79; Dillery 1995, pp. 248–249.

In no. 8 the Spartan ambassadors rehearse the various benefits that each state had bestowed on the other in the past, a line of argument to support their position that Athenian aid to Sparta would also be useful to themselves. Their claim that a united Athens and Sparta could decimate Thebes is reminiscent of Callistratus' observation (*Hell.* 6, 3, 14; 6, 3, 17) that if Athens and Sparta became friends, no one could successfully oppose them. Cleiteles next explains in *oratio recta* why Athens should support the Peloponnesians; and Procles, likewise in direct speech, warns at length that Athens could not afford to see Sparta destroyed. By devoting so much space to the speeches of Cleiteles and Procles, and by presenting them in direct speech, while reporting the remarks of the Spartan delegation briefly and in indirect speech, Xenophon in effect makes the allies plead the Spartan case. In this instance, Xenophon's use of speeches tends to spare Spartan pride.

The culmination of this theme comes in Procles' second speech (no. 11) and in Cephisodotus' response (no. 12) to it. In the spring of 369 the Spartans and their allies sent another embassy to Athens to work out the details of a full alliance between the two major powers. In this case, Xenophon does not give, even in abbreviated form, the speeches of the Spartans, even though they were the principal figures of the Peloponnesian delegation (see *Hell.* 7, 1, 13). As in the previous instance, it is an allied ambassador who speaks at length in favor of the alliance and its terms. Procles praises the decision to conclude the alliance on terms of full equality, which he interprets (in accordance, he claims, with the *probouleuma* of the Athenian *boulê*) as recognition of Spartan leadership of all allied land forces and Athenian leadership of all allied naval forces. He supports this view with numerous examples. In a briefer speech the Athenian Cephisodotus argues against Procles until he succeeds in changing the clause on the leadership of forces. His amendment that Sparta and Athens alternate command of all forces was actually adopted, and there-with the alliance was concluded and ratified. These two speeches, then, serve to inform the reader of the initial stance of the two states and the reasons for the amendment of the clause governing leadership in the field.

One can readily see the importance which Xenophon attaches to the course of Athenian-Spartan reconciliation by the amount of space that he devotes to the topic and to the numerous speeches (eight in all) in which the rapprochement is discussed. The significance of this theme is further emphasized by the fact that these speeches (with the exception of no. 8) are the longest and the most elaborate to be found in this portion of the *Hellenica*. The reasons for Xenophon's attitude are easily discerned. This

theme would naturally appeal to one exiled from and later pardoned by his native Athens, one who during the years of exile found safety and friendship among the Spartans and their allies.

Although no other theme is obvious in the diplomatic speeches, Xenophon uses the remaining ones to discuss what policies various states advocated and why they did so. Thus, Pelopidas' speech (no. 15) to King Artaxerxes outlines the reasons why Persia should support Thebes, and Lycomedes' speech (no. 18) records the reasons for Arcadian opposition to the proposed Common Peace of 366. So too with the Corinthian speech (no. 25) to the Spartans, wherein the Corinthian envoys give a synopsis of their beleaguered position and what they think a continuation of hostilities would entail for them.

The importance of diplomacy is also evident in the two speeches (nos. 4 and 13) labelled in the table as political and the two (nos. 23 and 24) labelled as judicial. In no. 4 the Spartan Prothous advises his fellow citizens on what course to take in response to the Theban rejection of the Peace of Sparta in 371. In no. 13 Lycomedes urges the Arcadians to formulate and then implement their own foreign policy instead of tamely following the lead of the Thebans. The two speeches delivered before the Theban *boulē* in 366 examine the traitorous conduct of the tyrant Euphron of Sicyon and the question of whether he was justly slain. Hence, even of these four speeches, which are not strictly speaking diplomatic in nature (i.e. not uttered by the lawfully designated representative of one state to another), the contents involve relations with other states. Accordingly, they are less of an anomaly than they first appear.

Of the seven speeches or quotations from conversations found in military contexts five (nos. 5, 6, 7, 20, 21) concern the question of whether to engage the enemy or whether to desist from further fighting. The Spartan officers who accompanied Cleombrotus to Leuctra (no. 5) exhort the king to give battle to the Thebans, while enumerating reasons why he could not avoid combat without serious risk to himself. Jason of Pherae assumed the role of arbitrator between the Spartans and Thebans after Leuctra, giving in no. 6 reasons why the Thebans should not press their advantage and in no. 7 why the Spartans should ask for a truce. Similarly, in no. 20 unnamed Phliasians list the reasons why Chares should lead his force against a Sicyonian strongpoint; and having persuaded him, they give Chares his final instructions (no. 21) before the entire force went over to the attack. None of these five cases is a set speech, but rather they are all excerpts from conversations. Somewhat similar is no. 26, in which a Spartan warrior during a lull in a battle with some Arcadian troops calls out to them requesting a truce.

Indeed, the only set speech in this category is no. 14, in which Archidamus harangues his troops before engaging the enemy. This speech exhorts the Spartans to show themselves brave men and to uphold their honor as Spartan warriors. Unlike the other examples, this speech, which is reminiscent of that of Hippocrates before Delium (Thuc. 4, 95), contains no discussion of strategy or tactics. Hence, with this exception, the speeches or quotations in this category explore the reasons which combatants offer either in favor of initiating military action or for breaking it off. In short, they serve to illuminate the motives for the action.

Xenophon rarely uses sets of opposing speeches to explore both sides of a question; and, even on the few occasions when he does, they are never marked by the penetrating analysis of the situation so often found in Thucydides' speeches. The closest that Xenophon comes to Thucydides are Cephisodotus' response to Procles' second speech and the Sicyonian assassin's reply to the indictment of the Theban magistrates. All four of these set forth the main issues in sufficient detail, all the while keeping rather closely to the point. Neither in the first case, in which Xenophon could have used the situation for a discussion of *hēgemonia* or of the nature of power, nor in the second, in which he could have examined the merits of tyrannicide, does Xenophon rely on the speeches to investigate philosophical (or at least more encompassing) questions. In this area he refused to follow the example of Thucydides.

Far more commonly, Xenophon devotes space only to speeches advocating a policy that was in fact adopted, while ignoring those who spoke in opposition. Thus, Xenophon treats at length the speeches of Callias, Autocles, and Callistratus in 371, who urge peace; but passes over in silence that of Epaminondas (Plut. *Ages.* 27–28), who portrays the peace merely as an instrument of Spartan *hēgemonia*. Likewise, Xenophon retails the speeches of the Spartans and their allies in 369, when they request military aid from Athens, but does not record the speech of Xenocleides (Ps.-Dem. 59, 27), who opposes the appeal.⁶

In his account of the negotiations at Susa in 367/6 Xenophon notes the speech delivered by Pelopidas (no. 15) upon his arrival at the Persian court.

⁶ Similarly, in Procles' speech Xenophon suggests that a Theban embassy had traveled to Athens in the hope of persuading the Athenians to remain aloof from the conflict. Procles establishes two antitheses: (1) between what he had once heard from others about the Athenian state and what he himself was actually seeing in Athens at that moment (*Hell.* 6, 5, 45); and (2) between the Spartans and their allies, whom he claims literally to see, and the Thebans, whom he likewise claims to see (6, 5, 45–46). Here Xenophon leads his readers to believe that a Theban delegation was actually present in Athens (otherwise the force of the antithesis would be seriously weakened), while feeling no obligation to give any space to its arguments.

The proposals of the other Greek embassies are omitted, neither summarized in the narrative nor conveyed in speeches, even though the Spartans and Athenians tried to persuade Artaxerxes to support their policies. Despite the fact that a great deal of intrigue took place at Susa,⁷ and that the Persian–Theban accord that resulted from Pelopidas' mission was a major blow to the Spartans, Athenians, and even the Arcadians, all that Xenophon reveals is that when Artaxerxes handed down his decision, the Athenian envoy Leon expressed his discontent in a veiled threat (no. 16).⁸ Of the complex negotiations Xenophon enumerates only the issues raised by Pelopidas and accepted by Artaxerxes.

By concentrating only on those policies that carried the day, Xenophon fails to give a complete picture of the individual concerns of the states involved and of the views expressed by their delegates in any particular situation. Consequently, the reader is left with a partial understanding of events such as the peace conference at Sparta in 371, of the Spartan appeal for Athenian aid in 369, and of the deliberations at Susa in 367/6. Thus, Xenophon's conception of the role of speeches as tools to promote the understanding of any given situation is far narrower than that of Thucydides.

In sum, Xenophon inserts speeches in his narrative, both in diplomatic and military situations, ostensibly to allow the participants in various events to urge the merits of their own views or to give voice to the policies of their states. The importance to Xenophon of the diplomatic and military aspects of the events of his day is obvious from his method of using speeches overwhelmingly to elucidate the motives for various alliances, treaties, diplomatic exchanges, and military operations. Even here, however, he rarely relies on antilogical speeches in the manner of Thucydides to convey both sides of an issue. Instead, he generally prefers to relay in one speech the policy adopted in a given situation, although in nos. 1–3 and 8–10 he employs a series of speeches to the same end. With the exception of nos. 3, 10, and 11, his speeches are normally short and to the point. If

⁷ Xenophon has drastically compressed the course of these negotiations. In the *Hellenica* Pelopidas recounts past Theban services to the Persians, after which Artaxerxes incorporates Theban proposals in his decree to the Greeks. Xenophon's narrative gives the impression that the whole scene took place on one brief occasion. Plutarch (*Pel.* 30, 5), however, states that only after Artaxerxes had heard the proposals of the Athenian and Spartan delegations did he decide to support Thebes. Plutarch (*Artax.* 22, 8–12) also knows of prolonged intrigue at Susa.

⁸ Although Xenophon includes the speech of the Arcadian envoy Antiochus (no. 17) to the Ten Thousand, in which he reports on the negotiations at Susa, he does so only to delineate the reasons behind the Arcadian decision to oppose the peace, not to throw any light on the Arcadian position at Susa. Antiochus' speech simply belittles the wealth and power of the Persian king.

Xenophon fully comprehended Thucydides' conception of the function of speeches, he clearly chose not to espouse it himself.⁹

THE SPEECHES AND HISTORY

The second question with regard to Xenophon's speeches is whether they are his inventions or whether they possess some basis in fact. In this portion of the *Hellenica* there are nine set speeches in *oratio recta* (see table, nos. 1, 2, 3, 9, 10, 11, 12, 23, 24), five in *oratio obliqua* (nos. 4, 15, 17, 18, 27), and six which begin in *oratio obliqua* and switch to *oratio recta* (nos. 8, 13, 19, 22, 28, 29). Of those which are entirely in direct speech or which switch into it ten (nos. 5, 6, 7, 16, 19, 20, 22, 26, 28, 29) record snatches of conversations or exhortations rather than formal speeches.

Xenophon himself could have heard few of these speeches and conversations. The possible exception here is the series of speeches (nos. 1–3), delivered at Sparta in 371, for he was very well informed about Spartan activity that year.¹⁰ As an exile, he could hardly have accompanied the Peloponnesian envoys to Athens in 369 (nos. 8–12); nor could he have witnessed at Thebes the trial of Euphron's assassins (nos. 23–24). Xenophon rarely, if ever, had the opportunity to transcribe the exact words of the speakers.

Xenophon seldom claims that he is recording the actual words of the speakers, as is obvious from the table. Any supposition that he uses the demonstrative pronouns *tauta* to indicate the actual words of the speaker and *toiauta* indicate an approximation of them falls when one observes that he uses both pronouns in reference to the contents of speeches no. 14, 23, and 24. Thus, Xenophon's approach falls far short of Thucydides' methods in his handling of speeches.¹¹ The first three speeches of the table, those of Callias, Autocles, and Callistratus, similarly argue against any rigorous category based on usage. Xenophon clearly indicates in his introduction to Callias' speech (no. 1) that the Athenian envoy spoke "somewhat in the following manner." Having done so, he surely did not expect his readers to believe that the two following speeches are the *ipsissima verba* of the speakers, even though all three of them are in direct speech. In a number of instances (nos. 2, 5, 6, 7, 14, 23, 24)

⁹ Rahn 1971 has argued that Xenophon developed his own view of historiography, one increasingly independent of the Thucydidean model, in books 3–7 of the *Hellenica*. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that Xenophon merely becomes progressively idiosyncratic.

¹⁰ Cawkwell 1976, p. 63 n. 5.

¹¹ For Thucydides' use of demonstrative pronouns in his introductions and conclusions, see Gomme 1937, pp. 166–167; see also Westlake 1973, pp. 90–108. Clearly, Xenophon was indifferent to such distinctions as pointed out by Gomme. Cf. Hornblower 1987, pp. 45–72.

Xenophon places the address in direct speech, while referring to the contents of the speech with the words *toiauta*, *toiade*, or *hōde pōs*. Hence, Xenophon seems to prefer *oratio recta* because it adds vigor and variety to the narrative.¹² The only three speeches in which Xenophon's use of direct speech seems to imply absolute accuracy are Procles' second speech (no. 11), Cephisodotus' reply to it (no. 12), and the speech of the Corinthian envoys to Sparta (no. 25). Because of this anomaly, and because in each case it can be demonstrated that Xenophon was in an excellent position to learn what had actually transpired, these three speeches will be treated at greater length below.

In cases where Xenophon's usage seems to be neutral (as when he employs only a verb of saying without pronouns) six (nos. 3, 10, 16, 20, 21, 26) are in *oratio recta* and two (nos. 17, 27) in *oratio obliqua*. Of the six cases in which one might assume that Xenophon is recording the words spoken verbatim, no. 3 no more contains the exact words of Callistratus than no. 1 does those of Callias, which in turn makes one hesitant to accept no. 10 as the *ipsissima verba* of Procles. The next four are quite similar to one another in that they are not set speeches, but rather comments or exhortations. No. 16 is merely a comment supposedly uttered by the Athenian envoy Leon at the court of Artaxerxes. Nos. 20 and 21 are likewise brief Phliasian arguments to persuade Chares to engage the Sicyonians, and no. 26 is the plea of a Spartan warrior for a truce. Since there is no consistency in Xenophon's usage, apart from a clear preference for *oratio recta* (presumably for dramatic effect), there is no reason to conclude that Xenophon regularly tried to record the exact words of the speakers.

These observations in turn raise the question of whether Xenophon tries to preserve the gist of the actual speeches. Xenophon could have freely invented these speeches and fashioned them out of whole cloth. Or following Thucydides' example, he could have tried to make the speeches say what the situation demanded of them while adhering as closely as possible to the general sense (or the main theme) of what was indeed said.¹³ Although many scholars have assumed that Xenophon uses his speeches as vehicles for his own views, it is difficult to see why he would have used the speeches exclusively for this purpose.¹⁴ He did not need them. He readily,

¹² For this same question of style in the speeches of Thucydides, see Gomme 1937, pp. 172–174.

¹³ Some of the more important recent discussions of Thucydides' method include Gomme *et al.* 1945–70, vol. 1, pp. 140–148; Andrewes 1962; de Ste Croix 1972, pp. 7–16.

¹⁴ Walbank 1967b, p. 5: "Xenophon of course provides speeches, but to express his own views; and if he takes a speaker's known opinions into account, the speeches remain none the less inventions." In view of his comments on Thucydides (4–5), Walbank must mean that although Xenophon may have known "the political colour of the speaker and the historical situation in which the speech was delivered or was supposed to have been delivered," he did not adhere to "what in truth was said." Yet

unabashedly, and openly gives his opinions in the course of his narrative on the conduct of individuals and the policies of states.¹⁵

On the other hand, Xenophon had ample and easy opportunity to question people who had heard the speeches. Eleven (nos. 1–3, 8–12, 15, 16, 18) of the twenty-nine speeches and quotations were uttered at assemblies of Greek envoys at which Spartans or Corinthians were present.¹⁶ For example, Xenophon could have questioned Cleiteles and probably Procles about the course of the negotiations in Athens in 369 (nos. 8–12). He could easily have discussed with the Corinthian envoys who spoke (no. 25) before the Spartan assembly in 365 the details of their message. Likewise, he could have learned from Pasimelus what Euphron had said to him (no. 22). So too in military affairs; since Chares and his force made Corinth their base of operations (*Hell.* 7, 2, 17–18), Xenophon had the opportunity to discover how the Phliasians persuaded (nos. 20–21) him to attack the Sicyonians. To judge by the wealth of detail on Sparta he made good use of his Spartan sources. Accordingly, he no doubt heard from the Spartans of Prothous' proposal (no. 4) before Leuctra and of the debate among Spartan officers (no. 5) about Cleombrotus' intentions before the battle, as well as details of Jason's arbitration (nos. 6–7) afterwards. The same is true of nos. 14 and 26. In thirteen other instances the person being quoted is a Peloponnesian, often an Arcadian, Sicyonian, or Phliasian, which is hardly surprising in view of Xenophon's interest in the affairs of the central Peloponnesus.¹⁷ Thus, in the vast majority of cases Xenophon had access to authentic information. Furthermore, it is difficult to assume that he went to the trouble of finding out what happened but made no effort to learn what was said.

Only three of these speeches and quotations can be checked against contemporary testimony. First is the speech (no. 24) of the Sicyonian who had assassinated Euphron at Thebes (see chapter 11). According to Xenophon, the assassin spoke in defense of his deed to the effect that Euphron had become a traitor to the Thebans, and as such deserved his fate. The facts given in this speech to support the assassin's line of argument

Walbank has given little evidence to support his claim. See also Hammond 1973, p. 53: "Now such conversations and accusations [such as those which Thucydides records of Hermocrates] might be fictional in Xenophon, but they are vouched for by Thucydides as possessing *akribeia*."

¹⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 5, 3, 7; 5, 4, 1; 6, 2, 32; 4, 3, 35; 4, 5, 26; 4, 5, 51; 7, 2, 1; 7, 2, 16; 7, 3, 12; 7, 58.

¹⁶ Not only was Xenophon on familiar terms with Agesilaus and his circle at Sparta, but at Corinth he was in a superb position to draw upon Athenian sources as well as Spartan. The Athenians maintained garrisons in the Corinthia from 369 to 366 (Xen. *Hell.* 7, 2, 5; 7, 4, 4), and the one at Mt. Oneion, only a few miles from the city, was reinforced by Spartans (Xen. *Hell.* 7, 1, 41).

¹⁷ Mosley 1972, pp. 7–8, has also emphasized the ease with which news of even local public debate soon became known throughout the Greek world.

are substantiated by Xenophon's narrative and to some extent by Diodorus (15, 70, 2). The main point of the speech as it is found in Xenophon is confirmed by Aristotle (*Rhet.* 2, 23, 3), who states that in this trial the assassin asked the court to decide whether Euphron deserved his fate. Xenophon and Aristotle agree on the essential point of what was said at Thebes.

The second example poses peculiar problems of its own. Xenophon relates (no. 25) the speech of the Corinthian ambassadors to Sparta in 365. The Corinthians ask the Spartans either to join them in concluding peace with Thebes or to allow them to do so without the Spartans. By urging the Spartans to accept Theban terms, the Corinthians were suggesting that the Spartans drop their claim to Messene (Xen. *Hell.* 7, 4, 9). Isocrates uses this episode as the setting for his epideictic speech *Archidamus*, which at least supports Xenophon's testimony that Corinthian ambassadors spoke at Sparta. Despite his contemporaneity, the word of Isocrates is not necessarily to be preferred to that of Xenophon. Since the *Archidamus* is quite probably nothing more than the rhetorical response to Isocrates' *On the Peace*, the two constituting an example of the device of *antilogiai*, the testimony of Isocrates cannot necessarily be used to controvert that of Xenophon.¹⁸ Nonetheless, Isocrates frequently illustrates or supports the arguments which he ascribes to Archidamus with facts which receive confirmation from other sources.¹⁹ Although Isocrates' Archidamus spends most of his time discussing the general situation confronting Sparta and offering his suggestions for dealing with it, he refers to the proposals of the allies. What he says of their recommendations is in rough agreement with Xenophon's account. Isocrates claims (6, 38) that the allies advised the Spartans to abandon their claims to Messene, which agrees with Xenophon. In Isocrates (6, 58) the envoys emphasize the weakness of Sparta and its lack of reinforcements, which is consistent with the Corinthians in Xenophon insisting on the futility of further resistance. In Isocrates 6, 13 the allies threaten to make a separate peace if the Spartans reject Theban terms. Although this threat is not found in the *Hellenica*, Xenophon makes it clear that the Corinthians were exhausted and bent on making peace. Their request of the Spartans is purely *pro forma*.

¹⁸ Thus Harding 1973. Baynes 1955, pp. 160–161, even doubts Isocrates' honesty. Perhaps it would be closer to the mark to say that Isocrates was more concerned with persuasion than with truth.

¹⁹ Even so, much of the *Archidamus* is surely pure fiction, particularly 73–76, in which Archidamus proposes an extreme and unlikely strategy of guerrilla warfare. Indeed, of the two, Xenophon's account of the issues under consideration is far more likely to correspond to the facts of the case than that of Isocrates.

Given the nature of the evidence, it is impossible to decide whether Xenophon is softening the Corinthian speech or whether Isocrates is making it more severe. Nonetheless, there is still a significant amount of agreement between Xenophon and Isocrates as to the allied appeal. Both make it clear that the Corinthians strongly indicated their desire for peace, whether the Spartans joined them or not, and that they proposed that Sparta drop its claims to Messene.

The third example is by far the most complex of the three. According to Xenophon (no. 8), the five members (whose names he records) of the first Spartan embassy of 369 said pretty much the same things to the Athenians, and he gives the gist of their words in summarized form. In asking for Athenian help against Thebes the Spartans remind the Athenians that both states had successfully stood together during crises: that Sparta had helped the Athenians to expel the tyrants, while Athens had aided the Spartans during the Messenian revolt. The Spartan envoys recall the great days of the Persian War, when co-operation between the two states had resulted in Greek victory. They claim that Sparta had supported the Greek choice of Athens as *hēgemon* at sea, and that Athens had agreed with the Greek choice of Sparta as *hēgemon* of the land forces. Xenophon concludes by quoting one ambassador who tells his audience that if the two states joined forces they could decimate Thebes.

Callisthenes (*FGrH* 124 F 8) and Aristotle (*Eth. Nic.* 4, 3, 25), on the other hand, claim that the Spartan envoys left unmentioned their past benefits to the Athenians, instead emphasizing the occasions on which the Athenians had aided them. Although the summary of the speeches which Xenophon ascribes to the Spartan delegation is somewhat conciliatory in tone, the contents of Xenophon's speech flatly contradict the testimony of Callisthenes and Aristotle. In Xenophon the Spartans speak to the Athenians more as equals than as suppliants, and he minimizes the fact that the Spartans were reduced to asking for help. In view of the desperate plight of Sparta and of the actual situation at the time of this embassy – when Epaminondas had ravished Laconia and was even then occupying a position at Mt. Ithome – and in view of Spartan losses, the conduct of the Spartan embassy as depicted by Callisthenes and Aristotle is far more credible than that of Xenophon (see also Xen. *Hell.* 6, 5, 1). Xenophon has distorted the picture for the sake of saving the Spartans from the humiliation of pleading for help from their erstwhile enemies. Xenophon's method in this case is similar to his refusal to mention Sparta's concurrence in Athens' usurpation of the role of *prostatēs* of the Common Peace (see no. 5). Once again, Xenophon has twisted history to

spare Spartan pride, and accordingly his report of this speech must be rejected.

In view of this, the speech of Procles (no. 10), supposedly delivered on the same occasion, throws additional light on Xenophon's use of speeches. According to Xenophon, Procles urges the desirability of Athenian and Spartan gratitude and loyalty. H. Breitenbach, who has seen in this speech Xenophon's way of thinking, concluded that Xenophon has overemphasized the importance of Spartan gratitude.²⁰ Breitenbach also maintained that Procles' speech contained a *laudatio* of Sparta (6, 5, 40–45) balanced by a *laudatio* of Athens (6, 5, 45–48),²¹ a view that is difficult to defend. The alleged *laudatio* of Sparta includes assurances that the Spartans would be grateful for Athenian help, and that they would be steadfast and trustworthy allies. The *laudatio* of Sparta also takes the form of Procles' stressing Spartan weakness. Remarkably, Procles even asks the Athenians whether they could possibly wish to be allied with anyone other than Sparta in the most unlikely event that the Persians should ever again invade Greece. Procles mentions some of the noble deeds of the Spartans, specifically the sacrifice at Thermopylae, but he does so to indicate the advantages of having them as allies. In 6, 5, 44 Procles assures the Athenians that Sparta's allies would also be grateful for Athenian aid, and would henceforth be loyal to Athens; while 6, 5, 45 is his statement of what he himself could perceive of the situation before him. Far different is this *laudatio* from the one which Procles pronounces on behalf of Athens and its glorious achievements.

The tone, and to some extent the content, of Procles' speech are similar to those of the speech which Thucydides ascribes (4, 19–20) to the Spartan ambassadors who were negotiating the release of those captured at Sphacteria.²² In Thucydides' speech too the Spartans stress their willingness to abide by the treaty, their trustworthiness, and their gratitude. In view of this speech, Procles' sentiments are by no means remarkable or out

²⁰ H. Breitenbach 1950, pp. 125–126; H. Breitenbach, *RE* 11 9.2 (1967), col. 1693, s.v. Xenophon. Yet the matter of gratitude could, and did, enter into the question of policy, as is witnessed by Aeschines' remark at 2, 117.

²¹ H. Breitenbach, *RE* 11 9.2 (1967), col. 1693, s.v. Xenophon. Higgins 1977, pp. 121–122, has argued that Xenophon has reproduced Procles' exact speech; cf. Gray 1989, pp. 113–121; Jehne 1994, pp. 74–79.

²² About this speech Westlake 1973, p. 99 has said: "The Spartan case with its vague offers of lasting friendship has a thoroughly authentic ring and is consistent with the embarrassingly weak position in which the Spartans found themselves." Should one conclude that such a speech in Thucydides is true, but in Xenophon free invention? Ironically, this is the only portion of Procles' speech which remotely conforms to the testimony of Callisthenes and Aristotle. See also Hornblower 1991–6, vol. 11, pp. 174–177.

of place. Nor are they inherently unlikely given the fact that Sparta had little else to promise Athens. Indeed, the portion of Procles' speech that emphasizes Sparta's weakness and need for help more nearly accords with the testimony of Callisthenes and Aristotle than does the summarized speech of the Spartans. The similarity, however, is very superficial, and in general Procles' speech, like that of the Spartan envoys, contradicts Callisthenes' and Aristotle's characterization of the Lacedaemonian appeal.

Breitenbach also drew attention to E. Vorrenhagen's observation that *Hell.* 6, 5, 46 was influenced by Isocrates' *Panegyric* (4, 54–55).²³ Perhaps the surprising thing about this speech in the *Hellenica* is not so much its use of the *Panegyric* as the way in which Isocrates' work was used, in what was taken from it, and still more in what was not borrowed from it. In the *Hellenica* Procles repeats only Isocrates' mythical allusions. He mentions that the Athenians did not let the Argive dead go unburied at the Cadmea, and that the Athenians both checked the violence of Eurystheus and saved the sons of Heracles. Xenophon's Procles relates these deeds as examples of Athenian magnanimity and to prove that in times past the Athenians had done precisely what the Spartans and their allies were at that moment asking. That is, however, the only reason why Xenophon's Procles employs these examples, and his purpose differs from that of Isocrates, who retails them to illustrate the power of Athens. In addition, Isocrates (4, 61ff.; esp. 65) mentions these deeds to support his claim that Athens was the state pre-eminently entitled to the hegemony of Greece. Leaving untouched the question of hegemony, Xenophon's Procles says nothing about Athens' fitness to be *hégemon*. He is obviously more concerned with the need to obtain military aid, which is entirely in keeping with the situation, than with the matter of hegemony, which did not arise until the next round of negotiations (7, 1, iff.). Nevertheless, Procles' speech is free invention, and as Breitenbach suggested, it is a sounding-board for Xenophon's views.

Xenophon's use of speeches in his account of these negotiations thus sheds light on his method of composition and his historical outlook. He accords the Spartan ambassadors a minor role in the proceedings, even though in truth their appeal surely outweighed that of their allies. Summarizing their arguments, which stress the advantages of co-operation, he makes it appear as though the Spartans spoke to the Athenians as equals, not as petitioners. Their speeches, according to Xenophon (*Hell.* 6, 5, 35), failed to convince the Athenians. Next in Xenophon's account Cleiteles

²³ *De orationibus quae sunt in Xenophontis Hellenicis* (1926), pp. 103–105; see also Blass 1892, pp. 483–484; Buchner 1958, pp. 30–32.

speaks briefly to inform the Athenians that Thebes had unjustly attacked Corinth and to remind them of their oaths. As *prostatēs* of the second Common Peace of 371, Athens had sworn to defend any state that had suffered attack.²⁴ Cleiteles' speech, then, makes a legal demand on the Athenians, which puts the matter of military assistance in a much different light. This speech, Xenophon says (*Hell.* 6, 5, 37), softened the attitude of the Athenians, whereupon Procles rose to deliver the decisive speech. Procles' address, which is the centerpiece of the episode and the principal vehicle for the expression of Lacedaemonian views, easily persuaded the Athenians to aid Sparta.

Xenophon mentions (*Hell.* 6, 5, 49) that the Athenians deliberated in assembly after Procles' speech, but refused to listen to those who spoke against helping Sparta. His testimony about the decisiveness of Procles' speech is contradicted by Ps.-Demosthenes (59, 27), who indicates that the debate in the Athenian assembly was more heated and significant than Xenophon suggests. According to Ps.-Demosthenes, Xenocleides spoke in opposition to the Spartan appeal, but failed to carry the day against Callistratus' arguments. Thus, Xenophon has suppressed the fact that the Spartan cause received powerful support from one of Athens' leading politicians, a man who devised Athenian policy in the Peloponnesus from 371 to 366.²⁵ In short, the speech that Xenophon attributes to Procles was not as decisive as Xenophon would have his readers believe. Far from persuading the Athenians of the merits of their case with their own arguments, the Spartans and their allies in large part owed their salvation to Callistratus.

By making Procles the spokesman for the entire Spartan and allied delegation, a spokesman who makes the strongest plea for assistance, Xenophon spares the Spartans the painful necessity of beseeching the Athenians for help, and in the process he spares them some embarrassment. This same desire is no doubt behind his suppression of Callistratus' part in the negotiations. Xenophon has seriously distorted the course of the proceedings and has put the Spartans and their allies in a much better light than other sources indicate they deserve. In nos. 8–10 Xenophon's testimony is true to the event only insofar as he reports that the Peloponnesians asked for Athenian assistance against Thebes. The rest is fiction. His method here is a striking illustration of the importance he attached to the image of Spartan honor and to the theme of Spartan–Athenian reconciliation on equal terms.

²⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 6, 5, 1–3; *SdA* 11, no. 270; Ryder 1965, pp. 71–74, 131–133.

²⁵ See Sealey 1956, pp. 192–194.

In the *Hellenica* Procles gives a second speech at Athens (no. 11), about which there is no other contemporary evidence, and this speech poses problems of its own. The views which Procles is made to expound reflect the policy of Agesilaus, a policy with which Xenophon agreed.²⁶ Furthermore, since Agesilaus was guiding Spartan affairs and was the Spartan responsible for responding to the Athenian offer of rapprochement, he certainly saw to it that the ambassadors, Spartan and allied, shared his views. An old friend of Agesilaus, Procles owed his position in Phliasian politics to the Spartan king (*Hell.* 5, 3, 13), so it is hardly surprising to find him espousing Agesilaus' policy.

On this occasion, another meeting in Athens between Sparta and Athens – this time to discuss the terms of alliance – the proposals of the Spartan and allied ambassadors led to a *probouleuma* which was presented to the assembly. The alliance was to be made on terms of full equality, which meant Spartan recognition of the dual hegemony: that of Sparta on land and that of Athens at sea (*Hell.* 7, 1, 1. 13).²⁷ Many Peloponnesians and Athenians approved of this arrangement, with many speaking in favor of it; but only Procles' address appears in the *Hellenica*, even though the original proposal and the reasons for it were clearly offered by the Spartan delegation (cf. 7, 1, 13). In this instance Xenophon uses Procles' speech to express the majority view. Just as in the previous case, when Procles was made the spokesman for the entire Spartan and allied delegation, so here he becomes the spokesman for all those, Peloponnesian and Athenian alike, who favored the arrangement as set forth in the *probouleuma*. The gist of Procles' comments is that Athens' geographical position and maritime traditions made it supremely suited to command the allied naval forces. On the other hand, Sparta, owing to its geographical situation and its long experience as leader of armies, was ideally qualified to command the allied army. While this is almost surely not the actual speech delivered at Athens,²⁸ arguments such as these were no doubt employed at the time. In that respect, Procles' second speech is true to the situation, and it is probably consistent with Procles' own views.

²⁶ See Cawkwell 1976, pp. 65–71.

²⁷ Agesilaus no doubt considered recognition of the dual hegemony the necessary price to pay for the alliance: see Cawkwell 1976, p. 79.

²⁸ Despite Xenophon's statement that Procles gave this speech, it is far more likely (in view of his practice in other cases) that this speech simply summarizes the arguments in favor of the *probouleuma*.

Yet Xenophon uses Procles here for some of the same reasons that he had used him earlier. It is Procles, not one of the Spartan ambassadors such as Timocrates, who gives voice to the proposal that is ultimately rejected because of Cephisodotus' speech against it. Once again Xenophon spares Spartan honor. Yet that alone is insufficient reason to reject the arguments presented by Procles as Xenophon's invention. Xenophon has obviously shaped the speech which appears in the *Hellenica*, and he obviously held the views which he ascribes to Procles, but he appears to have preserved the essentials of the situation: that at first Athens and Sparta were prepared to accept Spartan hegemony on land and Athenian by sea for geographical and historical reasons.²⁹

If anything, the speech that Xenophon credits to Cephisodotus (no. 12) strengthens this conclusion. Cephisodotus' arguments against the arrangement are scarcely those of Xenophon, and are most likely to be those which Cephisodotus actually expressed at the time. It is very difficult to see why Xenophon would have invented this speech, which is very unflattering to the Spartans. Cephisodotus' interrogation of Timocrates is brisk; and the way in which he shows that the alliance was not being made on terms of full equality constitutes a slap in the Spartans' faces. Cephisodotus' objections to the proposal of the *boulē* and the Spartan embassy were so potent that Xenophon states (7, 1, 14) that the Athenians voted to accept his recommendation. In the *Poroi* (5, 7) Xenophon again mentions that the Athenians decided how the *hēgemonia* was to be arranged, which is perfectly consistent with what he says in the *Hellenica*. This speech is important because it is clearly not a vehicle for Xenophon's views, and it argues in favor of the authenticity of the views ascribed to Procles. If Xenophon were creating this whole scene, then he could have composed Procles' speech in such a way that any objections to it would have been unnecessary. He could make Procles say anything he wished, even to the point of putting into his mouth the recommendation, which was finally adopted. At one stroke he could have saved the Spartans from the embarrassment caused by Cephisodotus' protests. He could have made the way in which the Athenian-Spartan alliance was concluded appear more cordial than it apparently was. Cephisodotus' speech would have been wholly unnecessary unless Xenophon intended to tell the basic truth about the entire incident.

The peace conference at Sparta in 371 (*Hell.* 6, 3, 1-17) deserves notice because, like the Spartan and allied appeal to Athens in 369, the issues at stake are enumerated in a series of speeches (nos. 1-3). Since Xenophon records the

²⁹ Thus, although Xenophon expresses his personal opinions in this speech, he has not (contra Westlake 1969, p. 206) used it solely as a sounding-board for his views; cf. Gray 1989, pp. 120-121.

speeches of three of the ten Athenian envoys – Callias, Autocles, and Callistratus – the question that immediately arises is what prompted Xenophon to choose these three men.³⁰ He could have selected them for reasons of his own or at random because he intended to ascribe to them speeches which were really expressions of his own views.³¹ That Xenophon was in favor of peace and amity between Sparta and Athens has been established above; and he, like Autocles and Callistratus, expresses his disapproval of the Spartan seizure of the Cadmea (*Hell.* 5, 4, 1).³² Yet these considerations do not explain the presence of three speeches in the *Hellenica*. If Xenophon employs these speeches merely to present his own views, he could have relied more easily on a single speech, which would have allowed him to relay his message more succinctly and effectively than three speeches of different shades of color. A second possibility is that Xenophon chose these three men because they delivered speeches proposing a policy that was in fact adopted. This suggestion is made all the more plausible in view of the fact that the thoughts which each speaker expresses are consistent with what he is known to have advocated on other occasions.³³

H. D. Westlake concludes that the historical value of Callias' speech is "almost negligible," and he considers Callias' use of mythological examples in his argument as "somewhat absurd."³⁴ Despite the fact that arguments based on mythology seem to have been more common in epideictic oratory (e.g. Isocrates) than in the diplomatic arena, they were at times used in the field of practical politics.³⁵ For example, Aeschines reports (2, 31) that he had employed arguments of this sort with Philip when he was defending the Athenian claim to Amphipolis.³⁶ When in 366 Callistratus urged the Arcadians to ratify an alliance with Athens, he used mythology to denigrate the Thebans and Argives.³⁷ Hence, arguments such as those used by Callias are by no means unknown or unlikely. Given the Athenian desire for

³⁰ Mosley 1962, pp. 42–43, has offered good reasons for concluding that the entire delegation numbered ten.

³¹ Although H. Breitenbach, *RE* 11 9.2 (1967), col. 1689, *s.v.* Xenophon, has claimed that these three speeches contain Xenophon's thoughts, he observed also that they are remarkably reminiscent of Thucydides. See also H. Breitenbach 1950, pp. 129–130.

³² On Xenophon's attitude to this incident, see Buckler 1980b.

³³ See Mosley 1962, pp. 44–45; Tuplin 1977.

³⁴ Westlake 1969, p. 205. Yet Westlake apparently assumes that Xenophon is giving an accurate depiction of Callias' personality, as does Higgins 1977, p. 9, who accepts the speech as genuine.

³⁵ See Pearson 1941, pp. 219–220.

³⁶ Cf. *Hdt.* 9, 27; *Thuc.* 1, 73, 2; on the latter occasion the Athenians claim that they do not need to use arguments of this sort.

³⁷ Cf. *Plut. Mor.* 193c–d; *Nep. Epam.* 6, 1–3; Roy 1971, p. 596. Mythology was often used in purely Athenian contexts: e.g. Aeschines. 1, 141–152; Deinarchus 1, 87; Lycurg. *Against Leocr.* 98–99.

reconciliation with Sparta, which is mentioned in all three speeches, Callias' remarks, with their protestations of friendship, open the way to rapprochement. Moreover, a speech urging peace and friendship between Sparta and Athens is precisely what one would expect from the Spartan *proxenos*.

The decisive speech in this scene is that of Callistratus (see above), who, like Autocles (no. 2), stresses the importance of Spartan adherence to the autonomy clause of the Common Peace. This policy had long been pursued by Athens, so it is not surprising to find Callistratus urging it, especially since he is known to have shared it.³⁸ Moreover, Xenophon states specifically (*Hell.* 6, 3, 3) that Callistratus became convinced of the necessity of making peace when he realized the futility and expense of further hostilities.³⁹ Callistratus' evaluation of the situation is what one would expect of someone who was dedicated to the promotion and welfare of the Second Athenian League, which by 371 had grown to encompass most of the Aegean and many important islands in the Ionian Sea. With further success at sea likely to be minimal in extent and expensive in attainment, Callistratus might well press for peace in 371 on the basis of the *status quo*. So these speeches are consistent with the views of the speakers and the situation in which they spoke.⁴⁰ Once again the speeches that appear in the *Hellenica* are Xenophon's but there is sufficient reason to conclude that they conform to what these three men had to say on this occasion.

The same can be said of Lycomedes' speech to the Arcadian assembly (no. 13). Lycomedes urges his fellow countrymen to pursue an independent policy instead of tamely following the lead of Thebes. The program that he proposes in his speech is the one that he energetically implemented for the rest of his career.⁴¹ The historical setting of this speech is also credible. Xenophon inserts the speech here because this was the first occasion on which dissension arose among the allies of Thebes, and for that matter Lycomedes' statement of policy coincided with the outbreak of the Arcadian–Eleian dispute over Triphylia.⁴² The views propounded in this

³⁸ Cf. *IG* 11² 34/5, lines 3–10; 43, lines 7–15; and especially 107, lines 35–49; Sealey 1956, p. 193; Mosley 1962, pp. 44–45; Cartledge 1987, p. 306.

³⁹ For the financial difficulties confronting Athenian commanders in these years, see Buckler 1971a, pp. 355–356; Pritchett 1974, pp. 102–109.

⁴⁰ In that respect all three of these speeches conform to Callisthenes' dictum (*FGrH* 124 F 44): "It is necessary to write something that attempts not to miss the mark of the man, but properly to capture him and his deeds in words."

⁴¹ Cf. Xen. *Hell.* 7, 1, 39; 7, 4, 2–3; Miller, *RE* 7.1 (1927), col. 2299; Amit 1973, pp. 179–180; Tuplin 1993, 151–153; Nielsen 1999, p. 25.

⁴² Xen. *Hell.* 7, 1, 26; *Syll.*³ 160; 183, lines 20–22; Diod. Sic. 15, 77, 2; Paus. 10, 9, 5.

speech agree with what is otherwise known about Lycomedes and his policies, and the setting of the speech is consistent with the political situation of 369.

The discussion in the Spartan camp before Leuctra (no. 5) is understandable in the light of Cleombrotus' earlier conduct of the war against Thebes. The king had not pursued the war with any great diligence. He had done Theban territory no harm in 378 and had turned back from an invasion of Boeotia in 376.⁴³ Just as there was good reason for Cleombrotus' friends to be concerned for him, so there was equally good reason for his opponents to wonder whether he would offer battle to the Thebans. Rather than assume that Xenophon has created out of whole cloth the views of the Spartan officers before the battle, it is more reasonable to think that he is recording the actual division of opinion about Cleombrotus' sympathies and intentions.

This consistency between what Xenophon makes his speakers say and what is known of their policies shows itself in Pelopidas' speech at Susa (no. 15). This was the ideal situation for Xenophon to give his hatred of Thebes full rein. He could blacken the fame of Thebes and its leaders by making Pelopidas say things which would lead the reader to feel contempt for Theban medizing. Yet he does none of these things, and his conduct here is instructive. Xenophon displays his hostility to Theban aspirations at 7, 1, 33, but thereafter in his summary of Pelopidas' speech he gives a straightforward list of Theban deeds, beginning with the Theban support of the Persians at Plataea in 479, continuing with the opposition of the Thebans to Spartan policy after the Peloponnesian War, and ending with their victories over the Spartans. Of these things only the medizing at Plataea would be considered dishonorable by the Greeks, yet nonetheless it was true and essential to the argument. All the accomplishments to which Pelopidas lays claim receive independent support and can be verified.⁴⁴ This speech does not look like a free composition which has little connection with what Pelopidas said at Susa. It apparently restricts itself to the

⁴³ Xen. *Hell.* 5, 4, 16, 59; see also R. E. Smith 1953, pp. 280–287; Cawkwell 1976, pp. 78–79; Buckler 1980a, p. 62.

⁴⁴ According to Xenophon, Pelopidas claimed that the Thebans had fought on the side of the Persians at Plataea, which receives the support of Hdt. 9, 31; 9, 40; 9, 49; that the Thebans refused to join Agesilaus' invasion of the Persian realm (see also 3, 5, 5), which receives some support from Justin 6, 4, 3–12; that the Thebans refused to allow Agesilaus to sacrifice at Aulis (see 3, 4, 3–4), confirmed by Diod. Sic. 14, 79, 1; Plut. *Ages.* 6, 6–11; that the Thebans had been victorious at Leuctra and had afterwards ravaged Laconia (cf. 6, 4, 4–15; 6, 5, 22–32), confirmed by Diod. Sic. 15, 55–56; 15, 63–67, 1; Plut. *Pel.* 22–25; and that the Argives and Arcadians had been defeated in battle when the Thebans were not present (cf. 7, 1, 28–32), which is supported by Diod. Sic. 15, 72, 3.

essentials either of what Pelopidas said or of what the situation demanded.⁴⁵ In that respect, this speech is Thucydidean.

Archidamus' speech before the Tearless Battle (no. 14), already noted as singular (see above), is a curious case in point. First, Xenophon does not claim that he is giving Archidamus' exact words, and he says specifically that he is reporting what he had heard from others. Secondly, the speech consists of commonplaces. Archidamus calls upon his men to preserve their homeland and to fight bravely so that they could cease to feel shame before their wives, children, elders, and the Greeks in general. In 368, after the disaster at Leuctra and the humiliation of Epaminondas' two invasions of the Peloponnesus, nothing could have been more appropriate. Moreover, the detail (note especially the wealth of topographical information) with which Xenophon narrates the episode suggests that he had the opportunity to interrogate eye-witnesses.⁴⁶ Thus, Xenophon relates that Archidamus spoke as he passed along his twelve *lochoi* in review. The military situation had given him very little time to compose a speech, and with the enemy drawing themselves up in battle array Archidamus had little time for a long, elaborate address, especially one which he was to deliver twelve times. Nor would one normally expect rhetorical elegance, sophistication, and originality from a Spartan, especially one with more pressing things than oratory on his mind. Ordinary though these sentiments are, they are under the circumstances *ta deonta*. Pertinent in this respect is the observation of Thucydides (7, 69), who in his account of Nicias' speech at Syracuse in 413, comments that in times of crisis men often resort to conventional and unremarkable appeals, including those involving wives, children, and tutelary gods. Xenophon had no particular reason to create this prosaic speech – and the ability to compose something more striking – and every opportunity to have learned what Archidamus had said. Consequently, it is reasonable to conclude that here too Xenophon is conveying the gist of what was said.

Of the remaining examples it can be said (with the exception of no. 29) that they are true to the essentials of the situation. In his intervention at Leuctra Jason tells the Theban officers (no. 6) that they have won a great victory, which they would risk by renewing the fight against desperate men. To the Spartans (no. 7) he observes that they command a defeated army

⁴⁵ Even if Xenophon had found the contents of Pelopidas' actual speech too distasteful to include even summarily and yet had no desire to create one of his own, he could have ignored it entirely. Anyone who could omit the foundings of Messene and Megalopolis could easily omit a speech.

⁴⁶ Xenophon also states that he had heard the report of the omens before the battle: *Hell.* 7, 1, 31.

and that some of their allies were even then negotiating with the enemy. He concludes by advising them to ask for a truce.⁴⁷

In conspiring with the Arcadians and Argives to overthrow the oligarchical government of Sicyon, Euphron (no. 19) warns that only a democracy is likely to be loyal to them.⁴⁸ He promises to establish a democracy if they will support him. Persuaded by his arguments, the Arcadians and Argives help to install Euphron in power, whereupon he carries out his revolution (*Hell.* 7, 1, 45–46). When Euphron later tries to persuade Pasimelus of his pro-Spartan leanings (no. 22), he claims that he had established the democracy to take revenge on those who had proved unfaithful to Sparta. About this specious line of argument Xenophon comments that even though many people heard Euphron's words, he was unsure how many believed them.⁴⁹

The deliberations before Mantinea are more complex. Epaminondas (no. 28) defends the conduct of a Theban officer on the grounds that the Mantineans were at the time concluding a peace treaty in contravention of their treaty with Thebes.⁵⁰ After pointing out that the Thebans originally intervened in the Peloponnesus only upon the request of the Arcadians and their allies, he warns the Mantineans that he intends to lead an expedition to Arcadia to reassert Theban rights. The factual contents of Epaminondas' words can be verified, and there is nothing improbable or irrelevant about them.⁵¹

The response of the Arcadians (no. 29) when their envoys reported Epaminondas' threat is suspect. They surmise that the Thebans wish to keep the Peloponnesus weak so that they can enslave it, a policy that the Thebans neither espoused nor possessed the resources to implement. The Arcadians conclude that the Thebans clearly intend to harm them. In this reaction, Xenophon's speakers have ignored the legal point raised by Epaminondas and the practical aspects of the diplomatic situation. Furthermore, Xenophon's equation of this group with those who were "harming the Peloponnesus" smacks of personal bias. Earlier (*Hell.* 7, 4, 35)

⁴⁷ Although his account of Leuctra is hopelessly confused, Diodorus (15, 55, 5) records Jason's presence at the battlefield: Sprawski 1999, pp. 96–97.

⁴⁸ For the chronology of Euphron's career, see Meloni 1951; Griffen 1982, pp. 73–75; and below, chapter 11.

⁴⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 7, 3, 3. In a summary of Euphron's career, Diodorus (15, 70, 2) confirms much of Xenophon's testimony. See also Skalet 1928, pp. 72–73; Berve 1967, pp. 305–306; Tuplin 1993, p. 124; Stylianou 1998, p. 464.

⁵⁰ Roy 1971, p. 597, points out that clauses prohibiting allies from making a separate peace were common in treaties of this period. See also Buckler 1980a, p. 206.

⁵¹ Dem. 16, 12; 16, 19–20; Diod. Sic. 15, 62, 3; *SdA* 11, no. 273.

Xenophon had equated the oligarchs of the Mantinean-led faction of the Arcadian League with those "who wanted to be the strongest in the Peloponnesus." That the Mantineans were truly dismayed by the prospect of a Theban campaign and that they felt that the conclusion of a separate peace was an inappropriate and insufficient reason for that campaign are credible enough. Yet Xenophon seems to have distorted the Arcadian response and to have cast Theban designs in the worst light possible. In this case Xenophon apparently exceeded the limits of reporting the essentials to voice his own views.⁵²

CONCLUSIONS

The results of this investigation are decidedly mixed. Although Xenophon is not above distortion (as indicated by no. 29) or outright invention (as witnessed by nos. 8–11), he normally tries to convey the essence of the speech (as proven by nos. 1–3, 11–12, and 23–25). His reports frequently conform to the situation, as in nos. 4–7, 13–15, and 19–22.⁵³ When Xenophon creates a speech to express his own views, it is invariably in the interest of the Spartans or their Peloponnesian allies.⁵⁴ In the speeches he demonstrates anew his anti-Theban bias by allotting only four (nos. 15, 23, 27–28) to Thebans, and in each case he does so only because of a Common Peace or because Peloponnesians were involved. Xenophon almost never uses speeches to throw light on Theban policy, even though the decisions made at Thebes or in the field by Theban commanders largely determined the course of events, especially in the Peloponnesus, during these years.

In conclusion, although his technique can roughly be called Thucydidean, Xenophon clearly employs speeches in his own fashion. The speeches in this portion of the *Hellenica* are not the ones actually delivered at the time, nor are they the actual words of the speakers. What

⁵² Cawkwell 1976, pp. 73–74, has emphasized that Xenophon was "a true 'Peloponnesian' at heart," one who was in complete sympathy with the social and intellectual outlook of the pro-Spartan elements.

⁵³ Similarly, Seager 1967, pp. 96–98, argues that the Theban speech to the Athenians (Xen. *Hell.* 3, 5, 8–15) is true to the event, and Usher 1968 demonstrates that the speeches which Xenophon ascribes to Critias and Theramenes (2, 2, 3 *ad fin.*) are based on those actually delivered at the time with the addition of what he knew of their policies.

⁵⁴ Even though Xenophon's treatment of the first Peloponnesian embassy of 369 seems to be unusual and explicable in terms of the theme of Spartan–Athenian reconciliation on terms of full equality and Xenophon's desire to save the image of Spartan honor from stain, it nonetheless stands as a warning that at times his speeches may have very little in common with the speeches actually delivered.

Xenophon omits can sometimes be significant, and his speeches should never be taken at face value. Even though he rarely claims to be quoting the speakers verbatim, he had ample opportunity to learn what had actually been said. He at times recounts opposing views, but not with the consistency or the frequency of Thucydides. In that respect, Xenophon does not normally use speeches to examine all aspects, positive and negative alike, of the issues under consideration.⁵⁵ In broad terms one can say that his speeches usually, but not invariably, convey the essentials of the matters under consideration.⁵⁶ Nevertheless, the unavoidable conclusion from this examination is that Xenophon is rather inconsistent in his attitude toward speeches in this portion of the *Hellenica*. Unlike Thucydides and Callisthenes, both of whom gave serious thought to the function of speeches in their works, Xenophon never reduced his attitudes toward speeches to an all-encompassing theory or approach which he consistently applied to all cases.

⁵⁵ Nos. 11–12, 15–18, and 23–24 are exceptions.

⁵⁶ To that extent one can say that (admittedly with some important exceptions) Xenophon's speeches conform in essence to the judgment that Adcock 1962b, p. 28, made on Thucydides' method: "Thus, when the procedure has been applied, the reader will know something at least of what the historian regarded as what the situation required and an approximation at least to what was actually said."

*The phantom **synedrion** of the
Boeotian Confederacy, 378–335 BC*

The subject of the political ties linking the Boeotian Confederacy with its allies during the Theban Hegemony has lately been clouded. D. M. Lewis argued against the common view that the Boeotians never built some formal machinery or synod of allies to formulate and direct a common foreign policy.¹ He relies on a passage from Xenophon (*Hell.* 7, 3, 11) and the Boeotian inscription *IG* VII 2418 to claim that the Boeotians did in fact create a **synedrion** with allied *synedroi* quite similar in nature to that established by the Athenians in their League of 378/7. Lewis admits, however, that the Boeotians did not include their allies on the mainland in this **synedrion**, but without explaining why they should have built a body that included their Peloponnesian allies while excluding the others. The weakness of this approach lies in its tendency to misunderstand the differences and goals of Boeotia's northern alliances from those with the southern states. Their two interests shared no common ground. Without an understanding of these realities and without adequate evidence any defense of a **synedrion** falls. Nor can one understand how the Byzantines became involved in this purported Boeotio-Peloponnesian **synedrion**. Further argument against it stems from the lack of evidence that Chios, Rhodes, Cnidus, or any other Aegean state showed anything but friendliness to Epaminondas and by extension to the Boeotians. A readier and better historically based explanation lies open: that the Boeotians dealt with all combinations. Although some historians share Lewis' views,² others reject them,³ which justifies a re-examination of the topic.

¹ Lewis 1990. His argument is based almost solely on Busolt and Swoboda 1926, pp. 1425–1426.

² Those agreed: Cargill 1981, p. 113 n. 46 and p. 169; Hornblower 1983/2002, p. 200; and Bakhuizen 1994, p. 308 n. 4.

³ Those opposed: Kelly 1980; Cartledge 1987, p. 310; Roy 1994, p. 202 n. 17; Jehne 1994, p. 22 n. 74; and Beck 1997a, p. 216 n. 15.

THE CASE OF EUPHRON OF SICYON

Lewis cites one passage from Xenophon as the only support for his first argument, yet this single episode is only a fraction of the evidence concerning the adventures of Euphron of Sicyon.⁴ Furthermore, he has complicated the issue by resting his argument on a somewhat distorted picture of the constitution of the Boeotian Confederacy as well as its diplomatic policy towards its allies, both of which are vital for a clear understanding of the episode. The best way by which to clarify the matter is to begin with the case of Euphron, as reported by Xenophon, a contemporary of these events.

At *Hellenica* 7, 3, 4–12 he narrates the assassination of Euphron at Thebes and the trial of one of his assassins. The trial was heard before the *archontes* and *boulē* in Thebes. When Euphron's murderers were arraigned, one defendant justified his actions on the grounds that the Thebans had voted that exiles should be subject to extradition from all cities of the alliance, and he further claimed that an exile who returned without a general resolution of the allies should be deserving of death: "You voted, I presume, that exiles are liable to seizure in all of the allied states (*pasōn tōn symmachidōn*). Such an exile returns without a common decree of the allies. Can anyone say in what way it is unjust to kill such a man?" R. Schneider considered *pasōn tōn symmachidōn* an interpolation, in which he is not followed by the edition of C. Hude.⁵ The trial of the assassin is, however, only the final episode of the story, which is inseparable from the beginning, the institutional and legal details of which are essential to the proper understanding of these events.

After Leuctra the Boeotians established their complex of alliances in at least two stages, the first encompassing the Phocians, Aetolians, and Locrians (Diod. Sic. 15, 57, 1). Probably at or near this time they included the Euboeans, Acarnanians, Heracleots, and Malians.⁶ In late 370, the last stage, they entered into alliance with the Eleans, Argives, and Arcadians.⁷ These combined allies met in Arcadia at the end of December 370 to plan and execute the first invasion of Laconia. Especially enlightening at this point is Plutarch (*Pel.* 24) – overlooked by Lewis – who states that Pelopidas and Epaminondas led the allies by their glory and "without a common decree and vote (*aneu dogmatos koinou kai psēphismatos*).” Instead of mentioning the existence of a *synedrion*, Plutarch emphasizes (*Pel.* 24, 3)

⁴ Meloni 1951; Berve 1967, pp. 305–306; and Griffin 1982, pp. 73–75.

⁵ Schneider 1860, pp. 16–17; Hude 1969.

⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 6, 5, 23; Ages. 2, 24; Diod. Sic. 15, 62, 4; Stylianaou 1998, pp. 410–413.

⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 6, 5, 19; Diod. Sic. 15, 62, 3; Stylianaou 1998, pp. 424–425.

that the two Thebans first persuaded their fellow *boeotarchs* to lead the invasion, whereupon the allies agreed to follow. At 24, 8 Plutarch speaks of the Argives, Eleans, and Arcadians in their *synedria* sometimes quarrelling with the Thebans over hegemony, and in this instance he clearly means individual assemblies of the three states. These powers each take their own counsel individually. Their three *synedria* are not combined as a whole, and they do not meet jointly as a unit with the Thebans. Plutarch's entire point is that the Boeotians led this alliance solely in their capacity as its *hēgemōn* and thus he provides evidence that from the very outset of Boeotian and allied operations no *synedrion* of any sort united them.⁸

The subsequent history of the Boeotian alliance, far from indicating the existence of such a *synedrion*, proves unquestionably instead that the Boeotians preferred to direct their foreign affairs without one. They did not consult their Peloponnesian allies before Epaminondas' third Peloponnesian campaign. Rather, Epaminondas persuaded the Argives to secure Mt. Oneion to facilitate an invasion on which he had already decided (Xen. *Hell.* 7, 1, 41). His last campaign further proves the lack of a federal *synedrion*. He announced his intentions to the allies, whereupon the Arcadians sent ambassadors urging him to forbear. They consulted him directly rather than voicing their objections before a meeting of a *synedrion* (Xen. *Hell.* 7, 4, 40–7, 5, 3). Instead of conferring with his allies in 362 he summoned them, but to find the Phocians refusing the order because they had only a defensive alliance with the Boeotians (Xen. *Hell.* 7, 4, 40–49; 5, 4–5). They did not, significantly enough, refuse in a meeting of a *synedrion*. Quite telling is the basic clause of the Boeotian alliance with the Achaeans in which they swore to follow wherever the Boeotians led, a familiar treaty clause.⁹ From these facts stems the conclusion that the Boeotians preferred to act as the *hēgemōn* of the alliance, for which they neither wanted nor thought that they needed a *synedrion*. The flaw in their thinking was demonstrated by the Arcadian Lycomedes, who resented the Boeotian hegemony of the alliance (Xen. *Hell.* 7, 1, 39). The basis of his objections on that occasion was that all discussion of peace should be held at the seat of the war, which presumably derived from a clause or notion of some alliances that in joint operations of allied armies command of them should be held by the state in whose territory the allies campaigned.¹⁰ This

⁸ See Buckler 1980a, pp. 73–78; Kelly 1980, pp. 70–71; Georgiadou 1997, pp. 181–182.

⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 7, 1, 42; see also 2, 2, 20; 3, 1, 5; 5, 3, 26; Beck 1997, pp. 64–65, 197.

¹⁰ E.g. *SA* 11, no. 193, especially *IG* 1³ 83, lines 24–25; no. 290, especially *IG* 11² 112 = Rhodes–Osborne, no. 41, lines 35–36.

challenge, of course, struck to the heart of *hēgemonia* in its original military sense. Nonetheless, the Boeotians refused to recognize it and never relinquished their position as *hēgemōn* of the alliance, not in the Peloponnesus nor in northern Greece.

The Boeotian alliance, then, was similar to the earlier large alliance of the Athenians with the Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans established in 420.¹¹ That *symmachia* too agreed upon certain details of military leadership and co-operation without forming a *synedrion*. In 362 the Athenians joined with the Arcadians, Achaeans, Eleans, and Phliasians to create a similar, but simpler, alliance; and even though by then they had the Athenian League for a model, they again refrained from establishing a *synedrion*. The mere creation of such a large, multi-state alliance did not of itself entail or require an organized federal *synedrion*.

The Boeotians and their allies won control of Sicyon in 369 after the creation of the general alliance.¹² In 368 Euphron approached the Argives and Arcadians with a plan to overthrow the ancestral government of Sicyon, which the Boeotians had obviously left undisturbed when they brought the city into their alliance (Xen. *Hell.* 7, 1, 44). They had, however, left a *harmost* in control of Sicyon, but this officer had not interfered in local affairs and refrained from doing so now.¹³ Euphron made a compact with the Argives and Arcadians that if they would support him in creating a democratic government in Sicyon, he would make his countrymen their allies. This alliance is clearly separate from the general Boeotian alliance of 370 and not simply a confirmation of the existing treaty of 369. The pact was between Euphron on the one hand and the Argives and the Arcadians on the other. Xenophon says nothing about Boeotian involvement in this agreement, nor can one automatically assume it on the strength of the assassin's tendentious assertion. Once Euphron had established himself in power, he executed some of the pro-Spartan element and banished others from Sicyon. Although Xenophon (*Hell.* 7, 3, 3) avers that Euphron claimed that he alone exiled the pro-Spartans, the responsibility lay with the Sicyonian people (*Hell.* 7, 3, 2), who steadfastly endorsed his actions and treated him as the second founder of the city (*Hell.* 7, 3, 12). Euphron also accomplished everything with the full approval of his Peloponnesian allies, as Xenophon's narrative makes abundantly clear. Thus, from the

¹¹ *SdA* 11, no. 193.

¹² Xen. *Hell.* 6, 5, 23; Diod. Sic. 15, 57, 4; 15, 62, 5; *SdA* 11, 193 and 290; Buckler 1980a, pp. 100–101, 183, 193.

¹³ Analogous is the situation of the Theban *harmost* at Tegea, whose decisions were valid only with the approval of the Boeotian government: Xen. *Hell.* 7, 4, 36–40.

start of Euphron's career his alliance with the Argives and Arcadians was intimately connected with the problem of the Sicyonian exiles, who continued to mount a constant threat to his regime (*Hell.* 7, 2, 1–10; 7, 3, 1).

Threats from exiles to new governments were common in the fourth century, and confronted with these situations, the principals often included a clause in the treaty of alliance specifically regulating the treatment of exiles. For example, the Athenians and Erythraeans agreed that anyone exiled from Erythrae should be considered banished from all the cities of the Athenian alliance (*IG* 1³ 14, lines 30–31). Similarly, the Athenians and Thasians in 390 agreed that exiles from one city were to be exiles from all other allied cities (*IG* 11² 24, lines 4–6), and another between the Athenians and the Clazomenaeans in 387 stipulated that the latter should independently decide upon the treatment of exiles (*IG* 11² 28 = Rhodes–Osborne, no. 18, lines 9–13). Both treaties preceded the creation of the Athenian League of 378/7, and thus before the establishment of its *synedrion*. More sweeping is the so-called charter of that League, where the exiles of one state are considered to be the exiles of all allied states (*IG* 11² 43 = Rhodes–Osborne, no. 22, lines 56–61). Different from the above, but nonetheless relevant, is Alexander the Great's "Letter to the Chians" in which he declares that those exiles who had joined the barbarians should be banned from all the cities that shared the peace.¹⁴ Famous as unilateral proclamations are that of the Spartans concerning the Athenian exiles of 404 and that of the Peloponnesians concerning the Thebans of 382.¹⁵ A clause governing the treatment of exiles is to be expected in the alliance between Euphron and the Argives and Arcadians, especially with the pro-Spartan exiles posing such a constant threat to the new democratic government. Here, then, is the most reasonable time for a provision concerning them, but again there is nothing in Xenophon's narrative to prove that the Boeotians were also a party to it except for the lone allegation of Euphron's murderer.

The events surrounding Euphron's assassination must be scrutinized within this historical context. Of immediate concern is the identity of the *archontes* and *boulē* at Thebes in 366. Another is to determine to what *synedrion* the assassin refers and the nature of Sicyon's connection with it. Concerning the first matter, some background on Boeotian *archontes* and *boulai* is as welcome as necessary. In the Confederacy dissolved by the King's Peace of 386 its constituent cities were governed by four local *boulai*

¹⁴ *Syll.*³ 283 and Heisserer 1980, pp. 79–95; Seibert 1979, pp. 156–157; Bosworth 1988, pp. 193–194.

¹⁵ In 404: *Lys.* fr. 78, 2; *Plut. Lys.* 27, 5–8; in 382: *Plut. Pel.* 6, 5; Georgiadou 1997, pp. 99–100.

that sat in turn, one serving as *prytanis* in each session (*Hell. Oxy.* 19, 2). Federal affairs were the prerogative of *boulai*, apparently also four in number, that represented the whole people and met in assembly on the Cadmea.¹⁶ The local *boulai* survived the dissolution of the Confederacy, as is proven by the events of 382 and 379. Theban government was then in the hands of three *polemarchoi* and a secretary.¹⁷ In 382 the Theban Leontiades conspired with the Spartan Phoebidas to seize the Cadmea, from which coup several details become apparent. Leontiades was a *polemarchos*, and as such possessed the power to arrest anyone whose activities deserved the death-penalty (Xen. *Hell.* 5, 2, 30; 5, 2, 32). Under his bidding were *lochagoi*, who served as a police force. The culprit was then bound over for trial. Leontiades took this opportunity to arrest his political opponent Hismenias, whom he arraigned, not before the local court, but before a special one convened by the Spartans (Xen. *Hell.* 5, 2, 35). The reason for this unusual tribunal for Hismenias was his reputed crimes against all the Greeks (Xen. *Hell.* 5, 2, 33–36). In 379 the government of three *polemarchoi*, secretary, and *boulē* continued to function, but after the liberation of Thebes Pelopidas and his colleagues re-established the *boiōtarchia*. They did not, however, abolish the local Theban government, which continued to enforce purely Theban laws.¹⁸

Given the function of the local *boulē* and the nature of the crime, there is every reason to conclude that the trial of Euphron's assassins also took place before the Theban *boulē* and not a federal one. For the sake of clarity this trial can be contrasted with the most famous federal case of the Theban Hegemony, that of Epaminondas and his fellow *boeotarchs* in 369.¹⁹ These magistrates of the Boeotian Confederacy were all indicted for the federal offense of having illegally prolonged the tenure of their office. Their crime obviously transcended the jurisdiction of any single constituent city of the Confederacy. These men were accordingly tried before a federal court. Yet the crime charged against the Sicyonians was murder, a local offense. It is

¹⁶ *Hell. Oxy.* 19, 4 (Chambers): "This was the polity of the whole *ethnos*, and the councils (*synedria*) and the common assemblies (*ta koina*) of the Boeotians sat in the Cadmea." Whether *synedria* here is a technical term cannot be determined by this one occurrence. Elsewhere the Oxyrhynchus historian applies it to a session of Rhodian *archontes* (18, 2), which may have been a regular assembly, as opposed to the hastily summoned *ekklēsia* of the Rhodian *demos*; cf. Bruce 1967, pp. 108–109.

¹⁷ See above, chapter 6.

¹⁸ *IG VII* 21, lines 1–2 (Orchomenus), see also Polyb. 20, 6, 1; 22, 4, 17; and *IG VII* 2708, lines 2–3 (Acraephea) also provide evidence for a local *synedrion* and *demos* elsewhere in Boeotia, on which see Preuss 1879, pp. 9–11, and in general Bussmann 1912, pp. 14–18.

¹⁹ Buckler 1978a. Although Jehne 1994, p. 22 n. 74, and Kelly 1980, p. 71, conclude that the trial took place before a *boulē* of the Boeotian Confederacy, Beck 1997a, p. 216 n. 15, points out that a Theban *boulē* heard the case.

difficult to assume that homicide was a federal felony, for that would mean that trials for every murder committed in Boeotia, whether in Thebes, Hyettus, Copae, or wherever else, against whomever, by whomever, for whatever reason would be held in a federal court seated at Thebes. Instead of denying the formal charge of murder, the principal defendant avoided it by placing the significance of his deed in the larger context of foreign affairs. He then averred reasons of expediency to justify his actions. He alleged that Euphron's duplicity and treason had harmed all alike and that the man deserved death because of his treachery. Nonetheless, the defendant's success in shifting the grounds for indictment from murder to justifiable homicide does not alter the nature of the court of first instance, which in this case applied the law of equity in preference to rigorous statute law. These details all indicate that the assassin was tried by Theban *polemarchoi* before a Theban court.

Additional proof of this conclusion comes from the speeches of the prosecutor and the defendant himself. The former addressed his "fellow citizens" (Xen. *Hell.* 7, 3, 6), by whom he means the Thebans, as proven by his several allusions to the ill repute that the city would receive for condoning open murder. He pleads his case as a purely local matter. The defendant also addressed the Thebans by name, not the Boeotians (7, 3, 7), and reminded his listeners of how they had rid themselves of Leontiades' coterie in 379, which again was a Theban affair.²⁰ Lastly, Xenophon notes (7, 3, 12) that the Thebans rendered their verdict. Taken together, there should be no doubt that Xenophon refers only to a Theban *boulē*, so this episode cannot stand as evidence for the existence of a federal Boeotian *boulē*.²¹

With the venue of the *boulē* decided, one can consider the defendant's charge that his murder of Euphron was justified on the grounds that the Sicyonian *stratēgos* had already broken the law when he returned from exile without a general decree (*dogma*) of the allies.²² Here finally is the gist of Lewis' argument. The defendant's claim that Euphron's death was proper is actually his interpretation of the *dogma* and not an expressed clause of it. The question then becomes whether the *dogma* itself was the defendant's fabrication or the truth, and if true what Xenophon meant by it. Xenophon

²⁰ Buckler 1982a, p. 191; Grey 1989, pp. 134–136.

²¹ Pace E. P. Orsi 1987. In arguing against her, Bakhuizen 1994, p. 308 n. 4, equates the alleged federal Boeotian *boulē* with the fourth-century *synedrion* in question. Buck 1994, p. 106, accepts the existence of a federal *boulē* chosen by lot, for which, however, there is no evidence: Beck 1997a, pp. 100–106.

²² Jehne 1994, p. 22 n. 74, rejects the reality of this *dogma*, which he compares to those cited in n. 15 above.

applies the word *dogma* to decisions of the Peloponnesian League (*Hell.* 5, 2, 37; 4, 37), of the Athenian *demos* (6, 2, 2; 5, 12) and *boulē* (6, 5, 33), and a decree of the Mantineans (6, 5, 5). In the *Anabasis* he regularly employs it to denote the decisions taken by the officers of the Ten Thousand.²³ He employs it consistently to signify a decision made by an official body. Seen in this light, the *dogma* of 7, 3, 11, if authentic, can only be the one issued by the Sicyonians, Argives, and Arcadians when they entered into their separate alliance, made only after the Boeotian treaties of 370 and 369.²⁴ Since the latter compact was still in effect despite local changes in government, the defendant could have interpreted the acquiescence of the Theban *harmost* as endorsement of the new alliance, basing his views on the concept that silence lends assent. If so, he was alone in his assumption. Significantly enough, at no time did the Eleans and Messenians, much less the Boeotian allies of the mainland, feel compelled or obliged to defend Euphron's government, nor did they interfere in Sicyonian affairs. The assassin's claim utterly lacks external support, and it cannot prove the existence of a formal, constitutional *synedrion* of all Boeotian allies, even of those in the Peloponnesus.

It is also noteworthy that the assassin nowhere speaks of a *synedrion* but only of a *dogma*, and the two are not necessarily or inseparably linked. The existence of a *synedrion* in this matter stems only from the modern assumption that where one finds a *dogma*, a *synedrion* must be lurking nearby, which was not found in Xenophon's use of the word. Moreover, Xenophon's use of *synedrion* does not automatically demand that the word *dogma* be applied to any pronouncement that a body might make. Xenophon employs *synedrion* to include the meeting of an informal council of officers (*Hell.* 1, 1, 31), usage also found in Diodorus (17, 54, 3; 17, 54, 7; 19, 46, 4); a meeting of the Thirty (*Hell.* 2, 4, 23); an assembly of delegates to the abortive peace conference of 366, which did not, however, constitute an alliance, become a permanent institutional body, or even ratify the peace treaty (7, 1, 39); and lastly a meeting of a circle of friends (*Mem.* 4, 2, 3). None of these examples even suggests a formal *synedrion* as found in the Athenian Confederacy. In sum, nothing in the episode of Euphron and its accompanying history supplies any evidence for a *synedrion* of the Boeotian Confederacy and its allies, and everything argues against one.

²³ Xen. *Anab.* 3, 3, 5; 6, 4, 11; 6, 8, 27; Manfredi 1980, pp. 156, 271, 285.

²⁴ See n. 12 above. This *dogma* would no more constitute proof of a *synedrion* than do the decrees of the Athenians, Thasians, and Clazomenians discussed above.

Before the discussion proceeds to Lewis' second main argument, a final historical incident deserves mention. In 335 Alexander and some of his allies crushed a Theban rebellion and on a vote taken in a *synedrion* of his allies he destroyed the city. Although this body included Thespians, Plataeans, and Orchomenians (Diod. Sic. 17, 14, 3–4), it was not a *synedrion* of the Boeotian Confederacy, for it also included Phocians.²⁵ Diodorus (17, 14, 1) makes it quite clear that it was a rump *synedrion* of the League of Corinth.

EPIGRAPHY AND ITS LITERARY NEIGHBOURS

The second piece of evidence in Lewis' argument is *IG VII 2418*, erected during the Sacred War, which records certain Greek contributions to the Boeotians to defray the costs of the war.²⁶ The inscription lists contributions from Alyzia and Anactorium brought to Thebes by their envoys (*prisgeies* = *presbeis*, lines 6, 7, and 18), from Byzantium brought by their *synedroi* (lines 11, 24), and by Athanodorus, the Boeotian *proxenos* from Tenedos (lines 14–15). Alyzia and Anactorium were members of the Acarnanian Confederacy, which had become a member of the Athenian League, but in 370 had allied itself with the Boeotian Confederacy.²⁷ Tenedos had re-established friendly relations with Athens when Thrasybulus was still active in the northern Aegean (389), and it too joined the Athenian Confederacy.²⁸ After Leuctra it remained loyal to Athens and never became a Boeotian ally, which explains why only the Boeotian *proxenos* there made a contribution. Far more complicated is the case of Byzantium. Editors from W. Dittenberger to P. J. Rhodes and R. Osborne and historians from H. Swoboda to S. C. Bakhuizen have used this inscription to prove that Byzantium had become not only an ally of the Boeotian Confederacy but also a member of a *synedrion* of Boeotian

²⁵ Plut. *Alex.* 11, 11; Arr. *Anab.* 1, 8, 8; Justin 11, 3, 8; see also J. R. Hamilton 1969, pp. 30–31; Bosworth 1988, pp. 195–196. For that matter, the existence of a general assembly and a federal *synedrion* of the Hellenistic Boeotian Confederacy is likewise uncertain: Liv. 33, 1, 7 – 33, 2, 6; Briscoe 1973, pp. 249–250; Roesch 1982, pp. 275–278, 369–370.

²⁶ See Buckler 1989a, and Jehne 1994, p. 22; Jehne 1999, pp. 328–344; Rhodes–Osborne, pp. 268–271. Jehne suggests that Byzantium was considered to be an extension of the Theban state. Even the notion that one state could be considered an extension of another can neither overwhelm nor outweigh factual treaty obligations. *Pace* Jehne, no official evidence supports such an extension.

²⁷ *IG II² 43* = Rhodes–Osborne, no. 22, line 106; Xen. *Hell.* 6, 5, 23; see Cargill 1981, pp. 68–69, 106–108; Beck 1997a, pp. 31–43.

²⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 5, 1, 7; *IG II² 43*, 79; Cargill 1981, p. 33 n. 15.

allies.²⁹ Some support their supposition by relying on two historical events, Epaminondas' naval expedition of 364 and the Social War of 357, as evidence.

The principal source for Epaminondas' naval venture is Diodorus (15, 78, 4 – 15, 79, 1), in which he writes that Epaminondas persuaded the Thebans to take the hegemony of the sea. The Theban *demos* accordingly voted him a fleet of a hundred triremes and voted also to urge the Rhodians, Chians, and Byzantines to help them in their designs.³⁰ Once at sea, Epaminondas “*idias tas poleis tois Thebaiois epoiesen*” (Diod. 15, 79, 1). The meaning of this sentence has been marked by more debate than agreement. The literal translation is “he made the cities Thebes' own.”³¹ The question becomes how he made them Thebes' own and in what way. They clearly did not become Boeotian possessions, and Diodorus does not specifically say that they became allies, though that is the interpretation of Lewis and others.³² Far more telling is the more abundant evidence that Epaminondas achieved nothing on his voyage. Isocrates (5, 53), a contemporary of these events, noted that the Thebans sent triremes to Byzantium, “as if they would rule by land and sea,” testimony that they actually failed to do so. Plutarch (*Phil.* 14, 2), whose lost *Life of Epaminondas* testifies to his interest in and knowledge of his hero's career, specifically states that Epaminondas returned from Asia and the islands without having achieved anything. Plutarch even makes the excuse that the Theban intentionally failed because he agreed with Plato that the life of sailors would corrupt steadfast hoplites. It is both illustrative and significant that those who defend the accuracy of Diodorus' testimony make little or no attempt to refute Isocrates and Plutarch. Nonetheless, these better sources prove that Diodorus cannot be right in saying that Epaminondas made Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium Thebes' own in any real, official sense. A final argument indicates that Diodorus himself did not believe that Epaminondas had achieved anything permanent. At 15, 79, 2 he opines

²⁹ Dittenberger, *Syll.*³ 201 n. 6; Tod, p. 178; Rhodes–Osborne, pp. 268–271; Busolt and Swoboda 1926, p. 1426; Bakhuizen 1994, p. 308 n. 4.

³⁰ Ruzicka 1998, p. 61 n. 8, and Stylianou 1998, p. 496, raise the notion that not all of the one hundred Boeotian triremes were built, but see chapter 12 below.

³¹ Various renderings include Cawkwell 1972, p. 270: he “made the cities friendly to the Thebans,” and p. 271: he made them “attached” to the Thebans; Hornblower 1983/2002, p. 255: “he made them *idias*, his own”; Ruzicka 1998, p. 61: he “made the cities ‘Thebes’ own”; lastly, Stylianou 1998, p. 496, who opines that the “precise meaning of *idias* here escapes us.” Cf. chapter 13 below.

³² Although Lewis 1990, p. 73 n. 14, does not understand why Buckler rejects the authenticity of a Byzantine alliance with the Boeotians, the references are in Buckler 1980a, p. 310 n. 42. See also Kelly 1980, p. 81.

that had the Theban lived longer he would have secured the hegemony of the land and the rule of the sea. According to Diodorus, then, Epaminondas had done neither. The historian has clearly muddled the entire episode.

There is, however, substantial and unappreciated evidence to indicate that Diodorus' testimony is not completely worthless and that he genuinely misunderstood Ephorus, his principal source. Very revealing in this respect is the new inscription from Cnidus that awards Epaminondas with *proxenia*, which proves that the Theban and his fleet received at least a friendly official welcome there (chapter 13). Other evidence proves that he was also warmly welcomed in other ports. Justin (16, 4, 3) mentions that Epaminondas sailed as far abroad as Heraclea Pontice, which means that his voyage took him from Rhodes in the southern Aegean to the Euxine Sea in the northeast. This expedition was a major event in which Epaminondas was well received by at least five major states. It was a noteworthy achievement in itself, one that brought the Theban considerable fame. It is small wonder that Diodorus probably misunderstood its meaning and exaggerated its significance in political and strategical terms. Epaminondas' exploit is similar to the later voyage of the American Great White Fleet around the world, which won loud applause but gained not one concrete diplomatic dividend.³³ Yet his popularity did not translate into official agreements by which states became formally allied with the Boeotians and then lent them material aid.³⁴ Epaminondas received *proxenia* but the Boeotians did not win *symmachia*. If Diodorus thought that this voyage resulted in an actual shift in the balance of naval power in the Aegean, then he is simply wrong, as are those who believe his testimony.

The vexed problem of the Social War demands only short consideration here. Those who conclude that Byzantium, either alone or with Chios and Rhodes, joined the Boeotian Confederacy in 364 also claim that these states thereby repudiated their formal ties with the Athenian League.³⁵ Yet they are then at a loss to explain the actual outbreak of the war in 357. If these states had seceded from the Athenians in 364, these scholars must explain, but have not, why the Athenians waited seven years to wage war against

³³ Hart 1965.

³⁴ See also Heskell 1997, p. 136. Yet Ruzicka 1998, pp. 62–64, and Stylianou 1998, pp. 412–413, 497, conclude that Byzantium did rebel from Athens and allied itself with the Boeotians without suggesting how the city fitted into the putative allied *syndrion*.

³⁵ So Badian 1995, p. 95, and Ruzicka 1998, pp. 66–68, who does not explain why, if Byzantium exerted such powerful commercial pressure on Athens in 362, the Athenians did not immediately respond. They could not have survived complete closure of the Hellespontine grain route for five years, the dire effects of which Lysander proved in 404 and Antalcidas in 387.

them. Diodorus is again the place to start looking for answers, and this time he provides a relatively clear explanation of events. He states (16, 7, 3) that Athens in 358/7 suffered the revolt of Chios, Rhodes, and Byzantium, and thereby became involved in the Social War. At 16, 21, 1 (356/5) he continues by saying that these states, together with Cos, pursued the war against Athens.³⁶ The point that Athens at that time entered into a formal state of war is supported by Dionysius (*Lys.* 12). His testimony is surely correct, having been drawn from an *Atthidographer* who was uniquely placed to provide accurate chronological testimony.³⁷ Diodorus' narrative also receives excellent contemporary support from Demosthenes (15, 3; 15, 15), who states that the Chians, Byzantines, and Rhodians accused the Athenians of plotting against them. For that reason they went to war against Athens. He adds that Mausolus, not Epaminondas, instigated the revolt.³⁸ Three things at least are immediately apparent from this contemporary source: (1) Epaminondas and the Boeotians had nothing to do with the outbreak of the Social War; (2) until 357 the Athenians considered themselves at peace with these three states. This is important for it takes no expert in international affairs to realize that if one state declares war on another, the previous relations between them were what one normally calls peace. Lastly, (3) the allies themselves began the war by rebelling against the Athenians. Tensions existed between Athens and Byzantium before 357, but the Athenians did not consider these differences to amount to acts of war.³⁹ The revolt of the allies in 358/7 means that until then they considered themselves loyal members of the Athenian League and formally at peace with it. If, as some modern historians suppose, they had already seceded from the League, they had no reason to rebel at this point. They could have continued to pursue their affairs undisturbed. Had they not drawn attention to themselves in 357, the Athenians might not even have noticed that they had seceded seven years earlier. There is not one piece of evidence in all this to suggest that Byzantium and the others acted in 357 as allies of the

³⁶ See Peake 1997.

³⁷ For Dionysius' reliance on *Atthidographers*, see Jacoby 1949, pp. 401–415 and Pearson 1942, pp. 88–89, 126–134.

³⁸ See also Isoc. 8, 16–17; 15, 63–64; Dion. Hal. *Isoc.* 15–16; Hornblower 1982, pp. 205–211, who nonetheless considers Byzantium already to be a Boeotian ally before the outbreak of the Social War. Stylianou 1998, p. 497, suggests that Ephorus (*FGrH* 70) fr. 83 (“Chrysopolis of the Calchedonians being handed over to the allies”) refers to this city being given to the Byzantines. Yet by the terms of the King's Peace of 386 Chrysopolis and Calchedon belonged to the Persians, and the King was unlikely to give the city even to one of his Greek allies, much less to the Byzantines with whom he was not allied.

³⁹ Roy 1994, p. 202 n. 17, succinctly and accurately describes this situation as “unfriendly” but nothing more.

Boeotian Confederacy or that the Boeotians had anything to do with these later events. The Social War is in fact irrelevant to the situation obtaining in *IG VII 2418* (Rhodes–Osborne, no. 57) and therefore ought to be dismissed from all consideration.

With Epaminondas' voyage and the Social War removed from the discussion, attention can revert to the inscription itself. The Alyzians and Anactorians, Boeotian allies for over fifteen years, sent *presbeis* to deliver their contributions. In 362 the Arcadians, Boeotian allies for eight years by then, sent *presbeis* to the *boeotarch* Epaminondas (Xen. *Hell.* 7, 4, 39). Yet the inscription records that the Byzantines had sent *synedroi*. The distinction between the two terms demands explanation. Until someone can satisfactorily explain why one state known to be an ally should send *presbeis* but another alleged to be one should send *synedroi*, there is no obvious reason why, if in fact allied, the Byzantines should fit into a separate, distinct, and hitherto unknown category of allies. Instead, the word *synedros* indicates that the Byzantines were not Boeotian allies. The basic meaning of *synedros* may provide the solution to the mystery.⁴⁰ Herodotus (3, 34, 3) speaks of certain Persian *synedroi* and Croesus sitting informally together with Cambyses discussing the reasons for his greatness. These worthies were hardly representatives of any federal body, but were instead a group of friends giving their private opinions. Thucydides (4, 22, 1) relates that Spartan envoys (*presbeis*: 4, 16, 3) asked that the Athenians send *synedroi* to negotiate with them about the crisis at Pylos. These commissioners were to settle the details of a mutually acceptable settlement of differences. Similarly, in the Melian affair (Thuc. 5, 84, 3 – 5, 86, 1) the Athenian *strategoí* sent *presbeis* with proposals to the Melians and were met by Melian *synedroi* whose duty was to deliberate independently of the *demos* but to act as representatives of it. Timaeus (*FGrH* 566) fr. 22 also relates that the Camarinians sent embassies to their allies requesting that they send trustworthy men to discuss terms of peace with the Geleans, whose deputies duly met in assembly. The manuscripts of Demosthenes (18, 157) contain a letter from Philip to the councillors of the allied Peloponnesians concerning Amphissan depredations of Delphic sacred land. The obvious problem with this piece of evidence is that the letter is a forgery, and there was no formal *synedrion* of Philip's Peloponnesian allies. Yet the forger and his audience could accept the concept of a select group of allied commissioners. Furthermore, with the probable exception of the passage from Demosthenes, these examples are drawn solely from

⁴⁰ Dreher 1990, pp. 151–153.

the fifth and fourth centuries. Xenophon, interestingly enough, does not use the word *synedros* and thus offers no help.

Fourth-century epigraphy supports this interpretation. The closest analogy to *IG VII 2418* comes from *IG II² 467*. In 306/5 the Athenians honored Timosthenes of Carystus, who had served as a commissioner to them during the Lamian War (lines 3–12). Timosthenes was the Carystian *proxenos* sent to the Athenians and their allies with the clear message that he was serving both the *koinon* of the Greeks and his own city. An alliance between the Athenians and the Spartans, though early third century, refers to select commissioners as distinct from ambassadors.⁴¹ In a Milesian treaty with the Sardinians dating perhaps before 344 (*Syll.³ 273, 2*), Dittenberger interprets the *synedroi* of the Milesians as an elected council (or selected commissioners: LSJ, *s.v.* *synedros*), not a *boulē*.⁴² This meaning of selected commissioners is the most likely one for the Byzantine representatives.⁴³ As in the other examples cited, they were commissioners whose duty was to represent the interests of their state in a novel situation. Not themselves at war with the Phocian temple robbers, the Byzantines nonetheless wanted financially to support Boeotian efforts to liberate Apollo's sanctuary and to have a public accounting of their piety and generosity.⁴⁴ Efforts against the sacrilegious gave the Byzantines the added satisfaction of opposing the Athenians, who had sided with the Phocians, without, however, giving them any reasonable justification for complaint. They could not send money direct to the Pythia, but they could to the Boeotians, who were also members of the synedrion of the Amphictyonic Council.⁴⁵ The duties of their commissioners included delivery of the contributions and a receipt for them, in this case the one actually inscribed. As financial supporters, they surely consulted with the Boeotians on the situation at Delphi, the progress of the war, and future Boeotian strategy. Included in these discussions were matters such as the possibility and amounts of future contributions and some discussion of how the money would be spent. Not being Boeotian allies, they labored under no

⁴¹ *SA* 111, no. 476, lines 47 and 51. ⁴² See also Wörle 1988, pp. 424–448 and Rhodes 1997, p. 374.

⁴³ In this instance the postulation of *synedrion* as a technical term in the same sense as it is used of members of the Athenian League is to assume what should be proven. Indeed, this process amounts only to circular argument.

⁴⁴ The Byzantine response was not totally novel. For a list of pious contributions to Delphi made before the Phocian seizure of the sanctuary, see Tod, pp. 119–123; Rhodes–Osborne, pp. 224–230, and for contributions to a Spartan war-fund dating to the Peloponnesian War, see Meiggs–Lewis, p. 67. The Byzantines simply combined the two. Their desire to ensure the proper use of their contributions is reminiscent of the Thessalian demand that Philip of Macedon make the same proper use of their taxes to prosecute the Sacred War; see Buckler 1989a, pp. 104–106.

⁴⁵ E.g. Theopompus (*FGrH* 115) fr. 63 and 169; Roux 1979, pp. 1–3, 27, 50, 53; and Buckler 1989a, pp. 7–8.

treaty obligations and thus were free from formal commitments to that alliance. To handle matters relating to the Sacred War commissioners were ideal, and they best explain the presence of Byzantine *syndroi*, not *presbeis*, in *IG VII* 2418. No other explanation so readily commends itself.

Thus, the evidence from Xenophon and Boeotian epigraphy cannot prove the existence of a *syndrion* of the Boeotian Confederacy and its allies. One final historical proof should seal the matter. In 367–366 the Boeotians and their allies sent delegates to King Artaxerxes to discuss a Common Peace (Xen. *Hell.* 7, 1, 33; Plut. *Pel.* 30; *Artax.* 22, 8). This is the only recorded time when they took concerted diplomatic action in their dealings with a third party. The Boeotians sent Pelopidas and Hismenias the Younger as their ambassadors, and the Arcadians, Eleans, and Argives sent their own legates.⁴⁶ The Boeotians did not send their own envoys and a representative from the putative *syndrion*. In that respect their conduct is strikingly different from that of the Athenian and allied embassy to Philip before the Peace of Philocrates. The Athenians then sent their own ten ambassadors and Aglaokreon of Tenedos, who alone represented the *synodos* of the Athenian League.⁴⁷ The reason for the difference between the Boeotian and the later Athenian embassy is that the Boeotians had no *synodos* to be represented, only individual allies who spoke for themselves.

It is possible to argue a case that the Boeotians actually wanted no *syndrion*, that they made a reasoned decision not to create one on the Athenian model. As members of the Athenian Confederacy, they had witnessed at first hand the inconvenience of a formal *synodos*: powerful members whose policies were sometimes at odds with those of the *hēgemōn*, members who refused to fund or co-operate with confederate operations – indeed, the Athenian League faced constant financial difficulties throughout its existence; and members who balked at Athenian leadership of the League. In some cases, the Thebans themselves had been guilty of these nuisances, so they knew the pitfalls from personal experience.⁴⁸ Rather than establish regular meetings of a *syndrion* drawn from various places throughout Greece, all of them located on – or in the case of Euboea, near – the mainland where communications were inconvenient and expensive, the Boeotians felt that a direct military hegemony was the simpler and more effective form of administration. All that can reasonably be said is that for reasons of their own the Boeotians did not create a *syndrion* of their allies.

⁴⁶ Buckler 1977b, pp. 139–145; Georgiadou 1997, pp. 205–211.

⁴⁷ Aeschin. 2, 20; 2, 97; 2, 126; Buckler 1989a, pp. 121, 132, 134. ⁴⁸ See chapter 9.

Boeotian Aulis and Greek naval bases

In the fourth century BC, after victory in the Peloponnesian War, Sparta stood supreme in Greece. Yet the fourth century saw two other developments as well. First was the eclipse and resurgence of Thebes, the city-state that unified the rich region of Boeotia in a federal system.¹ The second was the rebirth of Athenian sea power.² Rivalry and tension between Thebes and Sparta resulted in open warfare, and in 371 the Theban army smashed the Spartans at the battle of Leuctra (see chapter 8). This stunning shift in the balance of power drew Athens and Sparta into alliance. The entry of Athens into the war posed to Theban leaders a new and more difficult challenge. Behind their strong walls, relatively invulnerable to siege, the Athenians and their fleet were beyond the reach of the Theban army. Thebes, the leading land power, could defeat Athens only by taking to the sea.

In 366 Thebes voted to build a hundred triremes, a fleet large enough to challenge the Athenian navy.³ In many ways the Theban experience resembles that of Imperial Germany before World War I. Both powers lacked any significant naval traditions.⁴ Both faced the finest fleets of their day, fleets long accustomed to superiority at sea. Both suffered from geographical disadvantages. Although Boeotia is washed by the Corinthian Gulf and the Gulf of Euboea, it lacks good harbors.⁵

In view of these difficulties and obstacles, the Boeotian naval program is perhaps the most mysterious and least understood aspect of the Theban ascendancy. The problem includes the sources themselves. Apart from a notice by Isocrates, a contemporary, and an allusion by Plutarch, who was thoroughly familiar with the historical literature of classical Greece, the

¹ Buckler 1980a, pp. 15–21; Beck 1997a, pp. 94–100. ² Cargill 1981.

³ Diod. Sic. 15, 79, 1; Stylianou 1998, pp. 494–497, whose interpretation at times leads astray.

⁴ Theban warships had earlier served under Spartan and Athenian commanders: Thuc. 8, 3, 2; 106, 3; *IG* 11² 1607, lines 49–50, 153–158; Ps.-Dem. 49, 14; 49, 48–50; cf. Xen. *Hell.* 5, 4, 56.

⁵ Gomme 1937, pp. 17–41.

only extant account comes from Diodorus, who gives a cursory report of the building and operations of the fleet.⁶ Diodorus drew his information from Ephorus, whose treatment of contemporary events was far too detailed for Diodorus' aims and thus had been condensed drastically by him.⁷ The result is the barest outline of events, embellished with very few significant details. Diodorus even fails to name the naval base from which the fleet operated, not the least of the problems connected with this episode. From the riches of Ephorus the modern historian is reduced to the rags of Diodorus.

In brief, Diodorus reports that the Boeotians agreed to build a hundred triremes and the necessary harbor facilities for them.⁸ Once launched, the fleet was put under the command of Epaminondas, who sailed to Cnidus, Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium. His task was to persuade these states to join Thebes in a maritime alliance against Athens. When the fleet left port, it was intercepted by the Athenian admiral Laches, who refused to engage it, even though he commanded a considerable fleet. Epaminondas continued his voyage undisturbed, but little further is heard of the venture (see chapter 13).

Diodorus' figure of a hundred triremes has been rejected by K. J. Beloch and G. L. Cawkwell, who have concluded that only forty ships were actually constructed.⁹ If Diodorus' figure were to be rejected, in the absence of additional evidence, any other number would be arbitrary and unsubstantiated. While Beloch offers no evidence or argument for his view, Cawkwell bases his scepticism on the absence of any further mention of the fleet after 364. Yet he overlooks several factors, not the least being Diodorus' extreme brevity on the entire history of these years. Moreover, without constant and proper maintenance, which was expensive, Greek triremes quickly became unseaworthy. For example, in 429/8 the Peloponnesians found their warships not fully sound because they had been out of the water for some time.¹⁰ At Syracuse, on the other hand, Athenian triremes soon became waterlogged because they could not be hauled ashore for drying.¹¹ Even with the best care, Athenian triremes had an average lifespan of twenty years.¹²

⁶ 15, 78, 4–15, 79, 1; cf. Isoc. 5, 53; Plut. *Phil.* 14, 2–4; Aeschin. 2, 105.

⁷ Barber 1935/1993, pp. 34–38.

⁸ The term "trireme" is used here simply because it is familiar, even though the Greek warship called "trieres" may not have been equivalent to the Roman trireme: cf. Morrison and Williams 1968, p. 3.

⁹ Beloch 1912–27, vol. 111.2, p. 197 n. 4; Cawkwell 1972, p. 271. ¹⁰ Thuc. 2, 94, 3.

¹¹ Thuc. 7, 12, 3–5; cf. 6, 104, 2; Xen. *Hell.* 1, 5, 10; Gomme *et al.* 1945–70, vol. 1V, p. 388.

¹² Kolbe 1901, p. 397.

Even more important is the matter of finances. The deployment of a large fleet was an enormous expense. The Boeotians alone could not have afforded the costs of operating their ships. Rather, they were subsidized in the mid-360s by the Persians, who intended the fleet for use against the Athenian navy.¹³ When the Theban admiral Epaminondas failed to challenge the Athenians, and when the Persian king was forced to turn his attention to a major rebellion within his own realm, he abandoned the nascent fleet. In short, the most reasonable explanation for the inactivity of Epaminondas' ships after 364 is the stoppage of Persian funds.

Although Diodorus does not specifically say that all one hundred ships were built, he obviously thought that they were.¹⁴ He states that Epaminondas and the Boeotians intended to win dominion at sea, a Herculean task for a small force to accomplish in the face of the much larger and veteran Athenian navy.¹⁵ The only other indication that Diodorus believed the Boeotian fleet to have been huge comes from the actual Athenian challenge to its maiden voyage. Diodorus states that the Athenians dispatched Laches with a "considerable fleet" (*stolos axiologos*) to hinder Epaminondas' mission.¹⁶ In Book 15 alone Diodorus uses the adjective *axiologos* ("considerable") thirty-one times, usually without giving a specific idea of the numbers involved. Yet when describing the military preparations of the tyrant Dionysius I of Syracuse, he states that he assembled a "considerable force," mostly mercenary, for a war with Carthage.¹⁷ One part of his force defeated a Carthaginian army, which lost more than 10,000 killed. This same body of troops lost a later engagement, suffering more than 14,000 casualties. Obviously, then, this segment of Dionysius' "considerable force" was huge in numbers. Diodorus gives a similar idea of what he means by *axiologos* in his account of subsequent fighting between Dionysius and the Carthaginians.¹⁸ On this occasion Dionysius' "considerable force" included 30,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, and 300 triremes.

¹³ Buckler 1980a, p. 161.

¹⁴ Diodorus says simply that "the *demos* voted (*epsēphisato*) to construct (*naupēgeisthai*) a hundred triremes and dockyards to accommodate their number." The main verb is first aorist middle, indicating that the decision was actually made, followed by a present infinitive, which differs from the aorist infinitive only by expressing a continued or repeated action. Since the construction of a large fleet consumed time, continued action is meant here. Pace Stylianou 1998, p. 494; see also Ruzicka 1998, p. 61.

¹⁵ Isoc. 5, 53 also claims that Thebes strove for dominion at sea; cf. Plut. *Phil.* 14, 3.

¹⁶ In Book 15 Diodorus regularly uses *stolos* to mean naval forces: 15, 9, 3; 34, 6; 46, 2; 47, 3; 73, 3.

¹⁷ 15, 14, 4–15, 17, 2. ¹⁸ 15, 73, 1–2. Caven 1990, p. 207; Stylianou 1998, p. 474.

On other occasions Diodorus uses *axiologos* of forces that are also described by other ancient sources. In Diodorus' account the Spartan army sent against Olynthus in 382 was "considerable"; and Xenophon, a contemporary of these events, records that the Spartans sent 10,000 troops against the city, and that they were later joined by additional allied contingents.¹⁹ Similarly, when Diodorus portrays Epaminondas' army of 362 as "considerable," he mentions that when it was fully assembled, it numbered more than 30,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry.²⁰ Interestingly enough, Diodorus applies this adjective neither to Chabrias' fleet, which won the battle of Naxos, nor to Timotheus', which brought numerous islands and cities over to the Athenian side in the late 360s.²¹


Thus, whenever in Book 15 Diodorus' use of *axiologos* can be checked, it signifies large forces, and there is absolutely no reason to assume that it means anything else when applied to Laches' force. One cannot justly conclude from the evidence that Laches commanded only a small squadron. It is also very difficult to envision him with his considerable fleet turning aside from a Boeotian flotilla of forty ships – new triremes and green crews all at sea for the first time. Moreover, even though he shrank from engaging Epaminondas, there is no record that he was ever disciplined for his conduct. Clearly, then, the best explanation for Laches' refusal to carry out his orders, even with a considerable fleet, is that he faced far more numerous opponents. Hence, throughout his narrative Diodorus is consistent. He nowhere gives any reason to conclude that fewer than the stipulated one hundred triremes took to the sea – certainly nothing that could support the figure of forty. Diodorus' testimony must stand until something much more substantial than conjecture is set against it.

One may yet wonder why Epaminondas, with his numerical superiority, allowed Laches' ships to break off contact with impunity. Epaminondas' reasons, whether wise or not, were doubtless diplomatic rather than military in nature.²² Since Epaminondas intended to win over several powerful allies with his fleet, he wanted to avoid losses, especially at the outset of his mission. Like the German High Seas Fleet in World War I, his force was too valuable to be risked for small gains or temporary advantages. Indeed,

¹⁹ 15, 21, 1–2; Xen. *Hell.* 5, 2, 20–37. ²⁰ 15, 82, 3–15, 84, 4; cf. Xen. *Hell.* 7, 5, 4.

²¹ 15, 34–35; 81, 6. To these examples others can be added. At 15, 27, 3 Diodorus states that the Spartan relief force sent to Thebes in 378 was "considerable." Xenophon (*Hell.* 5, 4, 13–18) adds that the Spartans called out the ban for this operation, an army which Plutarch (*Pel.* 13, 2) describes as a "great force." At *Pel.* 20, 1 Plutarch states that the Spartan ban in 371 amounted to 11,000 infantry and cavalry. See also Diod. Sic. 15, 29, 1; Isoc. 4, 140; Dem. 20, 76.

²² Buckler 1980a, pp. 170–174.



Map 7 Southwestern Boeotia

he probably hoped to attain his goals by a mere show of force. Pericles had done precisely that a few decades earlier, when he led a huge fleet into the Black Sea.²³ Without coming to blows with the Persians, he won over many Greek cities and secured the Athenian grain supply. As with the sailing of the Great White Fleet in 1907–9, Epaminondas' voyage was a grand naval display – one for the Thebans that ultimately failed.

THE HARBORS

In view of the indifferent quality of Boeotian harbors, the first problem confronting the Thebans was where to station their fleet. Although Diodorus does not name the naval base, he reports that *neōria* were built in equal number to the ships. Like many other ancient authors, he usually employs the word *neōria* to mean “dockyards.”²⁴ Yet since dockyards could accommodate many ships (Demosthenes once suggested that the Athenian *neōria* be divided into ten areas, each capable of housing thirty ships), Diodorus here probably means “ship sheds,” which is also a common usage.²⁵ Excavated ship sheds range from six to six and a half meters in width, so one can reasonably assume that a naval base for the entire fleet possessed a waterfront of approximately 600 meters.²⁶ To complicate matters even further, no archaeological remains of classical ship sheds survive today in Boeotia.

Given the numerous difficulties, the location of the war harbor has naturally caused problems to modern scholars, who have proposed several candidates. E.-L. Schwandner has suggested that Creusis and Siphæe on the southern coast of Boeotia were integral parts of the new program.²⁷ Creusis, a rather exposed roadstead, had a notorious reputation in antiquity.²⁸ At the head of a small bay is a stretch of level beach some 250 meters in length. Behind it spreads a small, roughly rectangular plain, approximately 400 by 400 meters at its greatest extent, watered by the Oeroe River. The harbor and the city were fortified in antiquity, and in 371 a squadron of twelve triremes was stationed there.²⁹ Creusis is virtually cut off from the interior of Boeotia by high mountains, and the trip from sea

²³ Plut. *Per.* 20, 1–2; Meiggs 1972, pp. 197–199; Podlecki 1987, pp. 54–55.

²⁴ E.g. 14, 7, 3; 15, 73, 2; see also Dem. 18, 132; 19, 60.

²⁵ Demosthenes' suggestion: 14, 22–23; *neōria* for ship sheds: Morrison and Williams 1968, p. 181.

²⁶ Morrison and Williams 1968, pp. 182–184. ²⁷ Schwandner 1977, p. 550.

²⁸ Strabo 9, 2, 14; 9, 2, 25; Paus. 9, 32, 1; Steph. Byz. *s.v.* Creusis; Leake 1835, vol. II, p. 502; Heurtley 1923/4, pp. 38–40; Wallace 1979, pp. 100–101; personal observations of 11 August 1977 and 15 August 1978.

²⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 6, 4, 3; Diod. Sic. 15, 53, 1; Buckler 1980a, pp. 162–163; Stylianou 1998, p. 392.

level to the heights behind the port and thence to the interior is a relentless uphill walk of over three hours.

Siphae, at the easternmost point of the modern Bay of Domvrena, resembles Creusis in its main features. Two moles enclosed a length of beach of slightly more than 200 meters. The unprotected shoreline outside the moles extends for approximately 800 meters. Both harbor and the city it served were fortified, and the head of the bay opens onto a small plain. Siphae offers a better roadstead than Creusis, but it too has steep mountains at its back. Communications with the interior are very poor.³⁰

D. J. Blackman has argued that Anthedon on the northeastern coast of Boeotia was one of several harbors used to house the fleet, the others being Aulis, Larymna, and perhaps Halae.³¹ Halae is rather remote from Thebes. Larymna, which joined the Boeotian Confederacy during the Theban Hegemony, probably functioned as a secondary harbor, but certainly not as the main base.³² In the first place, the inner harbor, which has been identified as a war harbor, is very small. From his visit in 1895 J. G. Frazer observed that "the harbour is semicircular in shape and very small, with a shelving beach of sand and gravel. It is not more than sixty yards long from north to south."³³ The mouth of the harbor in his estimation was approximately eighty yards. Along the arc of the semicircle the length of enclosed shoreline is somewhat more than 200 meters in length. The harbor was fortified by beautifully constructed walls, built of ashlar masonry. The well-preserved remains of these walls are generally dated to the time of Epaminondas, or at least to the fourth century, but certain determination of date must await systematic excavation. Outside the inner harbor is a second and larger inlet, usually identified as the commercial harbor, where there are again remains of moles. Though not as well protected as the inner harbor, the commercial harbor must have been an excellent anchorage in antiquity. The walled city commanding the two harbors was likewise small, about 250 by 250 meters at its greatest extent. In 1805 Colonel Leake estimated that the entire circuit of the walls was less than one and a half kilometers. Larymna and its harbors sit in a deep, horn-shaped bay,

³⁰ Thuc. 4, 76, 3; 89; 101, 3; Paus. 9, 32, 4; Steph. Byz. *s.v.* Siphae; Leake 1835, vol. 11, pp. 501–516; Philippson and Kirsten 1950–9, vol. 1.2, p. 459; Roesch 1965, pp. 54–56; personal observations of 10 August 1977.

³¹ Schläger, Blackman, and Schäfer 1968, p. 90; Blackman 1969, pp. 11–18.

³² Paus. 9, 23, 7; Buckler 1980a, pp. 164–165. The fine harbor of Oropus can be eliminated for strategic reasons. Although the Thebans recovered the place in 366, it was vulnerable to quick overland attack from Attica.

³³ Frazer 1898, vol. v, p. 108.

hemmed in by mountains. Larymna's communications with Thebes, before the draining of Lake Copais, were poor.³⁴

The remains now visible at Anthedon date only to the sixth century AD, with nothing to indicate the nature or extent of earlier fortifications and facilities.³⁵ The harbor of Anthedon is small, backed by level ground with sandy soil. The waterfront of the harbor is only some 120 meters long, this area enclosed between two quays which allowed a narrow entrance. Behind the beach the land opens onto a small plain, more extensive to the west, until the ground gives way to low foothills. Here was situated the town of Anthedon, the walls of which are poorly preserved. At its greatest extent the walled area was some 600 by 600 meters. Unlike the southern ports, Anthedon enjoys easy access to the interior.³⁶


J. M. Fossey has suggested the Kástro of Skroponeri as the main Theban naval base.³⁷ The Kástro, or fortified akropolis, and the beach below it dominate a large, deep inlet, well protected from the winds and affording deep water and good anchorage. The shore at the head of the bay is relatively flat and the shoreline, which is well over 600 meters in length, is covered by small stones. At the mouth of the bay rises a small, rocky, and waterless island. The entire site rests in a deep amphitheater, with the mountains blocking access to the interior. The Kástro stands on a hill above the harbor, and both hill and Kástro are heavily overgrown. The style of masonry is nondescript. While the walls contain many squared blocks, they also consist of some rounded blocks and field stones. Although very few surface sherds were discovered, Fossey and P. Roesch found pottery fragments from various eras, including the fourth century. Likewise, no traces of habitations outside the Kástro were found. An examination of the entire beach disclosed neither ancient blocks nor remains of walls under water. Along the beach some few ancient sherds were scattered, primarily amphora handles and pieces of coarse ware, all of red clay. Even these sherds were not abundant, perhaps not more than a few handfuls. Surface

³⁴ Leake 1835, vol. 11, pp. 287–292; Oldfather 1916; Schäfer 1967; Lawrence 1979, p. 472; personal observations of 14 August 1978.

³⁵ In 86 Sulla destroyed Anthedon. The excavators date the existing remains to the sixth century AD not the fourth century AD, as erroneously stated in Buckler 1980a, p. 309 n. 29.

³⁶ Strabo 9, 2, 13; 9, 2, 22; 9, 2, 26; Ps.-Dicaearch. 1, 23–24 (in Müller 1878, vol. 11, p. 259), who describes the road between Thebes and Anthedon as “sloping” (*hodos plagia*); Plut. *Mor.* 295e; Paus. 9, 22, 5–7; Dionysius 91–92 (in Müller 1855, p. 241); Steph. Byz. *s.v.* Anthedon. Cf. Leake 1835, vol. 11, pp. 272–277; Schläger, Blackman, and Schäfer 1968; Wallace 1979, pp. 57–59; personal observations of 14 August 1978.

³⁷ Fossey 1979.



Map 8 The northern coast of Boeotia

remains do not immediately suggest that Skroponeri ever housed a large population.³⁸

The last candidate is Aulis, perhaps the most famous of all Boeotian harbors.³⁹ Aulis consists of two harbors separated by a low, rocky promontory that runs roughly north and south. At the head of Mikro Vathy, the smaller northern bay, extended a beach roughly 200 meters in length, but today part of it has been filled in, and upon the fill rests a large factory. The disruption to Mikro Vathy is so extensive that no ancient remains can have survived. Upon the promontory separating the two bays stood the ancient akropolis. The southern bay, Bathys Limen, though not as large as Skroponeri, is spacious. Along its head runs a sizable stretch of level ground, somewhat over 600 meters in length, which would have comfortably served the fleet. In fact, the two bays of Aulis provide more room than would have been needed by a fleet of a hundred triremes. The area behind the beach is bowl-shaped, with the land rising slightly at first. Along the southwestern side of the bay opens a considerable plain. Aulis was linked to Thebes by a good road, which permitted quick contact with the interior.⁴⁰ Recent use and development of both bays of Aulis by the Khalkis shipyard have fundamentally and irretrievably changed the face of the site.

CRITERIA FOR GREEK NAVAL BASES: THEORY AND PRACTICE

Inspection of these harbors in 1977, 1978, and 1980 prompted the very simple question of what the ancient Greeks demanded of a war harbor.⁴¹ Obviously, a sheltered location was essential, one in which ships were largely immune to high winds and seas. This requirement was vital for triremes, which were not good sea boats.⁴² Like modern racing eights, triremes were designed for speed and maneuverability. Unlike modern warships, they were not routinely moored or anchored; when they were,

³⁸ Leake 1835, vol. 11, pp. 287–292; British Admiralty, *Greece* (Naval Intelligence Division, 1944), vol. 1, p. 65; Wallace 1979, pp. 74–76; personal observations of 3 August 1980. Oldfather 1916, p. 52 n. 3, also notes that despite its deep anchorage Skroponeri never became an important port because of the mountains behind it.

³⁹ Strabo 9, 2, 8; Paus. 9, 19, 6–8; Dionysius 88–90 (in Müller 1855, p. 240); Liv. 45, 27, 9. Cf. Leake 1835, vol. 11, pp. 262–264; Frazer 1898, vol. v, pp. 72–73; Carrata Thomes 1952, pp. 28–31; Wallace 1979, pp. 29–31; personal observations of 14 August 1978.

⁴⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 3, 4, 3–4; 5, 5; Diod. Sic. 14, 79, 1; Plut. *Agēs.* 6, 4–6; *Lys.* 27, 3; Gomme 1937, p. 28.

⁴¹ On ancient harbors in general the best work is Lehmann-Hartleben 1923; see also Blackman in Morrison and Williams 1968, pp. 181–192. The distinguishing features of a war harbor were its installations for the docking, housing, and maintenance of triremes.

⁴² Gomme 1937, pp. 190–203; see also Tarn 1930, pp. 123–126.

they needed a calm roadstead.⁴³ Indeed, Greek history contains vivid descriptions of the danger and discomfort of triremes riding at anchor.⁴⁴ Whenever possible, triremes were hauled onto shore, even in the course of wartime operations.⁴⁵ Consequently, a war harbor needed an area of level ground either for permanent ship sheds, slips, and other port facilities or simply for hauling triremes onto the beach.

Lastly, the Greek war harbor, like the typical commercial harbor, needed good and secure communications with the interior. For commercial harbors this need is obvious – to facilitate the movement of cargoes. For both commercial and military harbors good communications permitted quick reinforcement from the interior in the event of attack. In most cases Greek harbors and the city-states they served were physically separated, although both might individually be fortified. Less frequently were the port and its *polis* connected by long fortification walls, such as those between Athens and the Piraeus or between Megara and Nisaea.⁴⁶ In Boeotia, Creusis, Siphae, Larymna, and Anthedon all possessed circuit walls that protected both city and harbor. When the city and its port were not joined by walls, both risked the danger of individual assault and isolation from each other.

The importance of good communications with the interior becomes apparent in the light of actual events. Harbors were susceptible to three types of attack: by an army in control of the countryside, by a seaborne force mounting combined land and sea investment, and by direct naval assault. Of the three, land attack, unaided by naval forces, was the least frequent and least successful. Given the rudimentary siege methods of the day, armies could do comparatively little against a strongly walled position.⁴⁷ Only in the Hellenistic period were sophisticated siege machinery and techniques developed, thus rendering walled cities and ports more vulnerable.⁴⁸ Before then, an army's usual method of investment was circumvallation, followed by waiting for the besieged to be starved into submission.⁴⁹ This approach offered little hope of success against a harbor, as the early years of the Peloponnesian War amply demonstrate. Year after year the Spartans led the forces of the Peloponnesian League against Athens

⁴³ Thuc. 6, 97, 1–2; 7, 4, 5; Xen. *Hell.* 2, 1, 25; Diod. Sic. 14, 73, 2; Plut. *Cim.* 12, 5; Polyæn. 3, 9, 38.

⁴⁴ Ps.-Dem. 50, 22–23; Thuc. 6, 74, 2; Diod. Sic. 20, 74, 3; 105, 3.

⁴⁵ Hdt. 9, 96; 9, 99; Thuc. 6, 44, 3; 7, 1, 3; 8, 44, 4; Xen. *Hell.* 6, 2, 28–30; Diod. Sic. 14, 73, 2.

⁴⁶ Lawrence 1979, pp. 155–158; cf. Winter 1971, pp. 238–239; Legon 1981, pp. 28–34.

⁴⁷ Thuc. 3, 102, 1–5; Xen. *Hell.* 5, 4, 20–21; 6, 5, 32, on which see Buckler 1980a, p. 294 n. 23; Diod. Sic. 16, 74, 2; 16, 17, 4; 76, 1–2. Marsden 1969, pp. 48–67; Garland 1974, pp. 106–200.

⁴⁸ Garland 1974, pp. 201–278.

⁴⁹ Thuc. 2, 71–78; 3, 52–68, gives the most detailed description of a Classical Greek siege; see also Lawrence 1979, pp. 53–66.

and its harbor, the Piraeus. Although they ravaged the countryside with impunity, they never seriously threatened either place, and they failed to interrupt the maritime flow of supplies to the city.⁵⁰ The Spartan experience was shared by many other armies. There are comparatively few examples of successful land attack against harbors. In the Peloponnesian War an Athenian army besieged a Spartan and allied garrison in the Megarian harbor of Nisaea.⁵¹ At the time the Megarians were split into two factions, one pro-Athenian and the other pro-Spartan, with the philo-Athenian element intriguing to hand over the city and the long walls to an Athenian expeditionary force. As a consequence of this plot, the Athenians were surreptitiously admitted into the Megarian fortifications, much to the alarm of the Spartan garrison. To support their partisans and to crush the enemy garrison, the Athenians sent an army from Attica as reinforcement. In this climate of confusion and conspiracy the Spartans held out for a while against an Athenian siege of their position. When the Athenians built a cross-wall that completely cut them off, the garrison surrendered the port. They did so because they expected their Megarian allies to turn against them completely and because the Athenian navy dominated the sea.

In 371 the Spartan king Cleombrotus captured the ports of Siphæ and Creusis in his invasion of Boeotia.⁵² As mentioned, both places suffered from very poor communications with the hinterland. Furthermore, at the time of the attacks the fighting men of both places were doubtless on campaign with the Boeotian federal army, which had been called out to repel the invasion.⁵³ In 366 Epaminondas captured Naupactus from the land side, but since the Achaeans probably held it against the wishes of some of its inhabitants, there is ample reason to suspect disaffection within the city.⁵⁴ Divided loyalties and civil unrest thrice led Oropus to side with Thebes against Athens.⁵⁵ In Classical Greece the number of cases in which an army, without naval support, captured a harbor that was free from internal discord and that enjoyed reasonable contact with the interior was small.

⁵⁰ Thuc. 2, 18–23; 47; 55; 4, 2, 6. In the fourth century the Spartan army ravaged Theban territory for two years. Although the Spartans brought the Thebans to the brink of starvation, the latter successfully brought in supplies from the outside: Xen. *Hell.* 5, 4, 13–66; Diod. Sic. 15, 32–15, 34, 2.

⁵¹ Thuc. 4, 69; Gomme *et al.* 1945–1970, vol. IV, pp. 531; Legon 1981, pp. 238–245.

⁵² Xen. *Hell.* 6, 4, 4; Diod. Sic. 15, 53, 1. ⁵³ Buckler 1980a, pp. 55–61.

⁵⁴ Diod. Sic. 15, 75, 2; cf. Xen. *Hell.* 4, 6, 1; Buckler 1980a, p. 312 n. 12.

⁵⁵ Buckler 1980a, pp. 193–194 and pp. 312 n. 17, p. 313 n. 18. For the dangers to a city from internal turmoil, see Aen. Tact. 11. Although Diodorus (14, 86) claims that in 394 the Spartans and their allies captured the Corinthian harbor of Lechaeon, Xenophon's contemporary and more accurate account (*Hell.* 4, 4, 7–13) proves that the Spartans failed to take the port. See Underhill 1900, pp. 136–138; Funke 2000.

Far more common and far more successful was attack from the sea. The method of approach that promised the surest results involved simultaneous operations by an amphibiously landed army and a covering fleet. In most instances the commander of the operation put his troops ashore at a spot beyond the walls of the target. Having established and fortified a camp, the army assaulted or invested the city or the harbor. Meanwhile, the fleet blockaded the harbor in an effort to cut off reinforcements and supplies.⁵⁶ Yet since Greek triremes lacked the endurance and seaworthiness of later and larger sailing ships, no naval blockade could be completely effective. Furthermore, the attackers often ran the risk of counterattack, especially given the slow pace of siege operations.⁵⁷

Perhaps the most famous example of this method of attack is the Athenian siege of Syracuse in the Peloponnesian War.⁵⁸ The city of Syracuse was built on a large promontory, with a mountain, the Epipolae, dominating it to the west. From the southern side of the promontory a small peninsula juts into a spacious bay, the Great Harbor. Opposite the peninsula to the south another headland, Plemmyrion, points north to form the southern side of the bay. This was the target of the greatest Athenian armaments of the war. In 415 an Athenian expeditionary force of sixty ships reached Syracuse and established a camp at the center of the Great Harbor. Having fortified their camp with a stockade and rubble wall, they repulsed a Syracusan counterattack. All the while the Athenian fleet held firm command of the sea. With the onset of winter limiting operations, the Syracusans built a more extensive wall to Epipolae, garrisoned strategic points, and erected palisades on the coast at vulnerable spots.

In the spring of 414 the Athenians and Syracusans began in earnest to struggle for the possession of strong points, especially Epipolae. Upon seizing Epipolae, the Athenians began their circumvallation of the city,

⁵⁶ E.g. Hdt. 6, 101: the Persian capture of Erythrae in 490; Thuc. 1, 61, 4–1, 65; 2, 70; Diod. Sic. 12, 46, 2–7: the Athenian siege of Potidaea in 432–430/29; Thuc. 8, 62, 3: unsuccessful Athenian attempt on Abydos; Diod. Sic. 13, 66, 3–13, 68: Athenian capture in 410 of Byzantium, aided by internal dissension; Diod. Sic. 14, 47, 4–14, 54, 5: Dionysius' capture of Motye in 397 which is reminiscent of Alexander's siege of Tyre: Arr. *Anab.* 2, 16–24; Diod. Sic. 17, 40–46; Curtius 4, 2–4; Plut. *Alex.* 24, 5–25, 3; Diod. Sic. 14, 103, 3: Dionysius' siege of Caulonia.

⁵⁷ See n. 78 below.

⁵⁸ Thuc. 6, 64–7; 6, 87; Diod. Sic. 13, 1–34; Plut. *Nic.* 16, 3–28; Beloch 1912–27, vol. 11.2, pp. 355–373. Equally enlightening, especially in view of the progress in siege methods and equipment, is Demetrius Poliorcetes' attack on Rhodes in 305: Diod. Sic. 20, 82–88; 20, 91–100; Plut. *Demetr.* 21–22; cf. Cloché 1959, pp. 199–203. For the defense of a harbor, see the Hellenistic treatise of Philon of Byzantium, *Poliorcetica* 3, 51–71 (English translation in Lawrence 1979, pp. 97–99; new text with French translation in Garlan 1974, pp. 313–315).

starting from the heights to the northern shore. In response the Syracusans built a cross-wall to the south of Epipolae, which an Athenian counter-attack destroyed. The Athenians thereupon extended their circumvallation south, which the Syracusans again tried to block with a cross-wall. Another Athenian attack resulted in the capture and destruction of this wall as well.

In 414 the tide of Athenian success was stemmed when substantial reinforcements reached Syracuse under the command of the Spartan Gylippus, an officer who also encouraged his allies to challenge Athenian naval superiority. Under Gylippus' direction, the Syracusans resisted complete circumvallation by pushing a cross-wall to the north of Epipolae. Once again winter intervened, and the summer of 413 saw the climax of the struggle.

With the coming of spring, the Syracusans prepared to win control of the sea. Their navy sailed into the Great Harbor and grappled with the Athenians in a series of naval battles. Nonetheless, they were unable to prevent the Athenian admiral Demosthenes from entering the harbor with a second huge expeditionary force. Thus reinforced with fresh ships and men, the Athenians made good their losses and prepared once again to take the city. The last act began when Demosthenes failed to take the third Syracusan cross-wall in a confused and bitter night action. The Syracusans then responded with a combined land and sea assault on the Athenian camp. Although the Athenians held their own on land, they lost much of their fleet. The battle spelled doom for the Athenians, for the Syracusan navy closed the Great Harbor, trapping the Athenian ships. In desperation the Athenians attempted to escape overland but were caught and utterly defeated. Thus, Athenian hopes foundered because of the Athenians' inability to complete the circumvallation of the city and the failure of their fleet to maintain control of the sea. The Athenians never effectively denied their enemy reinforcements and supplies, whereas the Syracusans succeeded in isolating and then destroying the Athenians.

Even though the siege of Syracuse serves as an excellent example, it is somewhat atypical in that Syracuse was among the largest and best defended cities and ports in the Greek world. More representative of the danger posed by large-scale amphibious and naval attack to an ordinary Greek *polis* and its harbor comes from the Athenian operations against Torone and its harbor in the Peloponnesian War.⁵⁹ The Athenians under Cleon first put in at Cophos, a port in the territory of Torone. Having disembarked the heavily armed troops, Cleon led them overland against Torone, while his ships sailed directly into the city's harbor. The Spartan garrison, incapable of countering

⁵⁹ Thuc. 5, 2–3; Strabo 7 fr. 32; Gomme *et al.* 1945–70, vol. III, pp. 631–632; Zahrtnt 1971, pp. 76–79.

both thrusts, was crushed between them. Operations of this sort proved effective because the fleet took temporary control of the local sea lanes while simultaneously menacing the harbor itself. Meanwhile, the amphibiously landed army could choose a favorable point of assault.

The last way in which Greek harbors were normally captured was by direct naval strike.⁶⁰ This approach was less common than joint land and sea efforts for a variety of reasons. In the first place, Greek triremes had little room for extra gear, so they were not easily capable of transporting large numbers of troops with their equipment and supplies. Even though some triremes were fitted as transports, they were apparently slower than first-line warships.⁶¹ Thus, they limited the ability of a fleet to strike quickly and unexpectedly, thereby reducing the element of surprise. Secondly, even though triremes carried a complement of heavily armed soldiers, or hoplites, the Greeks lacked the specialized landing craft necessary to put soldiers ashore quickly and safely. In short, the Greeks lacked a marine corps in the modern sense of a trained body of foot soldiers capable of ship-to-shore operations.⁶² It would have been a perilous venture for an armored infantryman, burdened with a large shield, sword, and thrusting spear, to make his way from a trireme into a small boat and thence onto shore. Nor, for that matter, is there evidence of triremes even carrying small boats.⁶³ The usual method of landing heavily armed troops was simply to drive the trireme onto shore and to allow the hoplites to tumble out.⁶⁴

⁶⁰ Thuc. I, 105, 1; Diod. Sic. II, 78, 2; 19, 75, 6–8; cf. Lehmann-Hartleben 1923, p. 256; Polyæn. 5, 35; 5, 40–41; 6, 16, 4.

⁶¹ Morrison and Williams 1968, pp. 247–248; Gomme *et al.* 1945–70, vol. I, p. 353, suggests that such transports were “old triremes adapted to be troop-carriers.” One is reminded of the old destroyers used as APDs at Guadalcanal: Morison 1954, vol. V, p. 67; Jordan 1975, pp. 108–109, concludes from several exceptional cases that even first-rate triremes could carry more supplies than is usually thought. Presumably, no one would argue that triremes could not, when the need arose, carry cargo far in excess of their normal capacity. Obviously, they could, but they would not undertake active operations under such a disadvantage; cf. Gomme *et al.* 1945–70, vol. IV, p. 487.

⁶² The complement of hoplites (and sometimes peltasts: Polyæn. 6, 27, 1) who served aboard ship were called *epibatai*, which is normally translated “marines.” They were simply soldiers serving at sea, not experts in amphibious warfare.

⁶³ Boats are never mentioned as part of the standard equipment of a trireme: e.g. *IG* 11² 1604–1632; see also Morrison and Williams 1968, pp. 289–307. Pertinent also is the fate of the shipwrecked Athenians at the battle of Arginusae: Xen. *Hell.* I, 6, 5; I, 7, 5; I, 7, 11; I, 7, 32; Underhill 1900, p. 321.

⁶⁴ E.g. Eurymedon River: Diod. Sic. II, 61, 2; Plut. *Cim.* 13, 1; cf. Thuc. I, 100, 1; Gomme *et al.* 1945–70, vol. I, pp. 286–288; Marathon: Hdt. 6, 115; Hammond 1968, p. 42. The Greeks made sure that their triremes were equipped with *apobathrai* before the battle of Mycale: Hdt. 9, 98, 2. At Pylos, where Brasidas urged his captains to run their ships ashore in the face of the enemy (Thuc. 4, 11, 2–4, 12, 2), Brasidas himself was struck down on the *apobathra* as he was about to land (Thuc. 4, 12, 1). Although Powell 1938, *s.v.* *apobathrē*, calls them “gangways,” and Gomme *et al.* 1945–70, vol. III, p. 448, thinks them either landing ladders or part of the ship “against which the landing-ladder was

Despite these limitations, direct naval raids on harbors were often quite effective, and they were frequently staged.⁶⁵ Success usually depended on speed, surprise, and determination. In 456/5 the Athenian admiral Tolmides destroyed the Spartan dockyards at Gytheum with impunity, the same war harbor that the Thebans attacked by land in 369.⁶⁶ Similarly, in 435 a Corcyraean fleet, having defeated its opponents at sea, destroyed the Elean seaport of Cyllene.⁶⁷ During the Peloponnesian War, when naval activity was rife, raids on harbors were frequent. An Athenian attack of 412 is particularly illustrative. An Athenian squadron made a surprise dash into the harbor of Mytilene on Lesbos. The Athenian triremes first neutralized enemy warships and next put their heavily armed troops ashore. The Athenian hoplites easily overwhelmed the defenders and took possession of the city.⁶⁸

Even formidable harbors, well protected by sea walls, like the Piraeus of Athens and the Great Harbor of Syracuse, were vulnerable to swift-striking fleets. Throughout the Peloponnesian War the Athenians were in fear for the safety of the Piraeus.⁶⁹ In 429/8 the Spartans planned an attack on the Athenian base, but lacked the nerve to carry it through.⁷⁰ In 388 Teleutias, a more daring Spartan officer, led twelve ships in a surprise raid on the Piraeus in which he destroyed Athenian triremes and cut out merchantmen riding at anchor.⁷¹ Similarly, in 361 Alexander of Pherae sailed boldly into the Piraeus, landed, and made off with large sums of money.⁷² The reduction of the Piraeus in the Peloponnesian War followed the destruction of the Athenian navy at Aegospotamoi. Though closely besieged by land and faced with famine, the Athenians held out until the Spartan commander Lysander brought his fleet into the Piraeus, thus sealing the city off from all outside contact.⁷³

placed," Morrison and Williams 1968, pp. 135 and 293, consider them landing ladders for descent onto hostile coasts. The latter are undoubtedly correct. A clue to the nature of the *apobathra* comes from Diodorus' narrative (12, 62, 3) of Brasidas' attack, where he uses the term *epibathrē*. The *epibathra* is well known as a scaling ladder used in sieges: Arr. *Anab.* 4, 27, 1; Josephus, *The Jewish War* 7, 9, 2.

⁶⁵ E.g. Hdt. 5, 81; 5, 89; Xen. *Hell.* 1, 6, 16–22; Diod. Sic. 13, 78, 4–13, 79, 7; Thuc. 8, 55, 1; Gomme *et al.* 1945–70, vol. V, pp. 131–132.

⁶⁶ Thuc. 1, 108, 5; Diod. Sic. 11, 84, 6; schol. Aeschin. 2, 75; Beloch 1912–27, vol. 11.2, p. 171; Meiggs 1972, p. 100.

⁶⁷ Thuc. 1, 30, 2; Gomme *et al.* 1945–70, vol. 1, p. 165.

⁶⁸ Thuc. 8, 23, 2–3; Gomme *et al.* 1945–70, vol. V, pp. 51–52. ⁶⁹ Thuc. 2, 24; 8, 1, 2; 8, 96, 3.

⁷⁰ Thuc. 2, 93, 1–3; Diod. Sic. 12, 49; Gomme *et al.* 1945–70, vol. 11, pp. 237–240; Hornblower 1991–6, vol. 1, pp. 370–371.

⁷¹ Xen. *Hell.* 5, 1, 20–23; cf. Demetrius Poliorcetes' attack on the Piraeus: Diod. Sic. 20, 45, 2; Plut. *Demetr.* 8, 4–7; Polyæn. 4, 7, 6; Marsden 1969, p. 105; Garland 1987, pp. 49–50.

⁷² Polyæn. 6, 2, 2; cf. Diod. Sic. 15, 95.

⁷³ Xen. *Hell.* 2, 2, 1–23; Diod. Sic. 13, 107; 14, 3, 5; Plut. *Lys.* 14, 1–5.

The Syracusans likewise had ample experience of swift naval assaults. After the massive Athenian attack in the Peloponnesian War, the tyrant Dionysius ringed in his war harbor with extensive fortifications and built dockyards capable of housing well over 200 ships.⁷⁴ Yet in 396 the Syracusans endured a Carthaginian attack fully as serious as the earlier Athenian menace.⁷⁵ A fleet of 250 Carthaginian ships rowed into the harbor of Syracuse, closing it off completely. After landing troops outside the city walls, the Carthaginians established a fortified camp in the suburbs. The siege failed largely because a plague ravaged the Carthaginian camp. Thus weakened, the Carthaginians easily fell to a Syracusan counterattack from land and sea. On three other occasions the Syracusans suffered naval strikes from the Carthaginians.⁷⁶ In 344/3 the Carthaginian assault was stemmed only by timely reinforcements from the interior. In the two other instances the Carthaginian fleet wreaked havoc on shipping in the harbor.

These last examples underline the importance of communications with the interior. As a rule, the surest hope of saving a harbor was to push reinforcements overland into the threatened area. Perhaps one example will suffice. In 366 the Athenians attempted to surprise the Corinthian harbor of Cenchreae on the Saronic Gulf. The Corinthians learned of the plot and quickly dispatched their army to the port, where they awaited the invaders. In the face of this response, the Athenian admiral cancelled the attack.⁷⁷

The other method of relieving pressure on a besieged harbor was by seaborne reinforcement, which obviously called for a state to have naval allies willing and capable of coming to the rescue, or for part of the state's fleet to be regularly at sea, or for the state to have at least a second base.⁷⁸ The Thebans, however, could hardly expect succor from the sea. First, they had no naval allies. Although they had hoped to conclude alliances with Byzantium, Chios, Cnidus, and Rhodes, all of them major naval powers, the Thebans were unable to win their adherence.⁷⁹ Nor could they use any of the available harbors for defense until a respectable squadron of ships could actually take to the sea. Relief for the main Theban naval base could come only from the interior.

⁷⁴ Diod. Sic. 14, 7, 3; 15, 13, 5; Lehmann-Hartleben 1923, pp. 106–109.

⁷⁵ Diod. Sic. 14, 62–76.

⁷⁶ Diod. Sic. 14, 49, 2; 16, 69, 3; 19, 103, 4.

⁷⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 7, 4, 4–5; cf. Thuc. 8, 10, 1; 23, 1; 23, 5 for Cenchreae as a war harbor; Lehmann-Hartleben 1923, p. 259; Buckler 1980a, p. 199.

⁷⁸ Athenian siege of Mytilene lifted: Thuc. 8, 23, 2–3; 27, 6; Spartan siege of Mytilene lifted: Xen. *Hell.* 1, 6, 16–38; Diod. Sic. 13, 78, 4–13; 79, 7; 97, 2–100, 6; Athenian siege of Aegina lifted: Xen. *Hell.* 5, 1, 2; Hellenistic examples: Diod. Sic. 18, 68, 3; 69, 1; 20, 107, 2–3. Yet Carthaginian forces failed to relieve Motye: Diod. Sic. 14, 50, 1–2.

⁷⁹ Buckler 1980a, pp. 170–173.

Thus, to establish a war harbor in an isolated spot was to invite disaster.⁸⁰ An episode in the Peloponnesian War vividly illustrates this conclusion. In 412 a Spartan flotilla of twenty-one ships, when intercepted by an Athenian force, took refuge at the deserted harbor of Speiraeon.⁸¹ The Athenian fleet immediately attacked the Spartan triremes and put hoplites ashore to mount a land assault. Thus cut off from outside assistance, the Spartan force was almost totally destroyed.

CONCLUSION

Since the Boeotian army was dominant on land, the only major threat to the fleet could come from the sea – a fact that underlines the importance of good communications with the interior. Indeed, the interior was the only direction from which help could be expected. This was especially true when the fleet was under construction and in no condition to defend itself. Any doubts about the speed with which an army from the hinterland could reinforce a coastal position are readily dispelled by the grim incident at Mycalessus during the Peloponnesian War.⁸² Although located over seven kilometers from the sea (and therefore admittedly not coastal), Mycalessus was connected both to Thebes and Chalcis by a good road. In 413 a band of Thracian mercenaries, having landed from Chalcis, burst upon the town and slaughtered many of the inhabitants. Before the Thracians could make their escape, an army from Thebes came to the rescue and inflicted severe casualties.⁸³

Given the vastly greater danger of attack from the sea and the importance of reinforcements from the interior, one may ask which Boeotian port was best suited for the main naval base. Cleombrotus' campaign of 371 suggests that Creusis and Siphæ can be ruled out at once.⁸⁴ Skroponeri is similarly situated in an isolated and vulnerable spot. Anthedon, even in Blackman's opinion, was not large enough to have housed the entire fleet;⁸⁵ and Larymna was likewise a small harbor. Furthermore, the whole length of coast from modern Atalanti

⁸⁰ An exception was the Athenian base at Delphinion: Thuc. 8, 38, 2; Gomme *et al.* 1945–70, vol. v, p. 82. This isolated spot was safe because at the time the Athenians were masters of the land and sea.

⁸¹ Thuc. 8, 10, 3–4; Gomme *et al.* 1945–70, vol. v, pp. 24–25; cf. Thuc. 4, 14, 1.

⁸² Thuc. 7, 29–30; Strabo 9, 2, 11; Paus. 9, 19, 4; Wallace 1979, p. 48; Best 1969, pp. 130–131.

⁸³ In the fourth century the Thebans had two defenses against surprise attack: a system of watchtowers in Boeotia: Fossey 1979, pp. 10–11; Buckler 1980a, pp. 283 n. 195; and an alliance with the cities of Euboea, with Carystus and Eretria being conveniently located to monitor naval movements in the southern Gulf of Euboea.

⁸⁴ In the Peloponnesian War Athenian designs on Siphæ failed only because the Boeotians had ample warning of them: Thuc. 4, 76, 3; 89; 101, 3.

⁸⁵ Schläger, Blackman, and Schäfer 1968, p. 90.

(Opus) to Chalcis on which Larymna, Skroponeri, and Anthedon are situated is subject to “violent gusts of wind” and “heavy squalls.”⁸⁶ Even with their various drawbacks, however, these harbors probably served as secondary bases or naval stations. The construction of some ships and the training of some crews may have taken place within their facilities.

By all criteria Aulis was best suited to serve as the principal naval base. Only Aulis possessed the necessary features of a protected bay, an area spacious enough for ship sheds or at least for hauling the triremes ashore, and good communications with the interior. Aulis also provides ample level ground suitable for the deployment of a supporting army. The principal navigational disadvantage of Aulis is the narrow Euripos to the north and the Burji channel to the south.⁸⁷ Yet these confined waters posed a far more serious problem to sailing vessels than to triremes, which relied on their maneuverability under oars to enter and leave harbor.⁸⁸ Fossey objects to Aulis as a major fleet base on the grounds that ships sailing eastwards through the southern Gulf of Euboea would have been under the surveillance of the Athenian fortress at Rhamnus, immediately north of the Bay of Marathon.⁸⁹ As mentioned above, Epaminondas’ fleet was in fact intercepted by a considerable Athenian force. Although Rhamnus was admirably suited to defend northeastern Attica, it posed no active threat to the Boeotian navy.

Finally, history suggests that Aulis was far preferable to other Boeotian harbors as a naval base. Aulis routinely figures in fleet movements throughout antiquity. It was famous in legend as the port from which the Greeks sailed to Troy.⁹⁰ In 313 a Macedonian admiral put in at Aulis with at least 160 warships.⁹¹ In 304 Demetrius Poliorcetes also sought shelter there for his huge fleet.⁹² Obviously, then, Aulis could readily have accommodated a fleet of 100 triremes. For the main naval base of the Boeotian fleet, one must look to Aulis, the only spot on the northern shore of Boeotia with space enough to house the navy, with good roads to Thebes, and with a record of accommodating large forces.

⁸⁶ *Sailing Directions* (1852), 52, cited by Gomme 1937, pp. 37–38.

⁸⁷ On the former see Diod. Sic. 13, 47, 3–5; on the latter Gomme 1937, pp. 27–28; British Admiralty, *Greece* (Naval Intelligence Division, 1944), vol. 1, p. 64; vol. 11, p. 272.

⁸⁸ Morrison and Williams 1968, pp. 310–311.

⁸⁹ Fossey 1979, p. 10. Pouilloux 1954, p. 55, admits that ancient sources provide little explicit information about the military history of Rhamnus. His fine account of Rhamnus’ history (pp. 56–65) shows that the fortress was used for defense.

⁹⁰ Hom. *Iliad* 2, 303–4; cf. Hesiod, *Works and Days* 646–653. ⁹¹ Diod. Sic. 19, 77, 4; cf. 19, 77, 1.

⁹² Diod. Sic. 20, 100, 5; cf. 20, 82, 4. In 192 the Seleucid king Antiochos III secured Aulis with his army to keep watch on Chalcis across the Euboean channel: Liv. 35, 51, 6.

*Epaminondas and the new
inscription from Cnidus*

The appearance of a Theban fleet of a hundred triremes in the Aegean Sea in 364 BC has always been an anomaly in the history of the Theban ascendancy.¹ From the liberation of the Cadmea in 379 to the battle of Mantinea in 362 the Thebans had consistently pursued a land strategy, first against the Spartans and later against the Athenians, who had come to the aid of the enemy. In 367/6 Pelopidas won the support of the King for a Common Peace, which, however, was never ratified.² Yet a connection with Persia had been made. Moreover, this diplomatic failure did not retard work on the Theban fleet, nor did it entail a break between Persia and Thebes. The usual strategy of the Persians for dealing with the eastern Aegean was to finance a Greek fleet as an agent of their policy in the area. The King and his satraps had employed both Athenian and Spartan fleets during the Ionian War and had provided Conon with the means to defeat the Spartans at the battle of Cnidus in 394.³ Themselves lacking the huge resources necessary for naval warfare, the Thebans needed foreign funds with which to build a fleet, and the only realistic source for them was the King.⁴

Diodorus is the principal, but not the only, source for these events. His testimony (15, 79, 1) is terse enough to be quoted in full:

The people immediately decreed to build a hundred triremes and dockyards to accommodate them, and to urge Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium to assist their schemes (*boēthēsai tais epibolais*). Epaminondas himself, who had been dispatched with a force to these cities, so overwhelmed the Athenian general Laches, who had a considerable fleet and had been sent out to circumvent the Thebans, that he forced him to withdraw, and he made the cities Thebes' own (*idias tas poleis tois Thēbaiois epoiēsen*).

¹ Buckler 1980a, pp. 160–165, with earlier bibliography; cf. chapter 12.

² Xen. *Hell.* 7, 1, 33–40; Nep. *Pel.* 4, 3; Diod. Sic. 15, 81, 3; Plut. *Pel.* 30; *Artax.* 22, 8, 1–2; Paus. 6, 1, 3; 3, 9; 17, 5; Aelian, *VH* 1, 21; and in general Roy 1994, pp. 196–197.

³ Lewis 1977, pp. 108–135; Dandamaev 1989, pp. 259–269.

⁴ Carrata Thomes 1952, pp. 22–24; Fortina 1958, pp. 80–81; Buckler 1980a, p. 161.

Epaminondas' objective is not explicitly explained, nor his reasons for having approached the three states. The most that one can make of the words *boēthēsai tais epibolais* is that he wanted their help in his hostile designs against a third party. Formal alliance is not mentioned, but the target, as known from other sources, was Athens.⁵ The precise diplomatic situation is nevertheless somewhat unclear, at least from Diodorus' account.

The problem becomes more opaque when Diodorus avers that during the voyage Epaminondas – literally – made the cities Thebes' own. That in turn leads to the question of what Diodorus means by *idias tas poleis epoiēsen*. This problem has been already been addressed above (chapter II). In two other instances Diodorus similarly uses the phrase. At II, 44, 6 he states that after the campaign to liberate Byzantium in 477, Aristides won over to the Athenian side the Greek states that supported the Panhellenic cause and, literally, "made them adherents of the Athenians" (*poleis ... idias epoiēse tois Athēnaiois*). These states immediately joined Athens to create the Delian League.⁶ They were obviously independent of external control and capable of making their own individual decisions. The next example comes from II, 52, 1, when in 319 Antigonos Monophthalmus, deciding to gain possession of Cyzicus (*polin idian kataskeuasthai*), which was presently being besieged by Arrhidaeus, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, set out with 20,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry to lift the siege of the city. In the event, Antigonos failed. In this instance Cyzicus was an independent city owing allegiance neither to Antigonos nor to Arrhidaeus. In all three of these cases, Diodorus describes these cities as private in the sense that they were unaligned and autonomous. Although free from external political direction, they were, however, vulnerable to the ambitions of more powerful neighbors.⁷ The most that Diodorus implies in all of these instances is that an external power tried to win the political co-operation, the goodwill, or the control of an independent state.⁸ Diodorus is clearly not using *idias* as a technical term. Instead, it seems to be one of his own stylistic devices to denote a state capable of making its own political decisions.

Thus, although one could translate Diodorus' clause as "he won over the cities to the Theban side," or as C. L. Sherman renders it in the Loeb edition, "he made the cities friendly to Thebes," neither translation takes

⁵ Isoc. 5, 53; Plut. *Phil.* 14, 2, and for a general discussion of the topic, Cargill 1981, pp. 183, 192–193.

⁶ Thuc. I, 97; Diod. Sic. II, 46, 4 – II, 47; Plut. *Arist.* 23–24; see also Meiggs 1972, pp. 42–49.

⁷ In general, see Amit 1973; Gehrke 1986, pp. 100–103. ⁸ See McDougall 1983, *s.v. idios* under *polis*.

into full account the meaning of *idios* in the phrase. Since *idias* clearly modifies *poleis*, it obviously cannot refer to *Thēbaiois*. Furthermore, *poieō* often means to procure something for oneself (cf. Thuc. 8, 76, 7; Isoc. II, 1; Dem. 10, 76). In accordance with Diodorus' usage noted above, the solution is to translate the sentence as "he procured the independent cities for the Thebans." A. Bresson, however, has objected to this reading which he thinks cannot be possible. He instead proposes "il gagne ces cités [Rhodes, Chios, Byzantium] à la cause de Thèbes."⁹ Bresson is quite correct to say that *idios* is normally used for private, not public, affairs. Yet this notion falls short simply because a *polis* is by nature public, not private. If one prefers to keep the meaning of *idios* as "one's own" one could render the sentence as "he gained the cities of their own accord for the Thebans." Either way, the Greek states had to be independent to make their political decision. There was no way in which they could have done so privately. In short, "independent" in this context renders *idias* most closely.

All of this naturally leads to a consideration of the political status of Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium in 364. Although at the beginning of the fourth century they were so hostile to Athens as to support Sparta, this situation changed, when they joined the Second Athenian League (*IG* II² 43 = Rhodes–Osborne, no. 22). At that point they allied themselves with Athens, Thebes, and other Greek cities on the basis that they maintained their liberty and autonomy, and ruled themselves under their own constitutions, as line 20 of the inscription makes clear. Thus being free, each of them could legitimately and technically pursue its own foreign policy within the limits of its other treaty obligations. In practice, however, Athens expected conformity to its policy. When, in 364, these states welcomed the arrival of Epaminondas' fleet, they acted within their treaty rights without violation of their diplomatic responsibilities to Athens. Furthermore, despite Atheno-Theban antipathy, they were still technically allies of Thebes.¹⁰ Their friendly reception of Epaminondas was not necessarily neighborly to the Athenians, but it was not illegal. In the light of the above, the most reasonable interpretation of the literary evidence is that Epaminondas won the favorable opinion of some states that Diodorus considered to be inclined towards Thebes. If Diodorus meant that he gained these cities as formal allies, he is simply wrong. Goodwill

⁹ *Rev. Ét. Anc.* 101 (1999) p. 86, n. 10.

¹⁰ This point is proven by *IG* II² 43, lines 79, 82–83. The *stèle* was not destroyed, and the names of none of the four states were erased. If Diodorus meant to include Cnidus as a free city, while under Persian rule, it was either a mistake or a polite fiction.

Epaminondas gained, but, as Isocrates and Plutarch rightly say, hegemony of the sea he did not.¹¹

So much was known until 1994, when W. Blümel found a Greek inscription in Burgaz, Turkey.¹² The inscription is a Cnidian proxeny decree honoring Epaminondas. Blümel's text reads:

[ῚΕδο]ξε [Κνιδί]οις·ῚΕ-	Resolved by the Cnidians. E-
[πα]μειν[ών]δαν Πο-	paminondas son of Po-
[λύ]μμη Θεβαῖον κ-	lymnes, the Theban, a-
[αἰ ἐ]κγόνος προξ-	and his descendants shall be <i>prox-</i>
[ένος] ἡμεν τᾶς πό-	<i>enoi</i> of the <i>po-</i>
[λιος] καὶ ὑπάρχεν α-	<i>lis</i> , and are to be granted
[ὑτοῖ]ς ἔσπ[λο]υν ἐ-	the right to sail int-
[ς Κνῖδον καὶ ἔκπλουν]	o and to sail out of Cnidus ¹³

This is only the second time that the name of Epaminondas appears in contemporary epigraphy, the other being *IG* VII 2462 (Rhodes–Osborne, no. 30). The historical importance of the new inscription is immediately apparent. It is the earliest contemporary document that testifies to the historicity of the Theban naval program (cf. chapter 12). It is also independent of hostile Athenian sources. It demonstrates that the Greeks in Asia and the Persian satraps along the coast took the Theban naval expedition seriously. In effect, Epaminondas and the new Boeotian accord with Persia added a new element to the volatile political situation in the eastern Aegean. The inscription also demonstrates that Theban naval ambitions went beyond the horizons of the three states mentioned by Diodorus. Because of the Satraps' Revolt, neither Greek nor Persian could be certain of the political

¹¹ See n. 5 above, and chapter 12. One body of ancient evidence can immediately be dismissed as irrelevant to Epaminondas' venture. G. Hiquily and F. Ephraim have associated a series of coins minted on the same standard by Cnidus, Rhodes, Iasus, Ephesus, Samos, Byzantium, Cyzicus, and perhaps Lampsacus, and linked them to Epaminondas' voyage (*Bulletin de la Société française de numismatique*, vol. 111.9, 1948). On the obverse of the coins is the legend ΣΥΝ and the representation of a young Heracles strangling two snakes. The reverse bears the emblem of the various minting cities. The same representation of Heracles and the snakes appears on some early Theban coins, but the latter were minted on a different standard and without the ΣΥΝ see Head 1884, pp. XL–XLI, 77–78. They also date to the early fourth century and cannot be dated much later, as witnessed by traces of the incuse square on them. Furthermore, the Theban coins all bear the legend ΘΕ, but in the period from 379 to 338 the Boeotian federal coinage bore neither the legend Thebes nor that of Boeotia, but only the first letters of the name of a federal magistrate; see Head 1884, p. 84, no. 169; Pl. xv, nos. 174–177; relevant also is Hepworth 1986; Cahn 1970, pp. 173–174, who dates the eastern coins to the time after the battle of Cnidus in 394; Cawkwell 1956.

¹² Blümel 1994, pp. 157–158 with Pl. 17.

¹³ The text and translation of the stone are essentially Blümel's, but we have taken the liberty of proposing some changes in the translation.

future.¹⁴ All that they knew at the moment was that the Thebans and Artaxerxes were acting in mutual agreement. The inscription further proves that the Cnidians officially recognized and supported the policy of the King against various rivalries of the satraps. There was an additional advantage to the Cnidians. At this period *proxenia* was an official, not merely a personal, honor (see n. 21 below). It was also a new political bond between Cnidus and Boeotia, although it was not equivalent to alliance. The Cnidians had nonetheless forged a new friendship with the ascendant power on the Greek mainland, while continuing to be loyal to the Great King. In addition, they did so presumably with the approval of the satrap in authority, who thereby proved his own loyalty to the King.

The formulae of the new inscription are common to those of other Cnidian inscriptions of approximately the same date.¹⁵ The texts often do not mention the reasons for the honor, and the new inscription differs from some others only because its heading does not contain the phrase *gnōma prostatan*, which in connection with *edoxe Knidiois* simply means that the people of Cnidus resolved to endorse the proposal put before them. The body making the motion was obviously the *boulē*; and its political inclination, whether democratic or oligarchic, is immaterial. The phrase is found on inscriptions ranging from the early fourth century to the mid third, during which Cnidus experienced several political changes.¹⁶ Yet it is also sometimes omitted for no apparent reason. Thus, the absence of the phrase *gnōma prostatan* in the Epaminondas inscription is unremarkable, and without political significance.

The inscription is undated, but Blümel places it in 363, based on older scholarship. The sailing of Epaminondas' fleet is now usually dated to 364.¹⁷ Although Blümel's date is wrong by a year, he is correct to place the event at this period, for two reasons that he does not mention. First, this is the only time when Epaminondas is known to have been in this area. That he was in command of ships is attested by the literary sources and suggested by the nouns $\epsilon\sigma\pi[\lambda\omicron]\upsilon\nu$ in line 7 and the reasonable restoration $[\epsilon\kappa\pi\lambda\omicron\upsilon\nu]$ in line 8. Blümel's translation of these nouns as "the right to sail into and to sail out of Cnidus" thus obscures a vital point. Furthermore, any voyage between Byzantium and Rhodes, whichever the direction, would necessarily have taken Epaminondas past Cnidus.

¹⁴ Weiskopf 1989, pp. 50–51.

¹⁵ Compare *Syll.*³ 187; Blümel 1992, nos. 1–10; Tod, no. 149; Rhodes–Osborne, no. 56.

¹⁶ E.g. Blümel 1992, no. 1; *SEG* 12, 418; *Syll.*³ 978.

¹⁷ Buckler 1980a, pp. 258–259 (not cited by Blümel).

J. M. Fossey relies upon D. Knoepfler and P. Roesch to use *SEG* 28, 465 as additional evidence for these events.¹⁸ The inscription is a reused proxeny decree that mentions a Po[–], sometimes restored as Po[δίων], although the restoration has been called into question. The reasons for the reuse of the stone in antiquity are not immediately apparent. The stone is badly damaged, and most of the restorations are quite conjectural. In view of these manifold difficulties, one must conclude that the inscription contributes virtually nothing to a further understanding of Epaminondas' voyage.¹⁹ At most it may support a part of Diodorus' testimony.

The clause of the Cnidian inscription granting Epaminondas the right freely to sail into and out of Cnidus is the most pertinent to an understanding of Theban naval ambitions in the Aegean. To put the inscription into its proper perspective a word on honorary decrees is instructive. Not all of the benefactors of a Greek state were rewarded in the fourth century by a grant of *proxenia*. In many cases those who helped a state in time of need were honored by the erection of a statue at public expense, the award of a gold crown, or simply a public inscription acknowledging them as a friend of the *polis*.²⁰ *Proxenia*, however, was in this period an official diplomatic right and responsibility, not merely an honorific ornament, as it would become in the Hellenistic period.²¹ It conferred on the honorand the rights of freedom from taxes and exile, personal inviolability in time of peace and war, and the right to own a house and land.²² In practical terms it meant that the *proxenos* was the official diplomatic agent of the state that had bestowed the honor upon him and the duty to be its recognized

¹⁸ Fossey 1994, p. 39; Knoepfler 1978, pp. 387–392; Roesch 1984; see also *SEG* 28, 465 and 34, 355. The other pertinent Boeotian inscriptions pose their own various problems. First, Fossey relies of necessity upon *IG* VII 2407 (Rhodes–Osborne, no. 43), which is now lost, for his interpretation; but one can reasonably trust Dittenberger's reading of the text. The problem is that no one can now check it (see also n. 29 below). Fossey also links *IG* VII 2408, a proxeny decree honoring an unnamed Byzantine to the program, but his point here has been adumbrated fourteen years earlier by Buckler 1980a, pp. 170–172, 309–310, whom he does not cite. Lastly, Roesch prefers to date *IG* VII 2407 to 361 for no credible reason. There is no evidence for the existence of a large Theban fleet at this late date.

¹⁹ Badian and Martin 1985, p. 172; and Badian 1993, p. 139, have pointed out that restorations *exempli gratia*, no matter how attractive, do not constitute fact.

²⁰ *IG* II² 103, 109, 117, 138; Rhodes–Osborne, nos. 38, 51.

²¹ In general, see Gschnitzer, "Proxenos," *RE* Suppl. 13 (1973), cols. 629–730, especially 721–729; and Olshausen 1979, pp. 306–307; Bauslaugh 1991, pp. 56–64, and specifically the comments of Bean and Cook 1952, p. 187, and Fossey 1994, p. 36, all of whom point out that *proxenia* at this time was still a genuine office, not a mere compliment. See also n. 33, below. Marek 1984, traces the evolution of *proxenia* from its original function of hospitality to strangers, to the position of recognized representation of a foreign state. Late in the fourth century it became more honorarily than politically significant. See also Gerolymatos 1986, who treats the commercial, religious, political, and intelligence roles of a *proxenos*.

²² *IG* II² 95, 106, 132, 172, 193; *IG* XII 8 292, line 17; Tod, no. 149; Rhodes–Osborne, no. 51.

representative. In return, the honorand's native state officially acknowledged that responsibility. Nevertheless, *proxenia* was never equivalent to alliance, and nothing on the new stone even suggests it. *Proxenia* was, however, an official diplomatic link between two states.²³

The privilege of a *proxenos* to sail in and out of a free harbor had two distinct, but significant, aspects, one official and the other honorary, as can be seen both at Cnidus and elsewhere in the eastern Aegean. There was a clear distinction between *proxenia* granted to a major political figure who could exercise real political power and to a wealthy private benefactor of the *polis*. A brief sampling of contemporary inscriptions easily proves the point. The most immediately pertinent is the Cnidian award of *proxenia* in c. 360 to Iphiades, the tyrant of Abydos.²⁴ In an attempt to establish himself as a power independent of Persian rule, he not only seized control of Abydos but also captured Parium and entertained designs on Cnidus. The people of Cnidus granted him *proxenia* and permission to make free use of their port, but his adventure came to an ignominious end. Erythrae similarly honored Mausolus, the satrap of Caria, with the same rights of *proxenia* and navigation. Although he nearly made Caria his independent domain, with ambitions farther afield, he was ultimately suppressed by the King.²⁵ The career of Athenodorus, a prominent mercenary commander of the period, also fits the pattern. In c. 360 the city of Cios in Bithynia awarded the adventurer with *proxenia* and the right of access to the harbor. The reasons for the honor are not stipulated on the stone, but it is easy to conclude that the Cians saw fit to placate a potentially dangerous and notorious figure.²⁶ An analogous situation occurred at Priene, which in 334 granted Antigonus Monophthalmus *proxenia* and the right of "entering" (*eisagōgē*) and "departing" (*exagōgē*).²⁷ A famous and somewhat similar example of the importance of access to a city by a powerful person occurred in 323, when the priests of Marduk asked Alexander the Great not to re-enter Babylon, even though he was the king of Macedonia and Asia. They certainly did not consider him a mere tourist.²⁸ Perhaps a telling example of the point, by way of contrast, is the Boeotian grant of *proxenia* to the

²³ *proxenia* as a diplomatic reality is amply illustrated by the results of Sphodrias' raid on Athens in 378: Xen. *Hell.* 5, 4, 22–23 (cf. chapter 5 above), and by Callias in Sparta: Xen. *Hell.* 6, 1, 4–6.

²⁴ *Syll.*³ 187; Arist. *Pol.* 5, 5, 5, 9; Dem. 23, 176–177; Sundwall, *RE* 9.2 (1916), col. 2016, s.v. Iphiades; Meyer 1902/1975, p. 475 n. 4.

²⁵ Rhodes–Osborne, no. 56; Hornblower 1982, pp. 107–110.

²⁶ Tod, no. 149; Isoc. 8, 24; Dem. 23, 12; Plut. *Phoc.* 18, 6; Aelian, *VH* 1, 25; Polyae. 5, 21; Judeich 1892, p. 217; Ruge, *RE* 11.1 (1921), col. 486, s.v. Kios; Parke 1933, pp. 129, 132.

²⁷ Tod, no. 186. ²⁸ J. R. Hamilton 1973.

Carthaginian Nobas about the same time as the previous examples.²⁹ Despite the fact that Nobas was the native of a maritime state, the Boeotians gave him *proxenia* but no leave to sail into or out of any of their harbors.³⁰

Another major category involving *proxenia* and navigational privileges within this region involves the emporia that awarded these rights to the royal family of the Bosporean kingdom. Panticapium, Borysthenes, and Olbia granted them the right of free access to the harbors, in this instance for the sake of maritime commerce.³¹ The single common thread running through all of these inscriptions is that all so honored were major political figures. In each of these instances these rights were bestowed upon people who possessed considerable power.

A similar, but none the less different, category pertained to private individuals. Ten Cnidian inscriptions, all incomplete but all dated to the fourth century, link the concepts of *proxenia* and navigational rights with people who are otherwise undistinguished. The names of only three of the men so honored survive, and it is instructive that all three are unknown from other sources, even one Amphares of Athens, which is somewhat surprising given the richness of Athenian prosopographical material. Although only half of the inscriptions mention sailing rights, the formulaic grant of *proxenia* makes it probable that all ten were awarded it. The inscriptions were all found in the vicinity of religious structures, but that appears more accidental than intentional. The editor, Blümel, interprets the verbs *espleō* and *ekpleō* to mean nothing more than “das Recht auf freie Einfahrt und Ausfahrt,”³² namely the right freely to enter and depart. He is surely right, for these honorands were obviously political nonentities, to judge by their obscurity alone. The difference between these worthy men and those like Epaminondas and Iphiades is one of real power.

²⁹ Fossey 1994, p. 35, has unnecessarily revived the notion that Nobas was a Carthaginian naval architect who built the Theban fleet. First, there is no evidence as to his profession (nor in fact whether he had one). Next, there is, however, ample evidence that the Thebans had enjoyed a long tradition of shipbuilding, and thus did not need the services of a foreign naval architect to design triremes: Thuc. 8, 3, 2; Xen. *Hell.* 5, 4, 56; 6, 4, 3; Salmon 1976, pp. 191–196; see chapter 12.

³⁰ *Syll.*³ 217; on Panticapium, see also Steph. Byz. *s.v.* Panticapium; Deinarchus 1, 43. Borysthenes: *Syll.*³ 218 (perhaps, but not certainly, a proxeny decree); Steph. Byz. *s.v.* Borysthenes; Mela 2, 1, 6; Tomaschek, *RE* 3.1 (1897) cols. 736–739, *s.v.* Borysthenes. Olbia: *Syll.*³ 219; see also Steph. Byz. *s.v.* Olbia; Schulten, *RE* 17.2 (1937), cols. 2403–2424, *s.v.* Olbia.

³¹ An exception is the Cnidian inscription *Syll.*³ 978, dating to 250, that allows the Bakchoi to sail into the harbor for religious observances at the temple of Dionysus. This was not a grant of *proxenia* but a recognition of traditional religious rights. The significant point is that these priests were prominent men with special and official rights.

³² Blümel 1992, no. 1.

The matter of individual status is one of first importance. A benefactor could doubtless sail into harbor with pomp and justifiably enjoy the public appreciation of his generosity. His visit would be official, but largely ceremonial, doubtless in the capacity of a friendly representative or ambassador of his own city. He would enjoy honor, but possess no real power. The situation would be different for a *proxenos* with armed forces at his command, someone who could either protect or threaten the city. These captains of war could use their *proxenia* in the arena of politics in a way that these benefactors could not. That is further indicated by the fact that neither Epaminondas nor Iphiadas is known to have bestowed any benevolence on Cnidus. As W. Dittenberger observed long ago, Iphiades and now Epaminondas enjoyed *officium*.³³ For leaders of state *proxenia* and the clause permitting naval access to Cnidus held a literal and practical meaning.

This is the context in which the Cnidian inscription finds its historical place. The grant of *proxenia* to Epaminondas proves that his visit was official. By accepting the honor, he became its legal representative in Thebes and the Boeotian Confederacy. The significance of the inscription is also immediately apparent in that it constitutes the only epigraphical piece of evidence for the Theban naval venture. The other contemporary evidence is literary, later, and slight. The first is Isocrates' brief statement (5, 53) that the Thebans sent triremes to Byzantium in order to win domination of the land and sea. Aeschines (2, 105 with schol.) also claims that Epaminondas wanted to transport the *propylaia* of the Athenian acropolis to the Cadmea, but the most that can be said of this exaggeration is that the Thebans wanted to defeat Athens and thus win ascendancy in Greek politics. Its context is likewise specious. Writing years after the Theban ascendancy, Aeschines used his rhetoric to oppose his arch-rival Demosthenes, who favored friendly relations with Thebes. If one assumes that Diodorus had accurately epitomized the work of Ephorus, then the latter would be the last fourth-century source to mention Theban naval ambitions. Yet the assumption is unwarranted, or at least open to question. K. S. Sacks has recently challenged the notion that Diodorus was a mere epitomizer. He presents instead evidence that Diodorus applied his own appreciation of history to the sources whom he read.³⁴ Thus, one should

³³ *Syll.*³ 187, concerning the office: "Hoc additamentum, quo recentiora huius generis decreta omnia carent, indicio est, tum temporis proxeniam etiam magis officium quam honorem aut ornamentum fuisse."

³⁴ Sacks 1990, pp. 23–54, specifically 35; see also Barber 1935/1993.

not automatically claim that Diodorus faithfully reflects Ephorus' testimony. That in turn means that the inscription is undeniably only one of two truly contemporary pieces of evidence for these events.

Yet one can reasonably ask whether Epaminondas' plans actually were as grandiose as these sources claim. No rational statesman, as Epaminondas surely was, could expect to overthrow the Athenian League at one stroke, much less to exercise a maritime hegemony. The Thebans lacked the necessary experience and above all the economic resources for the effort, and they could hardly depend upon the Persians for consistent support. The most that Epaminondas could do was to diminish Athenian power within the Aegean by depriving it of powerful allies, or at least by sowing dissension within the league.

Since Epaminondas apparently made no serious effort to bring Laches' large fleet to battle, when the opportunity arose, he obviously had no plan to join decisive battle with the Athenian navy (see chapter 12). The decision was probably wise, given the inexperience of his crews. From this scant evidence, one can assume that he intended to use his fleet as a tool of diplomacy, much as President Theodore Roosevelt used the voyage of the Great White Fleet in 1907–9.³⁵ For Epaminondas the policy proved partially successful at Cnidus, but for the most part his fleet accomplished nothing of note. None the less, in itself the idea was a good one. There is ample evidence of unrest among some islanders,³⁶ and Epaminondas could hope that the appearance of his fleet would prove enough to rally them to his side.

When Epaminondas sailed along the coast of Asia Minor, he could expect to be welcomed at Cnidus, Iasus, Ephesus, and Lampsacus, all of which were then under the jurisdiction of local satraps.³⁷ Samos was beyond him. Although the satrap Tigranes had seized it and held it with a garrison, Timotheus had regained it for Athens in 365.³⁸ The determination of the Athenians to hold Samos in these unsettled years is dramatically illustrated by another newly discovered inscription published by C. Habicht.³⁹ Dating to c. 350, it records in detail the organization of

³⁵ Buckler 1980a, pp. 169–170; cf. Hart 1965.

³⁶ Thus, *IG* 11² 111 (Rhodes–Osborne, no. 39); x11 5 594; schol. Aeschin. 1, 64; see also Busolt 1873–5, pp. 801–803; Cargill 1981, pp. 129–188; Cargill 1982; Sealey 1993, pp. 106–108.

³⁷ Cf. Hornblower 1982, chapter 5, for a careful analysis of this period.

³⁸ Dem. 15, 9; the scholium *ad loc.* (Dilts, p. 180) simply adds that the King was not displeased by Tigranes' action. Nevertheless, it was a Persian violation of the King's own peace. There is no evidence of when Tigranes garrisoned Samos, an episode not mentioned by J.M. Cook 1983; Dandamaev 1989; or Ruzicka 1992. It must be dated later than 384 on the basis of *IG* 11² 34–35, 43, line 79.

³⁹ Habicht 1996; see also Cargill 1995, pp. 17–21.

the Athenian settlement which was established on a large scale. It testifies to the Athenian will to maintain a permanent presence on the island. Hence, Timotheus' victory in 365 added another new element of political uncertainty in the area during the time of disquiet. That left Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium, which were alike independent of the Athenians and the Persians. If Epaminondas could win them over to his side, he would provide them with security against the Athenian fleet, perhaps even endanger the Athenian supply of grain from Egypt and the Black Sea and weaken the impact of Athenian sea power in the eastern Aegean. If successful, Epaminondas would provide an ample return to his Persian paymaster.

This harmony of Persian and Theban interests may very well explain the conduct of Mausolus, the satrap of Caria. He himself had not openly declared any antipathy to Athens, and indeed in 365 he had the luxury of waiting to see whether Athens or Thebes would prevail in the region. Time was on his side and discretion highly desirable.⁴⁰ Well-known for his percipience, Mausolus had every reason to countenance Epaminondas' appearance along the coast of his satrapy. He had only recently chosen the right moment to return to the King's allegiance. In 365 he co-operated with the satrap Autophradates to suppress the rebel Ariobarzanes in the Satraps' Revolt.⁴¹ In 364 he could again publicly demonstrate his loyalty to the King by furthering royal policy in the eastern Aegean. At the very least that meant causing Epaminondas no trouble and begrudging him no honor that any of his cities wished to bestow upon the Thebans. By so doing, he had nothing to lose and something to gain.

Seen in this light, Cnidian action seems perfectly sensible. The Cnidians, who were not members of the Second Athenian League, had proudly proclaimed their status as a *polis* under what S. Hornblower aptly terms "a permissive policy on the part of the satraps."⁴² As such, the Cnidians could grant *proxenia* to whomever they wanted, so long as the honor offended neither Mausolus nor the King. In this case there was no cause for offense, for Cnidian policy coincided with both. Having endured the vagaries of the Ionian War, the Cnidians and their neighbors had learned to sail with the prevailing wind, and in 364 that wind blew from Epaminondas' quarter. By honoring Epaminondas and the Theban naval

⁴⁰ Hornblower 1982, pp. 197–203.

⁴¹ Ruzicka 1992, p. 70, suggests that Timotheus' actions at Samos alarmed Mausolus, who at this time strengthened his ties with Cos. Under these circumstances, Epaminondas' fleet appeared at a most opportune time for the satrap, should he need naval support against further Athenian action in the area.

⁴² Hornblower 1982, pp. 116–119.

effort, the Cnidians were also publicly displaying their support for the King's policy, while establishing official friendship with the most influential statesman of the Boeotian Confederacy. Furthermore, the recent Athenian action at Samos may very well have prompted both the Cnidians and Mausolus to court the only Greek fleet capable of countering the Athenians. No one at the time could know that the appearance of the Theban fleet would prove an ephemeral episode producing no lasting results.⁴³ Yet the Cnidians would lose nothing by placing themselves on good terms with the leading power of mainland Greece. Although the entire Theban naval program was an expensive failure, the irony of it all is that no one either gained or suffered from it.

⁴³ Perhaps the only fleeting event was the uprising against the Athenians that occurred on Ceos: *IG* 11² 111; Rhodes–Osborne, no. 39; Buckler 1980a, pp. 173–175.

PART III

Domination

Thebes, Delphi, and the outbreak of the Sacred War

In the aftermath of the battle of Mantinea in 362 Xenophon gave his own gloomy, but accurate, view of the political situation in Greece: “Still more confusion and disorder occurred in Greece after the battle than before” (*Hell.* 7, 5, 27). His words proved true in their own day and prophetic for the future. Even before he wrote this melancholy opinion, trouble loomed at the sanctuary of Pythian Apollo in Delphi that would prove him right. The problem arose unexpectedly as early as 363, the year before Mantinea. All of the available evidence points to a combination of local strife and outside interference. In the spring of 363 the representatives of the Amphietyonic Council, the *hieromnēmones*, under the presidency of Andronicus of Crannon, banished Astyocrates and ten other prominent Delphians. The Delphic officials next confiscated their property. The refugees found a haven in Athens, where Astyocrates received Athenian citizenship and exemption from taxes, both worthy honors. His colleagues acquired *isopoliteia*, equal citizenship with the Athenians. The Athenians in turn used the occasion to accuse the *hieromnēmones* of having violated the laws of Delphi and those of the Amphietyonic League. Then at war with most of the other Amphietyons, the Athenians had obvious motives for making a spurious accusation, but nothing compels others to believe it.¹

These events provide a unique incident in Greek history, for they constitute the only documented instance of the Amphietyons’ intervening in the internal affairs of a member state. The *hieromnēmones* reached their decision at a regular meeting, a *pylaia*, of the Council, where the majority of them rendered their verdict. Later Amphietyons never charged any of them, Andronicus included, for any abuse of power or process. The

¹ The notion of four Sacred Wars proves anachronistic: see above chapter 2, n. 10, see also Pownall 1998. Therefore, the war discussed here remains unnumbered. Events of 363: *IG* 11² 109; see also Osborne 1981, pp. 49–51; *FD* 111.5, nos. 15–18, 91 line 19; Pomtow 1906, pp. 89–96; Kahrstedt 1922, p. 392; Buckler 1989a, pp. 9–13; Buckler 2003, pp. 398–401. The principal narrative source for the Sacred War is Diod. Sic. 16. On his sources for it see Hammond 1937; Sordi 1969; Alfieri 1988.

political position of Delphi in this controversy is crucial. Throughout the classical period Delphi strove for independence from the rest of Phocis. The Delphians saw themselves as the stewards of a Panhellenic religious center. As early as 448 they had asserted this view, much to the consternation of other Phocians. Although the Athenians had at first sided with Phocis, they soon endorsed Delphian independence. Later at the Peace of Nicias in 421 the Spartans, Athenians, and most of their allies formally agreed that Delphi was sacred ground and that the temple of Apollo and the Delphians themselves should be governed by their own customs. In the fourth century the status of Delphi as international ground was reiterated in 368, when the site was chosen, as Geneva often is today, as the seat of negotiations aimed at renewing a multilateral peace treaty. In the light of these facts, the Athenians in 363 violated the very principles of Delphian independence that they had earlier endorsed. Hence, several factors pertain to the situation in 363. The first included the long history of tension between Delphi and Phocis on the one hand and the close ties between Delphi and the other members of the Amphictyonic League on the other. The Amphictyony existed to administer the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi, its members drawn basically from neighboring peoples such as the powerful Thessalians, Phocians, and Boeotians, but also from folks such as the Dorians and Ionians. The Dorians included not only those from nearby Doris but also the Spartans. The Ionians likewise included the Athenians. They met in an assembly of twenty-four delegates in which the Delphians also enjoyed the right to deal with their own secular affairs. External politics and local rivalries nonetheless often clouded strictly Amphictyonic business. In 363 the animosity between Thebes and its Athenian and Spartan enemies constituted an immediate example. A similar complicating factor involved the traditional Athenian friendship with Phocis and their joint hostility toward Thebes. The Athenian diplomatic intrusion in the Delphian stasis of 363 fuelled these enmities.²

Trouble at Delphi increased dramatically until the situation at this point became critical. The Amphictyons issued a decree so sweeping that its provisions expressly protected the sanctuary and its prerogatives. Its clauses are instructive. One insisted upon the right of the Amphictyons to levy port taxes at Cirrha and the freedom to raise them at will. The Amphictyons also insisted upon the right to regulate the capital on deposit and to keep

² Fifth-century conditions: *IG* 1³ 9; Thuc. 1, 112, 5; 5, 18, 2; Philochorus *FGrH* 328 F 34; Theopompus *FGrH* 115 F 156; Eratosthenes *FGrH* 241 F 38. Fourth century: Xen. *Hell.* 7, 1, 27; Roux 1979; Beck 1997a, pp. 192–196; Lefèvre 1998.

account of sacred funds. The decree also forbade the introduction of foreign troops onto sacred land. At least three conclusions immediately follow. The first indicates that some imminent external power threatened Cirrha and its revenues. Next, that same power entertained designs on the dedications of the temple and the way in which they were administered. Lastly, this power was prepared to use armed force to obtain its goals. This decree clearly indicates that the sanctuary of Apollo faced the immediate danger of foreign invasion and seizure.³

Although some have suggested that the fate of Astyocrates was possibly linked to his alleged anti-Boeotian position, they offer no proof to establish the connection. Moreover, their view of an anti-Theban sentiment prevalent in fourth-century Greece, a sentiment shared by Astyocrates and his colleagues, depends almost solely on Athenian sources. Most Peloponnesians, who remained loyal to Thebes until the arrival of Philip of Macedonia, placed no trust in Athens, nor did the Locrians and Dorians in central Greece. A major piece of evidence for this anti-Theban feeling is the so-called "Oath of Plataea," which some have attacked as a fourth-century forgery. Even P. Siewert, who dates the oath to the fifth-century, thus defending its authenticity, admits that the Athenians in the fourth century used it as propaganda against Thebes. With regard to the events of 363, its authenticity is less important than its Athenian context. One cannot reasonably assume that the rest of Greece shared Athenian views. Theopompus, for one, provides testimony that at least some Greeks in the fourth century shared views sceptical to the point of scorn of Athenian boasting of past events. In fact, he cites the "Oath of Plataea" as a specific example of Athenian chicanery. The ancient evidence indicates only that Astyocrates and his companions were punished for an offence that involved both Delphi and the Amphictyons. It proves further that the Athenians so disagreed with these proceedings that they defied the Amphictyons, whose verdict they could not refute and whose decision they could only defy. The local problem at Cirrha provides a probable explanation in terms of the nature of the dispute and the occasion of its occurrence.⁴

The next piece of evidence usually associated with the outbreak of war is the Delphian grant of *promanteia* to Thebes in 360/59. Some have

³ Lefèvre 1994, pp. 99–110; Lefèvre 1998, p. 49; Salviat 1995; Pownall 1998, pp. 35–55; McNerney 1999, p. 228 n. 66; Buckler 2003, pp. 399–400.

⁴ Athenian sources: Walbank 1967a, pp. 180–182; Bosworth 1980, pp. 88–89. Even Diodorus' account goes back to Ephorus, a student of Isocrates: *FGrH* 70 TT 1, 5, 24, 28. "Oath of Plataea": Rhodes–Osborne, no. 88; Siewert 1972, pp. 69–70. Theopompus: *FGrH* 115 F 153; see also Connor 1968, pp. 78–84.

considered the honor as Delphian gratitude for Thebes' having ended the stasis of 363, a view that must obviously be rejected. Others have instead suggested that the honor celebrated the completion of the Theban treasury at Delphi. Dedicated from the spoils of Leuctra, its erection surely served as the occasion of much celebration at the sanctuary. Yet it remains quite difficult to explain why the Delphians should have bestowed the honor so long after the event. Two obstacles stand in the way of this hypothesis. First, the completion of the treasury cannot be securely determined, with dates ranging from 371 to 346. Secondly, although Xenophon and others saw in the battle of Mantinea the end of an era, many other historians, notably Callisthenes and Ephorus, did not. The former preferred to regard the beginning of the Sacred War as a new point of departure. Mantinea was not at the time such a turning point that it prevented the Thebans in the following year from intervening again in Arcadian affairs, this time to suppress the stasis at Megalopolis. Its power unimpaired by the battle of Mantinea, Thebes remained ascendant in Greece, and that situation had not changed by 360/59. None of these suggestions provide such an adequate explanation of these events as to solve, or perhaps even to apply to, the problems at Cirrha.⁵

Yet another explanation has also surfaced. In 361/0 the Athenians and Thessalians concluded an alliance. The latter were again at war with Alexander of Pherae, with whom the Athenians then revoked their earlier alliance. In addition to disrupting Thessaly, Alexander had also raided Athenian possessions in the northern Aegean and attacked the Piraeus itself. Those who see the Atheno-Thessalian alliance as a momentary eclipse of Theban influence within the Amphictyony make the explanation for the grant of *promanteia* even more elusive. Rather it can be more reasonably argued that the alliance did more damage to Thessaly's standing in the Amphictyony than to that of Thebes. The renewed civil war militarily weakened Thessaly, and the Thebans, who had never wholeheartedly supported Pelopidas' Thessalian policy, refused to intervene once again. Yet the Athenians, who two years earlier had defied Delphi and the Amphictyony by giving sanctuary to Astyocrates and his companions, now befriended one of the Council's leading powers. Given this situation, the Delphians would naturally have turned to the Thebans as their champion. There was no one else. The visible sign of the new link between them was the grant of *promanteia*. Indeed, Demosthenes (5, 23) testifies that the Thessalians had lost their ascendancy in

⁵ *FD* III.4, 375; Bommelaer 1969, pp. 93–94; Theban treasury: Michaud 1973, pp. 2–7. Historians: Callisthenes *FGrH* 124 T 27; Ephorus, *FGrH* 70 F 9. Shrimpton 1971, p. 311; Buckler 1989a, pp. 97–98.

Amphictyonic affairs before the outbreak of the Sacred War, and no factors better account for this situation than the weakening of Thessaly and the conclusion of the Atheno-Thessalian alliance.⁶

Since no one has successfully explained why the Thebans waited until 357/6 to level charges that in part prompted Philomelus to seize Delphi, the explanation must lie elsewhere. The new inscription exhibiting concern over Cirrha points in the best direction, while also helping to explain Philomelus' act of sacrilege. First in terms of chronology Diodorus (16, 23, 2–3) states that in the archonship of Callistratus (355/4) the Sacred War had its origins:

When the Spartans had fought (*diapolemēsantōn*) the Leuctrian War with the Boeotians and had been defeated (*katapolemēthentōn*), the Thebans on the one hand (*men*) brought a serious charge against the Spartans in the Amphictyonic Council because of their seizure of the Cadmea and obtained a judgment against them for a large indemnity. And the Phocians on the other hand (*de*) for having cultivated a large section of the sacred plain named Cirrhan were brought before the Council and fined a high number of talents.

At 16, 29, 2–3, under the archonship of Diotimus (354/3), he repeats the charges in somewhat different terms:

In the Leuctrian War the Thebans, after defeating the enemy (*katapolemēsantes tous polemiους*), brought a case before the Amphictyonic Council against the Spartans, the charge being that Phoebidas had seized the Cadmea, and the Council assessed a fine of 500 talents for the offence. When the Spartans had judgment entered against them and failed to pay the fine during the period set by the laws (*kata ton hōrismenon ek tōn nomōn kairon*), the Thebans sued them again, this time for double the amount. When the Council accordingly set the judgment at 1,000 talents, on account of the large amount of the fine, they made declarations similar to those of the Phocians, complaining that an unjust judgment had been rendered against them by the Amphictyons.

Diodorus clearly places the indictment after the Common Peace of 362. The aorist participles *diapolemēsantōn* and *katapolemēthentōn*, taken with the aorist main verb of the first passage (16, 23, 2), surely mean that the Spartans had suffered defeat in the “Leuctrian War” before the Thebans accused them. So too with 16, 29, 2, in which the aorist participle *katapolemēsantes* with the aorist main verb points to a time after the war, not during it, for the Theban prosecution of Sparta. While some previous scholars have argued that the Thebans lodged their indictment either in

⁶ *SdA* 11, no. 293 = *IG* 11² 116 = Rhodes–Osborne, no. 44; Dem. 50, 4–5; Diod. Sic. 15, 95, 1–2; Polyae. 6, 2; Sordi 1957, pp. 51, 70; Buckler 1980a, pp. 223–224; Stylianou 1998, pp. 549–550.

spring 366 or more probably in spring 361, Diodorus' testimony excludes the first, though allowing the second. When Diodorus (16, 29, 2) states that the Spartans refused to pay their fine *kata ton hōrismenon ek tōn nomōn kairon*, he means the regular rate of contributions to the rebuilding of the temple. To the contrary, the fine was extraordinary and is by that reason alone not part of the regular capitation. The Delphians kept the two payments entirely separate, as the case of the Phocian fine after the Sacred War proves. The Phocian fine is additionally instructive because it indicates that the Amphictyons would have linked the payments to the *pylaia*. Hence, once the fine fell due, no great lapse of time occurred before the Amphictyons could authorize further sanctions.⁷

The nature of the charges presented against the Spartans and Phocians presents its own curiosities. A casual reading of the passages cited above indicates that the Thebans brought charges only against the Spartans and that some unnamed party indicted the Phocians. Grammar alone allows no other interpretation of the evidence. Nothing otherwise explains the odd shift of the active voice of the main verb in the *men*-clause to the passive of the second verb in the *de*-clause. The change of subject is equally puzzling. If the Thebans had indicted both the Spartans and Phocians, one could more reasonably expect the same subject of active verbs in both clauses connected by a simple *kai* ("and") or something of the sort. With such a sentence structure Diodorus could have kept strict parallels between the two clauses, consisting of the same subject in each case and the same voice of the verb, ending in two accusatives for the objects of the verbs. That would have resulted in more simple and more elegant Greek.⁸

This much can be gleaned from Diodorus' narrative. The Thebans originally voiced their complaint of Sparta at a regular *pylaia*; and when the accused refused to pay the fine, the Amphictyons imposed further sanctions at another regular *pylaia*. Since the fine was intended as a punishment, it could be most effective only if payment were demanded at the earliest opportunity. Even in 346 Philip and the Amphictyons awarded the Phocians only a three-year period of grace before they were to begin reimbursing the sanctuary for depredations committed during the Sacred

⁷ For the end of the "Leuctrian War," see Diod. Sic. 15, 89, 1–2; Rhodes–Osborne, no. 42; Sordi 1957, pp. 51, 70; Pouilloux 1949, pp. 181–184. Amphictyonic affairs: *FD* 111.4, 14, col. 1, lines 12–14, col. 11, lines 24–25; see also Roux 1979, pp. 166–168.

⁸ Although McNerney 1999, p. 207, somehow objects to this reading of the Greek, see also J. Buckler's review of his work in *BMCr* (<http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/bmcr/2000/2000-11-29.html>); Buckler 2003, p. 401; Beck 2001b, p. 302, who with some kindness considers McNerney's interpretation of the text to be "grammatically untenable"; Sánchez 2001, pp. 344–351.

War. This leniency became necessary owing to the exhaustion produced by ten years of war and to the disruption of Phocian civil life (Diod. Sic. 16, 60, 1–2). There was no reason in 357 to delay penalties, so on the whole it is far preferable to conclude that the original indictment and subsequent increase of the fine occurred immediately before the Phocian seizure of the sanctuary – specifically only the two *pylaiiai* immediately preceding the coup. Here is where the new inscription finds its proper place, for it provides contemporary evidence that the sacred land of Cirrha stood under external threat at this very time. Neither the Thebans nor the Thessalians had either cause or opportunity to pose danger to it. The Phocians did.⁹

Historical reasons for a Theban indictment of Phocis are likewise lacking. Although the Phocians had refused – as was their right – to campaign with Epaminondas in 362, their absence did not prevent the Thebans from winning a tactical victory at Mantinea.¹⁰ Even had Phocian abstention from the campaign angered the Thebans, one wonders why they waited for five years to take their revenge. Nor in the years from 362 to 357 did the Phocians represent any threat to Thebes. Even if they had, they were vulnerable to swift Theban counterattack. With Orchomenus having been reduced in 364 (Diod. Sic. 15, 79, 6), the Thebans could easily – and almost at will – have marched through the Cephissus valley, the richest part of Phocian territory. Finally, there is no record of any particular Thebano-Phocian tension at this time. No great affection presumably existed between the two peoples, but something more substantial than traditional enmity is needed to explain a Theban indictment of Phocis in 357/6.

Two other pieces of ancient evidence bear on Diodorus' testimony. Justin's epitome of Pompeius Trogus' *Philippica* (8, 1, 1–11) is the only source that links Thebes to the indictment of Phocis. Justin's late account, however, is riddled with errors. He claims (8, 1, 4) that the Thebans accused the Phocians *apud commune Graeciae concilium* ("before the common council of Greece"), where he clearly means the Amphictyonic Council. As a motive for Theban action, he asserts (8, 1, 5) that the Thebans sought revenge for Phocian depredations in Boeotia. No such ravages took place in this period, and Justin's narrative is so inaccurate that it must be dismissed. Pausanias twice (10, 2, 1; 15, 1) testifies that the Amphictyons fined the Phocians, adding that they were charged with having cultivated sacred ground. He states that for his part he could not determine whether the Phocians were actually guilty of any misconduct or whether the Thessalians had acted because of their traditional hostility to Phocis. Pausanias may

⁹ Cloché 1952, p. 167; Bengtson 1969, p. 313. ¹⁰ Buckler 1980a, pp. 218–219.

have mistakenly assumed that the Thessalians were responsible for the indictment because they customarily presided over the meetings of the Council.¹¹ Significantly, he corroborates Diodorus' statement about the nature of the charges against the Phocians, and knows nothing of any Theban involvement in the proceedings against them.

Two questions, then, arise from Diodorus' testimony, the first being why the Spartans and Phocians were accused in 357/6, the second being who lodged the charges against the Phocians. The Theban accusation against Sparta is particularly puzzling. Crippled by the loss of Messene, Sparta had remained quiet and relatively unprovocative since Mantinea. The Spartans had made absolutely no attempt to take advantage of the turmoil around Megalopolis in 361, even though the city posed a distinct menace to their security (Diod. Sic. 15, 94, 1–3). There is no record of further military action or diplomatic tension in the Peloponnesus from 361 to 357; and although Agesilaus evidently planned to reconquer Messene, he died in 360. Likewise, the Thebans and their Peloponnesian allies could hardly hope to launch major offensive operations against Laconia so long as conditions in Arcadia remained unstable. The verdict of the Amphictyonic Council simply could not realistically be used either as a pretext or as justification for a repetition of the great invasions of Epaminondas' day. Nor is it easy to see Athens as the ultimate target of the indictment of Sparta, merely because there was no guarantee that Athens would automatically support Sparta. Sparto-Athenian relations seem to have cooled after Mantinea; and even though the two states supported Phocis in the Sacred War, the Athenians remained suspicious of Spartan ambitions in the Peloponnesus (Dem. 16, 4–8). In 352/1 they refused to aid the Spartans against Megalopolis, despite Theban intervention in defense of the city (Diod. Sic. 16, 34, 3; 39, 1–7). Moreover, Thebes had shown itself ready enough to confront Athens without the need of any pretext. When in 357 some Euboeans appealed to the Thebans for support, they responded promptly enough, even though it meant doing battle with the Athenians. So an indictment of Sparta could not have been either an effective or a necessary means of injuring Athens.¹²

In all, the Theban accusation of Sparta in 357/6 makes no sense in terms either of timing or of political and military needs. Nonetheless, some

¹¹ Roux 1979, pp. 52–53; Lefèvre 1998, pp. 24–29; Sánchez 2001, pp. 182–183, who accepts Pausanias' testimony that the Thessalians levelled the charges, which corrects Buckler 2003, p. 400; Jehne 1999, pp. 344–351.

¹² Outbreak of the Sacred War: Buckler 1989a, pp. 158–176. Agesilaus: Xen. *Ages.* 2, 29; 2, 31; II, 5; Plut. *Ages.* 40, 2; Cartledge 1987, pp. 331–343; Shipley 1997, pp. 397–399.

explanation of Theban conduct must be attempted. Although the Spartans were clearly guilty of the charges, the Thebans surely did not expect them to pay a fine of 500 talents (Diod. Sic. 16, 29, 2). The only obvious benefit was diplomatic. When the Spartans proved unwilling or incapable of paying the fine, they would be barred from the Amphictyonic Council. Their status in the Greek world would thereupon suffer, and their ability to influence Amphictyonic affairs would end. The Spartans would become outcasts (Diod. Sic. 16, 23, 3), and Thebes would have removed another vestige of Spartan influence. Yet on the whole this diplomatic prize seems somewhat small. Since historical and practical reasons for a Theban indictment of Sparta appear rather trivial and for an accusation against Phocis virtually non-existent, the possibility looms that someone else took the initiative at Delphi. In that case the Theban charge against Sparta will have come in support of the party denouncing Phocis. The identity and motives of those who prosecuted the Phocians thus take on additional significance. Once again the formal accusation provides the place to start. The Phocians received condemnation for having cultivated a large part of sacred land in the Cirrhaean plain, a charge that they never denied. On the contrary, Philomelus admitted that it was true, when he complained that the fine was too huge for the cultivation of a very small plot of land. Yet in the same speech he told his fellow countrymen that the land being tilled served as the very source of their livelihood (Diod. Sic. 16, 23, 4). If the sacred property was clearly that important, it must have been quite extensive. The Phocians were flagrantly guilty of the charge against them, as the Amphictyons and the Delphian *prytaneis* duly and properly determined. They were the ones who prosecuted those who violated the god's property.¹³

Given the special relation of Delphi to the sanctuary, the Delphians entertained a vested interest in the proper administration of sacred land, and they formed the likeliest group to object to any infringement of it. They stood to gain the most from denouncing the Phocians, and their formal complaint doubtless triggered the crisis. Their long-standing enmity towards the Phocians supplies an additional ingredient. Considering the importance of the sanctuary of Apollo to the Greek world, domestic politics at Delphi and Delphian relations with the Phocians could not necessarily be kept local. Any dispute concerning the sanctuary soon acquired an international component, in this instance the Thebans.

¹³ Spartan financial weakness: Xen. *Ages.* 2, 31; Plut. *Ages.* 40, 2; Phocian admission of guilt: Diod. Sic. 16, 23, 2; 16, 23, 5–6; 24, 5; 27, 3; see also Aeschin. 3, 107; Dem. 18, 18; extent of sacred land: Kahrstedt 1953.

A Delphian indictment of Phocis also explains subsequent Phocian conduct. When Philomelus seized the sanctuary, he claimed only to reassert Phocian presidency of it. He thereby threatened to usurp the role of Delphi, just as the Phocians had tried to do in the fifth century. Delphian charges of impiety also handily explain why Philomelus took such harsh measures against the Delphians when he took control of the sanctuary. He killed members of the Thrakidai, an aristocratic Delphian family, he levied an exceptional tax on all Delphians (Diod. Sic. 16, 28, 2), and Archidamus of Sparta only narrowly dissuaded him from extirpating all of the Delphians (Paus. 3, 10, 4). Philomelus was certainly bent on settling old scores.¹⁴

Two aspects of the crisis of 357/6 remain to be treated: first, the relation between the Theban complaint against Sparta and the Delphian indictment of Phocis, and secondly why the charges were lodged at this particular point. In the first place the Delphians not only needed protection for themselves but even more importantly also needed some party capable of enforcing the verdict of the Amphictyony. Under these circumstances a Delphian appeal to Thebes became perfectly natural for a variety of reasons. First, the Delphians had already publicly warned of the danger to sacred land. Next, the Phocians had demonstrably profaned the god's property. Having a legitimate grievance, the Delphians could reasonably expect the Thebans to prove themselves worthy of the honor of *promanteia* bestowed upon them three years earlier. Furthermore, the Thebans had a just complaint of their own to lay before the Amphictyony. Lastly, the Thebans would presumably be willing to support Delphian action against their traditional enemies. The plan proved so mutually satisfactory that it worked.¹⁵

Several factors probably contributed to the timing of the indictments in addition to those mentioned above. One of the most difficult to evaluate is the stasis within Phocis itself, which Aristotle (*Pol.* 5, 3, 4) claims precipitated the Sacred War. The dispute centered around the families of Mnason and Onomarchus, both of whom were to be prominent in the war. Aristotle does not, however, mention any connection between this turmoil and the Delphian action against Phocis. Nonetheless, the combination of Phocian sacrilege and the stasis must have made the Delphians eager to use

¹⁴ Gomme *et al.* 1945–70, vol. III, p. 667, observed: “the shrine and the community of the Delphians are almost one.” See also Thuc. 3, 101; 4, 118, 1; 5, 18, 2; Gomme, pp. 596–597, 606; Diod. Sic. 16, 24, 3; Buckler 1989a, p. 13.

¹⁵ Amphictyonic laws: Aeschin. 2, 115; Phoebeidas' seizure of the Cadmea: Xen. *Hell.* 5, 2, 27–31; Androtion *FGrH* 324 F 50; Diod. Sic. 15, 20, 2; Plut. *Pel.* 5; Plut. *Ages.* 23, 6; Buckler 1980b; Georgiadou 1997, pp. 85–95; Shipley 1997, pp. 279–280; cf. chapter 4 above.

the earliest opportunity to take action against those who had violated sacred land. Only in the timing of the indictments did the larger affairs of the Greek states perhaps play any part. The threat to sacred land had become obvious to all. Yet Sparta was too weak to react and Phocis too distracted by stasis. Thessaly was unlikely to support either state and anyway was embroiled with the tyrants of Pherae. Athens had its hands full with the Social War. In 357/6 there was very little reason to think that anyone could or would intervene on behalf of the condemned parties.¹⁶

In conclusion, despite the existence of Boeotian enmity towards the Phocians, nothing immediately connects it with the pressing events at Delphi. The sources instead prove that the Phocians and Spartans were guilty of the charges against them, and indicate that the indictments of both ought to be seen in the context of Amphictyonic politics. None of the principals foresaw the outcome of his actions. What began as a rather local affair within the Amphictyony quickly grew to international proportions, and after a decade of war it ended in the triumph of a new force in Greek affairs – Philip of Macedonia.

¹⁶ Phocian families: Arist. *Pol.* 5, 3, 1–5; Aeschin. 2, 143; Diod. Sic. 16, 36, 1; 38, 6; Plut. *Mor.* 825b–c; Paus. 10, 2, 2; 10, 2, 5–7; Aelian, *VH* 11, 5; Buckler 1989a, pp. 18–19. Thessaly: Xen. *Hell.* 6, 4, 37; Diod. Sic. 16, 4, 1–2; Social War: Diod. Sic. 7, 3–4; 7, 21, 1–7, 22, 2.

*Pammenes, the Persians,
and the Sacred War*

Pammenes can be seen as a link between the time of the Theban ascendancy and the victory of Philip II of Macedonia over the Greek states. He continued the foreign policies of Epaminondas and Pelopidas, the first fruits of which Philip harvested at the end of the Sacred War. The tie between Pammenes and Philip began in 369, only two years after the battle of Leuctra and at a time when the Thebans stood at the height of their power. In this summer Pelopidas first undertook a victorious campaign in Thessaly and later in Macedonia, where King Alexander II defended his crown against the usurper Ptolemy, who would later become regent.¹ In return for Theban support, Alexander II sent his brother Philip, the future king of Macedonia, and other nobles as hostages to Thebes. Philip, then a young man, dwelt with Pammenes, where he doubtless occasionally met Epaminondas and Pelopidas.² Pammenes, himself a young man, was nonetheless old enough to command a unit of Boeotian soldiers in Epaminondas' second campaign in the Peloponnesus, where he captured through a ruse the harbor of Sicyon.³ Having publicly won Epaminondas' and Pelopidas' trust, he also shared their concept of Theban foreign policy. At the same time he gave the young Philip, by his stay in Pammenes' house, his first intimate instruction in Greek politics.

Pammenes' next opportunity to further Epaminondas' foreign policy came in the campaigning season after the battle of Mantinea. In 361 he led a Boeotian army to Arcadia to prevent the dismemberment of Megalopolis.⁴ The scanty sources make it impossible to say more about his further deeds until the time of the Sacred War. Although it cannot be established whether he had anything to do with the outbreak of that conflict, he doubtless shared

¹ Buckler 1980a, pp. 110–119.

² Plut. *Pel.* 26, 4–8; Diod. Sic. 15, 67, 4; 16, 2, 2–3; Dem. 19, 135; Aelian, *VH* 13, 7; Justin 7, 5, 1–3; Aymard 1954; Sordi 1975, pp. 56–64; Georgiadou 1997, pp. 194–196.

³ Buckler 1980a, p. 296 n. 40, see also pp. 98–99 and 134.

⁴ Diod. Sic. 15, 94, 1–3; Dusanic 1971, pp. 56–64; Stylianou 1998, pp. 548–549.

the especially deep regard of the Boeotian aristocracy for Delphic Apollo.⁵ In the summer of 356 Philomelus, the *stratēgos autokratōr* of the Phocians, seized the sanctuary of Apollo in Delphi. In late autumn or the beginning of winter in 356 the Delphic Amphictyons declared a Sacred War on the Phocians, whom they named temple robbers.⁶ During the winter the Amphictyony planned a united campaign against Phocis, which they intended simultaneously to attack from the north and south. In early 355 the Thessalians passed through Thermopylae into central Greece in order to join the Locrians, while the Boeotians marched northwards.⁷ Philomelus' army, strengthened by a unit of Achaeans, numbered about 11,500 infantry and cavalry and the Amphictyonic army about 13,000.⁸ Pammenes led the Boeotian contingent to the theater of war, but not before Philomelus had intercepted the Thessalians and Locrians at Argolas, the modern Mendenitza, where he inflicted a serious defeat upon them. Rallying the survivors, Pammenes assumed command of the Amphictyonic army, which he led in several small engagements against Philomelus' mercenaries.⁹ His efforts so thwarted Philomelus that the Phocian hurriedly retreated through the Cleisura Pass south of Argolas to Tithorea.¹⁰ At Neon, the acropolis of Tithorea, Pammenes defeated Philomelus in a great battle in which more soldiers participated than at Leuctra.¹¹ The Phocian general Onomarchus led the survivors back to Delphi, while leaving a rear guard at Philoboeotus, a hill in the Cephissus valley between Phocis and Boeotia.¹²

Pammenes' conduct is far more difficult to understand. The army of Philomelus had suffered defeat, Onomarchus had fled with the survivors, the rear guard on Philoboeotus posed no danger, and the road to Delphi lay open. Nonetheless, although he had won the greatest battle of his career, he did not use his victory to end the Sacred War. Instead of liberating the sanctuary of Apollo and subduing the Phocians, Pammenes merely led his army homewards. He probably thought that the victory at Neon sufficed to suppress the Phocians, but he thereby deceived himself. So long as the Phocian leaders could use the wealth of Delphi for their purposes, they

⁵ Buckler 1980a, pp. 136–137. ⁶ Diod. Sic. 16, 24–28; Pouilloux 1949; Buckler 1989a, pp. 148–176.

⁷ Diod. Sic. 16, 30, 3–16, 31, 4; Paus. 10, 2, 4; Ferguson, *RE* 18.1 (1939), cols. 494–497, *s.v.* Onomarchos; Lefèvre 1998, pp. 31–32.

⁸ Diod. Sic. 16, 30; Flathe 1854, p. 10; Beloch 1912–27, vol. III.1, p. 250; Fiehn, *RE* 19.2 (1938), col. 2525, *s.v.* Philomelos.

⁹ Diod. Sic. 16, 30, 4; cf. A. D. Schaefer 1885, p. 501; Buckler 1989a, pp. 41–43.

¹⁰ Diod. Sic. 16, 31, 1–2.

¹¹ Diod. Sic. 16, 31, 3. Buckler 1989a, pp. 43–44; Buckler 2003, p. 407; McInerney 1999, pp. 209–210.

¹² Polyae. 5, 16, 1; Plut. *Sull.* 16; Bursian 1862, p. 157; Kirsten, *RE* 19.2 (1938), cols. 2431–2432, *s.v.* Philoboitos; Buckler 1989a, p. 44; personal observations of 10 July 1986.

could easily recruit mercenaries. In 355 the Amphictyons and the Greeks in general had not yet understood that simple fact. Since he had failed to make adequate use of his victory, Pammenes had lost the best opportunity for the Amphictyons to win the war.

After the battle of Neon, Onomarchus gathered the remains of Philomelus' army and recruited more mercenaries, the Boeotians agreed to a surprising request from the rebellious Persian satrap Artabazus to come to his aid.¹³ Artabazus and his brothers, Oxythres and Dibictus, had led an aimless struggle against the King and his satraps Chares and the Athenians had played a significant role. In 356/5 the King had threatened the Athenians with war if they refused to recall Chares and immediately withdraw their support of the rebels.¹⁴ The Athenians immediately yielded, which persuaded Artabazus to seek the help of Thebes. The decision held its own logic. The Boeotians had won the great victories of Leuctra and Mantinea, and by the battle of Neon Pammenes had gained a significant place of honor.¹⁵ The Boeotian response is not so easy to understand as is the initiative of the rebels. To the astonishment of the Greek world the Boeotians prepared to support Artabazus and to send him Pammenes and 5,000 hoplites.

These astounding developments demand an explanation, and only one answer suffices: the impossibility of Epaminondas and Pelopidas to make a reality of a Common Peace in 367/6 led to the most humiliating defeat in Theban foreign policy since the King's Peace (see chapter 10). Although Pelopidas won the support of Artaxerxes, the Thebans did not obtain Greek endorsement of the treaty. Lycomedes of Mantinea suggested rather that it be abandoned in order to draft a new Common Peace.¹⁶ The subsequent failure of Epaminondas' naval program led the Boeotians to doubt the usefulness of the closer relations with Persia.¹⁷ In 355 Artabazus made the Boeotians a simple and understandable offer: gold in return for hoplites. The direct advantages were obvious without entailing any great danger from the anger of the King. One can thereby interpret the decision of the Boeotians in 355 as a repudiation of the previous policy of Epaminondas and Pelopidas.

¹³ Diod. Sic. 16, 34, 1; cf. Weiskopf 1989, pp. 54–64; Heskell 1997, pp. 119–120.

¹⁴ Diod. Sic. 16, 22, 1–2; 34, 1; cf. Sachs 1977, p. 138; Bosworth 1980, p. 113; Hornblower 1982, pp. 168–169, 213–214.

¹⁵ Artabazus was then the only rebellious satrap. See also Judeich, *RE* 2.1 (1895), cols. 1299–1300, s.v. Artabazos; Olmstead 1948, pp. 424–429; Ruzicka 1992, pp. 95–97.

¹⁶ *SA* 11, no. 282; Buckler 1980a, pp. 151–160; Jehne 1994, pp. 82–90. ¹⁷ Buckler 1980a, pp. 169–175.

Sometime in the summer of 355 Pammenes and his men began their march to Asia Minor before the Boeotians had fully realized the menace that Onomarchus represented. Pammenes' route is, however, the subject of much, and often unsuccessful, discussion. The Theban led his hoplites overland through Macedonia, the kingdom of his friend Philip, who had recently further extended his authority eastwards along the northern Aegean coast. In the process he had come into conflict with Athens, still a Boeotian enemy in the Sacred War.¹⁸ Philip granted Pammenes the right to march through Macedonia, and Pammenes joined him along the way to the northwestern Aegean. Their meeting was more than a gesture of amity, and Philip was far more than an old boyhood friend. Philip's ambition had steadily led him in the east from Amphipolis until by 355 he had shared the Thracian empire with Cersebleptes.¹⁹

Various factors rendered the situation in Thrace difficult. Since the death of King Cotys the area between Philip's Macedonia and Cersebleptes' kingdom had become split. Even the alliance of Athens with Berisades, Amadocus, and Cersebleptes did not stabilize the situation.²⁰ Cersebleptes probably hoped to reunite Cotys' kingdom. If that failed, his next goal was to divide Amadocus' realm with Philip.²¹ That signified a departure from his earlier policy in which he with Berisades, who died in 357/6, had striven to work together with Amadocus and the Athenians.²² These troubles gave Philip an opportunity to exploit the possibilities that the dismal situation in Thrace offered him. In the meantime, the sons of Berisades in the first *prytaneia* of 356/5 concluded an alliance with Athens, a treaty that essentially renewed their father's agreement.²³ Chaos naturally invited Philip to seize the opportunity in Thrace. When Pammenes reached the north, he met Philip in the realm of Amadocus, which the Macedonian had already invaded. At the same time Cersebleptes stood poised to move westwards. Cersebleptes sent an embassy to Philip and Pammenes at Maronea, where they all strengthened their understanding.²⁴ For Philip there could be an agreement with Cersebleptes

¹⁸ Beloch 1912–27, vol. III.2, p. 269; Hammond 1937, p. 59; Hammond and Griffith 1972–9, vol. II, pp. 264–265; Kelly 1980, p. 79, supposes that Pammenes travelled by sea to Asia, which, however, makes it very difficult to explain how and why Pammenes could have met Philip at Maronea. See also Buckler 1989a, p. 51.

¹⁹ J. R. Ellis 1976, pp. 76–77; Cawkwell 1978a, pp. 36–37; Hammond and Griffith 1972–9, vol. II, pp. 264–267; Buckler 1989a, p. 51.

²⁰ Danov 1976, pp. 343–344; Zahrt 1971, pp. 105–106; Buckler 1986, pp. 348–350; Archibald 1998, p. 232.

²¹ Dem. 18, 23; 18, 183; Cloché 1932. ²² Dem. 23, 183; Diod. Sic. 16, 34, 1; Badian 1983, pp. 57–60.

²³ Tod, no. 151; Rhodes–Osborne, pp. 234–237.

²⁴ Beloch 1912–27, vol. III.2, p. 269; Hammond and Griffith 1972–9, vol. II, pp. 264–267; Buckler 2003, pp. 412–413.

over the future of Amadocus' kingdom and in general over Thrace itself. Pammenes' role in these matters was probably limited to the needs of his own instructions from home. His 5,000 veteran soldiers could serve Philip's goals, and his presence alone probably influenced Cersebleptes to seek an agreement with the Macedonian king. The union of Boeotian and Macedonian forces led by two able and friendly commanders represented not only a huge menace to the Thracian monarchy but also to the interests of Athens in this region.

While Pammenes was doubtless prepared to support Philip, he could not afford to offend Cersebleptes. In order immediately to reach Artabazus, he needed above all the latter's permission freely to march through Thrace. Cersebleptes and his kingdom were also significant for the further reason that the Theban forces would campaign for Artabazus in Phrygia on the eastern side of the Hellespont. A campaign against the King was also dangerous, and the experience of Xenophon's march of the Ten Thousand had demonstrated the great value of a secure escape route back to Europe. Cersebleptes, master of the area west of the Hellespont, stood next to Phrygia, and so Pammenes could easily secure a return path should it be necessary. In short, at the moment Pammenes needed Cersebleptes more than the latter needed him.

For all of these reasons in 355 the three commanders had good cause to work in unison. The single problem was Amadocus' refusal to become their sacrifice. Thrace was not an area easy to conquer, and Amadocus' enemies had differing goals. Cersebleptes was too weak alone to overrun him, Philip was insufficiently prepared to launch such a wearisome war, and Pammenes had no reasonable ground to provoke the Thracians. Opposite them an Athenian squadron under Chares lay at anchor off Neapolis in a prominent position to bar Philip's return to Macedonia.²⁵ Amadocus was awake to the challenge. He ordered Philip to leave his kingdom. The Macedonian complied but not before he plundered Maronea and Abdera. Chares' naval force proved to be only an irritation that Philip evaded by a ruse. Cersebleptes' plans lay scattered in the sands; and later when he realized the possible implications of Philip's designs, he renewed his treaty obligations to Athens. Yet the gesture came too late to save himself from Philip's army.²⁶

An interesting aspect of these events, which has not yet been sufficiently noticed, is the ease with which Amadocus ended the crisis. At first sight his difficulties seemed intimidating. Yet a pre-emptory demand sufficed to stir his enemies to disperse. One must therefore ask why. The bravery of the

²⁵ Polyaeus. 4, 2, 22; Badian 1983, pp. 58–59; Wirth 1985, pp. 50–51.

²⁶ Aeschin. 2, 74; 2, 81–85; Dem. 19, 174; 19, 181; 19, 334. See also *SdA* 11, no. 319.

Thracians and the difficult terrain provide only parts of the answer, which essentially lies with Pammenes. The ultimate destiny of Amadocus' kingdom held for Pammenes far less significance than his immediate assignment. Philip and Cersebleptes at this point stood in no position to provoke Amadocus. Moreover, the fact that Philip must evade Chares' squadron proves the weakness of his force. Nevertheless, Amadocus allowed Pammenes to march through his realm. The simplest explanation is probably the best, with Amadocus' ultimatum providing the answer. Pammenes could not consider the possibility of launching a major campaign unless the road back to Greece lay open to him. Disaster would then prove to be the price of defeat. He also needed a good deal of time for any such contingency. Amadocus offered him precisely that. Philip's plans to conquer Thrace proved premature and Cersebleptes' unrealistic. Allied to neither, Pammenes probably assured Amadocus of his neutrality in return for permission to march through Thrace, probably with free access to markets. Nothing else explains so clearly the sudden collapse of these ambitious plans.

G. T. Griffith has interpreted these events with the help of Pausanias.²⁷ He avers that Philip had concluded an alliance with the Boeotians to end the Sacred War. This thesis lacks support. First, the Boeotians had interpreted their victory at the battle of Neon as the end of the Phocian War. Second, the constitution of the Boeotian Confederacy allowed no commander, even a boeotarch, as Pammenes surely was in 355, to conclude a treaty with a foreign power. As Epaminondas' experience in Achaëa in 366 sufficiently proves, a treaty became valid only after the Boeotian assembly had ratified it.²⁸ Third, inaccuracies of Pausanias should be considered, which are indeed of fundamental importance. One must remember, for example, that he dates the outbreak of the Sacred War in the archonship of Agathocles (357), and that the conflict lasted ten years and ended in the archonship of Theophilos.²⁹ These details, mistaken about a major and well-documented event in Greek history, should bear witness that Pausanias, while an excellent source for what he actually saw, bears no comparison with the testimony of a Thucydides. Rather, he wrote a superb guidebook, not a history, of Greece.

²⁷ Paus. 10, 2, 3; Hammond and Griffith 1972–9, vol. 11, p. 266 n. 4; Kelly 1980, pp. 64–83.

²⁸ Buckler 1980a, pp. 26–28, 188–191; Beck 1997a, pp. 100–102.

²⁹ Outbreak of the war: see n. 6 above. Diod. Sic. 16, 9, 1; 53, 1; Paus. 10, 3, 1; *FD* 111, 5, 19, line 71; Aeschin. 3, 62; Dem. 19, 59; 19, 125–126; Duris *FGH* 76 F 2; Habicht 1985, pp. 95–116; Bearzot 1992, pp. 15–25.

Pausanias' chronology poses many problems that are fortunately not so significant because of the contemporary testimony of Delphic inscriptions and the evidence of Demosthenes, Aeschines, and Duris of Samos. It is far more significant here to realize how Pausanias made his error. It amounts only to Pausanias' assumption that Philip, when in 353 he defended the Thessalians against Onomarchus in the battle of the Crocus Plain, was allied with the Boeotians against the temple robbers. From these events Pausanias has drawn some erroneous conclusions. He failed to realize that Philip held in mind several thoughts and ambitions. First, he ordered his men to crown themselves with laurel, as though they were not only already victors but also served as the avengers of the god. Next, Philip had Onomarchus' corpse crucified to deny him proper burial, which was the fate of the sacrilegious. Lastly, he ordered the defeated mercenaries to be drowned, again because of the sacrilegious source of their pay. These gestures prove that Philip intended to keep his promises to his Thessalian allies, honorably to rid himself of a dangerous enemy, and to appear as the champion of Apollo. Despite their importance to Philip's image as a virtuous man, all of these gestures served to justify his elimination of a man and an army that had twice defeated him.³⁰ Either Pausanias misunderstood Philip's theatrical gestures or he believed that Philip's war against the Phocians began only at this point. At any rate, Philip's half-hearted march on Thermopylae a few weeks later indicates that central Greece did not then hold immediate interest for him.³¹ Philip actually became involved in the Sacred War in 347/6 after the Thessalians had pushed him into it and long after he had forgotten anything that Pammenes may have said.

In Phrygia Pammenes defended Artabazus very ably by several times confounding the loyal Persian army.³² Nevertheless his very success probably caused his downfall. His popularity became something of a thorn in Artabazus' side. At any rate the rebel suspected Pammenes of alleged treasonable relations with the loyal satraps and therefore imprisoned him in the camp.³³ Without suspecting Artabazus' plot and probably innocent of his suspicions, Pammenes went easily to his end. His employer handed him over to his brothers and from there Pammenes disappeared from

³⁰ Justin 8, 2, 3; J. R. Ellis 1976, p. 82; Hammond and Griffith 1972–9, vol. 11, pp. 274–275; Buckler 2003, pp. 418–419.

³¹ Dem. 5, 22–23; 19, 140–141; Aeschin. 2, 140; Diod. Sic. 16, 59, 2; Buckler 1989a, pp. 157–158; Lefevre 1998, p. 95.

³² Diod. Sic. 16, 34, 2; Front. *Strat.* 2, 3, 3; Polyæn. 5, 16, 4–5; A. D. Schaefer 1885, p. 505.

³³ Polyæn. 7, 33, 2; Olmstead 1948, p. 429; Chroust 1972, pp. 373–374.

history. The fate of Orontas in Xenophon's *Anabasis* suggests how Pammenes met his end.³⁴ Under these circumstances Artabazus could scarcely depend any longer on the loyalty of the Boeotian troops, and his deceit basically sealed his own fate. Without the Boeotians Artabazus soon fled to the safety of Macedonia, probably at the beginning of 353.³⁵ The Boeotians took Artabazus' treachery to heart. At the beginning of 351 the Thebans renewed their friendly relations with the King, and offered to provide an army for his Egyptian campaign.³⁶ Artaxerxes overlooked their earlier recklessness and renewed friendly relations. Nevertheless, the Boeotian troops proved unable to conquer Egypt in the campaign about which history knows little.³⁷ Yet the newly established union between Persians and Boeotians remained intact until Alexander's destruction of Thebes in 335. When the King in 344 undertook a new campaign in Egypt, 1,000 Boeotians under Lacrates numbered among his best troops.³⁸

Pammenes' fate reflects the confusion of Theban policy, one that reflected the political myopia of all other Greek states. The *polis* could dominate, but it could rarely integrate. The Greeks came closest with their exploration of federalism as a workable political concept. Yet, only the Romans achieved anything resembling success in these matters. By extending their citizenship even to people who had never seen Rome, they created a community of shared laws, literature, and culture. Nothing of this sort ever received serious consideration in Thebes or elsewhere in Greece. Those concepts that helped to propel Rome to greatness went beyond Pammenes, the Thebans, and their fellow Greeks. Instead, the death of the most gifted Boeotian leader since the days of Pelopidas and Epaminondas, wasted valuable talent when it was so badly needed. The Thebans, like other Greeks, had only themselves to blame for it. They proved incapable of translating military power into a lasting political institution. Seen in this light, the Thebans and their fellow Boeotians, despite their undeniable

³⁴ Orontas was sentenced to death because of persistent disloyalties. After his trial "no man ever saw him living or dead, nor could anyone say how he was put to death; and no grave was ever seen" (Xen. *Anab.* 1, 6, 4–11 [quotation at 11]). Cf. Manfredi 1986, pp. 127–128; Lendle 1995, pp. 52–53.

³⁵ Diod. Sic. 16, 34, 3; Athen. 6, 256d–e; Curtius 6, 5, 1; Pritchett 1974, p. 91, mistakenly maintains that Pammenes later participated in the Sacred War. A. D. Schaefer 1885, p. 505 and Lenschau, *RE* 19.1 (1949), cols. 298–299, s.v. Pammenes, rightly connect Polyaeus' testimony (5, 16, 4) with the Sacred War and specifically with the episode at Philoboetous (5, 16, 1), therefore dating it to 355/4. See also Ferguson, *RE* 18.1 (1939), cols. 494–495, s.v. Onomarchos.

³⁶ Diod. Sic. 16, 40, 1–2. Badian 1983, p. 58, denies the authenticity of this change in policy, as does Heskell 1997, p. 120. Yet the Boeotians needed money, and the King often forgave the perfidy of his traitors: Diod. Sic. 15, 91, 1 (Orontes); 15, 91, 2–7 (Datames); 16, 43–16, 45, 4 (Tennes and Mentor).

³⁷ Dem. 15, 11–12; see also Isoc. 5, 101; Diod. Sic. 16, 44, 1; 48, 1; cf. Beloch 1912–27, vol. III.1, p. 483.

³⁸ Diod. Sic. 16, 44, 1–16, 53, 8; Kahrstedt 1922, p. 529; Pritchett 1974, pp. 90–92.

abilities and their grand operations, proved incapable of maintaining their ascendancy in Greece. The reason for it lay in the nature of Theban leadership with its inability to remedy a fatal flaw in Greek political thinking. In the first fifty years of the fourth century the Boeotians had undertaken campaigns in the Peloponnesus, northern Greece, and Asia Minor mainly with success but basically without a clearly recognized goal. Pammenes' premature death can in some ways be viewed as symptomatic of the crisis of Greek politics in general. His vain attempt to bring a swift end to the Sacred War ironically opened the door to Greece for Philip, who used the exhaustion of the Boeotians and Phocians to his own ends. His alliance with the Boeotians in 347 served as only the prelude to his easy victory over the last Phocian army. He afterwards used the good Theban relations with those in central Greece and the Peloponnesus in order to assume Epaminondas' foreign policy for his own purposes. The inheritance of ascendancy thus fell to Philip and the Macedonians.

*Philip II, the Greeks, and
the King, 346–336 BC*

The aim of this chapter is to examine a congeries of diplomatic, political, and legal arrangements and obligations that linked the Greeks, Macedonians, and Persians in various complicated ways during Philip's final years. The ties between them all were then often tangled and now imperfectly understood and incompletely documented. These matters evoke such concepts as the King's Peace and the Common Peace (*koinē eirēnē*) and involve a number of treaties, some bilateral between Philip and individual states, others broader, as with the Peace of Philocrates between himself and his allies and the Athenians and theirs, and finally the nature of Philip's settlement with the Greeks in 338/7. In the background there always stood the King, who never formally renounced the rights that he enjoyed under the King's Peace of 386, even though he could seldom directly enforce them. It is an irony of history that Philip used the concept of a Common Peace in Greece both to exclude the King from Greek affairs and as a tool of war against him. By so doing, Philip rejected the very basis of the King's Peace as it was originally drafted and later implemented. In its place he resurrected the memory of the days when the Greeks had thwarted Xerxes' invasion, and he fanned the desire for retaliation of past wrongs, a theme that Alexander would also later put to good use.¹

The year 346 was remarkable for three peace treaties, each separate, although all involved at least some of the same numerous belligerents. The

¹ Proof that the King was instrumental in establishing the concept of a general peace comes from Xen. *Hell.* 5, 1, 31–32, in which he writes "King Artaxerxes thinks it just . . . that the other Greek cities, both small and great, should be left independent." Lewis 1977, p. 147, and Badian 1991, p. 37, emphasize that he was ending a bilateral war with the Spartans and their allies, basing their argument on the next clause beginning with *hopoteroi* ("whosoever"). If limited merely to that goal, one can reasonably expect terminology identical with that found in Thuc. 8, 37, which includes only "the Lacedaemonians and their allies" on the Greek side. The King encompassed in the Peace of 386 even those states that had not participated in the war, a view independently proposed by Sealey 1993, p. 13. Lewis and Badian do not realize that the King used his diktat both to end the Corinthian War and also to settle to his satisfaction the affairs of all the Greek states.

first was the Phocian general Phalaecus' surrender to Philip that ended the hostilities between them.² The next was the Peace of Philocrates between Philip and the Athenians that ended their conflict for control of the northwestern Aegean.³ The terms of the Peace of Philocrates bound most, but not all, of the major participants of the "War for Amphipolis."⁴ Thebes and its allies were not considered a party to it, even though Thebes itself had only the year before concluded a separate alliance with Philip.⁵ Last-minute efforts to include Phocis failed; and Cersebleptes, who had played such a prominent, if undistinguished, role in the conflict was expressly excluded from it.⁶ The only Athenian allies who formally participated in it were the members of the Second Athenian League. Despite the number of Greeks involved, this treaty can by no means be considered a Common Peace and was not so referred to in antiquity.⁷ That much should have been clear from the testimony of Aeschines, who repeatedly mentions the failure of the Athenians to interest other Greeks in peace with Philip.⁸ This simple fact is hardly surprising, inasmuch as most of them were not at war with him, which of itself made a peace treaty pointless. Nor did they wish unnecessarily to become embroiled with him. Finally, the Peace of Philocrates did not include the King, who had played no part in these events.

The last treaty came when the Amphictyonic Council accepted the surrender of the Phocians and resumed control of the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi.⁹ Although he was not then a member of the Delphic Amphictyony, Philip nonetheless participated in the rites that concluded hostilities and used the votes of his allies to establish a peace to his and their liking.¹⁰ Moreover, a Delphian inscription makes it abundantly clear that only some members of the Amphictyony were formally involved in these events. Others were conspicuously absent.¹¹ Sparta, Corinth, and Sicyon

² *SdA* 11, no. 330.

³ *SdA* 11, no. 329; Ryder 1965, pp. 145–49, with earlier bibliography; J. R. Ellis 1976, pp. 107–126; Cawkwell 1978a, pp. 91–113; Hammond and Griffith 1972–9, vol. 11, pp. 329–341; Errington 1981/2, pp. 73–77; Buckler 1989a, pp. 114–142; Urban 1991; McNerney 1999, pp. 215–225, on which see J. Buckler's review in *BMCr* (<http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/bmcrr/2000/2000-11-29.html>).

⁴ For the term, see Isoc. 5, 2; Aeschin. 2, 70; Dem. 5, 14.

⁵ *SdA* 11, no. 327; Hammond and Griffith 1972–9, vol. 11, p. 266; Kelly 1980, pp. 64–83; see above, chapter 15, p. 227.

⁶ Aeschin. 3, 73–74; 2, 84; Buckler 1989a, pp. 132–34.

⁷ Diod. Sic. 16, 77, 2, who in fact pays little attention to this treaty. Hampl 1938, pp. 58–59; Griffith 1939; Ryder 1965, p. 149.

⁸ Aeschin. 2, 57–61; 3, 58. ⁹ *SdA* 11, no. 331.

¹⁰ *FD* 111.5, no. 19, line 74; Dem. 5, 13; 19, 24; Diod. Sic. 16, 60, 1. Philip only later became a member of the Council; see Ps.-Dem. 11, 4 and Roux 1979, pp. 18, 166–167; Lefèvre 1998, pp. 94–101.

¹¹ *FD* 111.5, no. 19, lines 71, 75.

remained passive in the Peloponnesus; and when Philip explicitly called upon the Athenians for help in liberating the sanctuary, they refused because of fear.¹² Furthermore, the term *koinē eirēnē* is nowhere found in the document. Nor should it even be expected, for the Amphictyony was a religious, not a political, association.¹³ The King was neither a member of the Amphictyony nor a participant in the plundering of Apollo's treasures. Therefore, there was absolutely no reason for him to be a party to these events. Philip had simply made possible a settlement by most, but not all, of the Amphictyons concerning the sanctuary. He had in fact ended a war that had neither involved all the states of Greece nor had anything to do with the King.

Diodorus (16, 60, 3), however, states that the Amphictyons established a "Common Peace and concord of the Greeks," a phrase reminiscent of Andocides' "Common Peace and freedom for all of the Greeks" (3, 17). Here again the adjective *koinē* modifies both nouns and cannot be taken as a technical term. It is thus well to ask what Diodorus meant by a "Common Peace." The use of it in the so-called "Reply to the Satraps"¹⁴ and by Ps.-Demosthenes (17, *Concerning the Treaty with Alexander*) clearly dates it to the fourth century, and perhaps Diodorus found it in Ephorus. Throughout his work Diodorus uses the phrase *koinē eirēnē* inconsistently and often in a non-technical sense. The point here is that the Amphictyonic Council clearly could not conclude a formal Common Peace, as that term is generally understood by scholars today, nor did it attempt to do so.¹⁵ In short, neither the Peace of Philocrates nor the end of the Sacred War constituted a Common Peace analogous to the settlement that Artaxerxes dictated to Antalcidas in 387/6 and again in 375 or to Pelopidas in 367/6.¹⁶ Nor were these treaties of 346 identical with that made after the battle of Mantinea in 362.¹⁷ In 346 there was no single joint convention of the Greeks and no one formal, general treaty of peace mutually accepted. Instead, most of the major and many of the minor Greek states had simply settled their differences for the moment in separate situations and under separate treaties, and that without the participation of the King.

¹² Dem. 5, 14; 19, 51; Aeschin. 2, 137.

¹³ Freeman 1893, chapter 3; Roux 1979, chapter 1; Gehrke 1986, pp. 166–168. ¹⁴ *SdA* 11, no. 292.

¹⁵ In 368 Philiscus tried to restore peace at a meeting in Delphi (Xen. *Hell.* 7, 1, 27; Diod. Sic. 15, 70, 2), but his presence there was independent of the Amphictyonic Council. Delphi was presumably chosen as a neutral spot. See also Ryder 1965, pp. 134–135; Buckler 1980a, pp. 102–104.

¹⁶ *SdA* 11, nos. 242 and 265, and (for 371) no. 269; for Pelopidas, see Buckler 1980a, pp. 151–160; Jehne 1994, pp. 82–90; Georgiadou 1997, pp. 205–211.

¹⁷ *SdA* 11, no. 292, with bibliography.

It remains to observe what Philip and the Greeks made of this state of affairs. The general response of the Greeks, when it can be documented at all, was largely favorable to Philip, as even the Athenians grudgingly admitted.¹⁸ The Boeotians and Thessalians were pleased by Philip's diplomatic accomplishments. Demosthenes and Aeschines, for once in agreement on a topic, realized that Athens had almost simultaneously lost two wars. In the process, Athens had also lost Euboea, and Phocis was already politically dissected. The Peloponnesian allies of Thebes saw in Philip one willing to assist their friend and to continue the policies of Epaminondas.¹⁹ Although consensus elsewhere in the Peloponnesus was lacking, that was nothing more than a reflection of normal Greek politics there, and yet another sign that many states did not consider the treaties of 346 as a Common Peace. In Elis the citizenry was hotly divided between those who championed Philip and those who opposed him (Dem. 19, 260). In Megara Philip's supporters were so strong that Demosthenes claimed that they almost handed the area to him (Dem. 19, 294–295; 19, 334). The Arcadians and the Argives openly honored Philip for his efforts (Dem. 19, 261). Thus, by 346 Philip had won new friends in a region where his influence had previously been negligible, and he was beginning to draw the noose around the Athenian neck. Furthermore, he did so solely on the basis of his own achievements without reference to any Common Peace and without drawing unwelcome attention from the King.

If the point needs any further demonstration, the history of the following years readily provides it. As early as 344 Demosthenes complained that Philip was breaking the Peace of Philocrates, which he describes as a treaty only between Macedonia and Athens.²⁰ Although he also claims that Philip had designs on all of Greece, it is clear that most Greeks thought otherwise and preferred to let Athens settle its own differences with Philip. Nor for that matter is there any evidence to suggest that Philip then entertained thoughts of the conquest of Greece. He had far too much to do in the northern Aegean to think of further fields of conquest to the south. Decisive proof of the point comes from the embassy of Python of Byzantium to Athens, also in 344.²¹ Python and other ambassadors from Philip and his allies traveled to Athens to settle a dispute over the possession of Halonnesus. Python proposed to submit the question to the legal

¹⁸ Dem. 18, 219–220; 18, 334; Aeschin. 2, 119–120.

¹⁹ Cawkwell 1978a, pp. 108–113; Buckler 1980a, pp. 145–147; Wirth 1985, pp. 95–98.

²⁰ Dem. 6, 2; see also Ps.-Dem. 7, 30.

²¹ Hammond and Griffith 1972–9, vol. 11, pp. 493–495; Wirth 1985, p. 115.

procedure of *symbolē* and any other differences between Philip and Athens to arbitration.²² Neither *symbolē* nor arbitration had hitherto been a part of a Common Peace. *Symbolē* was a commercial contract between two states in which any dispute was to be settled in court.²³ Arbitration was normally a feature of peace treaties between two powers, such as that found in the Thirty Years' Truce and the Peace of Nicias.²⁴ Halonnesus was itself unimportant, but it provided the occasion to review the clauses of the Peace of Philocrates.²⁵ Some Athenians urged in response that the peace be amended and others that it be rescinded in order to regain Amphipolis, Potidaea, and other places.²⁶ Still another Ps.-Demosthenes, perhaps in this case Hegesippus, states specifically that the peace was limited to Athens, Philip, and their allies, and he suggests that other Greeks should be included so that it could become a real and generally shared peace.²⁷ Here is additional contemporary testimony that nothing so formal as the previous King's Peace or the Common Peace of 362 was a feature of the Peace of Philocrates. The evidence is quite to the contrary. Nor did Philip accept the Athenian suggestion to broaden the peace. He obviously preferred to keep his diplomatic relations with other Greek states separate from those with the Athenians and some of their allies. Noteworthy,

²² Dem. 18, 136; Ps.-Dem. 7, 7; 7, 12–14; Plut. *Mor.* 804a–b.

²³ Kahrstedt, *RE* 11 4.1 (1931), cols. 1088–90 s.v. *symbolē*.

²⁴ *SdA* 11, nos. 156, 183; Tod 1913, p. 179. Ryder 1965, pp. 84–85, 140–144, suggests arbitration as part of the Peace of 362 on the authority of Accame 1941, p. 175, but there is actually no evidence for it. Arbitration cannot be proven an ingredient in the Common Peace even in the late Hellenistic period: *Syll.*³ 665, lines 19–20. See also Larsen 1939, p. 378; Larsen 1944, p. 160; Ryder 1965, pp. 158–159, 161, but even here the evidence is at best inconclusive: Rhodes–Osborne, no. 82.

²⁵ If Ps.-Dem. 12 truly came from Philip's hand, it would suggest that Philip also took the occasion to enjoy some fun at Athenian expense; see 12, 13–15, in which the author remorselessly proves the idiocy of the Athenian case. On the authenticity of the letter, see Wüst 1938, pp. 133–136. According to Ps.-Dem. 7, 33, the letter was still in the *bouleuterion*.

²⁶ Ps.-Dem. 7, 13; 7, 18; 7, 22–23; 7, 26–27; Ps.-Dem. 12, 8; 7, 18 alone argues against the statement of Cawkwell 1978a, p. 124 that Philip suggested any amendments to the Peace of Philocrates (see also 7, 7–11). Indeed, Philip claimed (7, 32–33) that he had never agreed to amend the peace, which fully explains his offer only of arbitration.

²⁷ On the authorship of Ps.-Dem. 7, see Lesky 1966, p. 604. The words of Ps.-Dem. 7, 30–31 have special importance: “Concerning the other amendment that you propose to us about amending the peace, namely that the other Greeks, those not joining the peace (*tous allous Hellēnas, hosoi mē koinōnousi tēs eirēnēs*) should be free and autonomous; and if anyone attacks them, the participants in the peace should help them, you thought it just and benevolent that the peace should not remain solely between us and our allies and Philip and his. Others instead being allies of neither, finding themselves in the middle and under the threat of ruin by stronger powers, you thought indeed that your peace should extend to protect them and that we should disarm to achieve peace.” The words “the other Greeks, those not joining the peace” need not, and in this case cannot, refer to a Common Peace. Rather it means only a specific peace shared by specific parties. In view of this passage alone, it is difficult to understand why J. R. Ellis 1976, p. 146, claims that Philip proposed a Common Peace, when it was clearly an Athenian initiative.

moreover, is that some Athenians now saw both Philip and the King as threats to Greek liberty (Dem. 6, 6; 6, 11–12).

Immediately pertinent in this connection is yet another embassy to Athens in 344, this one from the King. The Persian ambassadors were received at a time when Macedonian envoys were also in the city. Philochorus, Androtion, and Anaximenes report that the Persian ambassadors stated that the King considered it appropriate that the peace and the ancestral friendship between them be maintained.²⁸ The Athenians replied stoutly that peace would endure between them unless the King attacked the Greek cities.²⁹ The arrival of the Persian embassy had absolutely nothing to do with that of Philip's. Artaxerxes at the time was engaged in reconquering Phoenicia and Egypt and obviously wanted to recruit mercenaries, or, failing that, at least be assured of Athenian neutrality.³⁰ Nothing better reflects the complexity of the meaning of the concept of the Common Peace in these years than the Athenian response to these delegations. First, the term *koinē eirēnē* nowhere appears here, merely a reference to hereditary friendship.³¹ Yet the reference to peace in the context of the Persian delegation surely refers to previous treaties between the King and the Greeks. The Athenian allusion to the Greek cities obviously echoes the terms of the original King's Peace, by which Asia was Persian and Europe Greek. It simply repeats the Greek sentiments expressed earlier in the so-called "Reply to the Satraps." In essence, the Greeks considered a peace to be both *de facto* and also *de iure* in effect among themselves and between themselves and the King so long as he confined his activity to Asia. Thus, the Greeks remained willing to abide by their part of the pact made in 386 and later renewed, the "Peace of Pelopidas" notwithstanding. Even though a multitude of events earlier in the fourth century makes the Athenian stance in 344 convenient, specious, and even sanctimonious, it was nevertheless legally correct.³²

²⁸ Philochorus *FGrH* 328 F 157; Androtion *FGrH* 324 F 53; Anaximenes *FGrH* 72 F 28. See also Diod. Sic. 16, 44; Sordi 1969, pp. 81–82.

²⁹ Harris 1989 denies that the Athenian response was haughty, yet the tone is decidedly firm, and reminiscent of the "Reply to the Satraps."

³⁰ Dandamaev 1989, pp. 309–311. For the date: Isoc. 5, 102–103; S. Smith 1924, p. 148.

³¹ In terms of hereditary friendship, the Argives had earlier done something similar when they sent an embassy to Artaxerxes to ask whether the friendship that they had enjoyed with Xerxes was still in effect: Hdt. 7, 151.

³² Convenient: in 344 the Athenians were in no position to aid anyone. Specious: Iphicrates had earlier helped the Persians in precisely the same way that Artaxerxes requested in 344 (Diod. Sic. 15, 34). Sanctimonious: the Athenians were forced in 357 to recall Chares because he was leading rebellious Persian forces (Diod. Sic. 16, 21–22), but only after Artaxerxes' firm complaint. No diplomatic principles were involved in these episodes, only political expediency.

If peace of whatever sort prevailed in Greece in 344, it did not elsewhere in the eastern Mediterranean. A detailed account of these years would go well beyond the immediate theme of the present investigation and can be found elsewhere.³³ Nevertheless, certain specific events pertain alike to the history of Philip's career, his relations with the King and some of his subjects, and with the Athenians, as well as to the topic of Common Peace.

In the following years a single Macedonian policy both provoked renewed hostility with Athens and also brought Philip into conflict with the King. That policy was Philip's determination to subdue Thrace in order at the very least to anchor the eastern boundary of his empire on the western shore of the Hellespont. If successful, Philip would eliminate all Athenian influence in the northern Aegean, imperil the vital grain route of Athens, and give the King a powerful and perhaps unwanted neighbor.³⁴ War with Athens, its allies, and perhaps other Greek states was quite likely, and Philip could not readily foresee how wide such a war would be. Granted that possession of the Thermopylae corridor gave him a solid defensive position in the south and granted that many Greek states felt well disposed towards him, the fact nonetheless remains that he had not yet secured either their loyalty or their obedience.³⁵ Even his settlement in Phocis had its dangers. Although the Phocians were physically and politically divided and garrisoned by Macedonians and Thebans, in terms of power the area was a political vacuum, one that Thebes could fill more quickly, if not permanently, than he, as the Theban occupation of Nicaea amply demonstrated.³⁶ It thus becomes clear that until Philip had conquered Thrace he could not in any reasonable strategic terms think either of moving south against Athens and the rest of Greece or of mounting a major invasion of Persian territory.

Philip renewed his operations in Thrace in 342 and by the next year he had dethroned Cersebleptes and sent aid to Cardia in the Chersonesus to baffle Athenian aspirations there.³⁷ Despite the vociferous denials of some Athenian orators, Philip had every right to protect his Cardian allies from

³³ Wüst 1938, pp. 86–140; J. R. Ellis 1976, pp. 125–159; Hammond and Griffith 1972–9, vol. 11, pp. 458–495; Bengtson 1985, pp. 75–92; Dandamaev 1989, pp. 296–313; Ruzicka 1992, pp. 115–121.

³⁴ Kienast 1973, pp. 13–15 provides a discussion of Philip's Thracian ambitions and their place in his policy towards Persia.

³⁵ For the strategic importance of Thermopylae, see Aeschin. 2, 132; 2, 138; 3, 140 with schol.; Ps.-Dem. 11, 4; Oldfather, *RE* 17.1 (1936), cols. 222–226 *s.v.* Nikaia; Buckler 1989a, pp. 92–97.

³⁶ Philochorus *FGrH* 328 F 56b.

³⁷ Cersebleptes: Ps.-Dem. 10, 5; 10, 8; Diod. Sic. 16, 71, 1–2; Justin 9, 1; Cardia: Dem. 8, 14; 9, 16; Ps.-Dem. 10, 60; 10, 65; 12, 11; see also Ps.-Dem. 7, 39–45. The two events are linked by Ps.-Dem. 10, 15–18 and Dem. 8, 14.

Athenian depredations.³⁸ Nonetheless, his intervention in the Chersonesus brought him again in conflict with the Athenians. Moreover, he moved further north in the defense of the Greek cities of the Hellespont where he was at first welcomed as an ally and protector (Diod. 16, 71, 2). The Athenians responded by claiming that he had broken the peace, and Demosthenes urged that embassies be sent to various Greek cities and to the King to stop any further Macedonian advance.³⁹ According to Ps.-Demosthenes (12, 6–7), the Athenians had actually proposed to send an embassy to the King seeking a common front against Philip. Whether true or not, such a delegation, if limited only to a defensive alliance, would not violate the terms of the Peace of Philocrates.⁴⁰ Nor does Ps.-Demosthenes 12 at any time accuse the Athenians of having violated any Common Peace. These factors make the reference to the King especially pertinent in this connection. Gone is the image of the King as the traditional enemy of Greek freedom. Elsewhere as well Demosthenes tells his audience that the King harbors friendly feelings for all of the Greeks except the Athenians (Dem. 10, 52).⁴¹ He reminds them that they deserve such treatment for having earlier spurned the King's overtures (10, 34), an obvious reference to the events of 344. To mend this state of affairs he urges them to send an embassy to the King (10, 33), the latter a reflection of Demosthenes' earlier policy (9, 71). Ps.-Demosthenes shows no patience with those who call the King "the barbarian and the common enemy of the Greeks."⁴² Although the Athenians apparently rejected his advice, at least some of them had obviously come to fear Philip far more than the King. He is ironically enough depicted as the one best able to protect the common liberty of the Greeks.

The purported reason for this new community of purpose, insofar as it can be documented, is that Philip had wronged both the Greeks and the Persians. In fact, Philip had as yet done nothing of the sort to either. The only flimsy evidence that Philip harbored at that time any hostile designs

³⁸ Dem. 5, 25 (see also Diod. Sic. 16, 34, 4) in 346 admits that the Athenians had renounced any claim to Cardia in the Peace of Philocrates, thus leaving them no legal claim to it. Accordingly, Philip had no reason either to deny or to justify his aid to the city: Dem. 8, 14; 9, 16; Ps.-Dem. 12, 11; see also Ps.-Dem. 7, 39–45.

³⁹ Dem. 9, 71; the passage referring to these embassies, though lacking in the best MSS, is nonetheless printed by Dindorf and Blass 1901, *ad loc.*; Ps.-Dem. 10, 33.

⁴⁰ If these accusations were true, however, they would be still another sign of the increasing isolation of Athens in Greek politics and could not then be taken as typical of the attitude of other Greek states. Since the Athenians had long been sending embassies to the King (Hdt. 7, 151), there is nothing implausible about the claim.

⁴¹ For the authenticity of the Fourth Philippic, see Körte 1905 Adams 1938; and Worthington 1991.

⁴² Didymus 6, 63–64; Anaximenes *FGrH* 72 F 9; see also Jacoby *FGrH* 111b (Suppl.), pp. 531–533.

against the King comes from the inconsiderable cases of Artabazus and Hermias of Atarneus. After the failure of his revolt against Artaxerxes, Artabazus and his son-in-law Memnon fled to Philip's court.⁴³ Yet Artabazus' other son-in-law, Mentor, served so well as satrap of the Asian coast and overall commander of the Persian forces that he gained pardon for his kinsmen, who thereafter served the King faithfully.⁴⁴ The two Persians could at most have provided Philip with information drawn from experience and perhaps with some friendly Persian contacts. Yet they could hardly have served as useful agents for any designs that Philip may have had on the King's possessions. Nor had Philip harmed the Greeks during these years, his attention having been directed primarily against the Thracians.⁴⁵

The career of Hermias of Atarneus, for all of its dramatic qualities, could not have prompted hostility between Philip and the King. Hermias is generally depicted as a political adventurer who took advantage of the turmoil in Asia Minor to turn Atarneus into his own independent principality and to expand his influence into the Troad. Although Ps.-Demosthenes calls Hermias Philip's agent, privy to the Macedonian's plots, he probably played no part in Philip's plans.⁴⁶ There is certainly no evidence at all of any formal treaty between the two, and absolutely none to support Ps.-Demosthenes' claims about Philip's intentions.⁴⁷ A mere glance at the map will show that Atarneus could never successfully have served as a bridgehead for a Macedonian invasion of Asia Minor. The political dimension of this relationship may have been nothing more elaborate than Philip's desire to remain on friendly terms with Hermias and his colleagues in the Troad. Hermias in turn wanted to remain in good standing with his new neighbor in Europe, especially should his ambitions make it necessary for him to seek asylum. The fate of Hermias had nothing to do with Philip. Hermias had independently, briefly, and ultimately unsuccessfully set himself against the King, a part of a larger and common enough pattern in Asia Minor in these years. He paid the price of his failure with his life. Even his famous refusal to divulge anything to the Persians

⁴³ Diod. Sic. 16, 5, 3; Buckler 1989a, pp. 53 n. 35, with bibliography.

⁴⁴ Diod. Sic. 16, 52, 2; Arr. *Anab.* 1, 12, 9; Bosworth 1980, pp. 112–113.

⁴⁵ Diod. Sic. 16, 34, 4; *SdA* 11, nos. 308, 318; Wirth 1985, pp. 121–123.

⁴⁶ Ps.-Dem. 10, 32 and schol. to 10, 7; Didymus 4, 61–67; 8, 26–32; Theopompus *FGrH* 115 F 250; Diod. Sic. 16, 52, 5. Although Wirth 1985, pp. 118–119, rightly sees an anti-Persian element in this relationship, Errington 1990, p. 89, is correct in finding no long-cherished ambitions of Philip in the area. See also Sealey 1993, p. 183.

⁴⁷ Judeich 1892, p. 298, nonetheless posits a formal alliance between them.

about Philip's plans may have resulted more from his lack of anything to say than from any philosophical principle or political friendship.

Philip did give both the Athenians and the King cause for alarm, when he attacked Perinthus and Byzantium without clear provocation. The details are obscure, but the complaints against the two cities are doubtless specious.⁴⁸ Philip and later Alexander claimed that Perinthus had wronged Macedonia and that Byzantium had failed to honor its treaty obligations when it refused to take up arms against Perinthus. In terms of alliances, Byzantium had seceded from the Second Athenian League, and Perinthus had apparently followed its lead.⁴⁹ Hence, they were bound neither by the agreements that had created the Athenian sea-league nor had they participated in the Peace of Philocrates. Byzantium had in the meantime agreed to an alliance with Philip that it interpreted as purely defensive in nature.⁵⁰ The Byzantines clearly did not believe that Perinthus was the aggressor and accordingly refused to answer Philip's call to arms. Lastly, since Artaxerxes had never renounced his right to do what he considered "just," he could consider it proper for him to intervene against Philip to defend the "autonomy of Greek states small and great." Thus, in this incident at least two different treaties could be invoked, with each party interpreting the situation in the way that it wished.

Philip's attacks on Perinthus and Byzantium drew Athens and the King, albeit independently, closer to a common goal of thwarting Philip's ambitions in the area. At least one Athenian orator even hoped that the King would become the paymaster of the Athenians in the effort to repel Philip (Ps.-Dem. 11, 6). Although the King had never since the original King's Peace attempted directly to enforce his will militarily in Greece, he was now in a situation in which he could do so with very slight risk. He intervened so effectively that the orator averred that the mercenary soldiers of the satraps of Asia Minor had compelled Philip to raise the siege of Perinthus (Ps.-Dem. 11, 5).⁵¹ Support for his claim comes from a variety of sources, some of them contemporary. Theopompus (*FGrH* 115 F 222) reports that one Aristodemus of Pherae, who later commanded Greek mercenaries against Alexander the Great, had also served with the generals of the King against Philip. Anaximenes (*FGrH* 72 F 11b, 5) also testifies to mercenaries in the pay of the King operating against Philip in defense of

⁴⁸ In the *Letter of Philip* (Ps.-Dem. 12) no mention of Perinthus is made, even though the matter figures prominently in the *Answer to Philip's Letter* (Ps.-Dem. 11, 3; 11, 5); Dem. 18, 87; Ps.-Dem. 12, 2; Diod. Sic. 16, 74, 2; Arr. *Anab.* 2, 14, 5; Justin 9, 1, 2–5.

⁴⁹ Plut. *Dem.* 17, 2; Cargill 1981, p. 181. ⁵⁰ *SdA* 11, no. 318.

⁵¹ Philochorus *FGrH* 328 T 54; Diod. Sic. 16, 75, 1.

Perinthus. Diodorus (16, 75, 1–2) states that the King ordered his satraps on the coast to assist Perinthus with mercenaries, funds, food, and material. One of the mercenary commanders was Apollodorus of Athens, who was dispatched by Aristes, satrap of Phrygia.⁵² An important aspect of this incident is that whatever the Greeks might make of the concept of the Common Peace, Artaxerxes still thought in terms of his original King's Peace. If he acted in 340 and not earlier it was because these events provided him with a unique situation. He had never before enjoyed such a favorable opportunity directly to use military might to enforce his will in Greece without at the same time alarming the Greeks.⁵³ Moreover, there was now no one to stop him, and the scene of action was far removed from the mainstream of Greek politics. He could even justifiably argue, although there is no evidence that he did, that he protected Greek freedom from Macedonian aggression.

Sometimes associated with these events is the alleged treaty of alliance and friendship between Philip and the King, which surfaces in a very suspicious context.⁵⁴ According to Arrian (*Anab.* 2, 14, 2), after the battle of Issus, Darius sent Alexander a letter in which, among other things, he mentioned such a treaty. He also claimed that when Arsēs, son of Artaxerxes, became king, Philip first wronged him. The letter also observes that Alexander had sent no envoy to the Great King to confirm their ancient friendship and alliance. The events of 340 argue forcibly that the letter cannot be authentic. Nevertheless, even should one wish to accept it, it is obvious that the situation compelled Darius to be as conciliatory and as aggrieved as possible. Alexander had just defeated him in pitched battle, Egypt was in the Macedonian's grasp and even as Alexander read the letter he had the Great King's wife, children, and mother in his power. Darius had every reason to bend the truth and to fabricate generalities of past amicable Persian and Macedonian relations. Furthermore, in his purported reply Alexander never acknowledges the existence of this treaty, much less does he defend his conduct by accusing the Persians of having been the first to violate it. Instead, he retails the various wrongs that the Persians had done the Macedonians and Greeks, a defense of Philip's publicly proclaimed reason for having invaded Persian territory in the first place.

⁵² Paus. 1, 29, 10, on which see Frazer 1898, vol. 11, pp. 382–383; Strabo 16, 3, 5.

⁵³ Pharnabazus' use of Conon during the Corinthian War is somewhat analogous: Funke 1980, pp. 81–85.

⁵⁴ *SA* 11, no. 333; Bosworth 1980, pp. 228–233, with earlier bibliography. Wirth 1985, p. 115, associates the treaty with the King's Egyptian campaign. Neither Bernhardt 1988 nor Sealey 1993, p. 308 n. 40, can prove a formal alliance.

Alexander's letter provides no evidence whatsoever that the Macedonian was even aware of a treaty, which, even had it existed, would have had nothing to do either with the King's Peace or the Common Peace.

In his letter Alexander is himself guilty of trying to falsify history. He claims that Ochus at some unspecified time had sent a force into Thrace, then under Macedonian rule (Arr. *Anab.* 2, 14, 5). Yet it is virtually impossible to substantiate the accusation. Theopompus mentions that Philip launched an attack on a Thracian tribe, the Tetrachoritae, also identified with the Bessoi, and the city of Agesus, to which Polyaeus (4, 4, 1) adds that Antipatrus played a prominent part in the operations.⁵⁵ Some have put this incident in 340.⁵⁶ Yet even without questioning the authenticity of a Macedonian campaign in this area, one cannot link the Persians to it. Geography alone is against any alleged Persian intervention in northern Thrace in this or, for that matter, any other time. Moreover, there is no comprehensible way that a Persian expedition to assist the Bessoi could be strategically significant to an effort to bring relief to Perinthus and Byzantium, even as a diversionary tactic. For the Persian-paid forces the distances were too great, the lines of supply too long, and the invading army too vulnerable to the danger of being cut off from its base. If Alexander's complaint has any validity at all, which is extremely doubtful, he must have referred to the actions around Perinthus. If so, he was doing nothing more than gilding the lily, and so that particular claim should not be taken as a separate grievance. Perhaps the important aspect of his allegation, despite its meretricious nature, is that it brings the point of friction between Philip and the King once again to Thrace. The soundest conclusion of all, however, is that the entire matter of a Persian-Macedonian alliance as related by Arrian is an ancient fabrication.

The only other piece of evidence available also supports the view that Philip had no official ties with Persia. Plutarch reports a Persian embassy to Philip that cannot be dated.⁵⁷ Philip himself was absent at the time, and obviously nothing came of the matter. It need not be doubted that Philip maintained contact with the satraps in Asia Minor and also with the King but that hardly constitutes a treaty.⁵⁸ Nor have historians found an appropriate and convincing place in Philip's career for such a treaty. The only contemporary evidence to bear upon the matter comes from Demosthenes

⁵⁵ Theopompus *FGrH* 115 F 217–218; Hdt. 7, 3, 2; Liv. 44, 7; Steph. Byz. *s.v.* Tetrachoritai; Oberhummer, *RE* 3.1 (1897), cols. 329–331 *s.v.* Bessoi.

⁵⁶ Beloch 1912–27, vol. 111.1, pp. 548–551; Bosworth 1980, p. 231.

⁵⁷ *Alex.* 5, 1; *Mor.* 342b; J. R. Hamilton 1969, p. 13.

⁵⁸ Momigliano 1934, p. 139 n. 1; Wüst 1938, p. 89; Wirth 1985, p. 148.

(4, 48). In 351 he claimed that some Athenians had spread the rumor that Philip had sent an embassy to the King, and immediately added (4, 49) that these rumor-mongers were a pack of fools. The important point in this connection is that the only contemporary witness, who was certainly no friend of Philip, displays no knowledge of any treaty between Philip and the King. Therefore, there is no need to postulate one.

Enough remains, however, to prove Philip's distinct interest in Asian affairs but nothing more. Even his response to the King's intervention in the Perinthian affair was defensive in nature. His new advances in Thrace gave Philip additional reason to seek friendly relations with his immediate Asian neighbors, as the incident with Pixodarus proves.⁵⁹ Pixodarus of Caria made overtures to Philip seeking a marriage alliance. Philip treated the matter with his usual caution. Nothing came immediately of the contact, although Alexander would later reap the harvest of friendly relations between Macedonia and Caria. Nevertheless, this otherwise insignificant incident demonstrates both Philip's interest in Asia Minor and the realization of dynasts there that Philip could be a potential friend against the King. Yet nothing could be done in Asia until Philip had settled Greek affairs.

In Greece meanwhile the Athenians declared war on Philip in 340.⁶⁰ The Macedonian victory over the Athenians and Thebans at Chaeronea in 338 ended the period of open warfare. Victory also gave Philip the opportunity to secure the obedience of the other Greek states. He first made peace with his two opponents and their allies.⁶¹ He next entered the Peloponnesus, where he settled a number of territorial disputes.⁶² Having done so, he announced his intention to wage a war of revenge against Persia and summoned the Greeks to a congress at Corinth.⁶³ Philip's conduct can be put into a traditional context. It was by no means unusual for Greeks to settle their differences and to choose a *hēgemōn* before embarking upon a war. Some had done so before Xerxes' invasion. Afterwards, without a formal peace having been concluded, some

⁵⁹ Plut. *Alex.* 10, 1–3; J. R. Hamilton 1969, pp. 25–26. Arr. *Anab.* 1, 23, 7; Bosworth 1980, pp. 152–153. Wirth 1985, pp. 151–152, rightly points out that Halicarnassus was too far removed to serve as a bridgehead for a Macedonian invasion of Asia.

⁶⁰ J. R. Ellis 1976, pp. 179–180, with full references at 288, correctly interprets Philip's seizure of the grain fleet as the last straw. Nevertheless, the Athenians are hardly innocent of blame for the deterioration of relations, if only because they had earlier and needlessly antagonized Philip in the Chersonesus: Ps.-Dem. 12, 23; Dem. 8, 2; Ps.-Dem. 9, 20; 9, 23; schol. Dem. 10, 1.

⁶¹ *SDA* 111, no. 403 (Rhodes–Osborne, pp. 372–379).

⁶² Polyb. 9, 33, 7–12; 18, 14; Aelian, *VH* 6, 1; Walbank 1967a, pp. 172–173.

⁶³ Diod. Sic. 18, 89, 1–2; *FGH* 255 F 5; Justin 9, 5, 5; 9, 5, 8.

Greeks joined with Athens to establish the Delian League.⁶⁴ In the fourth century the Athenians called upon the Greeks to form a coalition under the hegemony of Athens to maintain the existing King's Peace. Similarly, in 378 Agesilaus had ordered Sparta's allies to suspend their various hostilities before his invasion of Boeotia (Xen. *Hell.* 6, 4, 37). With the exception of the creation of the Delian League, in which peace was not a factor, the other examples display similarities. First, there is the concept of a generally perceived external threat; next, the necessity for Greeks to pool their resources against it; and lastly agreement among them on a leader that commanded overall respect. Those assembled at Corinth in 337 concluded an alliance and elected Philip both *hēgemōn* and *stratēgos autokratōr* of it. Philip immediately set quotas of soldiers and supplies to be contributed by the cities for the campaign against the King.

These conclusions lead to the question of whether Philip's settlement was considered a Common Peace. The answer, unfortunately, is not as simple as the question. Contemporary literary sources do not use the term until 330 and only two later secondary sources, Plutarch and Justin, apply it to this treaty. Plutarch (*Phoc.* 16, 5) states that Demades introduced a bill enjoining the Athenians to participate in the *koinē eirēnē* and the *syndrion* of the Greeks, which he could perhaps have found in Craterus' collection of Athenian decrees.⁶⁵ Justin's testimony (9, 5, 2) is far less important for in his eyes any large meeting of the Greeks could be seen as universal or common, and any state of peace that ensued would also therefore be general or common. Thus, he had earlier referred (8, 1, 4) to the Amphictyonic Council as the "common council of Greece," which it decidedly was not.⁶⁶ In fact, most contemporaries do not use the phrase *koinē eirēnē* in connection with the Charter of the League of Corinth. Demosthenes (18, 201) speaks of Philip as lord of all Greece, and Aeschines (3, 132) refers to the Macedonian hegemony of Greece against the Persians. Polybius (9, 33, 7) saw Philip as such a benefactor of Greece that he was given hegemony on land and sea. He further observed (9, 33, 11–12) that Philip forced the Greeks to settle their differences in a common body.⁶⁷ Even Diodorus (16, 89, 1–5) who has at least once manufactured a Common Peace for posterity (the "Peace of Pelopidas"), never applies the term to the settlement of 337.⁶⁸ In brief, he states that after

⁶⁴ *SA* 11, nos. 130, 132, 257.

⁶⁵ Helmbold and O'Neil 1959, p. 20, and for Plutarch's use of inscriptions: Buckler 1992, pp. 4794–4799.

⁶⁶ Roux 1979, pp. 1–59. ⁶⁷ Walbank 1967a, pp. 171–173.

⁶⁸ Ryder 1965, pp. 137–139; Buckler 1980a, pp. 198–201.

Chaeronea Philip wanted to be the *hēgemōn* of all Greece. In order to discuss with the Greeks matters of individual and general concern, he convened a common congress (*koinon synedrion*) at Corinth, at which he was elected *stratēgos autokratōr*. Both Plutarch (*Mor.* 240a–b) and the Oxyrhynchus Chronicle (*FGrH* 255 F 5) record the creation of a common congress and the election of Philip as *hēgemōn* and *stratēgos autokratōr*, but nowhere is peace mentioned.

Despite this body of testimony, there is ample reason to conclude that Philip's settlement indeed included a *de facto* and *de iure* Common Peace as part of his settlement of Greek affairs. Likewise, common or general peace in Greece now certainly had become a well-understood notion without, however, *koinē eirēnē* having become a technical term.⁶⁹ The best monument to the complexity of Philip's settlement and the most important is the contemporary inscription often referred to as the Charter of the League of Corinth.⁷⁰ Here one finds *eirēnē*. The question becomes, "Of what sort?" The answer is complicated by the fact that most of the left-hand side of the inscription and some of the right are lost. Hence, resort must be made to restoration. Yet with so much of the original wording gone, virtually any restoration amounts to speculation. It is moreover an unsound method to base a historical interpretation on one restoration, especially when others are equally possible.⁷¹ For example, M. N. Tod prints the following text of lines 3–5 of the inscription:

[ν ἌϞη θεοὺς πάντας καὶ πάσα]ς· ἔμμενῶ [ἐν τῇ-]
[ι εἰρήνῃ, καὶ οὐ λύσω τὰς σ]υνθήκας τᾶ[ς πρ-]
[ὸς Φίλιππον Μακεδόνα, οὐδ]ὲ ὀπλὰ ἐποί[σω ἐ-]

Ares, and all of the gods and goddesses I shall abide by
the peace, and I shall not break the treaty
with Philip of Macedonia, nor shall I bear arms.

The *stoichēdon*-count of the inscription is 33 but with irregularities. The extant parts of these lines read:

[... 22 ...]ς· ἔμμενῶ [...]
[... 21 ...]συνθήκας τᾶ[...]
[... 21 ...]ὲ ὀπλὰ ἐποί[...]

⁶⁹ Dobesch 1968, p. 25; Perlman 1985, pp. 168–169.

⁷⁰ *SdA* 111, no. 403; E. Badian, in Badian 1966, pp. 51–52, 66 n. 60.

⁷¹ For an earlier enunciation of this approach, see Badian and Martin 1985, p. 172; Badian 1993, p. 139. Restorations *exempli gratia*, no matter how attractive, do not constitute fact.

Hence, there are 26 letters missing from line 3, 24 from line 4, and 24 from line 5, although the restorations of [σ]υνθῆκας τᾶ[ς] in line 4 and [οὐδ]ὲ ὁπλαῖ ἐποί[στω] in line 5 are obvious. Even though some formulaic material helps to fill the gap at the beginning of line 3, its end and the beginning of line 4 remain a mystery. In fact, most restorations of lines involving *eirēnē* in this inscription are among the most intractable. Restorations of line 4 range from Wilcken's [τῇ σ|υμμαχίαι] through Schwahn's [ἐν τοῖς ὅρκοις] and Calabi's [ταῖς | σπονδαῖς] to Tod's and Wilcken's [ἐν τῇ| εἰρήνῃ]. H. H. Schmitt (*SdA* III, no. 403) rejects all of them. The same problem occurs in lines 7–8, where two possibilities are equally acceptable. Once again, with due caution Schmitt rejects the one involving *eirēnē* and prints another, though with hesitation. Likewise, in lines 9–10 Köhler suggests οὐθενὸς τῶν τῆς εἰρήνης κοινωνούντων (“no one of those who have held the peace in common”), a phrase that is indeed unrestored in the inscription concerning Alexander's restoration of the Chian exiles: ἀδοτοὺς ἐξ ἀπασῶν τῶν πόλεων τῶν τῆς εἰρήνης κοινωνου|σῶν (“those from all of the cities having joined the peace”: Rhodes–Osborne, no. 84, lines 12–13).⁷²

Lines 19–20 have the most direct bearing on the question of a Common Peace in 338/7. Schmitt is quite alive to the difficulties involved, when he prints [οἱ ἀδικούμενοι (?) καὶ πολεμήσω τῶ|[ι τὴν κοινὴν εἰρήνην (?) παρ]αβαίνοντι (“those who have done wrong, and I shall wage war against those violating the common peace”). If correct, this restoration would constitute only the second fourth-century epigraphical appearance of the phrase *koinē eirēnē*. Three other equally suitable restorations have also been proposed, none of them involving the word *eirēnē*. Schwahn suggested τῶ|[ι τὰς συνθῆκας], with line 4 as support,⁷³ Schehl τῶ|[ι τὰςδε τὰς συνθῆκας], with lines 15–16 as support,⁷⁴ and Raue τῶ|[ι τοῦ σδε τοὺς ὅρκους], unsupported by anything on the stone.⁷⁵ Lastly, Heisserer prints *koinē eirēnē* without comment.⁷⁶

Only in line 14 is there an unequivocal reference to a sworn peace: τ|[οὺς ὅρκους τοὺς περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης ὥμνουν (“they swore the oaths concerning the peace”). It is instructive that *eirēnē* cannot be modified by *koinē* because of the *stoichēdon*-count. The imperfect of the verb adds its own complications. Regarding the exchange of these oaths, it is impossible “to distinguish between the progress of an action and its mere occurrence”⁷⁷ or

⁷² For a new edition of *SdA* III, no. 403, see Heisserer 1980, p. 9; Rhodes–Osborne, pp. 372–379.

⁷³ Schwahn 1930, pp. 2, 37. ⁷⁴ Schehl 1932. ⁷⁵ Raue 1937, pp. 5–6, 72–74.

⁷⁶ Heisserer 1980, p. 9. ⁷⁷ Goodwin and Gulick 1958, p. 1261b.

as an act or process not yet completed. It is conceivable, but not demonstrable, that the process of formally concluding the peace had not been completed when the delegates met at Corinth. For example, the Spartans stubbornly refused to participate in these affairs.⁷⁸ The epigraphical debut of the term may help to solve the problem. In *SdA* II, no. 292 one reads in lines 2 and 5 of a *koinē eirēnē*. Thereafter the noun is without any modifier but the article. At the beginning of this document, the Greeks were determined to emphasize the common nature of the peace among them and their desire to remain at peace with the King, so long as he refrained from interfering in Greek affairs. One does not find the same usage in line 14 of *SdA* III, no. 403, the first time in the inscription when peace is undeniably mentioned. The absence of the phrase *koinē eirēnē* in this context proves that it was not a technical term. As in 362 many Greeks and now the Macedonians had concluded peace without including the King. In fact, Philip had done precisely what the Athenians had urged in 344. The greater number of states involved made Philip's settlement an even more extensive and general peace than that concluded after Mantinea in 362. Because peace preceded the formal congress at Corinth, at least in most cases, it could reasonably be called a Common Peace in a way that would generally be understood in Greece.

If the inscription recording Philip's settlement with the Greeks says nothing about a *koinē eirēnē*, the phrase is likewise conspicuously absent elsewhere in contemporary Greek inscriptions, except in restorations that admit of other possibilities. The closest analogies come from Tod, no. 183 (= *SdA* III, no. 403. II), lines 10–11, which is Alexander's renewal of Philip's treaty. Wilhelm, Tod, and Schmitt refuse restoration. Yet Heisserer in a masterful restoration prints [ἀλλὰ ἀπ᾽ αἱ κοινωνοῦσαι τῆς εἰρήνης], (“and all those who have in common joined the peace”), which is reminiscent of Rhodes–Osborne, no. 84, lines 12–13: ἀδοτούς ἐξ ἀπασῶν τῶν πόλεων τῶν τῆς εἰρήνης κοινωνου|σῶν (for a translation, see above).⁷⁹ Heisserer was the first to observe the four-bar *sigma* at the beginning of line 11, yet he also notes that in line 11 a *sigma* and a *tau* occupy the same *stoichos*, which suggests that similar irregularities are possible elsewhere on the stone, thus making certain restoration ultimately impossible.⁸⁰ One will also seek the phrase in vain in the longer inscription printed by Schmitt (*SdA* III, no. 446). Although peace is mentioned several times

⁷⁸ Plut. *Mor.* 240a–b; Arr. *Anab.* I, 1, 1–2; I, 16, 7; Roebuck 1948, pp. 84–89; Clauss 1983, p. 75.

⁷⁹ Heisserer 1980, pp. 4, 9, 80.

⁸⁰ Heisserer 1980, pp. 81–95, where he remarks that “the lettering is undistinguished.”

(lines 22, 67, 72), it is never modified by *koinē*, whereas war is (*koinos polemos*: lines 71, 77, 91). In these diplomatic contexts, *koinē* and *koinos* are obviously as exclusive as they are inclusive.⁸¹

The problem of the nature of Philip's settlement is further complicated by still another technicality. There has long been a dispute as to whether the Charter is one of a Common Peace or only of alliance. Among scholars T. T. B. Ryder and S. Perlman claim that it is a Common Peace, largely on the basis of Ps.-Demosthenes 17, but J. A. O. Larsen and A. J. Heisserer argue that the document is an instrument of alliance.⁸² The very clauses of the inscription support the position of Larsen and Heisserer. The first of them, lines 4–7, concerns non-aggression among those who had sworn the oaths sealing the agreement. A similar clause appears earlier in *SdA* II, no. 280, lines 23–30, an alliance between Athens and Dionysius I of Syracuse, in which both parties agree not to attack each other. This stipulation is also found in the Peace of Nicias (*SdA* II, no. 188), which alone suggests that things may not be as clear-cut as one would like. Lines 12–13 require that no state overthrow a constitution of a member state. This clause was very common in treaties among Athens and its allies.⁸³ One finds a version of it in the Charter of the Second Athenian League, where each ally has the right to live under whatever constitution it wants (*SdA* II, no. 257, lines 10–12). This right is repeated in a treaty between Athens and Chalcis (*SdA* II, no. 259, lines 21–26) and in the alliance between Athens and Dionysius (above, lines 23–30). Lines 15–19 of *SdA* III, no. 403 pledge to provide mutual assistance to any of the parties that had been wronged or attacked. This clause is standard in alliances, as can be seen from a host of inscriptions. The reference to peace, such as that found in line 14 of *SdA* III, no. 403, is also common, parallels being *IG* II² 34, 35, and 103. Finally, a fragment of *SdA* III, no. 403 gives a partial list of the participants of the agreement, which again has an epigraphical precedent in *SdA* II, no. 257.

Although the word alliance never appears in this document, even in a restoration, the fact of alliance is proven by the clear reference to the *hēgemōn* of the signatories in lines 21–22. A peace treaty did not have a

⁸¹ Compare *SdA* II, no. 262, lines 21–22, referring to members of the Second Athenian League as opposed to those outside it; Rhodes–Osborne, no. 35, line 16, a reference to the common practices of the Greeks.

⁸² Ryder 1965, pp. 150–162; Perlman 1985; Larsen 1925, pp. 316–317; Larsen 1939, p. 378. Larsen's theory that the alliance excludes the peace is contradicted by line 14 of the inscription. See also Heisserer 1980, pp. 8–20; Bosworth 1971, pp. 610–613; Seibert 1981, 74–77; Hammond and Walbank 1988, pp. 571–579.

⁸³ *SdA* II, no. 290 (Rhodes–Osborne, pp. 372–379), lines 24–34, an alliance between Athens, Arcadia, Achaea, Elis, and Phlius, which guarantees the existing constitutions of the participants.

hēgemōn, as witnessed by the Peace of Nicias (Thuc. 5, 18). The reference in lines 13–14 to a peace that was already considered sealed or in the process of being sealed strengthens the conclusion that peace and alliance were two separate parts of the same settlement, and that *SdA* III, no. 403 dealt only with alliance. In fact, the Charter of the League of Corinth most closely resembles that of the Second Athenian League, which was also made within the framework of an existing peace.

Two other fourth-century sources later support the conclusion that Philip's settlement, taken as a whole, was considered a Common Peace. The first is the Athenian orator known only as Ps.-Demosthenes (17, *Concerning the Treaty with Alexander*). In his speech, which is normally dated to 331, he repeatedly refers to a Common Peace with Alexander, and accuses him of several violations of it.⁸⁴ One serious difficulty with the use of Ps.-Demosthenes in connection with the events of 337 is the question of whether Alexander's arrangements were a simple renewal of Philip's pact or something new. Alexander, as had Philip before him, made some adjustments to the situation in Greece, especially in the Peloponnesus.⁸⁵ Other literary sources maintain that upon Philip's death Alexander immediately demanded that the Greeks recognize him as *hēgemōn*, and that he assumed all of his father's other rights.⁸⁶ All of the evidence indicates that Alexander simply renewed Philip's settlement and that he made his decisions regarding Peloponnesian affairs under its aegis. Furthermore, Alexander doubtless lacked the time, inclination, and the need radically to recast Philip's treaty. The second contemporary source is Aeschines (3, 254), who in 330, immediately before the celebration of the Pythian Games and the meeting of the *syndrion* of the Greeks, spoke against any Athenian decision to honor Demosthenes. Aeschines' ostensible reason is that such a gesture would make it appear that the Athenians were sympathetic with those who violate the Common Peace. Hence, these two Athenian sources link the concepts of the Common Peace, the *syndrion* of the Greeks, and the *hēgemōn* of an alliance with Macedonia.

Another episode, though not from a contemporary source, is singularly pertinent to this topic. Diodorus reports an incident that occurred in 335

⁸⁴ Common Peace: 1, 2; 1, 4; 1, 16–17; violations: 4, 8; 4, 10; Cawkwell 1961b. Heisserer 1980, p. XXVII, is quite right to note that no modern, systematic examination of this speech is available.

⁸⁵ Polyb. 18, 14, 6–13, on which see Walbank 1967a, pp. 568–570. On this problem, *SdA* III, no. 403 (p. 14), provides an extensive earlier bibliography, and Seibert 1981, pp. 74–76 an excellent discussion of the problem.

⁸⁶ Diod. Sic. 17, 3, 1–2; 4, 9; Plut. *Alex.* 14, 1; Arr. *Anab.* 1, 1, 1–2.

during Alexander's siege of Thebes.⁸⁷ Before launching his assault on the city, Alexander sent a herald to invite the Thebans "to share in the peace that was common to the Greeks." The Thebans responded that anyone who wished to free the Greeks from tyranny should rather join them and the King. Although the Theban retort could conceivably refer to the abortive "Peace of Pelopidas" or more probably to the original King's Peace and its renewals, it is preferable to understand it as a denouncement of the state of peace in which the king of Macedonia had not only assumed the role of the King in Greek affairs but had also become the guarantor of the Common Peace. Significant also is that peace with the King is contrasted with a Common Peace shared by Greeks and Macedonians.⁸⁸

The evidence, taken as a whole, presents a reasonably clear picture of the settlement in 338/7. In effect, Philip did several things in quick succession. He brought about a state of peace among the Greeks in which the King had played no part. Next, he established a broad Greek alliance of which the King was not a member. Philip thus excluded the King from Greek affairs, and freed the concept of a general Greek peace from the notion of the King's control. Lastly, he intended to use this situation against the King. The peace was only a component, albeit an important one, of Philip's policy toward the Greeks and Persians. Hegemony was the essential element in Philip's plans, peace a means to make them possible of fulfillment, and war against Persia a traditional Greek way to bring them to completion.

The novel component of Philip's policy was to use the concept of general peace in Greece for ends certainly not envisaged in 386 and later. Both in 362 and again in 344 Greeks had said that they were at peace with the King and thus would not take military or naval action against him so long as he honored the peace. Yet for Philip peace in Greece formed the foundation for a war to avenge the depredations of Xerxes, a grievance that had nothing to do with the conditions that had led to the original King's Peace. Since during the fourth century the King had not harmed the Greeks to any significant degree, a *casus belli* not covered by the King's

⁸⁷ Diod. Sic. 17, 9, 5; see also Plut. *Alex.* 11, 8.

⁸⁸ As *hēgemōn* of the League of Corinth, Alexander had the right and the duty to maintain the peace and alliance that Philip had established. It was also utterly necessary for him to assert his position in the face of the first serious opposition to it. Yet more was involved than mere propaganda or rationalization. By invoking the Common Peace, Alexander issued a singular ultimatum to the Thebans, as well as a practical way in which to end the rebellion. If the Thebans surrendered and honored the Common Peace, they would return to the fold of the Greeks. If not, they would betray the Greeks, just as their forebears had done during the invasion of Xerxes, this at a time when Alexander was preparing to take his father's war of revenge into Asia itself.

original edict must be found to justify Philip's planned attack on Asia. For that purpose Xerxes' invasion served his needs well enough.

Once he had made peace and alliance with the Greeks, Philip turned his attention to the King, so it remains to ask what his intentions were in this area. "It may be . . . that [he] never had a blue-print of expansion and conquest, complete with dates, but instead often responded opportunistically to crises brought about by the drift of events or the actions of others." That is actually the opinion of A. J. P. Taylor of the ambitions of Adolf Hitler, but the evaluation seems far more appropriate to Philip.⁸⁹ If Philip ever had a master plan, he never revealed it to anyone who subsequently repeated it, and he did not live long enough to implement it. Hostile sources hinder understanding and baffle speculation (see chapter 18). Nothing of the extant evidence suggests that he had had any ambitions in Asia until the King interfered with his Thracian operations, specifically the King's aid to Perinthus. Philip's Asian contacts further suggest that the Macedonian's ambitions were limited to the coast and to the environs of Asia Minor. The available evidence points to one reasonable conclusion. All of Philip's known contacts with the King's subjects and his rebels were with those in the immediate vicinity of the expanded Macedonian kingdom. As *hēgemōn* of the Greeks, he pursued a traditional Greek policy, one limited to the Aegean basin. There is absolutely no reason to think that he ever seriously looked beyond the Ionian coast. Seen in this light, one can justifiably conclude that Philip used the concepts of hegemony and peace in Greece to pursue a traditional and limited policy against the Persians. There is nothing to suggest that he, like his son, ever seriously planned to conquer the entire Persian Empire.⁹⁰

⁸⁹ Taylor, quoted in Barnett 1989, p. 5. Nevertheless, J. R. Ellis 1976, p. 175 refers to Philip's "timetable," a view quite common in the United States as early as the Colonial Period: Madison in Cooke 1961, p. 113; Ames in Hyneman and Lutz 1983, vol. 11, p. 1306.

⁹⁰ For Philip's ambitions, see Ruzicka 1985, pp. 84–91. The question is an old one: Calder and Demandt 1990, pp. 18–19. Perhaps the most nihilistic view ever presented comes from Clemenceau 1926, pp. 14–15, who claims that Philip waged his war against Persia "for ends that he never took the trouble to determine."


A note on the battle of Chaeronea

Although the battle of Chaeronea was one of the truly decisive conflicts of Classical antiquity, surprisingly little is known of it, and that little has unfortunately and unnecessarily been embroidered by modern historians. This note aims to unravel some of that embroidery. Specifically, it argues against the prevalent view that at Chaeronea Alexander led a force of cavalry in a flanking attack against the Boeotians who stood opposite him.¹ Diodorus, the principal source for the battle, depicts Alexander's actions at 16, 86, 3: After the engagement began, "Alexander, his heart set on showing his father his prowess and yielding to none in will to win, ably seconded by his men, first succeeded in rupturing the solid front of the enemy line. And striking down many, he bore heavily on the troops opposite him." He thus states that Alexander broke the solid formation of the enemy with those who assisted him in the fighting. Plutarch (*Alex.* 9, 3) supports this aspect of Diodorus' testimony, and he further (*Pel.* 18, 7) corroborates it when he describes Philip's inspection of the slain Sacred Band after the battle. When Philip came to the place where the Thebans had fought and fallen, he remarked that they had bravely faced the *sarisae* of his army. Although the *sarisa* was sometimes used by light cavalry, the first use of it in this context cannot be dated earlier than Alexander's campaign at the Granicus River in 334.² The *sarisa* was primarily and normally the weapon of the Macedonian infantry.³ Moreover, the point of Plutarch's story is that the Thebans had stood to the death rather than flee. This interpretation takes Plutarch's words (*Pel.* 18, 7) that "when Philip was inspecting the dead after the fighting, he stood at the place where the three hundred had faced the long piles of his phalanx and lay dead in their

¹ Cawkwell 1978a, p. 148; Cloché 1955, p. 263; J. R. Ellis 1976, p. 197; Ferrill 1985, p. 177; J. R. Hamilton 1973, p. 36; Hammond and Griffith 1972–9, vol. 11, pp. 597–603; Wirth 1985, p. 133.

² Arr. *Anab.* 1, 14, 1; Polyb. 12, 20, 2; Lammert, *RE* 11 1.2 (1920), cols. 2515–2530, s.v. *Sarisse*, especially cols. 2515–2516, 2521; see also Bosworth 1980, pp. 62–63, 110, 352; Ferrill 1985, pp. 176–177.

³ Cf. Tarn 1930, pp. 11–16; Griffith 1980, pp. 59, 62.



Map 9 The plain of Chaeronea

armour, their bodies piled one upon the other” literally to mean that the Sacred Band had faced the enemy.⁴ The Lion of Chaeronea is another, but mute, testimonial to the stoutheartedness of the Sacred Band.⁵

The ancient sources portray the Macedonians in a line extending from the foothills of Mt. Thourion to the Cephissus River. Philip commanded the right wing near Chaeronea, and Alexander the left, which was anchored on the river. On the Greek side the Athenians opposed Philip, while the Boeotians faced Alexander. Some modern scholars have also postulated that in the course of the action Alexander launched a mounted assault against a Theban flank. A. R. Burn, in a dramatic reconstruction, writes that Alexander brought his superior cavalry “in on the flank of the devoted Theban infantry, already held by the Macedonian infantry in their front.”⁶ N. G. L. Hammond interprets Alexander’s cavalry attack somewhat

⁴ LSJ, *s.v.* *apantaō*.

⁵ Paus. 9, 40, 10; cf. Strabo 9, 2, 37. Frazer 1898, vol. v, p. 210, observes that the marks of their wounds were still visible on the unearthed skeletons. See also G. Soteriades, *MDAI (A)* 28 (1903), pp. 301–330; 30 (1905), pp. 113–120; Wallace 1979, pp. 147–148.

⁶ Burn 1964, pp. 40–41.

similarly. He envisions a gap opening between the Boeotians and Athenians into which Alexander charged. As a result, "the Sacred Band, encircled by Alexander's cavalry, was annihilated."⁷ While not accepting the concept of any flanking maneuver, A. Ferrill offers a different explanation of how cavalry could have frontally charged hoplites standing in compact order. In his view, the Macedonian cavalryman could have released his *saris* "immediately before or on impact, so as not to unhorse the rider."⁸ J. R. Ellis also posits a mounted frontal assault against the Theban line, without explaining how it could have been done.⁹ Others have been equally unsuccessful in explaining the role of the Macedonian cavalry during the battle.

In fact, there are several reasons to doubt that Alexander led a mounted attack on the Sacred Band or that he took them in flank. First, although Diodorus (16, 85, 5) mentions the presence of about 2,000 cavalry in Philip's army, he nowhere mentions its use in battle, much less names Alexander as commander of it. For that matter, no ancient source describes cavalry action at Chaeronea. In short, all hypotheses about cavalry, Macedonian or Greek, belong to the realm of modern speculation. The suggestion that the heavily armed Macedonian cavalryman could inflict great damage on a phalanx suffers from a severe defect. Even if the Macedonians released their *sarisae* on or shortly before impact, it is still not easy to see how they could have maintained their mounts.¹⁰ Nor does it explain what damage the cavalry could thereafter have done to the Sacred Band, especially at close quarters. The initial shock wave would presumably have inflicted a certain number of casualties on both sides; but having expended their *sarisae*, the Macedonians could hardly have penetrated the Sacred Band or cut down 254 of them. Until someone offers a reasonable explanation for the way in which a frontal cavalry assault could have crushed the Theban formation, no one else need give any credence to the idea.

There remains the matter of a flanking attack. Whether mounted or afoot, Alexander could not easily have turned the right flank of the Theban line, which was firmly anchored on the Cephissus, and the Cephissus was broad and deep enough to present an obstacle both to cavalry and infantry.¹¹ Furthermore, in the vicinity of the battlefield the river often overflowed its banks to create marsh terrain, and Theophrastus (*Hist. pl.* 4, 11, 3)

⁷ Hammond 1938, p. 210; see also Hammond 1986, pp. 567–568.

⁸ Ferrill 1985, pp. 176–177. ⁹ J. R. Ellis 1976, pp. 197–198.

¹⁰ Xen. *Anab.* 3, 2, 18–19; see also Anderson 1970, p. 58.

¹¹ Arist. *Pol.* 5, 2, 12; Plut. *Pel.* 16; *Dem.* 19; *Sull.* 16; 17, 6–7; Kromayer 1903, pp. 149–150, 163; Cawkwell 1989, p. 379; personal observations of 1 October 1970 and 10 July 1986.

testifies to these conditions at the time of the battle.¹² There was no reason to fear attack from this quarter. Only on the left could the Boeotian line be taken in flank, and to suppose an attack here one must believe a rather improbable anecdote from Polyaeus (4, 2, 2; 4, 2, 7), who claims that Philip ordered his wing, while facing the Athenians, to make an orderly withdrawal to lure the Athenians onto higher ground and thus into a trap.¹³ The ruse worked, and the Athenians vigorously pursued Philip's men only to face a Macedonian counterattack that overwhelmed them. The difficulty for Philip to maintain contact with his other forces is immediately apparent. Yet here is where scholars suggest that the creation of a gap on Philip's left allowed Alexander the opportunity to launch his cavalry attack against the Boeotian left flank.

It is time that this unlikely stratagem, mentioned only by an often undependable source, be rejected.¹⁴ In the first place, no one has found Polyaeus' higher ground.¹⁵ Moreover, H. Delbrück has remarked on the improbability that any such maneuver could actually have been possible under the given circumstances: "600 Meter rückwärts gehen kann kaum ein einzelner Mann auf guter Straße, ohne zu stolpern; eine Phalanx, die das im Gelände unternehmen wollte, würde binnen kurzem einer über dem anderen auf der Erde liegen."¹⁶ It also fails to explain Diodorus' account of the action. Diodorus and Plutarch agree that Alexander was in the forefront of the attack – that is the point of their having mentioned the fact in the first place. The reconstruction that Alexander at the head of his cavalry took advantage of the newly opened gap means that he initially held a position behind his own phalanx, which was already engaged. If Alexander only later turned the Theban left flank, already pinned by the Macedonian phalanx, then Polyaeus' unlikely testimony makes nonsense of better sources.

Given the evidence of the best sources and the realities of the terrain, a simple solution can be offered that does justice to both. On that day at Chaeronea Philip and Alexander led frontal assaults on foot against their opponents. The Macedonian phalangites under Alexander, through their courage, discipline, strength, and ability, cut through the Sacred Band and the other Boeotians in direct confrontation.¹⁷

¹² See also Strabo 9, 2, 19; 9, 2, 37; 9, 3, 16; Paus. 9, 41, 7, and Knauss 1987, p. 182.

¹³ See especially Kromayer 1903, pp. 165–167.

¹⁴ Lammert, *RE* 21.2 (1952), cols. 1432–1436, *s.v.* Polyainos; see also Markle 1978, pp. 488–489, who seems not to have examined the terrain himself, accepts the authenticity of the stratagem, despite the physical difficulties of the operation that he himself recognizes.

¹⁵ Leake 1835, pp. 192–201; Hammond 1938, p. 208. ¹⁶ Delbrück 1920, p. 173.

¹⁷ Only Momigliano 1934, p. 159, shares this view. See also Fuller 1960, p. 35.

Philip introduced no new strategy at Chaeronea. Indeed, the field chosen by his enemies successfully discouraged maneuverability. The Greek line from mountain to river demanded that Philip resort to frontal attack. The Greek position also left no room for cavalry, which generally proved incapable of penetrating a steady, disciplined phalanx. If Epaminondas' cavalry at Mantinea stood as a notable exception to this observation, that can in no small part be explained by Epaminondas' having taken the Spartans and Athenians by surprise (Xen. *Hell.* 7, 5, 22). Nor, in broader terms, could Philip's plans at battle have influenced Alexander's military thinking. This traditional engagement differed markedly from Alexander's concept of a mixed and complex order of battle that included not only the standard heavy infantry but also light-armed and heavy cavalry that served as a striking force.

Philip, however, should not be seen simply as a traditionalist who unthinkingly mimicked his predecessors. On two earlier occasions he adumbrated Alexander's concept of unity of arms and integral use of them. In Illyria (Diod. Sic. 16, 4, 5–6) he ordered his cavalry to outflank the barbarians, while he attacked their main line in a frontal assault. The occasion indicates the first example of original tactics that may well have influenced Alexander. The Crocus Plain offers the second obvious instance, where again Philip's cavalry turned the Phocian flank, while the king attacked headlong. Philip's lasting innovations included the *sarisa* and the lightening of the armament of the Macedonian phalangites (Diod. Sic. 16, 3, 2). These Alexander seized upon immediately and further developed with great success. These two elements carried the day at Chaeronea. In short, on that fateful day, two lines of infantry confronted each other without the use of cavalry or the ability to maneuver. The cavalry was there, but Philip lacked the opportunity to use it. Instead, infantry decided the battle face to face.

Philip II's designs on Greece

The career of Philip presents many intriguing problems, but few more intractable than the question of his ultimate goals, a source of numerous interpretations and speculation. This offering is yet another attempt to determine and then to understand Philip's aspirations in Greece. If Philip ever formed any definite plans for acquiring the hegemony of Greece, no trace of them has survived. Even his ambitions in Persia have been the subject of numerous conjectures.¹ The very silence surrounding these matters is significant for it makes an incontestable explanation of them impossible. That fact is one of Philip's more enigmatic legacies. It is sufficient here to examine, insofar as possible in the space available, what objectives Philip wished to achieve in Greece.

Demosthenes labored under no such doubts. He believed that Philip was bent on the defeat of Athens, and as early as 349, he used the First Olynthiac (1, 3) to voice his concerns to his fellow countrymen: "Most of all there is this to fear. This cunning and terrible man makes use of his accomplishments, yielding on points when he must, threatening (and he certainly appears to mean it) on others. He slanders us and our inactivity. He fosters and takes for himself anything of value." On a later occasion he (6, 2) warned that Philip's ambitions extended to all of Greece. With delicious cynicism G. Clemenceau thus described Philip's ambitions: "His dream was to subject Hellas by ruse backed with force and to make of it not only an ornament but an instrument of war against the Orient – a war that he wanted to wage for ends that he never took the trouble to determine."² The matter was much clearer to A. M. Adam, who in 1941 compared Philip with Adolf Hitler: "It is in the various incidents of the process [of Philip's conquests] that the similarity with Hitler's operations lie."³

¹ E.g. Errington 1981/2; Ruzicka 1985. ² Clemenceau 1926, p. 15. ³ Adam 1941.

Modern scholars have been divided in their opinion of the subject. Their views can be most easily surveyed in a schematic way, even at the risk of some oversimplification. Some see Philip as nothing more than an aggressor who lacked any preconceived plan of conquest, an opportunist pure and simple. Among this number can be mustered G. Grote, G. T. Griffith, M. Errington, and E. N. Borza.⁴ There has also recently developed the view of Philip as "the reluctant conqueror." According to this interpretation, which has been expressed in various forms and degrees, Philip, admittedly an opportunist, only marched on Greece when Demosthenes had persuaded the Athenians that he was not to be trusted. Another group, most prominently represented by M. M. Markle, J. R. Ellis, G. L. Cawkwell, M. B. Sakellariou, H. Bengtson, and G. Wirth, postulates that Philip, genuinely wanting peace with the Athenians, turned his thoughts to aggression only after Demosthenes had undermined the Peace of Philocrates.⁵ Ellis, like Adam, even writes once of Philip's "time table." The scholars endorsing this interpretation may be said to hold the majority view in contemporary scholarship.

Since Philip left no equivalent of *Mein Kampf* for guidance in these matters, the only reasonable test of any interpretation is the examination of recorded events pertinent to the question.⁶ The thesis presented here stems from his own movements and policies: Philip was indeed an aggressor and an opportunist; relatively early in his reign he gave thought to expanding his influence into central and southern Greece, but the decision to march directly into Greece came rather late in his career.

From the beginning of his reign, Philip found in the Athenians an obdurate, irksome, and meddlesome foe. In terms of aggression at Philip's accession, the Athenians were the first at fault. They provoked Philip's animosity by needlessly supporting Argaeus' pretensions to the throne, even after the Macedonians had in fact recognized Philip as their rightful leader.⁷ Their reckless, but long-standing, claim to Amphipolis further strained relations with the young king. That was nothing new in their northern policy, for they had devoted much energy during the fifth and fourth centuries to interfering in Macedonian affairs.⁸ Another factor complicating the issue was

⁴ Grote 1846–56, vol. XI, pp. 396–398; 408–410; Hammond and Griffith 1972–9, vol. II, pp. 260–264; Errington 1990, pp. 99–102; Borza 1990, p. 209; Sawada 1993.

⁵ Markle 1974; Markle 1980; J. R. Ellis 1976, pp. 101–103, 115–117, 175; J. R. Ellis 1982, pp. 49–51; Cawkwell 1978a, p. 101; Cawkwell 1978b; Sakellariou 1980, p. 135; Bengtson 1985, pp. 68–69; Wirth 1985, pp. 9–10.

⁶ The principle involved is that of Sherlock Holmes: "It is of the highest importance . . . not to have useless facts elbowing out the useful ones" (Doyle 1930, p. 21).

⁷ Diod. Sic. 16, 2, 6. Errington 1990, pp. 35–40. ⁸ Hammond 1989, pp. 71–99.

the ambitions of the Thracians and Chalcidians, who supported their own candidate for the kingship. The Illyrians and the Paionians took the opportunity of disputed kingship to ravage Macedonian territory.⁹ Toward none of these peoples need Philip have felt any affection or trust.

Thus embattled, Philip fought to protect his realm from the Athenians and other foreign intruders; and once he had gained sufficient strength, he expanded his domain at their expense. With regard to Athens his design to secure every possible port along his and neighboring coasts made excellent strategic sense. By so doing, he denied the Athenians any significant bridgehead from which they could penetrate inland. For their part, the Athenians conducted a series of inept and ineffectual operations against him. The result of these adventures increasingly worsened relations between Macedonia and Athens. So too with the Thracians and Chalcidians. To eliminate any further threat to Macedonia from the east, Philip combined his policy toward Athens with that toward his immediate neighbors, many of whom were Athenian allies.¹⁰ Philip had certainly as much, and perhaps more, right to exert his will in this area than had Timotheus, who had without immediate cause intervened there in 365–362.¹¹ Philip, at least, had been provoked; Timotheus had not.

So far, these early conflicts had been confined to the remote north, far removed from the center of Greek affairs. An independent, but pregnant, development drew Philip's attention to the south. Early in his reign Philip had formed close ties with the influential Aleuadae of Larissa and with other Thessalians. He had defended them militarily, probably against the tyrants of Pherae, Lycophron, and Peitholaus.¹² In so doing, he pursued a traditional Macedonian policy that dated from the early fifth century. Moreover, he made himself personally agreeable to many Thessalian aristocrats, who considered him a friend.¹³ This policy drew him into a new and unforeseen crisis, one that offered him incalculable possibilities. In 356 the Third Sacred War erupted in central Greece when the Phocians seized the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi, which provoked a declaration of war against them by the Amphictyonic Council.¹⁴ Philip himself played no role in these events. Indeed, his only known direct contact with Delphi before the war is his treaty with the Chalcidians, a copy of which was erected in the sanctuary.¹⁵ An ordinary document, the only unusual thing

⁹ Diod. Sic. 16, 2, 6. Errington 1990, pp. 35–40. ¹⁰ *SdA* 11, nos. 309, 312, 317, 323; *IG* 11² 114 and 130.

¹¹ Buckler 1980a, pp. 166–169.

¹² Buckler 1989a, pp. 58–64.

¹³ Theopompus *FGrH* 115 F 34, 35, 162; Martin 1981; Martin 1982. ¹⁴ Buckler 1989a, pp. 20–29.

¹⁵ *SdA* 11, no. 308; Rhodes–Osborne, no. 50.

about it was the claim that Apollo had himself prophesied friendship between Philip and the Chalcidians so long as they honored their oaths. At most it demonstrates Philip's ostensible reverence for Delphic Apollo and his wish to announce himself favorably to the Greeks.

At the outbreak of the war the Thessalians, influential members of the Amphictyonic Council, supported Thebes in an effort to liberate the sanctuary. During the campaign that culminated in the battle of Neon (355), the Phocians inflicted very heavy casualties on the Thessalians.¹⁶ The result was twofold: the Thessalians were weakened and demoralized, and they presented to the Phocians a relatively easy target. The new Phocian general Onomarchus, eager to take advantage of the situation, made an alliance with the tyrants of Pherae. The defeated Thessalians, now geographically separated from their Theban allies, could only turn to Philip for protection. The appeal of the Aleuadae not only brought Philip back to Thessaly but also involved him in the Sacred War. Here was an opportunity that he did not create, for he could not foretell that the Amphictyons would fight the battle of Neon, much less that they would squander the fruits of their victory. Yet the possibilities of extending his power in Thessaly were immediately apparent. Furthermore, he came not as an invader but as a savior.¹⁷ Onomarchus' alliance with Pherae also provided Philip with the possibility of playing a role in the Sacred War, both as an ally of the Amphictyons and as a champion of Apollo. Thus the Thessalians provided Philip with the ideal way to enter the mainstream of Greek politics.

That entry occurred immediately but inauspiciously. In either late summer or early autumn of 354, Philip returned to Thessaly at the request of the Thessalian Confederacy. Onomarchus responded by detaching some 7,000 mercenaries under the command of Phayllus to counter the threat. Although Philip easily defeated Phayllus, his victory prompted Onomarchus to turn his undivided attention to Thessaly, with stunning results. In two battles he worsted the Macedonians, inflicting such losses that Philip was fortunate enough to lead a demoralized army back home to safety. Whether historically accurate or not, Philip reputedly said of his retreat, "I did not flee, but just like the rams, I walked backward in order to ram again the harder." These two defeats had in fact given the Sacred War a peculiarly personal significance to Philip, both in terms of his status at

¹⁶ Buckler 1989a, pp. 39–45, with full bibliography. Although Hammond 1994, p. 200 n. 2, states that he finds Buckler's chronology "unconvincing," he does not attempt to refute it.

¹⁷ Buckler 1989a, pp. 63–64.

home and in terms of the Greek world abroad. Philip now made it his immediate and paramount object to eliminate Phocian influence from Thessaly and to replace it with his.¹⁸ True to his alleged word, Philip returned to Thessaly in 353. Onomarchus again marched north to oppose him. They met at the Crocus Plain in the vicinity of Pagasae.¹⁹ Four things indicate that on this occasion Philip came with intentions beyond the immediate necessity of confronting Onomarchus and his Pheraean allies. First, before the clash he ordered his Macedonians to crown themselves with laurel, sacred to Pythian Apollo, thence into battle, not so much as defender of the Thessalians but as the avengers of the god, who would lead them to victory.²⁰ Griffith interprets this gesture as a means to strengthen the confidence of the Macedonian soldiery.²¹ Yet he denies that the symbol had any genuine meaning to a Greek world that blamed the war on the Thebans. Griffith's views were not shared by the Greeks, as is seen by their response to the ultimate overthrow of the Phocians.²² Contrary to Griffith's doubts, the laurel played its part in Philip's larger plans, which aimed as much at Greece as at the morale of his troops.

The second incident is Philip's treatment of Onomarchus' corpse after the Phocian defeat in battle. Philip either hanged or crucified the corpse for public display, thus denying Onomarchus proper burial.²³ Diodorus and Justin maintain that Philip treated the corpse with such indignity because of Onomarchus' sacrilege in having despoiled Apollo's sanctuary. Griffith agrees with that interpretation, even though he does not recognize its relationship to the laurel.²⁴ There was no longer any reason to strengthen the morale of the Macedonians, who had just won a momentous victory over a formidable foe, by thus displaying Onomarchus' body. Instead, this was the second occasion on which Philip could portray himself to the Greeks as one fighting on the side of the god.

The third point is more controversial and grisly. Diodorus states that Philip threw no fewer than three thousand mercenaries into the sea to drown on the charge of sacrilege (Diod. Sic. 16, 35, 6). This incident as well

¹⁸ For two differing views of these events, with full references, see Hammond and Griffith 1972–9, vol. 11, pp. 267–273; Buckler 1989a, pp. 65–69.

¹⁹ Strabo 9, 5, 8; 9, 5, 14; Beloch 1912–27, vol. 111.1, 477 n. 1; Buckler 1989a, p. 75 n. 37.

²⁰ Justin 8, 2, 3; for the importance of laurel to Pythian Apollo, see Sourvinou-Inwood 1979, pp. 234–235.

²¹ Hammond and Griffith 1972–9, vol. 11, pp. 274–275. Errington 1990, p. 62, however, sees Philip's design as an attempt to identify his goals with those of the Amphictyony, which is precisely the interpretation of Justin 8, 2, 1–7.

²² Aeschin. 2, 131–132; Rhodes–Osborne, no. 57. ²³ Diod. Sic. 16, 35, 6; 61, 2; Oldfather 1909.

²⁴ Hammond and Griffith 1972–9, vol. 11, p. 276.

as its implication have been misunderstood by several scholars.²⁵ A sound treatment of the episode comes from Griffith,²⁶ whose ideas have won the support of N. G. L. Hammond.²⁷ Diodorus writes that Philip hanged Onomarchus; the rest “he threw into the sea as temple robbers (*hōs hierosulous katepontisen*).” Griffith maintains that Diodorus refers only to the corpses of the slain, not to the captured. Yet he admits that “to take [Diodorus’] words literally, they ought to mean both, no doubt.” He thereby twists Diodorus’ statement without satisfactorily explaining his rejection of the text.²⁸ Other objections to Diodorus’ testimony have been dealt with elsewhere and need not be repeated here.²⁹

When Griffith honestly admits that he does not know the fate of the prisoners, he both rejects the evidence and avoids the question. Although he is indeed correct to say that no other such mass drowning is known from Classical Greek history, that also avoids both the evidence and the significance of such a singular event. Philip’s triumphant army was more than adequate to bind some 3,000 prisoners for whom the Macedonians presumably harbored little affection and to push them into the sea. Men whose hands are tied find it difficult to swim.

Griffith and Hammond either overlook or ignore the reason for this manner of punishment, which is admittedly laborious. After all, Philip could have sold them all into slavery and in the process gained some monetary profit from his labors. Diodorus had already explained that Greek custom demanded that temple robbers be denied proper burial.³⁰ The Amphictyons ordinarily hurled the sacrilegious from the Phaedriadae Rocks above Delphi, which was obviously impossible in the Crocus Plain. The alternative was to drown them, for which there is support from other Greek religious practices.³¹ It is yet another sign that Philip was avenging Apollo by punishing those who had benefited from the plundering of his

²⁵ See, e.g., C. J. Tuplin, Review of J. Buckler, *Philip II*, in *History* 76, 1991, p. 476, in which Tuplin calls Onomarchus’ mercenaries “certain POWs.” A careful reading of Diod. Sic. 16, 1, 4; 61–64, presents a more accurate understanding of Greek attitudes toward these men; see, in general, Isoc. 4, 168; 5, 121–122; 8, 24 on contemporary attitudes toward mercenaries.

²⁶ Hammond and Griffith 1972–9, vol. 11, pp. 276–278. ²⁷ Hammond 1989, p. 114 n. 15.

²⁸ The only known difficulty in the manuscript tradition in this connection is with the reading of P: *katepontise* which does not affect the historical argument.

²⁹ Buckler 1989a, pp. 76–77. It is difficult to understand Hammond and Griffith 1972–9, vol. 11, p. 276, when Griffith claims that prisoners were less important to Philip than corpses. Prisoners could always be sold into slavery, thus increasing the sums in Philip’s coffers. Yet 3,000 drowned mercenaries, in the absence of a used-corpses market, especially mercenaries in the service of the Phocians, enhanced Philip’s political image in the eyes of the Greeks. On this point, see Isoc. 5. 55.

³⁰ Diod. Sic. 16, 25, 2. See also Beloch 1912–27, vol. 111.1, p. 477; Momigliano 1934, p. 105; J. R. Ellis 1976, p. 83; Wirth 1985, p. 49.

³¹ See also McDougall 1983, *s.v. katapontizein*; esp. 4, 33, 8; 4, 33, 10; 13, 86, 3; 14, 112, 1.

treasure. The fourth point is his activity after his victory. After the Crocus Plain, Philip immediately began settling Thessalian affairs, which left the Spartans, Achaeans, and Athenians time to succor the new Phocian general, Phayllus (Diod. Sic. 16, 37, 1–4). His work in Thessaly done, Philip marched on Thermopylae only to be thwarted by an Athenian force.³² According to Diodorus, he claimed that he wanted to carry the war to Phocis itself.³³ One can reasonably ask why. He had entered Thessaly originally only to support an ally, but in 353 he made it obvious to the world that he now intended to pursue the Sacred War. Were his ambitions limited to securing Thessaly for himself, he had no need of Thermopylae. Attack on Thessaly from the south was never easy. Thucydides comments on the difficulties of a hostile army marching through the region, and a Boeotian army barely extricated itself from the area north of the pass by the brilliant leadership of Epaminondas.³⁴ In short, Thermopylae was not essential to Philip's defense of his Thessalian gains. Perhaps his religious enthusiasm was genuine; but, if so, it was also convenient. His ability to chastise Phocis would at once add to his reputation for piety and provide him with a toehold in central Greece. His march on Thermopylae, usually no more than cursorily mentioned by modern scholars, is the first concrete indication that Philip had begun to look southward.³⁵

Stopped at Thermopylae, Philip again turned his energies eastward toward Thrace. Since others cited above have amply treated these events, no extensive rehearsal of them is necessary here. The only point of note is that Philip's next campaign involved both the Thracians and their Athenian allies. Griffith has even gone so far as to argue that Athens, not the Thracian king Cersebleptes, was the principal object of Philip's operations.³⁶ Another distinct possibility is Philip's desire to anchor his eastern boundary on the Hellespont. That in turn brought about the peril of drawing the unwelcome attention of the King. According to the King's Peace of 386, the Persians claimed as theirs the cities of Asia and proclaimed

³² Dem. 19, 84; 19, 319; see also 18, 114 (115 is a spurious decree, as witnessed by the otherwise unattested *archōn* Demonicus). Dion. Hal. *de Din.* 13, 665; Diod. Sic. 16, 38, 1–2; Justin 8, 2, 8–12. For chronology, see Beloch 1912–27, vol. III.1, pp. 268–270; Cawkwell 1962a, p. 138; Buckler 1989a, pp. 181–186.

³³ Diod. Sic. 16, 38, 1; Sordi 1969, p. 72.

³⁴ Thuc. 4, 78, 2–4, referring to Brasidas' passage through Thessaly; also 1, 11, 1; Xen. *Hell.* 4, 3, 3–8; Epaminondas: Diod. Sic. 15, 71, 5–7; Plut. *Pel.* 29, 1; *Mor.* 680b, 797a–b; Nep. *Epam.* 7, 1–3; Paus. 9, 15, 2.

³⁵ A major exception is Cawkwell 1978a, p. 66, although it will be argued below that his views are proleptic in that it is unclear that Philip had as yet formed any definite plans regarding Greece. See also Hammond and Griffith 1972–9, vol. II, pp. 279–281.

³⁶ Hammond and Griffith 1972–9, vol. II, p. 283.

that other Greek cities both large and small were, with three exceptions, to be autonomous.³⁷ D. M. Lewis has argued on the basis of the meaning of the word *hopoteroi* ("whosoever") at Xen. *Hell.* 5, 1, 31 that the king was only dictating the terms of peace to the two sides actually at war.³⁸ One can, as Lewis has not, realize the literal meaning of the phrase "to leave the other Greek cities, small and large, autonomous." If the Greek text is to be taken literally, it means that the other Greek cities in Europe were also to be autonomous and that the King reserved to himself the right to ensure that autonomy. That is precisely the point of Isocrates' complaints in the *Panegyricus*.³⁹ In short, Lewis mistakes the potential extent of the king's settlement in 387/6. So long as Philip left the Greek cities in Thrace alone, he was technically free to extend his dominion of the area, without violating either the King's Peace or the subsequent Common Peaces. Despite the risks, success in Thrace offered Philip further opportunities there and afterward freed him for operations elsewhere. That elsewhere was Olynthus, the last major power in his immediate neighborhood. Once again, the clash drew Athens into conflict with Philip, but to no benefit either to Olynthus or to Athens.⁴⁰

By 346 Philip had ended his immediate labors in Thrace. In the absence of any pressing demands on his time, he once more enjoyed the luxury of turning his thoughts to the south. The Thessalians and the Thebans gave him that opportunity. Their aim, which they achieved, was to prevail upon him to end the Sacred War.⁴¹ In early summer 346 Philip led his forces to Thermopylae, then held by the Phocian general Phalaecus with a force of 8,000 mercenaries. Instead of fighting, Philip offered Phalaecus generous terms. The Phocian and his men could place the pass in Macedonian hands and afterward safely go wherever they chose. In addition to his distrust of his Spartan and Athenian allies, Phalaecus may have remembered the fate of Onomarchus' 3,000 mercenaries. With his path free through Thermopylae, Philip, now joined by his Theban allies, marched on Delphi and ended the Sacred War.

³⁷ *SdA* 11, no. 242.

³⁸ Lewis 1977, p. 147 n. 79. Although Lewis 1977 and Badian 1991, p. 37, claim that the King was ending a war between two opposing alliances of Greeks, they both do not realize that Artaxerxes was settling all Greek affairs to his own satisfaction: see above, chapter 16, n. 1.

³⁹ On which, see Mikkola 1954, pp. 235–243; Buchner 1958, pp. 29–30; Eucken 1983, pp. 141–171.

⁴⁰ Hammond and Griffith 1972–9, vol. 11, pp. 296–328, for the details of these events. For more concise views, see J. R. Ellis 1976, pp. 98–99; Cawkwell 1978a, pp. 82–90; Wirth 1985, pp. 63–74; and Errington 1990, pp. 50–51.

⁴¹ Buckler 1989a, pp. 126–142, with full bibliography.

Apollo's sanctuary was now free, and Philip was in central Greece. Furthermore, his alliance with the Thebans gave him the goodwill of their Peloponnesian allies, as well as that of other states in the region.⁴² Philip's settlement of the Sacred War gives the most significant clue to his designs on Greece. Philip razed the Phocian cities, excepting Abae, and dispersed the inhabitants into villages no larger than fifty houses in number, each a stade apart. They were also disarmed. Furthermore, surely at Philip's behest, Macedonian and Boeotian garrisons were billeted among the conquered.⁴³ The question must obviously be, why did Philip, the most powerful among the victorious parties, take these particular measures, especially the installation of Macedonian garrisons in Phocis? In Ellis' opinion, he did so to limit any possible excesses of the Amphictyons, a view similar to Griffith's that Philip refused to allow the Thebans any strategic advantage in the area by their sole occupation of it.⁴⁴ Both Cawkwell and Wirth agree that he wanted the co-operation of the Greeks for his greater Panhellenic plans, ultimately aimed at Persia.⁴⁵ Errington sees the possibility for Philip's conquest of Greece at this time, but the question must remain: if so, why did he hesitate?⁴⁶

The question is not an idle one, given the immediate opportunities open to Philip. If he had formed a master plan first to subject Greece and next to launch a crusade against Persia, it is not immediately obvious at this point. Once he had entered Greece, and had obtained the gratitude of many Greeks, he enjoyed a number of options. He could have marched directly on Athens, a fear that Demosthenes expressed in his *On the Peace*. Demosthenes had every reason to be anxious. Athens and Sparta were isolated among hostile neighbors. No one could have easily stopped Philip from spreading his power throughout Greece, and many would have gladly helped him because of local quarrels.⁴⁷ Next, Philip could have led his army, supported not only by the Thessalians and Thebans but also by those

⁴² In general: Dem. 5, 19; 19, 204; Arcadia: 5, 18; 19, 261; Argos: 5, 14; 6, 9–11; 19, 261; Messene: 5, 18; 6, 27; Elis: 19, 260; 19, 294; Megara and Euboea: 19, 294–295; 19, 334.

⁴³ Dem. 19, 81; 19, 204; Aeschin. 2, 140–142; Diod. Sic. 16, 60, 1–2; Paus. 10, 3, 1–3.

⁴⁴ J. R. Ellis 1976, pp. 122–124; Hammond and Griffith 1972–9, vol. 11, p. 454.

⁴⁵ Cawkwell 1978a, pp. 109–111; Wirth 1985, pp. 95–101. The influence of Isocrates' idea on war with Persia is much argued and mercifully largely irrelevant here. Wirth correctly notes that the notion predated Isocrates' letter to Philip, which Clemenceau 1926, p. 80, sardonically dismisses as "the puerile suggestion of a rhetorician," "a laborious letter like a student's exercise." Such was also the opinion of Speusippus; see Bickermann and Sykutris 1928, pp. 7–12.

⁴⁶ Errington 1990, pp. 76–77.

⁴⁷ For arguments against the thesis of Markle, adopted by J. R. Ellis, that Philip actually preferred the support of Athens to that of Thebes, see Cawkwell 1978a, pp. 108–113; Buckler 1989a, pp. 121–25; Sawada 1993, pp. 29–40.

of the latter's allies, into the Peloponnesus. Lastly, he could have made a general settlement with the Greeks before advancing on the Persians. Yet he pursued not one of these possibilities.

That leaves unanswered the question of why Philip left Macedonian garrisons in Phocis in the first place. Few of the Phocian cities had had much influence on the course of the war, and many of them openly opposed it.⁴⁸ Without the wealth of Apollo to finance their campaigns, they posed no threat to anyone. Furthermore, there remains the geographic situation of the Macedonian garrisons. They served as a bridgehead of Macedonian power in central Greece, but one connected by a long and tenuous line to Philip. That line ran through Phocis to Thermopylae, past Echinus to Thessaly and beyond. The position of Echinus in this connection has never been fully appreciated.⁴⁹ The city, the ancient remains of which are few, was a Theban settlement that dominated the coastal route between Phocis and Achaia Phthiotis. Most of the line of communications southward, then, led through Thessaly past a city loyal to the Thebans into a Phocis jointly garrisoned by Thebans and Macedonians. Having established his bridgehead in Phocis, Philip obviously entertained no doubts about the reliability of his Theban and Thessalian allies. As Cawkwell has seen, "Philip did not fear Thebes,"⁵⁰ for the obvious reason that his allies had proven themselves loyal and pursued policies compatible with his. All were rid of the Phocians, who had plagued them for ten years, and they all took the opportunity to isolate their common enemy, the Athenians. If there is one acceptable explanation for Macedonian garrisons in Phocis, the safety of which depended on the loyalty of these particular allies, it is that all involved felt a common interest in curbing the political ambitions of the Athenians. Philip was finally and safely south of Thermopylae and in a position to deal with the Athenians, when the opportunity provided itself. Seen in this light, one can comfortably dismiss the visions of Markle and Ellis. In their place, one is left with at least three distinct impressions: the first is that Philip intended to make his presence felt south of Thermopylae; the second is that his immediate design was to intimidate Athens; and the third is that he had not yet conceived of any specific plan to subdue all of Greece.⁵¹

⁴⁸ Buckler 1989a, pp. 196–204.

⁴⁹ Dem. 1, 34 and schol.; 9, 39 and schol.; Baedeker 1904, p. 202; Philippson, *RE* 5.2 (1905), col. 1921, s.v. Echinus. Personal observations of 27 May 1983 revealed a small village dominating a small plain, the breadth of which is roughly two kilometers from the coast to the foothills in the north.

⁵⁰ Cawkwell 1978a, p. 110.

⁵¹ Hammond and Griffith 1972–9, vol. 11, pp. 463–468, following Ryder 1965, pp. 145–149, argues against the notion that the peace settlements of 346 amounted to a *koinē eirēnē*, a view supported by Buckler 1989a, pp. 100–102.

Philip's subsequent movements support these conclusions. Although Philip made his presence felt in scattered Peloponnesian disputes, he did not thereby violate the terms of the Peace of Philocrates.⁵² For the most part, the years from 344 to 340 saw Philip active in the north, specifically in his operations in Epirus, further dealings with the Thessalians, an interlude in Euboea, but above all renewed campaigning in Thrace. In the process, he did nothing more than to strengthen his position, often, as in the cases of the Peloponnesians and Euboeans, at the request of one group at variance with another. These endemic disputes predated the arrival of Philip on the scene of Greek politics. Thrace, however, was different. Philip had some unfinished business with Cersebleptes, whom he had excluded from the Peace of Philocrates, and with the Thracian Teres.⁵³ His obvious aims were to eliminate any Thracian threat to his eastern border and to diminish Athenian influence in the area. Philip had simply resumed his march to the Hellespont.

His path brought him immediately against Cersebleptes, who had long sought to bring all of Thrace under his sway.⁵⁴ The Thracian king had also conducted a war against the Greek cities in the Hellespont, which gave Philip an excellent opportunity to protect them and to anchor his eastern boundary on this vitally important strategic line.⁵⁵ Once again, Philip reacted to a problem not of his own invention. He responded by trying to win the goodwill of the Greek cities in Thrace by coming to their defense. In a major campaign, he won several victories that crushed Cersebleptes, founded some cities, and made alliances with various Greek cities in the region (Diod. Sic. 16, 71, 1–2). The campaign also brought him to Cardia in the northern part of the Chersonesus. If Philip used his march there to provoke the Athenians, he succeeded admirably, without, however, having broken the Peace of Philocrates. The geographic and diplomatic position of Cardia is essential to a proper understanding of subsequent events. Cardia was the greatest city in the Chersonesus, from which Philip could easily swing southward. Demosthenes (9, 35; 23, 182) compares its position in the area with that of Euboean Chalcis to Boeotia. Commanding a good harbor, Cardia stood at the narrowest point in the peninsula of the Chersonesus, a strategically significant point made all the

⁵² In this connection Hammond and Griffith 1972–9, vol. 11, p. 490, have misunderstood the significance of Dem. 7, 30–32, where the orator appeals for an extension to other states of the existing peace, as is proven by 7, 18, not for a *koinē eirēnē*. Since most of the Greek states were not at war with Philip, they had no reason to make peace with him.

⁵³ Dem. 12, 8–11; Diod. Sic. 16, 71; Arr. *Anab.* 7, 9, 3. ⁵⁴ Badian 1983; Buckler 1989b.

⁵⁵ Diod. Sic. 16, 71, 1–2.

more formidable by its command of a wall across the peninsula.⁵⁶ It was never an Athenian possession, as is witnessed by its absence from the *Athenian Tribute Lists*.⁵⁷ Although Diodorus (14, 39, 3) mentions that Athenian generals moored their ships in the harbor of Cardia in 410, there is no evidence of any permanent Athenian presence in the city.

The Athenian orators have as usual done their best to obscure the diplomatic position of Cardia. In 353/2 Cersebleptes handed over to the Athenians all of the cities in the Chersonesus except Cardia.⁵⁸ Thereupon, the Athenians sent *klērouchoi* to the peninsula, which obviously increased tension in the area. Demosthenes and other Athenian orators claimed that Cardia likewise belonged to them.⁵⁹ The truth is quite different. The Peace of Philocrates specifically excluded Cardia from the rest of the Chersonesus.⁶⁰ In a temporary fit of honesty Demosthenes (19, 174) himself later admitted that the Athenians had entered the Cardians as allies of Philip in the peace. Now, alarmed by Athenian ambitions against them, the Cardians called on their ally Philip for protection.⁶¹ Upon his quick response, Demosthenes and other Athenian orators, in their usual hysterical and hypocritical way, ranted about his aggression against Cardia and his seizure of Athenian territory. In return, Philip allegedly reminded the Athenians that absent from their own inscription recording the peace were the names of Cersebleptes and Teres, which meant that Athenian claims to Thracian territory were nugatory (Ps.-Dem. 12, 8). Having never claimed any right to the possession of Cardia, he further explained that the only way in which he could aid his allies was to protect them with armed force against their immediate threat. Philip then perhaps roguishly suggested that if the Athenians were at odds with the Cardians, they should both arbitrate their differences. He added piously that he would personally ensure Cardian compliance with any decision.⁶² He further emphasized the defensive nature of his intentions by offering, but surely not seriously,

⁵⁶ Hdt. 6, 36–7; Xen. *Hell.* 3, 2, 8; Theopompus *FGrH* 115 F 6; Plut. *Per.* 19, 1; Oberhammer, *RE* 10.2 (1919), cols. 1932–1933, s.v. Kardia; Casson 1926, pp. 214–216; personal observations of 7 June 2002.

⁵⁷ Meiggs 1972, pp. 543–546, 560. Xen. *Hell.* 3, 2, 8 supports this view. Schol. Dem. 5, 25 claims that Cardia was originally a colony of Miletus, but also mentions its independence from the rest of the Chersonesus.

⁵⁸ Diod. Sic. 16, 34, 4; *IG* 11² 1613, lines 257–310. Cersebleptes had previously been at peace with Philip: *SdA* 11, no. 319; Ruzicka 1992, p. 96, for the background.

⁵⁹ Dem. 8, 58; 8, 64; cf. 7, 41–44; 10, 60; 10, 68. ⁶⁰ *SdA* 11, no. 329, esp. Dem. 5, 25; 19, 174.

⁶¹ Dem. 12, 11; schol. Aeschin. 3, 83, a treaty not included in *SdA* 11. See also Hammond and Griffith 1972–9, vol. 11, p. 512; Wirth 1985, p. 86; 121.

⁶² Dem. 7, 41; 7, 43–4; 12, 11; 12, 17; see also Aeschin. 3, 83. In 343 Philip had similarly suggested arbitration to the Athenians to settle the status of Halonnesus. He had no reason to expect a different result over Cardia.

to dig a canal across the peninsula in order to maintain the peace.⁶³ With the facts of the case on his side, Philip could discreetly laugh at the Athenians and their lack of any legitimate claim either to Thrace or to Cardia.

The Athenians reacted with anger and frustration. They sent more *klērouchoi* to the Chersonesus, and their general Diopceithes began a series of unprovoked depredations on Philip's Thracian territories, going so far as to seize a Macedonian herald and an ambassador.⁶⁴ The dispute was no longer over Cardia. Diopceithes had attacked Philip himself with the full approval of the Athenians. Philip responded by accusing the Athenians of open and wanton aggression against him. More ominously, he declared that they had violated the Peace of Philocrates and that he would settle matters with them in the future.⁶⁵

Griffith has argued against this position, denying that Philip declared war at this point. He prefers the later testimony of Dionysius of Halicarnassus that war was declared only when the Athenians destroyed the *stèle* that recorded the Peace of Philocrates. That in turn followed Philip's thrusts against Perinthus and Byzantium and his seizure of the Athenian grain fleet.⁶⁶ The point is so important to the present theme, and Griffith's ideas so popular among contemporary scholars, that it deserves attention in some detail. As it happens, a refutation is simple. Griffith has misread his sources, especially the so-called "Philip's Letter," included as number 12 in the Demosthenic *corpus*. At Ps.-Dem. 12, 2–5 Philip lists his grievances against the Athenians, and the aorists prove that these events have already taken place. Next, at 12, 16, he chides the Athenians for their actions against him that were even then taking place, as the present active participles and the present subjunctive prove. Ps.-Dem. 12, 23 dramatically ends with the words "*kai martyras tous theous poiēsamenos dialēpsomai peri tōn kath' hymas*." Griffith translates these final words as "the gods my witness as I deal with your case." Errington errs as well when he translates the passage as "I shall defend myself against you with justice on my side, and I call the gods to witness that I shall bring my dispute with you to a decision."⁶⁷ These renderings do no justice to the text, especially their

⁶³ Dem. 6, 30; 7, 39–40.

⁶⁴ Dem. 8, 2–4; 8, 27; 12, 2–3; schol. Dem. 10. See Dem. 9 for a ludicrous response that entirely avoids the issues.

⁶⁵ Dem. 12, 23; 8, 2; 9, 20; 9, 23; schol. Dem. 10.

⁶⁶ Hammond and Griffith 1972–9, vol. 11, p. 567; Dion. Hal. *Ep. ad Amm.* 1, 11; so too Errington 1990, p. 81.

⁶⁷ Hammond and Griffith 1972–9, vol. 11, p. 80.

cavalier disregard of the aorist verb forms *poiēsamenos* and the future *dialēpsomai*. A literal, if unglamorous, translation of Ps.-Dem. 12, 23 reads “and having made the gods witnesses, I shall deal with you about these matters.” Errington adds that this statement “was not itself a declaration of war.” Even if the Athenians did not realize it, war was already upon them, as Philip had promised.⁶⁸ The author of the letter plainly says that he has already made the gods his witnesses and that he will deal with the Athenians later at his pleasure.

The course of events is perfectly clear. Not only have the Athenians harmed Philip, but they continue to encourage opposition to him. They have sent an embassy to the King to declare war against him.⁶⁹ Furthermore, they were even then urging the Byzantines to declare war against him (12, 16). Because of their aggression Philip considered the Athenians guilty of having violated the Peace of Philocrates, and he promised to deal with them in the future. The facts that the King had not yet intervened against Philip and that the Byzantines had likewise shown no active hostility towards him prove that he had not yet attacked Perinthus (Diod. Sic. 16, 75, 1). Philip is at pains to note that although he had moved his naval and army forces around the Chersonesus, he had done no harm to the Athenian settlements, even though he had been so sorely provoked.⁷⁰ The Athenians could, however, see in his actions a threat to their interests in the area. Philip was certainly actively pursuing his plans, but he had not yet reached his target. Griffith’s argument that the declaration of war came only with the Athenian destruction of the *stele* bearing the terms of the Peace of Philocrates has absolutely nothing to do with Philip’s proclamation of war. He could not have cared less, and indeed Athenian inaction served his purposes. Philip could afford to wait for a suitable opportunity to strike his blow against Athens, as Hitler was later to do against France during the “Phoney War.”⁷¹ A further matter is pertinent to any examination of Philip’s designs on Greece. Philip had declared war only on the Athenians and those of their allies who had participated in the Peace of Philocrates, those whose names had actually been on the *stele*. The Athenians admitted as much, when they themselves destroyed it on the grounds that Philip had not kept the peace with them. Philip had by no means declared war on the Greek states that were not parties to the peace.

⁶⁸ See Philochorus *FGrH* 328 F 55; Dem. 11, 20; 18, 76. As Goodwin 1982, p. 236, and Cawkwell 1978a, have already seen.

⁶⁹ Dem. 12, 6. See also Wendland 1987, p. 113, in which he discusses the reasons behind a rapprochement between Athens and Persia against Philip.

⁷⁰ Dem. 12, 3; 12, 16; see also Philochorus *FGrH* 328 F 53–56. ⁷¹ Wheeler-Bennett 1961, pp. 456–497.

Philip now enjoyed an ideal opportunity to continue his policy of subduing eastern Thrace and coming to terms with the Greek cities there. He began by defeating the Thracians, after which the Greek cities in the region allied themselves with him (Diod. Sic. 16, 71, 1; schol. Aeschin. 2, 81). To judge by his pact with Byzantium, Philip made ordinary defensive alliances with them.⁷² Yet in 340/39 he attacked Perinthus in northeastern Thrace. The formal reasons for his attack are obscure and perhaps ultimately irrecoverable. All that Diodorus (16, 74, 2) says is that the Perinthians opposed him and tended toward the Athenians. A possibility remains. Philip could legally claim assistance from Perinthus against Athens because Diopieithes had attacked him. No matter that the Athenian threat was negligible; Philip would have been technically within his treaty rights. Whatever the legalities, Philip clearly intended to win Perinthus as a further blow to Athenian influence in the area. The move against Perinthus, with its strategic importance to his own realm and to the Athenian grain trade, can easily be seen as the first blow in his newly declared war with Athens.

When Philip attacked Perinthus, he called on the Byzantines to help him in his efforts. His request being specious, the Byzantines refused.⁷³ They instead made their choice of allies by promptly supporting Perinthus with men and material. The King also ordered his satraps on the Asian coast to assist Perinthus. Baffled at Perinthus, Philip struck quickly but unsuccessfully at Byzantium, a move reminiscent of Epaminondas' futile assault on Sparta during the Mantinean campaign.⁷⁴ In the course of these operations Philip seized the Athenian grain fleet.⁷⁵ Having promised the Athenians that he would deal with them at his own chosen time, whether they believed him or not, he stunningly did so in the Hellespont. He seized, as was his right, about two hundred ships, from which he gathered the sum of 700 talents. Finally realizing that they were actually at war, the Athenians destroyed the stele bearing the terms of the Peace of Philocrates and declared war on Philip.⁷⁶ Griffith, however, concludes that Philip had committed an act of piracy.⁷⁷ Since Philip had already proclaimed a state of war, the grain fleet was a legitimate target. Nonetheless, the war still encompassed only the Athenians and their allies and now the King, whensoever Philip chose to deal

⁷² So also schol. Aeschin. 2, 81; *SdA* 11, no. 318; see also 319.

⁷³ Dem. 9, 35; 18, 87–94; Diod. Sic. 16, 74, 2 – 16, 75, 2; *SdA* 11, no. 318.

⁷⁴ Dem. 9, 35; Diod. Sic. 16, 76, 3; Buckler 1980a, pp. 209–211.

⁷⁵ Philochorus *FGrH* 328 F 162; Bearzot 1985, pp. 105–114.

⁷⁶ Didymus Dem. 1, 67 – 2, 2; Dion. Hal. *Ep. ad Amm.* 1, 115; Diod. Sic. 16, 77, 2.

⁷⁷ Hammond and Griffith 1972–9, vol. 11, p. 577.

with him.⁷⁸ The ensuing military and naval actions have been well discussed elsewhere. The combined efforts of the Perinthians, Byzantines, and Athenians, aided by Persian mercenaries, sufficed to force Philip to admit failure. By a stratagem he extricated his fleet from the Black Sea, and his army retreated without incident.⁷⁹

Taking the rebuff in his stride, Philip launched an expedition against Scythia, in the course of which he received a serious wound.⁸⁰ It provided him with the enforced luxury to give thought to his next step. He had stabilized the situation in the north and could not expect better results against Perinthus and Byzantium in 339 than he had enjoyed in 340, so long as Athens could use its fleet against him. The importance of the Athenian fleet has recently been vastly overestimated.⁸¹ Although it had, together with significant local assistance, temporarily thwarted his ambitions, Philip knew that ancient naval power had its limitations. If Lord Byron could later write “Man marks the earth with ruin – his control | Stops with the sea,” Philip could say something similar of the Athenian navy.⁸² It could not enforce its will very far inland. Those modern scholars who argue that Philip favored Athens because of its fleet must explain (which they have not) why neither he nor Alexander ever made any use of it.⁸³

In fact, the immediate problem confronting Philip had nothing to do with the sea at all. His target was Athens, which had impeded his ambitions from the beginning of his reign. Those allies who had saved the day at Perinthus and Byzantium were unlikely and probably unable to come to the defense of Athens, especially if the attack should come by land. He was the *archōn* of Thessaly, the master of Phocis, and the ally of Thebes. The rest of Greece had no quarrel with him, not even the inconsequential Spartans. Since the Athenian fleet could thus not impede his movements, the Athenians at best could surrender their countryside to the invader in the hope that at least the navy could keep the city supplied.⁸⁴

⁷⁸ Alexander was later to defend his invasion of the Persian Empire on the grounds that the Persians had intervened against Philip at Perinthus: Arr. *Anab.* 2, 14, 5; *SdA* 11, no. 333; Bosworth 1980, pp. 228–233, with earlier bibliography.

⁷⁹ Front. *Strat.* 1, 4, 13; 1, 4, 13a; see also Polyæn. 4, 2, 8.

⁸⁰ Justin 9, 2, 1–3, 3; Wirth 1985, pp. 122–126.

⁸¹ E.g. J. R. Ellis 1976, p. 126; J. R. Ellis 1982, pp. 48–49.

⁸² Lord Byron, Child Harold's Pilgrimage CLXXIX, in R. Noyes, *English Romantic Poetry and Prose*, New York, 1956, p. 825.

⁸³ Hammond and Griffith 1972–9, vol. 11, p. 570, somehow know that Philip needed the Athenian fleet for a war against Persia in “a year or two's time.”

⁸⁴ Ober 1985, pp. 217–220.

Athens being the principal obstacle to his ambitions, Philip planned to remove the problem in 339. Diodorus notes that he had already gained the friendship of most Greeks and claims that he hoped to win the hegemony of Greece by intimidating Athens.⁸⁵ At the beginning of the campaigning season he suddenly seized Elatea, a move that sent panic throughout Athens.⁸⁶ His formal excuse was the outbreak of another Sacred War at Delphi, a pretext that had served him so well before. Terrify the Athenians he did, but intimidate them he did not. Demosthenes' desperate but brilliant gamble in response was to sink Athenian differences with Thebes in order to oppose what he saw as their common menace. The course of events is so well known that little need be recounted here. Both Philip and the Athenians sent ambassadors to Thebes. Philip offered the Thebans an ultimatum: they could choose whether to join in the invasion of Attica, grant the Macedonians free passage through Boeotian territory and thus join in the spoils of war, or suffer the ravages of war themselves.⁸⁷ Despite the attractiveness of the offer and the portent of the threat, the Thebans understood the significance of the matters before them. In 341 they had stood by while Philip seized Echinus, thus removing any remaining barrier to his movements southward.⁸⁸ They fully realized the extent of their own danger. In what was perhaps the finest hour of both the Thebans and Demosthenes, the Boeotian Confederacy and the Athenians, aided by a handful of Greek states, defied Philip. Theirs was hardly a Panhellenic force such as had opposed Xerxes.⁸⁹ If one can point to any one moment when Philip decided to subdue Greece and not merely Athens, it must surely have been upon receipt of his ambassadors' reports from Thebes. The war was no longer between Athens and him, but the defeat of Thebes and Athens now opened the possibility of his winning the hegemony of Greece, made all the easier by the overwhelming number of Greek states favorably inclined toward him. The climax came at Chaeronea, and after the battle no one could stand in his way.⁹⁰

There is nothing in all of this to suggest a master plan, but there is ample evidence that by pursuing his war with Athens, Philip realized the

⁸⁵ The verb *kataplēssō* in Diodorus' text does not necessarily mean that Philip had already decided to attack the Athenians. It means rather that he was even at that late hour trying to bully or terrify them into submission.

⁸⁶ Dem. 18, 152; 18, 169–178; Diod. Sic. 16, 84 – 16, 85, 1; Wüst 1938, pp. 155–156; Sordi 1969, pp. 146–147; Wirth 1985, p. 129.

⁸⁷ Dem. 18, 213–215; Diod. Sic. 16, 85, 3–4; Mosley 1971. ⁸⁸ Dem. 9, 34; Philippson 1897, pp. 54–55.

⁸⁹ At most only some eight states willingly took the field against Philip at Chaeronea: Dem. 18, 237; Aeschin. 3, 97; Diod. Sic. 16, 84, 1; Paus. 10, 3, 3.

⁹⁰ For the battle itself, see chapter 17 above.

feasibility of seizing the mastery of Greece. He took advantage of unexpected opportunities and created many of his own. His settlement with the Greek states was mild, and most Greeks did not yet realize that things would thenceforth be different.⁹¹ They did not enjoy the hindsight of Pompeius Trogus, who observed, "The states of Greece, while each one wished to rule alone, all squandered sovereignty. Indeed, hastening without moderation to destroy one another in mutual ruin, they did not realize, until they were all crushed, that every one of them lost in the end."⁹² Although it cannot be said of Philip that he won his empire in a fit of absence of mind, he cleverly, sometimes cautiously, usually successfully, and ultimately victoriously, realized that he could turn Greek, especially Athenian, factiousness to his own ends.

⁹¹ Even the League of Corinth would not be a drastic innovation: see chapter 16 above. For Philip's settlement of Greek affairs, see Roebuck 1948; Heisserer 1980, pp. XXIII–XXVII.

⁹² Justin 8, 1, 1–2.

Epilogue

(by John Buckler and Hans Beck)

Until recently scholars, as noted earlier in these pages, looked upon fourth-century Greece as a period of decay and decadence, a time when the greatness of the *polis* had seen its zenith only to witness its decline. More recent work has appreciated it rather as a time of political evolution and experimentation that both changed the face of Greek life and left an enduring legacy to future generations. By the end of the fourth century the *polis* had indeed begun to lose its singular significance as the essential political institution of interstate affairs. Yet it must also be observed that during this trying period the Greek city-state staunchly confronted the challenges before it in various original and productive ways. Some of the most virulent of these potentially lethal challenges came from the combination of internal discord – *stasis* – and external rivalry for maximizing power and resources among states. Looming class distinctions, disagreements over the political philosophies of democracy and oligarchy, and the threat of tyranny often led to the internal disruption of the *polis* and to its exposure to outside force. All too often these pressures threatened the autonomy of the *polis* and its very way of life. These dangers led to constant social and political turmoil throughout the century and later periods, which did not end under the Roman Empire.

To ensure the survival of the *polis* in a larger and turbulent political world the Greeks turned to a variety of alternatives. As seen above, federalism came to the fore as a reasonable hope. While not a new factor in Greek political life, federalism began to assume a broader significance over wider areas. Cities that shared a vivid belief of common ethnicity, a more or less contiguous territory as well as customs and culture that separated them from other *ethnē*, banded together to meld local autonomy with class solidarity into a shared polity, one better equipped than any individual state to deal with the broader outside world. During the fourth century especially, federalism held the promise of providing an alternative to the traditional multipolar military alliances of Sparta and Athens. The

first significant sign of this development came in Boeotia. After the liberation of the Cadmea in 379 the Thebans remodelled the previous Boeotian Confederacy into an organization marked by fundamental structural changes. The Thebans introduced a broad direct Boeotian citizenship as the prerequisite for participation in federal affairs. They abolished the old federal units that had provided specific levies to the army, their leaders, and political representatives to the federal *boulē*. In their place came direct federal citizenship. In theory sovereignty lay squarely in the hands of all Boeotian citizens. In reality, however, direct democratic franchise gave actual power to the Thebans, the unchallenged leaders of the confederacy. In this way the Thebans marshalled the strength of all Boeotia behind them, making their confederacy the most important single power in Greece.

The Thebans extended their influence beyond central Greece by applying their military superiority to political ends. They did so in the traditional way of creating a network of alliances with other city-states. Although they relied on these alliances to create a bloc against Sparta and then Athens, there was no central organization to lead this network. The Thebans gained no formal recognition of their position as *hēgemōn*, nor did they create a *synedrion* to formulate allied planning and policies. Consequently, their allies frequently pursued individual aims to the detriment of any goals that embraced all members. These defects not only led to the collapse of Theban leadership but also threw Greece back onto its traditional modes of interstate relations. While the Thebans clung to the principle of multiple symmachial arrangements that were fostered to underline their leadership, this claim was exposed to uncontrolled competition between their opponents and also their allies. In this regard, the Theban Hegemony might be seen as the climax of a long series of attempts to create interstate order through the means of symmachial hegemony, with its involved shortcomings.

Although central Greece, albeit temporarily, became the home of the most notable federal state, other areas witnessed similar processes of regional dynamics, both in the north and in the Peloponnese. Yet federations such as the Arcadian League and the Thessalian League proved even more fragile than the federal arrangement in Boeotia. Their governments were sharply divided and hence unable to present regional stability, let alone a united front in transregional affairs. Despite this, while federalism may not have added to interstate security, it did not necessarily lead to a deadlock either. Once the structure of interstate affairs had been altered in the early Hellenistic period, the Achaean and Aetolian Leagues amply

proved that federal governments could in fact win the loyalty and muster the resources of large groups of people who shared neither ethnic bonds nor intentionally remodeled historical traditions. To that extent these Hellenistic federations more successfully resolved the tensions between local autonomy and delegated sovereignty than their predecessors. This notion of a shared community that reached beyond the *polis* and incorporated it into a general political entity gave federalism a new place in the history of the ancient world.

Federalism was not the only attempt to establish order. In the late fifth and throughout the fourth centuries, city-states sought to structure their relations by the means of Common Peace treaties, a political adventure with an eventful development. In the final stages of the Peloponnesian War the Spartans and the King of Persia united to defeat Athens by a mutual agreement whereby the King maintained a Spartan fleet in return for Spartan recognition of Persian sovereignty of all the Greek states of Asia Minor. Later, to end the Corinthian War, the King and Sparta struck a similar, but broader, deal in which all Greeks recognized Persian rule over Asia, and all Greeks received in turn the guarantee of peace and autonomy, whether or not they had served as belligerents in the war. Thus arose the concept of the King's right to rule Asia Minor and the Greek right to enjoy a state of widespread autonomy. As neat as this may sound, this deal had fatal consequences. The demand of *autonomia*, henceforth a political norm, turned into a powerful weapon in power politics, enabling leading states to justify their expansionist goals on the grounds of an interstate treaty sanctioned by the Great King.

Throughout the rest of the fourth century the twin concepts of the King's and the Common Peace provided a structural reference for interstate affairs, but their roles were crippled from the outset by the single fact that neither could be made a lasting reality. Neither the King nor the Greeks could enforce this peace program, if only because no one really wanted it to function as created. Only the smaller Greek states proved the exception. To them the peace guaranteed the right to live their lives as they wished under the aegis of autonomy. Larger states, however, most prominently Sparta, Athens, and Thebes, saw it as a tool for hegemony. By enforcing the treaty according to the dictates of their own ambitions they turned the peace into an instrument of power politics. By the middle of the fourth century the very concept of a general peace had become so threadbare that states ceased to take it seriously. Ironically enough, only Philip solved the problem, though in his own inimitable way. At the Peace of Corinth in 338/7 he established a Common Peace among the Greeks, put

himself forward as its enforcer, and excluded the King. Even though he too planned to use it as an instrument of conquest and expansion, it resulted in a profound restructuring of Greek interstate affairs. Although the assassin's blade foiled Philip's ambitions, Alexander brought them to fruition. He also gave his own stern opinion of the significance of Thebes and central Greece to these developments. Unwilling to admit the supremacy of Macedonia over Greece, Thebes in 335 rose in defiance only to suffer utter defeat. At the end of the Peloponnesian War the Thebans had urged the destruction of Athens. Now, at the beginning of his career, Alexander dealt Thebes that very fate. For all that, peace prevailed against adversity. In the course of its vexed and often ineffectual lifetime, the very concept of peace as the normal, desired condition of Greek interstate relations survived until the end of Classical antiquity in the form of the *Pax Romana*, a precious heirloom of the ancient world.

Some Greek states in the mid fourth century made a short-lived and unsuccessful attempt to use the Amphictyonic Council at Delphi to maintain peace by settling interstate conflicts. By appealing to treaties and other official agreements they relied on this religious body to resolve disputes. Yet their hopes were shattered by the very reason that the Amphictyony was a body intended primarily to maintain Apollo's sanctuary at Delphi, not to establish interstate order. Its proper functions involved due observance of the cult's rites, assurance of open access to the sanctuary, and just administration of the god's land and offerings. The council oversaw the activities of its members in this capacity only. Yet the Greeks had traditionally looked to Apollo's sanctuary as to Zeus's at Olympia to witness the validity of oaths and settle disputes involving sacred customs, which naturally put the Amphictyony in an impossible situation when purely political quarrels arose.

The principal political problem of this period resulted from an ongoing dispute between the Phocians and the Amphictyonic Council over who had the right to administer the Panhellenic sanctuary. The Phocians for their part claimed jurisdiction because the sanctuary was located in their territory. Yet the Amphictyons, representing the peoples normally entitled to the honor and adhering to the generally accepted tradition, rejected the contention. In the process the Amphictyons enjoyed broad general support. A number of disputes had led to the so-called Sacred Wars, but couched in the interstate system of the fourth century, the sanctuary soon found itself caught up in a war on a system-wide scale. In 356 the Amphictyons fined the Phocians for having illegally cultivated some sacred land and (which is often overlooked) the Spartans for having seized the

Cadmea of Thebes in time of peace. Phocian, Spartan, and soon Athenian defiance of this decision resulted in a prolonged war to which only Philip could put an end. Thereafter, in a different dispute, the Athenians turned to the Amphictyons to stop the military progress of Philip, only to be officially foiled in their efforts. In both cases the original complaints, though religious in nature, were highly politically charged. Only the Athenians, however, tried to use Delphi as a purely political device against Philip. Their attempts fell short because Delphi lacked the authority – and power – to regulate interstate relations. In fact, in both cases most Greeks looked upon Philip as the saviour of Delphic integrity when he defended the Amphictyonic decisions. Delphi thereafter reverted to its accustomed role as the haven of Apollo until the emperor Theodosius closed the oracle in AD 391.

Power politics and military advances were inextricably entwined throughout the fourth century. Military campaigns were indeed exceptionally frequent during these years, even by Greek standards. Military commanders and thinkers revolutionized strategy and tactics, while developing a new use of artillery. Thebes and Boeotia played a particularly creative role in the first of these developments. Epaminondas established his role as a fertile thinker who carried hoplite tactics to new levels of versatility and efficiency. At Leuctra and Mantinea, he co-ordinated infantry and cavalry so as to create a formidable striking force that he launched against the enemy's strongest point. This strength he deployed on the left of his line. Greek armies had previously pitted the most potent part of their formations against the weakest of the enemy. Seldom had these battles resulted in decisive victory. Now in a single encounter Epaminondas unveiled an effective means of destroying the heart of the enemy's army while rendering the rest of it virtually useless. Epaminondas and Pelopidas also used cavalry to contribute to the main blow against the hostile phalanx, an innovation not lost on Philip, Alexander, and their successors.

Both Thebans made a further contribution to military thought and practice by remodeling strategic concepts, which they took to a much more sophisticated level than had previous commanders. Greek armies had traditionally, as in the Peloponnesian War, launched frequent invasions of enemy territory during which they burned, harried, and plundered, reducing hapless farms to ashes. They thereby impoverished the enemy and destroyed their resources, while crushing their will to resist. The destruction of the enemy's economic and social strength seems to have been exactly what was sought by Boeotian troops under Epaminondas – the Theban Hegemony might again be viewed as the final result of this

military strategy, one that illustrates yet again its shortcomings when translated into post-warfare attempts to create interstate order. As in strategy, so in tactics, Epaminondas was soon followed by Philip and Alexander who concentrated their maximum strength against the foundation of the enemy's forces. Sweeping victory resulted, and these years taught a valuable lesson: mobility and speed bolstered by the full military arsenal generally resulted in successful campaigns.

The last significant military innovation, the development of artillery, followed its own circuitous history. Originally a Syracusan invention, Philip first fully realized its potential in Macedonia and Greece. His use of catapults and arrow-firing engines made siege-warfare deadly and more effective. Even though these years also saw great strides in the construction and complexity of stone fortifications – most notably at Messene, Athens, and Boeotian Orchomenus – torsion machinery now presented a formidable threat. As so often in the wide-ranging advances of these years, artillery and the defense against it became more complex, sophisticated, and successful in the course of time. Nonetheless, this period saw their birth.

Greek history of the fourth century bears no traces of decadence, decrepitude, or decline. Rather, the Greek world went through a deep power-transformation crisis that was triggered by its inability to adapt to changed circumstances. The Greeks were unable to replace a multipolar state system with anything more embracing. In bald terms, no single Greek state conceived of a political idea or principle acceptable to others that could bring peace and stability. Nor was any state capable of mastering the others. Relative peace came not from political or intellectual enlightenment but from physical exhaustion. Toward the second half of the period the Greek state system had almost reached an impasse. Even though in Philip, and later Hellenistic kings, the Greek world encountered in monarchy a new solution to this problem, many Hellenistic states reverted to a broadened federalism that expanded the horizon beyond the limitations of the Classical *polis*. Both the Achaeans and Aetolians created leagues broad enough to appeal to peoples beyond their own original territories and ethnic identities, and capable of holding their own against the great monarchs. Nonetheless, when Alexander and his successors opened the east, the ramifications for the Greek state system were profound. The Seleucids, Ptolemies, and Attalids forged monarchies and commanded natural and human resources that dwarfed the old *polis*. Greece itself became something of a revered backwater, more the ornament and tool of the greater power politics than something vital in itself. Yet the heritage

of the *polis* prevailed in its insistence on the value of civic community, the emphasis on the essential social role of the city, and individual personal rights and liberties. These ideals prevailed until they received a final, and most fruitful, endorsement under the Roman Empire. In this light, the fourth century made its own particular contribution to Greco-Roman civic life, cultural vigor, and political thought. It was a period of experiments, some of which led to a dead end while others proved to be more lasting.

Glossary

See also the relevant entries in *OCD*³ and in *New Pauly*, Encyclopaedia of the Ancient World (continuing English translation of *Der Neue Pauly*, Enzyklopädie der Antike).

amphictyony: league of peoples living in the region of a sanctuary who had bound themselves by oath to maintain it and to provide that the proper sacrifices, rituals, and games were observed

archē: rule or empire

archōn, archontes: the leading elected political figure in a state; in those having several leaders the foremost were collectively called *archontes*

boulē: a council that possessed civil authority to advise on legislation and to oversee daily public activities

boiōtarchia: the office of the boeotarchs, who were the supreme elected leaders of the Boeotian Confederacy

demos: term for the people, often only citizens but also sometimes the entire population of a city

ekklēsia: a political unit of citizens that decided public policy; assembly

embolon: a ram in naval terms; a triangular formation in military action

enkōmion: a piece of formal, rhetorical praise

enōmotiai: members of a forty-strong unit of the Spartan army

harmost: military governor, generally Spartan, in control of garrisons and the political functioning of the state

hēgemonia, hēgemōn: leadership of a federation or an alliance of states; the leader of such a union

hieromnēmones: religious representatives of the Delphic Amphictyony who determined political and financial matters pertaining to the sanctuary

hipparchos: commander of cavalry

hoplite: heavily armed infantryman equipped with a large circular shield, spear, helmet, breastplate, and greaves.

- isopoliteia*: equality of civil rights, generally among citizens of foreign cities
- karanos*: Persian commander appointed by the King who held superior rank over the local satraps in the area where they served
- klērouchoi*: citizens sent abroad to hold allotments of officially granted foreign lands
- koinē eirēnē*: common peace, a term to describe a peace treaty agreed upon by all states
- koinon*: a term to describe the union of several different, independent states in one general political unit
- lacuna*: any gap or lost passage, especially in manuscripts or in the historical account of an event
- lochagos*: commander of a company of troops, especially in the Spartan army
- lochos, lochoi*: a regiment or large body of Spartan soldiers
- mora*: a Spartan military formation that for a period in the fourth century BC replaced the *lochos*
- naopoios*: temple builder
- pelasts*: lightly armed infantry, primarily equipped with a small shield and javelin
- polemarchos, polemarchoi*: highest ranking military officers in command of the *morai* (see above); in some states also a civil official
- probouleuma*: advisory decision of the Athenian *boulē* on a piece of legislation to be presented to the assembly
- promanteia*: the right of a person or state first to consult an oracle
- prostatēs*: the leader and spokesman of a political group; also the unofficial but generally recognized executor of the King's Peace
- proxenos, proxenia*: the official representative and friend of one citizen of his own state for the interests of a foreign state; the office thereof
- prytaneia, prytanis*: the position of a legislative body of the Athenian *boulē*, which made arrangements for presenting legislation for the *boulē* and the assembly
- pylaia*: gates, especially architectural gates in ornamental style; also a meeting of the Delphic amphictyons
- sarisa*: a long pike held by Macedonian infantrymen
- stadion*: both a measure of length and a building intended to house a running track
- stasis*: internal civil turmoil, often violent in nature
- stele*: a stone column used to exhibit official and honorary dedications and laws

stoichēdon: the method of inscribing stones in a rectangular fashion without spaces or division of words

stratēgos: a military commander in charge of a large levy of troops or ships

stratēgos autokratōr: a general who commanded his troops with full command over all other officers and men

symbolē: an agreement between states and some individuals dealing with legal relations between individuals of different states

symmachia: a formal alliance between independent states

sympoliteia: the merging of several individual states into a larger political unity in which all involved enjoyed equal communal rights

synedrion: a body of officials (*synedroi*) who sat in conference to decide political, diplomatic, and legal matters

synodos: an assembly principally devoted to deliberations

synteleia: a domain in which the neighbouring cities were the subordinates of a leading local power

tageia, tagos: the official title of the supreme civil and military magistrate of Thessaly, whose principal duty was leadership of the army

References

- Accame, S. 1941. *La lega ateniese del sec. IV a.C.*, Rome.
 1951. *Ricerche intorno alla Guerra Corinzia*, Naples.
- Adam, A. M. 1941. "Philip alias Hitler," *G&R* 10, 105–113.
- Adams, C. D. 1938. "Speeches VIII and X of the Demosthenic Corpus," *CPh* 33, 129–144.
- Adcock, F. E. 1962a. *The Greek and Macedonian Art of War*, Berkeley and Los Angeles.
- 1962b. *Thucydides and His History*, Cambridge.
- Adcock, F. E. and Mosley, D. J. 1975. *Diplomacy in Ancient Greece*, London.
- Alfieri, T. T. 1988. "Problemi di fonti nei libri XVI e XVII di Diodoro," *Acme* 41, 21–29.
- Aly, W. 1957. *Strabon von Amaseia*, Bonn.
- Amit, M. 1973. *Great and Small Poleis: a Study in the Relations between the Great Powers and the Small Cities in Ancient Greece*, Brussels.
- Anderson, J. K. 1970. *Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon*, Berkeley and Los Angeles.
1974. *Xenophon*, London.
- Andrewes, A. 1962. "The Mytilene Debate: Thucydides 3.36–49," *Phoenix* 16, 64–85.
1971. "Two Notes on Lysander," *Phoenix* 25, 217–226.
- Archibald, Z. H. 1998. *The Odrysian Kingdom of Thrace*, Oxford.
- Aymard, A. 1954. "Philippe de Macédoine otage a Thèbes," *Rev. Ét. Anc.* 56, 15–36.
- Badian, E. (ed.) 1966. *Ancient Society and Institutions*, Oxford.
1983. "Philip II and Thrace," *Pulchre* 4, 51–71.
1991. "The King's Peace," in M. A. Flower and M. Toher (eds.), *Georgica. Greek Studies in Honour of George Cawkwell*, London, 25–48.
1993. "Alexander and Philippi," *ZPE* 95, 131–139.
1995. "The Ghost of Empire," in Eder (1995), 79–106.
2004. "Xenophon the Athenian," in Tuplin (2004a), 33–53.
- Badian, E. and Buckler, J. 1975. "The Wrong Salamis?," *Rh. Mus.* 118, 226–240.
- Badian, E. and Martin, T. 1985. "Athenians, Other Allies, and the Hellenes in the Athenian Honorary Decree for Adeimantos of Lampsacus," *ZPE* 61, 167–172.
- Baedeker, K. 1904 *Griechenland. Handbuch für Reisende*, 4th edn., Leipzig.

- Bakhuizen, S. C. 1988. "A Note on Syntely: the Case of Boeotia," *Epetēris tēs Hetaireias Boiōtikôn Meletôn*, 1a, 279–289.
1994. "Thebes and Boeotia in the Fourth Century BC," *Phoenix* 48, 307–330.
- Barber, G. L. 1935/1993. *The Historian Ephorus*. Text and translation by M. C. J. Miller. Chicago.
- Barends, D. 1955. *Lexicon Aeneium*, Assen.
- Barnett, C. 1989. *Hitler's Generals*, New York.
- Bauslaugh, R. A. 1991. *The Concept of Neutrality in Classical Greece*, Berkeley.
- Baynes, N. 1955. *Byzantine Studies and Other Essays*, London.
- Bean, G. E. and Cook, J. M. 1952. "The Cnidia," *BSA* 47, 172–212.
- Bearzot, C. 1985. *Focione tra storia e trasfigurazione ideale*, Milan.
1992. *Storia e storiografia ellenistica in Pausania il Periegeta*, Venice.
2004. *Federalismo e autonomia nelle Elleniche di Senofonte*, Milan.
- Beck, H. 1997a. *Polis und Koinon*, Stuttgart.
- 1997b. "Das Attentat auf Lykomedes von Mantinea," *TEKMHPIA* 3, 1–5.
1999. "Ostlokris und die 'Tausend Opuntier.' Neue Überlegungen zum Siedlergesetz für Naupaktos," *ZPE* 124, 53–62.
2000. "Thebes, the Boiotian League, and the Rise of Federalism in Fourth Century Greece," in P. A. Bernardini (ed.), *Presenza e funzione della città di Tebe nella cultura greca*, Pisa and Rome, 331–344.
- 2001a. "The Laws of the Fathers' versus 'the Laws of the League': Xenophon on Federalism," *CPh* 96, 355–375.
- 2001b. "Review of J. McInerney, *The Folds of Parnassos*," *SCI* 20, 298–302.
2003. "New Approaches to Federalism in Ancient Greece. Perceptions and Perspectives," in K. Buraselis and K. Zoumboulakis (eds.), *The Idea of European Community in History*, vol. 11: *Aspects of Connecting Poleis and Ethne in Ancient Greece*, Athens, 177–190.
- Beister, H. 1970. *Untersuchungen zu der Zeit der Thebanischen Hegemonie*, Munich.
- Beister, H. and Buckler, J. (eds.) 1989. *BOIOTIKA. Vorträge vom 5. Internationalen Böötien-Kolloquium zu Ehren von Prof. Dr. Siegfried Lauffer*, Munich.
- Beloch, K. J. 1912–27. *Griechische Geschichte*, 2nd edn., vols. I–IV, Berlin and Leipzig.
- Bengtson, H. 1969. *Griechische Geschichte*, 4th edn., Munich.
1985. *Philipp und Alexander der Große*, Munich.
- Bernhardt, R. 1988. "Zu den Verhandlungen zwischen Dareios und Alexander nach der Schlacht bei Issos," *Chiron* 18, 181–198.
- Bernstein, F. 2004. *Konflikt und Migration*, St. Katharinen.
- Bersanetti, G. M. 1949. "Pelopida," *Athenaeum* NS 27, 43–101.
- Berve, H. 1967. *Die Tyrannis bei den Griechen*, Munich.
- Best, J. G. P. 1969. *Thracian Peltasts and Their Influence on Greek Warfare*, Groningen.
- Bétant, E.-A. 1843. *Lexicon Thucydideum*, Geneva.
- Bickermann, E. and Sykutris, S. 1928. *Speusipps Brief an König Philipp*, Leipzig.
- Blackman, D. J. 1969. "Plautus and Greek Topography," *TAPA* 100, 11–22.

- Blass, F. 1892. *Die attische Beredsamkeit*, vol. 11, 2nd edn., Leipzig.
- Bleckmann, B. 1998. *Athens Weg in die Niederlage. Die letzten Jahre des Peloponnesischen Krieges*, Stuttgart and Leipzig.
- Blümel, W. 1992. *Die Inschriften von Knidos*, vol. 1, Bonn.
1994. "Two New Inscriptions from the Cnidian Peninsula," *EA* 23, 157–159.
- Bommelaer, J.-F. 1969. "Un nouvelle proxénie de Delphes," *BCH* 93, 92–96.
1981. *Lysandre de Sparte*, Paris.
- Bonner, R. J. and Smith, G. 1945. "Administration of Justice in Boeotia," *CPh* 40, 11–23.
- Borza, E. N. 1990. *In the Shadow of Olympus. The Emergence of Macedon*, Princeton.
- Bosworth, A. B. 1971. "The Congress Decree. Another Hypothesis," *Hist.* 20, 600–616.
1980. *A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander I*, Oxford.
1988. *Conquest and Empire*, Cambridge.
- Botsford, G. W. 1910. "The Constitution and Politics of the Boeotian League from Its Origin to the Year 387 BC," *PSQ* 25, 271–296.
- Breitenbach, H. 1950. *Historiographische Anschauungsformen Xenophons*, Freiburg.
- Breitenbach, L. 1876. *Xenophons Hellenica III* (Berlin, 1876).
1878. *Xenophons Kyropädie II*, 3rd edn., Leipzig.
- Briscoe, J. 1973, *Commentary on Livy Books XXXI–XXXIII*, Oxford.
- Bruce, I. A. F. 1960. "Internal Politics and the Outbreak of the Corinthian War," *Emerita* 28, 75–86.
1967. *An Historical Commentary on the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, Cambridge.
- Brunt, P. A. 1980. "On Historical Fragments and Epitomes," *CQNS* 74, 477–494.
- Buchner, E. 1958. *Der Panegyrikos des Isokrates*, Wiesbaden.
- Buck, R. J. 1974. "Boeotarchs at Thermopylae," *CPh* 69, 47–48.
1979. *A History of Boeotia*, Edmonton.
1994. *Boiotia and the Boiotian League, 432–371 BC*, Edmonton.
- Buckler, J. 1971a. "Dating the Peace of 375/4 BC," *GRBS* 12, 353–361.
- 1971b. "Theban Treaty Obligations in *IG* 11² 40. A Postscript," *Hist.* 20, 506–508.
1972. "A Second Look at the Monument of Chabrias," *Hesp.* 41, 466–474.
- 1977a. "The Thespians at Leuktra," *Wien. Stud.* 90, 76–79.
- 1977b. "Plutarch and the Fate of Antalkidas," *GRBS* 18, 139–145.
- 1978a. "Plutarch on the Trials of Pelopidas and Epameinondas (369 BC)," *CPh* 73, 36–42.
- 1978b. "The Alleged Achaian Arbitration after Leuktra," *Symb. Osl.* 53, 71–83.
1979. "The Re-establishment of the Boiotarchia (378 BC)," *AJAH* 4, 50–64; reprinted in this volume.
- 1980a. *The Theban Hegemony, 371–362 BC*, Cambridge, MA.
- 1980b. "The Alleged Theban–Spartan Alliance of 386 BC," *Eranos* 78, 170–185.
- 1980c. "Plutarch on Leuktra," *Symb. Osl.* 55, 75–93; reprinted in this volume.
- 1982a. "Xenophon's Speeches and the Theban Hegemony," *Athenaeum* NS 60, 180–204; reprinted in this volume.

- 1982b. "Alliance and Hegemony in Fourth-Century Greece: the Case of the Theban Hegemony," *The Ancient World* 5, 79–89; reprinted in this volume.
- 1985a. "Epameinondas and the Embolon," *Phoenix* 39, 134–143.
- 1985b. "Boiotian Aulis and Greek Naval Bases," in Department of History, US Naval Academy (ed.), *New Aspects of Naval History*, Baltimore, 13–25; reprinted in this volume.
- 1985c. "Thebes, Delphoi, and the Outbreak of the Third Sacred War," in Roesch and Argoud (1985), 237–246; reprinted in this volume.
1986. "Delphi und die Söhne des Kersebleptes," *Klio* 68, 348–350.
- 1989a. *Philip II and the Sacred War*, Leiden.
- 1989b. "Pammenes, die Perser und der heilige Krieg," in J. Beister and H. Buckler (1989), 155–162; reprinted in this volume.
1990. "A Note on the Battle of Chaironeia in 338 BC," *Teiresias* Suppl. 3, 75–80; reprinted in this volume.
1992. "Plutarch and Autopsy," *ANRW* 11. 36.6, 4788–4830.
1993. "Epaminondas and Pythagoreanism," *Hist.* 42, 104–108.
1994. "Philip II, the Greeks, and the King, 346–336 BC," *ICS* 19, 60–77; reprinted in this volume.
1995. "The Battle of Tegyra, 375 BC," *Boeotia Antiqua* 5, 43–58; reprinted in this volume.
- 1996a. "The Battle of Koroneia and Its Historiographical Legacy," *Boeotia Antiqua* 6, 59–72; reprinted in this volume.
- 1996b. "Philip's Designs on Greece," in R. W. Wallace and E. M. Harries (eds.), *Transitions to Empire. Essays in Greco-Roman History, 360–146 BC, in Honor of Ernst Badian*, Norman, 77–97; reprinted in this volume.
1998. "Epameinondas and the New Inscription from Knidos," *Mnemos.* 51, 192–205; reprinted in this volume.
- 2000a. "A Survey of Theban and Athenian Relations between 403 and 371 BC," in P. A. Bernadini (ed.), *Presenza e Funzione della città di Tebe nella cultura greca*, Pisa and Rome, 319–329; reprinted in this volume.
- 2000b. "The Phantom *Synhedrion* of the Boiotian Confederacy, 378–335 BC," in Nielsen *et al.* (2000), 431–446; reprinted in this volume.
2003. *Aegean Greece in the Fourth Century BC*, Leiden.
2004. "The Incident at Mt. Parnassos," in Tuplin (2004a), 397–411; reprinted in this volume.
- Bulle, H. 1907. *Orchomenos*, vol. 1: Die älteren Ansiedlungsschichten, Munich.
- Burckhardt, L. 1996. *Bürger und Soldaten*, Stuttgart.
- Burn, A. R. 1962. *Persia and the Greeks*, London.
1964. *Alexander the Great and the Hellenistic World*, London.
- Burr, V. B. 1944. *Untersuchungen zum homerischen Schiffskatalog*, Berlin.
- Bursian, C. 1862. *Geographie von Griechenland*, vol. 1, Leipzig.
- Busolt, G. 1873–5. "Der zweite athenische Bund und die auf der Autonomie beruhende hellenische Politik von der Schlacht bei Knidos bis zum Frieden des Eubulos," *NJ* 7, 641–866.
1908. "Der neue Historiker und Xenophon," *Hermes* 43, 255–285.

- Busolt, G. and Swoboda, H. 1926. *Griechische Staatskunde*, vol. 11: Darstellung einzelner Staaten und der zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen, Munich.
- Bussmann, J. B. 1912. *Die böotische Verfassung*, Fulda.
- Cahn, H. A. 1970. *Knidos. Die Münzen des sechsten und des fünften Jahrhunderts v. Chr.*, Berlin.
- Calder III, W. M. and Demandt, A. (eds.) 1990. *Eduard Meyer. Leben und Leistung eines Universalhistorikers*, Leiden.
- Cargill, J. 1981. *The Second Athenian League. Empire or Free Alliance?*, Berkeley and Los Angeles.
1982. "Hegemony, Not Empire. The Second Athenian League," *AncW* 5, 91–102.
1995. *Athenian Settlements of the Fourth Century BC*, Leiden.
- Carrata Thomes, F. 1952. *Egemonia beotica*, Turin.
- Cartledge, P. 1979. *Sparta and Lakonia. A Regional History c. 1300–362 BC*, London and Boston.
1987. *Agesilaos and the Crisis of Sparta*, Baltimore.
2000. "Boiotian Swine F(or)ever? The Boiotian Superstate 395 BC," in T. H. Nielsen *et al.* (2000), 397–418.
- Casson, S. 1926. *Macedonia, Thrace, and Illyria*, Oxford.
- Caven, B. 1990. *Dionysius I*, New Haven.
- Cawkwell, G. L. 1956. "A Note on the Heracles Coinage Alliance of 394 BC," *Num. Chron.* 6. Ser. 16, 69–75.
- 1961a. "The Common Peace of 366/5 BC," *CQ NS* 55, 80–86.
- 1961b. "A Note on Ps.-Demosthenes 17.20," *Phoenix* 15, 74–78.
- 1962a. "The Defense of Olynthos," *CQ NS* 12, 122–140.
- 1962b. "Note on the Social War," *C&M* 23, 34–49.
1972. "Epamindondas and Thebes," *CQ NS* 66, 254–278.
1973. "The Foundation of the Second Athenian Confederacy," *CQ NS* 67, 47–60.
1976. "Agesilaos and Sparta," *CQ NS* 70, 62–84.
- 1978a. *Philip of Macedon*, London and Boston.
- 1978b. "The Peace of Philocrates Again," *CQ NS* 28, 93–104.
- (ed.) 1979. Introduction to: *Xenophon. A History of My Times*, trans. R. Warner, 2nd edn., Harmondsworth.
1981. "Notes on the Failure of the Second Athenian Confederacy," *JHS* 101, 40–55.
1989. "Orthodoxy and Hoplites," *CQ NS* 39, 375–389.
- Chambers, M. 1993. *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, Stuttgart and Leipzig.
- Chroust, A. 1972. "Aristotle and the Foreign Policy of Macedonia," *Review of Politics* 34, 367–394.
- Clauss, M. 1983. *Sparta*, Munich.
- Clemenceau, G. 1926. *Demosthenes*, Boston and New York.
- Cloch  , P. 1932. "Ath  nes et Kerseblept  s de 357/356    353/352," in *M  langes Gustave Glotz*, vol. 1, Paris, 215–226.
1942. "Isocrate et Th  bes", *Rev. Hist.* 193, 277–296.

1952. *Thèbes de Béotie*, Louvain.
1955. *Un fondateur d'empire: Philippe II*, St.-Étienne.
1959. *La dislocation d'un empire*, Paris.
- Connor, W. R. 1968. *Theopompus and Fifth-Century Athens*, Washington, DC.
- Cook, J. M. 1983. *The Persian Empire*, London.
- Cook, L. M. 1988. "Ancient Political Factions. Boiotia 404 to 395," *TAPA* 118, 57–85.
- Cooke, J. E. (ed.) 1961. *The Federalist*, Cleveland and New York.
- Cornelius, F. 1933. "Die Schlacht bei Sardes," *Klio* 26, 29–31.
- Corsten, T. 1999. *Vom Stamm zum Bund. Gründung und territoriale Organisation griechischer Bundesstaaten*, Würzburg.
- Crane, G. 1998. *Thucydides and Ancient Simplicity. The Limits of Political Realism*, Berkeley.
- Curtius, G. 1868. *Griechische Geschichte*, vol. 111, 6th edn., Berlin.
- Dandamaev, M. A. 1989. *A Political History of the Achaemenid Empire*, Leiden.
- Danov, C. M. 1976. *Altthrakien*, Berlin and New York.
- Davies, J. K. 1995. "The Fourth-Century Crisis – What Crisis?," in Eder (1995), 29–36.
- Delebecque, E. 1957. *Essai sur la vie de Xenophon*, Paris.
- Delbrück, H. 1920. *Geschichte der Kriegskunst*, vol. 1: Das Altertum, 3rd edn., Berlin.
- DeVoto, J. G. 1988. "Agesilaos and Tissaphernes near Sardis in 395 BC," *Hermes* 116, 41–53.
- Dillery, J. 1995. *Xenophon and the History of His Times*, London.
- Dindorf, W. and Blass, F. 1901. *Demosthenis Orationes* 4, Leipzig.
- Dobesch, G. 1968. *Der Panhellenische Gedanke im 4. Jh. v. Chr. und der "Philippos" des Isokrates. Untersuchungen zum Korinthischen Bund*, vol. 1, Wien.
- Doyle, A. C. 1930. *The Complete Sherlock Holmes*, New York.
- Doyle, M. W. 1991. "Thucydides: a Realist?," in B. S. Strauss and R. N. Lebow (eds.), *Hegemonic Rivalry. From Thucydides to the Nuclear Age*, Boulder, 169–188.
- Dreher, M. 1990. "Ein athenischer Synhedros im Zweiten Athenischen Seebund. *Kolpē* in Dem. 24,127," in G. Nenci and G. Thür (eds.), *Symposion 1988*, Cologne and Vienna, 149–172.
- Dugas, C. 1910. "La campagne d'Agésilas en Asie Mineure," *BCH* 34, 58–95.
- Dusanic, S. 1971. *Arkadski Savez IV Veka*, Belgrade.
- Eckstein, A. M. 2003. "Thucydides, the Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, and the Foundation of International Systems Theory," *International History Review* 25, 757–774.
- Eder, W. (ed.) 1995. *Die athenische Demokratie im 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr.*, Stuttgart.
- Ehrenberg, V. 1964. *The Greek State*, New York.
1965. "The Fourth Century as Part of Greek History," in V. Ehrenberg, *Polis und Imperium*, Zurich, 32–41.
- Ellis, J. R. 1976. *Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism*, London.
1982. "Philip and the Peace of Philokrates," in W. L. Adams and E. N. Borza (eds.), *Philip II, Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Heritage*, Washington, DC, 42–59.

- Ellis, W. M. 1989. *Alcibiades*, London and New York.
- Errington, M. 1981/2. "Review-Discussion. Four Interpretations of Philip," *AJAH* 6, 69–88.
1990. *A History of Macedonia*, English trans., Berkeley and Los Angeles.
- Essen, M. H. N. von 1887. *Index Thucydideus*, Berlin.
- Eucken, C. 1983. *Isokrates. Seine Positionen in der Auseinandersetzung mit den zeitgenössischen Philosophen*, Berlin and New York.
- Farrington, B. 1947. *Head and Hand in Ancient Greece*, London.
- Felsch, R. et al. 1980. "Apollon und Artemis oder Artemis und Apollon," *Arch. Anz.*, 39–118.
- Ferrill, A. 1985. *The Origins of War*, London.
- Feyel, M. 1942. *Polybe et l'histoire de Béotie au IIIe siècle*, Paris.
- Fiedler, K. G. 1840. *Reise durch alle Theile des Königsreiches Griechenland im Auftrag der Königl. Griechischen Regierung in den Jahren 1834 bis 1837*, Leipzig.
- Fine, J. V. A. 1983. *The Ancient Greeks*, Cambridge, MA.
- Flathe, Th. 1854. *Geschichte des phokischen Kriegs*, Plauen.
- Fliess, P. J. 1966. *Thucydides and the Politics of Bipolarity*, Nashville.
- Forchhammer, P. W. 1837. *Hellenika*, Berlin.
- Fortina, M. 1958. *Epaminonda*, Turin.
- Fossey, J. M. 1979. "Un base navale d'Epaminondas," *Teiresias* Suppl. 2, 9–13.
1988. *Topography and Population of Ancient Boiotia*, Chicago.
- 1990a. *Papers in Boiotian Topography and History*, Amsterdam.
- 1990b. *The Ancient Topography of Opountian Lokris*, Amsterdam.
1994. "Boiotian Decrees of Proxenia," *Boeotia Antiqua* 4, 35–59.
- Fougères, G. 1898. *Mantinée et l'Arcadie orientale*, Paris.
- Frazier, J. G. 1898. *Pausanias's Description of Greece*, vols. 1–VI, London.
- Freitag, K. 2000. *Der Golf von Korinth*, Munich.
- Freeman, E. A. 1893. *History of Federal Government in Greece and Italy*, London.
- Fuller, J. F. C. 1960. *The Generalship of Alexander the Great*, New Brunswick.
- Funke, P. 1980. *Homonoia und Arche*, Wiesbaden.
2000. "Grenzfestungen und Verkehrsverbindungen in Nordost-Attika. Zur Bedeutung der attisch-boiotischen Grenzregion um Dekeleia," in Nielsen et al. (2000), 121–131.
- Fuscagni, S. 1975. "Callistene di Olinto e la Vita di Pelopida di Plutarco," *CISA* 3, 31–55.
- Gaebel, R. E. 2002. *Cavalry Operations in the Ancient World*, Norman.
- Garlan, Y. 1974. *Recherches de poliorcétique grecque*, Paris.
- Garland, R. 1987. *The Piraeus*, Ithaca.
- Gehrke, H. J. 1985. *Stasis*, Munich.
1986. *Jenseits von Athen und Sparta. Das Dritte Griechenland und seine Staatenwelt*, Munich.
- Georgiadou, A. 1990. "Note on Clavier's Emendation of Plutarch's Text (Pel. 1.8–9)," *Teiresias* Suppl. 3, 81–82.
1997. *Plutarch's Pelopidas*, Stuttgart.
- Gerolymatos, A. 1986. *Espionage and Treason*, Amsterdam.

- Gilpin, R. 1981. *War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge.
- Gomme, A. W. 1937. *Essays in Greek History and Literature*, Oxford.
1962. *More Essays in Greek History and Literature*, Oxford.
- Gomme, A. W. et al. 1945–70. *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, vols. I–V, Oxford.
- González, J. R. 1986. “La política Tebana de 378 a 371 AC,” *Studia Zamorensia Historica* 7, 383–409.
- Goodwin, W. W. (ed.) 1982. *Demosthenes: On the Crown*, Cambridge.
- Goodwin, W. W. and Gulick, G. B. 1958. *Greek Grammar*, Boston.
- Graefe, F. 1935. “Die Operationen des Antalkidas im Hellespont,” *Klio* 28, 262–270.
- Grant, U. S. 1885–6. *Personal Memoirs*, vols. II–III, New York.
- Gray, V. J. 1979. “Two Different Approaches to the Battle of Sardis in 395 BC,” *CSCA* 12, 183–200.
1989. *The Character of Xenophon’s Hellenica*, London.
- Griffin, A. 1982. *Sikyon*, Oxford.
- Griffith, G. T. 1939. “The So-called Koine Eirene of 346 BC,” *JHS* 59, 71–79.
1980. “Philip as a General and the Macedonian Army,” in Hatzopoulos and Loukopoulos (1980), 58–77.
- Grote, G. 1846–56. *History of Greece*, vols. I–XII, London (cited after Everyman edition, London and New York 1907).
- Grundy, G. B. 1894. *The Topography of the Battle of Plataea*, London.
1901. *The Great Persian War*, London.
- Habicht, C. 1985. *Pausanias’ Guide to Ancient Greece*, Berkeley and Los Angeles.
1996. “Athens, Samos, and Alexander the Great,” *PAPhS* 140, 397–403.
- Hack, H. M. 1978. “Thebes and the Spartan Hegemony. 386–382 BC,” *AJPhil.* 99, 210–227.
- Hall, J. 1997. *Ethnic Identity in Greek Antiquity*, Cambridge.
- Hamilton, C. D. 1979. *Sparta’s Bitter Victories*, Ithaca.
1989. “Diodorus on the Establishment of the Second Athenian League,” *AHB* 3, 93–101.
1991. *Agasilaus and the Failure of the Spartan Hegemony*, Ithaca.
- Hamilton, J. R. 1969. *Plutarch, Alexander. A Commentary*, Oxford.
1973. *Alexander the Great*, London.
- Hammond, N. G. L. 1937. “Diodorus’ Narrative of the Sacred War and the Chronological Problems of 357–352 BC,” *JHS* 57, 44–78.
1938. “The Two Battles of Chaeronea,” *Klio* 31, 186–218.
1954. “The Main Road from Boeotia to the Peloponnese through the Northern Megarid,” *BSA* 49, 103–122.
- 1968 “The Campaign and the Battle of Marathon,” *JHS* 88, 13–57.
1973. “The Particular and the Universal in the Speeches in Thucydides with Special Reference to That of Hermocrates at Gela,” in Stadter (1973), 49–59.
1986. *A History of Greece*, 3rd edn., Oxford.
1989. *The Macedonian State. The Origins, Institutions and History*, Oxford.
1994. *Philip of Macedon*, London.

- Hammond, N. G. L. and Griffith, G. T. 1972–9. *A History of Macedonia*, vols. I–II, Oxford.
- Hammond, N. G. L. and Walbank, F. W. 1988. *A History of Macedonia*, vol. III, Oxford.
- Hampl, F. 1938. *Die griechischen Staatsverträge des 4. Jahrhunderts*, Leipzig.
- Hansen, M. H. 1991. *The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes*, Oxford.
1995. “Boiotian *Poleis* – a Testcase,” in M. H. Hansen (ed.), *Sources for the Ancient Greek City-State* (Acts of the CPC 2), Copenhagen, 13–63.
- Hansen, M. H. and Nielsen, T. H. (eds.) 2005. *An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis*, Oxford.
- Hanson, V. D. 1988. “Epameinondas, the Battle of Leuktra and the ‘Revolution’ in Greek Battle Tactics,” *Cl. Ant.* 7, 190–207.
1989. *The Western Way of War*, New York.
1999. *The Soul of Battle*, New York.
- Harding, P. 1973. “The Purpose of Isokrates’ Archidamos and On the Peace,” *CSCA* 6, 137–149.
1995. “Athenian Foreign Policy in the Fourth Century,” *Klio* 77, 105–125.
- Harris, E. 1989. “More Chalcenteric Negligence,” *CPh* 84, 36–44.
- Hart, R. A. 1965. *The Great White Fleet*, Boston.
- Hatzopoulos, M. B. and Loukopoulos, L. D. (eds.), 1980. *Philip of Macedon*, London.
- Head, B. V. 1881. *On the Chronological Sequence of the Coins of Boeotia*, London.
1884. *Catalogue of the Greek Coins in the British Museum, Central Greece*, London.
- Heisserer, A. J. 1980. *Alexander the Great and the Greeks. The Epigraphic Evidence*, Norman.
- Helmbold W. C. and O’Neil, E. N. 1959. *Plutarch’s Quotations*, Baltimore.
- Hepworth, R. G. 1986. “Epaminondas’ Coinage,” in *Proceedings of the 10th International Congress of Numismatics*, London, 35–40.
- Heskel, J. 1997. *The North Aegean Wars, 371–360 BC*, Stuttgart.
- Heurtley, W. A. 1923/4. “Notes on the Harbours of S. Boeotia, and Sea-Trade between Boeotia and Corinth in Prehistoric Times,” *BSA* 26, 38–45.
- Higgins, W. E. 1977. *Xenophon the Athenian*, Albany.
- Hitzig, H. and Blümner, H. 1886–1910. *Pausaniae Graeciae Descriptio*, vols. I–VI, Leipzig.
- Holmes, T. R. 1911. *Caesar’s Conquest of Gaul*, 2nd edn., Oxford.
- Hornblower, S. 1982. *Mausolus*, Oxford.
1987. *Thucydides*, Baltimore.
- 1991–6. *Commentary on Thucydides*, vols. I–II, Oxford.
1992. “The Religious Dimension to the Peloponnesian War, or What Thucydides Does Not Tell Us,” *Harv. Stud.* 94, 169–197.
- 1983/2002. *The Greek World, 479–323 BC*, 3rd edn., London and New York.
- Hude, C. 1969. *Xenophontis Historia Graeca*, Stuttgart.
- Hyneman, C. S. and Lutz, D. S. 1983, *American Political Writing during the Founding Era*, Indianapolis.

- Immerwahr, W. 1889. *Die Lakonika des Pausanias*, Berlin.
- Jacoby, F. 1949. *Atthis*, Oxford.
- Jehne, M. 1994. *Koine Eirene*, Stuttgart.
1999. "Formen der thebanischen Hegemonialpolitik zwischen Leuktra und Chaironeia (371–338 v.Chr.)," *Klio* 81, 317–358.
- Jones, C. P. 1971. *Plutarch and Rome*, Oxford.
- Jordan, B. 1975. *The Athenian Navy in the Classical Period*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London.
- Judeich, W. 1892. *Kleinasiatische Studien*, Marburg.
1927. "Athen und Theben vom Königsfrieden bis zur Schlacht bei Leuktra," *Rh. Mus.* 76, 171–197.
- Kahrstedt, U. 1922. *Griechisches Staatsrecht*, vols. 1, Göttingen.
1953. "Delphoi und das heilige Land des Apollon," in *Studies Presented to D. M. Robinson on His Seventieth Birthday*, vol. 11, Saint Louis, 749–757.
- Kallet-Marx, R. M. 1985. "Athens, Thebes, and the Foundation of the Second Athenian League," *Cl. Ant.* 4, 127–151.
- Kambanis, M. L. 1892/3. "Le dessèchement du lac Copais par les anciens," *BCH* 16–17, 121–137, and 322–342.
- Keen, A. G. 1996. "Were the Boiotian Poleis Autonomoi?," in M. H. Hansen and K. Raaflaub (eds.), *More Studies in the Ancient Greek Polis* (Papers from the CPC 3), Stuttgart, 115–120.
- Kegley, C. W. (ed.) 1995. *Controversies in International Relations Theory. Realism and the Neoliberal Change*, New York.
- Kelly, D. H. 1980. "Philipp II and the Boiotian Alliance," *Antichthon* 14, 69–73.
- Kienast, D. 1973, *Philipp II. von Makedonien und das Reich der Achaimeniden*, Munich.
- Kirsten, E. 1951, "Das östliche Mittelmeer und die Insel Euboea, nebst einem Anhang. Beiträge zur historischen Landeskunde des östlichen Mittelgriechenlands und Euboeas," in A. Philippson (ed.), *Die griechischen Landschaften. Eine Landeskunde*, vol. 1.2, Frankfurt, 317–744.
- Knauss, J. 1984. *Die Wasserbauten der Minyer in der Kopais. Die älteste Flußregulierung Europas*, Munich-Obernach.
1987. *Die Melioration des Kopaisbeckens durch die Minyer im 2. Jt. v.Chr.*, Munich-Obernach.
1990. *Wasserbau und Geschichte. Minysche Epoche – Bayerische Zeit*, Munich-Obernach.
- Knoepfler, D. 1978. "Proxénies béotiennes du IV^e siècle," *BCH* 102, 375–393.
1986. "Un document attique à reconsidérer: le décret de Pandios sur l'Amphiarion d'Oropos," *Chiron* 16, 71–98.
- Köchly, H. and Rüstow, W. 1852. *Geschichte des griechischen Kriegswesens*, Aarau.
- Kolbe, W. 1901. "Zur athenischen Marineverwaltung," *MDAI(A)* 26, 377–418.
- Körte, A. 1905. "Zu Didymos" Demosthenes-Commentar," *Rh. Mus.* 60, 388–416.
- Krentz, P. 1989. "Athena Itonia and the Battle of Koroneia," in Beister and Buckler (1989), 313–317.
1995. *Xenophon Hellenika 11.3.11–IV.2.8*, Warminster.

- Kromayer, J. 1903. *Antike Schlachtfelder*, vol. 1, Berlin.
1905. "Zu den griechischen Schlachtfelderstudien," *Wien. Stud.* 27, 1–34.
- Kromayer, J. and Veith, G. 1922. *Schlachten-Atlas zur antiken Kriegsgeschichte*, Leipzig.
- Kugler, J. and Lemke, D. (eds.) 1996. *Parity and War. Evaluations and extensions of "The War Ledger,"* Ann Arbor.
- Kühr, A. 2006. *Als Kadmos nach Boiotien kam. Polis und Ethnos im Spiegel thebanischer Gründungsmythen*, Stuttgart.
- Larsen, J. A. O. 1925. "Representative Government in the Panhellenic Leagues," *CPh* 20, 313–329.
1939. Review of E. Hampl, *Die griechischen Staatsverträge des 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.*, *CPh* 34, 375–379.
1944. "Federation for Peace in Ancient Greece," *CPh* 39, 145–162.
1955. *Representative Government in Greek and Roman History*, Berkeley and Los Angeles.
1968. *Greek Federal States*, Oxford.
- Lauffer, S. 1959. "Die Diodordoublette xv 38 = 50 über die Friedensschlüsse zu Sparta 374 und 371 v. Chr.," *Hist.* 8, 315–348.
1971. "Topographische Untersuchungen im Copaisgebiet 1970," *AA* 26, 239–241.
1986. *KOPAIS. Untersuchungen zur historischen Landeskunde Mittelgriechenlands*, vol. 1, Frankfurt a.M.
- (ed.) 1989. *Griechenland. Lexikon der historischen Stätten*, Munich.
- Lawrence, A. W. 1979. *Greek Aims in Fortification*, Oxford.
- Lazenby, J. F. 1985. *The Spartan Army*, Warminster.
- Leake, W. M. 1835. *Travels in Northern Greece*, vols. I–IV, London. Edited with a new Preface, Introduction, and illustrations by John Buckler, Chicago, 2004.
- Lefèvre, F. 1994. "Un document amphictionique inédit du IV siècle," *BCH* 118, 99–112.
1998. *L'Amphictionie pyléo-delphique*, Paris.
- Ligon, R. P. 1981. *Megara*, Ithaca and London.
- Lehmann-Hartleben, K. 1923. *Die antiken Hafenanlagen des Mittelmeeres*, Leipzig.
- Lemke, D. 2004. "Great Powers in the Post-Cold War World: a Power Transition Perspective," in T. V. Paul, J. J. Wirtz, and M. Fortmann (eds.), *Balance of Power*, Stanford, 52–75.
- Lendle, O. 1995. *Kommentar zu Xenophons Anabasis (Bücher 1–7)*, Darmstadt.
- Lendon, J. W. 1989. "The Oxyrhynchus Historian and the Origins of the Corinthian War," *Hist.* 38, 300–313.
- Lendon, J. E. 2005. *Soldiers and Ghosts. A History of Battle in Classical Antiquity*, New Haven and London.
- Lerat, L. 1952. *Les Locriens de l'Ouest*, vols. I–II, Paris.
- Lesky, A. 1966. *A History of Greek Literature*, London.
- Lévêque, P. and Vidal-Naquet, P. 1960. "Epaminondas Pythagoricien ou le problème de la droite et de la gauche," *Hist.* 9, 294–308.
- Lewis, D. M. 1977. *Sparta and Persia*, Leiden.

1989. "Persian Gold in Greek International Relations," *Rev. Ét. Anc.* 91, 227–235.
1990. "The *Synhedrion* of the Boiotian Alliance," *Teiresias* Suppl. 3, 71–73.
- Londey, P. 1990. "The Outbreak of the Fourth Sacred War," *Chiron* 20, 239–260.
- Lotze, D. 1964. *Lysander und der Peloponnesische Krieg*, Berlin.
- Ma, J. 2000. "Fighting *Poleis* of the Hellenistic World," in H. van Wees (ed.), *War and Violence in Ancient Greece*, London.
- MacDonald, A. 1972. "A Note of the Raid of Sphodrias," *Hist.* 21, 38–44.
- Mafodda, G. 2000. *Il koinon beotico in età arcaica e classica*. Storia ed istituzioni, Rome.
- Malkin, I. 1987. *Religion and Colonization in Ancient Greece*, Leiden.
- Mandel, J. 1980. "Jason of Pherae: Tags of Thessaly, as Reflected in the Ancient Sources and Modern Literature," *Rivista di storia antica* 10, 47–77.
- Manfredi, V. 1980. *Senofonte. Anabasi*, Milan.
1986. *La Strada dei Diecimilia*, Milan.
- Marchant, E. C. 1900. *Xenophontis Historia Graeca*, Oxford.
- Marek, C. 1984. *Die Proxenie*, New York.
- Markle, M. M. 1974. "Philip's Strategy in 346," *CQ* NS 24, 253–268.
1978. "Use of the Sarissa by Philip and Alexander of Macedon," *AJArch* 82, 483–497.
1981. "Demosthenes' Second Philippic. A Valid Policy for the Athenians against Philip," *Antichthon* 15, 62–85.
- Marsden, E. W. 1969. *Greek and Roman Artillery*, Oxford.
- Martin, T. R. 1981. "Diodorus on Philip II and Thessaly in the 350s BC," *CPh* 76, 188–201.
1982. "A Phantom Fragment of Theopompus and Philip II's First Campaign in Thessaly," *Harv. Stud.* 86, 55–78.
- Mathieu, G. 1925. *Les idées politiques d'Isocrate*, Paris.
- McDougall, J. I. 1983. *Lexicon in Diodorum Siculum*, Hildesheim and New York.
- McInerney, J. 1999. *The Folds of Parnassos. Land and Ethnicity in Ancient Phokis*, Austin.
- McKay, K. L. 1953. "The Oxyrhynchus Historian and the Outbreak of the Corinthian War," *CR* 67, 6–7.
- McPherson, J. M. 1988. *Battle Cry of Freedom. The Civil War Era*, New York.
- Meiggs, R. 1972. *The Athenian Empire*, Oxford.
- Meiggs, R. and Lewis, D. 1988. *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions*, 2nd edn., Oxford.
- Meister, K. 1975. *Historische Kritik bei Polybios*, Wiesbaden.
- Melber, J. 1885. "Über die Quellen und den Wert der Strategemensammlung Polyäns," *Jahrb. f. cl. Phil.* 14, 417–688.
- Meloni, P. 1951. "La tirannide di Euphrone I," *Riv. Fil.* 79, 14–24.
- Meyer, E. 1902/1975. *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. v: Das Perserreich und die Griechen. Der Ausgang der griechischen Geschichte, 6th edn., Darmstadt (repr. of the 5th edn. 1969 by H. E. Stier; 1st edn. 1902).
1909. *Theopomps Hellenika*, Halle a.d.S.

- Michaud, J.-P. 1973. *Le trésor de Thèbes*, Paris.
- Michaud, J.-P. 1974. "Chronique des fouilles et découvertes archéologiques en Grèce en 1973," *BCH* 98, 579–722.
1973. *FD II 1.8, Le trésor de Thèbes*, Paris.
- Mikkola, E. 1954. *Isokrates*, Helsinki.
- Momigliano, A. 1934. *Filippo il Macedone*, Florence.
1936. "Un momento di storia greca. La pace del 375 a.C. e il Plataico di Isocrate," *Athenaeum* NS 14, 3–35.
- Morgan, C. 2003. *Early Greek States beyond the Polis*, London.
- Morison, S. E. 1954. *A History of United States Naval Operations in World War II*, Boston.
- Morris, I. and Powell, B. B. 2006. *The Greeks. History, Culture and Society*, Upper Saddle River.
- Morrison, J. S. and Williams, R. T. 1968. *Greek Oared Ships 900–322 BC*, Cambridge.
- Mosley, D. J. 1962. "The Athenian Embassy to Sparta in 371 BC," *PCPS* 8, 41–46.
1971. "Athens' Alliance with Thebes 339 BC," *Hist.* 20, 508–510.
1972. "Diplomacy in Classical Greece," *Anc. Soc.* 3, 1–16.
1973. *Envoys and Diplomacy in Ancient Greece*, Wiesbaden.
1979. *Antike Diplomatie*, Darmstadt.
- Müller, C. 1855. *Geographi Graeci Minores*, Paris.
1878. *Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum*, vols. 1–11, Paris.
- Munn, M. H. 1987. "Agésilas' Boiotian Campaigns and the Theban Stockade of 378–377 BC," *Cl. Ant.* 6, 106–138.
1993. *The Defense of Attica*, Berkeley and Los Angeles.
- Nellen, D. 1972. "Zur Darstellung der Schlacht bei Sardes in den Quellen," *Anc. Soc.* 3, 45–54.
- Nielsen, T. H. 1996. "A Survey of Independent Poleis in Classical Arkadia," in M. H. Hansen and K. Raaflaub (eds.), *More Studies in the Ancient Greek Polis*, Stuttgart, 63–105.
1999. "The Concept of Arkadia – the People, Their Land and Their Organisation," in T. H. Nielsen and J. Roy (eds.), *Defining Ancient Arkadia*, Copenhagen, 16–79.
2002. *Arkadia and Its Poleis in the Archaic and Classical Periods*, Göttingen.
- Nielsen, T. H. et al. (eds.) 2000. *Polis and Politics. Studies in Ancient History, Presented to Mogens H. Hansen*, Copenhagen.
- Ober, J. 1985. *Fortress Attica*, Leiden.
- Oldfather, W. A. 1909. "Livy 1,26 and the Supplicium de More Maiorum," *TAPA* 39, 49–72.
1916. "The History and Topography of Locris," *AJArch.* 20, 51–58.
- Oliver, J. H. 1936. "Inscriptions from Athens," *AJArch.* 40, 461–463.
- Olmstead, A. T. 1931. *History of Palestine and Syria*, New York and London.
1948. *History of the Persian Empire*, Chicago.
- Olshausen, E. 1979. "Zur Frage ständiger Gesandtschaften in hellenistischer Zeit," in E. Olshausen and H. Biller (eds.) 1979. *Antike Diplomatie*, Darmstadt, 291–317.

- Orsi, D. P. 1974. *Sull'ordinamento della Beozia da Coronea alla Pace di Antalcida*, Bari.
- Orsi, E. P. 1987. "La boule die Tebani," *Quaderni di storia* 13, 125–144.
- Osborne, M. J. 1981. *Naturalization in Athens*, Brussels.
- Ostwald, M. 1982. *Autonomia. Its Genesis and Early History*, New York.
- Parke, H. W. 1933. *Greek Mercenary Soldiers*, Oxford.
1939. *A History of the Delphic Oracle*, Oxford.
1977. *Festivals of the Athenians*, London.
- Parker, V. 1997. "Bemerkungen zum ersten Heiligen Krieg," *Rh. Mus.* 140, 17–37.
- Peake, J. 1997. "Note on the Dating of the Social War," *G&R* 44, 161–164.
- Pearson, L. 1941. "Historical Allusions in the Attic Orators," *CPh* 36, 209–229.
1942. *The Local Historians of Attica*, Philadelphia.
1960. *The Lost Histories of Alexander the Great*, London.
- Pélékides, C. 1962. *Histoire de l'éphébie attique des origines à 31 avant J.-C.*, Paris.
- Peper, L. 1912. *De Plutarchi "Epaminonda"*, Jena.
- Perlman, S. 1964. "The Causes and the Outbreak of the Corinthian War," *CQ NS* 58, 64–81.
1969. "Isocrates' 'Philippus' and Panhellenism," *Hist.* 18, 370–374.
1985. "Greek Diplomatic Tradition and the Corinthian League of Philip of Macedon," *Hist.* 34, 153–174.
- Philippson, A. 1897. *Thessalien und Epirus*, Berlin.
- Philippson, A. and Kirsten, E. 1950–9. *Die griechischen Landschaften*, vols. I–III, Frankfurt a.M.
- Podlecki, A. J. 1987. *Plutarch. Life of Pericles*, Bristol.
- Pomtow, H. 1906. "Eine delphische *stasis* im Jahre 363 v.Chr.," *Klio* 6, 89–126.
- Pouilloux, J. 1949. "O EPIKEFALOS OBOLOS," *BCH* 73, 177–200.
1954. *La forteresse de Rhamnonte*, Paris.
- Powell, J. E. 1938. *A Lexicon to Herodotus*, Cambridge.
- Pownall, F. S. 1998. "What Makes War a Sacred War?," *EMC* 17, 35–55.
- Prandi, L. 1985. *Callisthene*, Milan.
- Preuss, S. 1879. "Quaestiones Boeoticae," *Schriften des Nicolaigymnasiums*, Leipzig, 1–40.
1904. *Index Isocrateus*, Leipzig.
- Pritchett, W. K. 1972. "Lucubrationes epigraphicae," *CSCA* 5, 153–182.
1974. *The Greek State at War*, vol. II, Berkeley and Los Angeles and London.
- 1965–92. *Studies in Ancient Greek Topography*, vols. I–VIII: vol. I: 1965; vol. II: *Battlefields*, 1969; vol. III: *Roads*, 1980; vol. IV: *Passes*, 1982, Berkeley and Los Angeles.
- Proietti, G. 1987. *Xenophon's Sparta*, Leiden.
- Psoma, S. 2001. *Olynthe et les Chalcidiens de Thrace. Études de numismatique et d'histoire*, Stuttgart.
- Rahn, P. J. 1971. "Xenophon's Developing Historiography," *TAPA* 102, 497–508.
- Raue, H. O. 1937. *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des korinthischen Bundes*, Marburg.
- Rawlings, H. R. 1977. "Thucydides on the Purpose of the Delian League," *Phoenix* 31, 1–8.

- Reinmuth, O. W. 1971. *The Ephebic Inscriptions of the 4th Century BC*, Leiden.
- Rhodes, P. J. 1997. *The Decrees of the Greek States*, with the late D. M. Lewis, Oxford.
- Rhodes, P. J. and Osborne, R. 2004. *Greek Historical Inscriptions, 404–323 BC*, Oxford.
- Rice, D. G. 1974. "Agesilaus, Agesipolis, and Spartan Politics 386–379 BC," *Hist.* 23, 164–182.
1975. "Xenophon, Diodorus, and the Year 379/8. Reconstruction and Reappraisal," *YCS* 24, 95–130.
- Roebuck, C. 1948. "The Settlements of Philip II with the Greek States in 338 BC," *CPh* 43, 73–92.
- Roesch, P. 1965. *Thespies et la confédération béotienne*, Paris.
1982. *Études béotiennes*, Paris.
1984. "Un décret inédit de la ligue thébaine," *Rev. Ét. Grec.* 97, 45–60.
- Roesch, P. and Argoud, G. (eds.) 1985. *La Béotie Antique*, Lyon and St.-Étienne.
- Roux, G. 1979. *L'Amphictionie, Delphes et le temple d'Apollon au IV^e siècle*, Lyon.
- Roy, J. 1971. "Arcadia and Boeotia in Peloponnesian Affairs 370–362 BC," *Hist.* 20, 569–599.
1973. "Diodorus Siculus xv 40. The Peloponnesian Revolutions of 374 BC," *Klio* 55, 135–139.
1994. "Thebes in the 360s BC," *CAH*, vol. VI, 2nd edn., 187–208.
- Runciman, W. G. 1990. "Doomed to Extinction: the Polis as an Evolutionary Dead-end," in O. Murray and S. Price (eds.), *The Greek City from Homer to Alexander*, Oxford, 347–367.
- Ruzicka, S. 1985[1992]. "A Note on Philip's Persian War," *AJAH* 10, 84–91.
1992. *Politics of a Persian Dynasty*, Norman and London.
1998. "Epaminondas and the Genesis of the Social War," *CPh* 93, 60–69.
- Ryder, T. T. B. 1963. "Athenian Foreign Policy and the Peace-Conference at Sparta in 371 BC," *CQ NS* 57, 237–241.
1965. *Koine Eirene*, Oxford.
- Sachs, A. J. 1977. "Achaemenid Royal Names in Babylonian Astronomical Texts," *AJAH* 2, 129–147.
- Sacks, K. S. 1990. *Diodorus Siculus and the First Century*, Princeton.
- Ste Croix, G. E. M. de 1972. *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War*, London.
- Sakellariou, M. B. 1980. "Panhellenism. From Concept to Policy," in Hatzopoulos and Loukopoulos (1980), 128–145.
1976. *Étude sur la Confédération béotienne (447/6–386)*, Brussels.
- Salvati, F. 1995. "Documents amphictyonique CID IV 2," *BCH* 119, 565–571.
- Samuel, A. E. 1972. *Greek and Roman Chronology*, Munich.
- Sánchez, P. 2001. *L'Amphictionie des Pyles et de Delphes*, Stuttgart.
- Sauppe, G. 1869. *Lexilogus Xenophonteus*, Leipzig.
- Sawada, N. 1993. "Philip II's Policy toward Greece," *Kodai* 4, 21–50.
- Schachter, A. 1967. "A Boiotian Cult Type," *BICS* 14, 1–16.
- 1981–1994a. *Cults of Boiotia*, vol. 1–IV, London.
- 1994b. "Gods in the Service of the State. The Boiotian Experience," in *Federazioni e federalismo nell'Europa antica*, Milan, 67–85.

- Schaefer, A. D. 1885. *Demosthenes und seine Zeit*, vol. 1.2, Leipzig.
- Schaefer, H. 1963. *Probleme der Alten Geschichte*, Göttingen.
- Schäfer, J. 1967. "Beobachtungen zu den seeseitigen Mauern von Larymna in der Lokris," *Arch. Anz.*, 527–545.
- Schehl, F. 1932. "Zum korinthischen Bund vom Jahre 338/37 v.Chr.," *JÖAI* 27, 115–145.
- Schläger, H., Blackman, D. J., and Schäfer, J. 1968. "Der Hafen von Anthedon," *Arch. Anz.*, 21–98.
- Schneider, R. 1860. *Quaestiones Xenophontae*, Bonn.
- Schober, F. 1924. *Phokis*, Crossen a.d. Oder.
- Schwahn, W. 1930. *Heeresmatrikel und Landfriede Philipps von Makedonien*, Berlin.
- Schwandner, E.-L. 1977. "Die böotische Hafenstadt Siphai," *Arch. Anz.*, 513–551.
- Seager, R. 1967. "Thrasybulus, Conon, and Athenian Imperialism, 396–386 BC," *JHS* 87, 95–115.
1974. "The King's Peace and the Balance of Power in Greece, 386–362 BC," *Athenaeum* NS 52, 36–63.
- Sealey, R. 1956. "Callistratos of Apludna and His Contemporaries," *Hist.* 5, 178–203.
1993. *Demosthenes and His Time*, New York and Oxford.
- Seibert, J. 1979. *Die politischen Flüchtlinge und Verbannten in der griechischen Geschichte*, Darmstadt.
1981. *Alexander der Große*, Darmstadt.
- Shay, J. 1994. *Achilles in Vietnam*, New York.
- Sherman, W. T. 1875. *Memoirs*, New York.
- Shipley, D. R. 1997. *Plutarch's Life of Agesilaos*, Oxford.
- Shrimpton, G. S. 1971. "The Theban Supremacy in Fourth-Century Literature," *Phoenix* 25, 310–318.
- Siewert, P. 1972. *Der Eid von Plataiai*, Munich.
- Siewert, P. and Aigner-Foresti, L. (eds.) 2005. *Föderalismus in der griechischen und römischen Antike*, Stuttgart.
- Sinclair, R. K. 1978. "The King's Peace and the Employment of Military and Naval Forces 387–78," *Chiron* 8, 29–54.
- Skalet, C. H. 1928. *Ancient Sicyon*, Baltimore.
- Smith, R. E. 1953. "The Opposition to Agesilaos' Foreign Policy 394–371 BC," *Hist.* 2, 274–288.
- Smith, S. 1924. *Babylonian Historical Texts*, London.
- Sordi, M. 1957. "La fondation du collège des Naopes et le renouveau politique de l'amphictionie au IV siècle," *BCH* 81, 38–75.
1969. *Diodori Siculi Bibliothecae Liber XVI*, Florence.
1975. *Storiografia e propaganda*, Milan.
1985. "Acilio Glabrione e l'Atena di Coronea," in Roesch and Argoud (1985), 265–269.
1989. "Pelopida da Tegira a Leuttra," in Beister and Buckler (1989), 123–30.
- Soulis, E. M. 1972. *Xenophon and Thucydides*, Athens.
- Sourvinou-Inwood, C. 1979. "The Myth of the First Temples at Delphi," *CQ* NS 29, 231–251.

- Sprawski, S. 1999. *Jason of Pherae*, Cracov.
2004. "The Battle of Tegyra (375 BC). Breaking Through and the Opening of the Ranks," *Electrum* 8, 13–26.
- Stadter, P. A. (ed.) 1973. *The Speeches in Thucydides. A Collection of Original Studies with a Bibliography*, Chapel Hill.
1975. "Plutarch's Comparison of Pericles and Fabius Maximus," *GRBS* 16, 77–85.
- Starr, C. G. 1974. "Greeks and Persians in the Fourth Century BC 1," *IrAnt* 11, 39–99.
- Stern, E. von 1884. *Geschichte der spartanischen und thebanischen Hegemonie*, Dorpat.
1887. *Xenophons Hellenika*, Dorpat.
- Strauss, B. S. 1986. *Athens after the Peloponnesian War*, Ithaca.
- Strauss, B. S. and Lebow, R. N. (eds.) 1991. *Hegemonic Rivalry. From Thucydides to the Nuclear Age*, Boulder.
- Sturtz, F. G. 1801–4. *Lexicon Xenophonteum*, Leipzig.
- Stylianou, P. J. 1998. *A Historical Commentary on Diodorus Siculus Book 15*, Oxford.
- Symeonoglou, S. 1985. *The Topography of Thebes*, Princeton.
- Szemler, G. J. 1996. "Two Notes on the Corinthian War," *The Ancient World* 27, 95–104.
- Szemler, G. J. and Kase, E. W. et al. 1991. *The Great Isthmus Corridor Route*, Dubuque.
- Szemler, G. J. et al. 1996. *Thermopylai. Myth and Reality in 480 BC*, Chicago.
- Talbert, R. J. A. (ed.) 2000. *Barrington Atlas of the Greek and Roman World*, Princeton.
- Tarn, W. W. 1930. *Hellenistic Military and Naval Developments*, Cambridge.
- Taylor, T. 1978. "Power Politics," in T. Taylor (ed.), *Approaches and Theory in International Politics*, London, 122–140.
- Thiel, J. H. 1926. "De synoecismo Boeoticae post annum 379 peracto," *Mnemos.* 54, 19–28.
- Tod, M. N. 1913. *International Arbitration amongst the Greeks*, Oxford.
1949. *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions*, vol. 11: 403 to 323 BC, Oxford.
- Tomlinson, R. A. 1972. *Argos and the Argolid*, London.
- Tritle, L. A. (ed.) 1997. *The Greek World in the Fourth Century*, London.
- Tuplin, C. J. 1977. "The Athenian Embassy to Sparta, 372/1," *LCM* 2, 51–56.
- 1986a. "Military Engagements in Xenophon's Hellenika," in I. S. Moxon, J. D. Smart, and A. J. Woodman (eds.), *Past Perspectives*, Cambridge, 37–66.
- 1986b. "The Fate of Thespieae during the Theban Hegemony," *Athenaeum* NS 64, 321–341.
1993. *The Failings of Empire*, Stuttgart.
- (ed.) 2004a. *Xenophon and His World*, Stuttgart.
- Tuplin, C. J. 2004b. "Xenophon and His World: an Introductory Review," in Tuplin (2004a), 13–31.
- Ulrichs, H. N. 1840. *Reisen und Forschungen in Griechenland*, vol. 1, Bremen.

- Underhill, G. E. 1900. *A Commentary on the Hellenica of Xenophon*, Oxford.
- Urban, R. 1991. *Der Königsfrieden von 387/86 v. Chr.*, Stuttgart.
- Usher, S. 1968. "Xenophon, Critias and Theramenes," *JHS* 88, 128–135.
- van de Maele, S. 1989. "La route antique du port mégarien de Pagai à la forteresse d'Aigosthènes," *EMC* 33, 183–188.
- van Wees, H. 2004. *Greek Warfare. Myths and Realities*, London.
- Veith, G. and Kromayer, J. 1922. *Schlachten-Atlas zur antiken Kriegsgeschichte*, Leipzig.
- Vischer, W. 1875. *Erinnerungen und Eindrücke aus Griechenland*, 2nd edn., Basel.
- Walbank, F. W. 1967a. *A Historical Commentary on Polybius*, vol. II, Oxford.
- 1967b. *Speeches in Greek Historians*, Oxford.
- Walker, E. M. 1913. *The Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, Oxford.
- Wallace, P. W. 1979. *Strabo's Description of Boiotia. A Commentary*, Heidelberg.
- Waltz, K. M. 1979. *Theory of International Relations*, New York.
- Wardman, A. 1974. *Plutarch's Lives*, London.
- Weiskopf, M. 1989. *The So-Called "Great Satraps' Revolt," 366–360 BC*, Stuttgart.
- Welwei, K.-W. 1999. *Das klassische Athen. Demokratie und Machtpolitik im 5. und 4. Jahrhundert*, Darmstadt.
- Wendland, P. 1987. "Beiträge zu athenischer Politik und Publizistik des vierten Jahrhunderts," in U. Schindel (ed.), *Demosthenes*, Darmstadt, 100–138.
- Westlake, H. D. 1939. "The Sources of Plutarch's Pelopidas," *CQ* 33, 11–22.
1969. *Essays on the Greek Historians and Greek History*, New York.
1973. "The Settings of Thucydidean Speeches," in Stadter (1973), 90–108.
- Wheeler, E. L. 1987. "Ephorus and the Prohibition of Missiles," *TAPA* 117, 157–182.
- Wheeler-Bennett, J. W. 1961. *The Nemesis of Power*, London.
- Whitehead, D. 1993. "Samian autonomy," in R. M. Rosen and J. Farrel (eds.), *Greek Studies in Honor of Martin Ostwald*, Ann Arbor, 321–329.
- Winter, F. E. 1971. *Greek Fortifications*, Toronto and Buffalo.
- Wirth, G. 1985. *Philipp II*, Stuttgart.
- Wolter, J. 1926. *Antike Schlachtfelder*, vol. IV, Berlin.
- Worley, L. J. 1994. *Hippeis*, Boulder.
- Wörle, M. 1988. "Inscripfen von Herakleia am Latmos I. Antiochos III, Zeuxis und Herakleia," *Chiron* 18, 421–470.
- Worthington, I. 1991. "The Authenticity of Demosthenes' Fourth Philippic," *Mnemos.* 44, 425–428.
- Wüst, F. 1938. *Philip II. von Makedonien und Griechenland in den Jahren von 346 bis 338*, Munich.
- Wytttenbach, D. 1829–30. *Plutarchi Chaeronensis Moralia*, vol. VIII, Oxford.
1843. *Lexicon Plutarcheum et Vitas et Opera moralia complectens*, Leipzig.
- Zahrnt, M. 1971. *Olynth und die Chalkidier*, Munich.
2000. Xenophon, "Isokrates und die *koinē eirēnē*," *Rh. Mus.* 143, 295–325.
- Ziegler, K. 1968. *Plutarch. Vitae parallelae*, vol. II.2, Leipzig.

Index

- Abae 51, 267
 Abdera 228
 Abydus 9, 205
 Acanthus 73, 74
 Acarnania 12, 18, 166, 173
 Achaea, Achaeans 12, 13, 137, 167, 168, 191, 225, 229, 265
 Achaea Phthiotis 268
 Aegospotamoi 195
 Aeolia, Aeolians 63, 166
 Aeschines 158, 207, 230, 234, 236, 246, 251
 Aetolia, Aetolians 12, 13, 134
 Agathocles 229
 Agesilaus 1, 9, 34–35, 37, 38, 41, 42, 47, 49, 57, 71, 72–73, 76, 77, 79, 84, 87, 97, 109, 121–122, 140, 156, 220, 246
 Alalcomenae 62, 63
 Aleuadae 261, 262
 Alexander the Great 4, 20, 27, 95, 169, 173, 205, 231, 233, 242, 243–244, 248, 249, 251–252, 254–258
 Alexander of Pherae 83, 134, 195, 216
 Alyzia 173, 177
 Amadocus 227–229
 Amphictyony, Amphictyonic Council 4, 8, 21, 23, 28, 178, 213–223, 225–226, 234–235, 246, 261, 262–265, 267
 Amphipolis 158, 227, 234, 237, 260
 Amphissa 49, 54
 Anactorium 173, 177
 Andocides 58, 235
 Androcleidas 24, 45, 46, 47, 52, 54
 Andronicus 213
 Antalcidas 9, 71, 127, 128–139, 235
 Peace of: *see* Common Peace, 46
 Anthedon 187, 190, 197
 Antigonus Monophtalmus 200, 205
 Antipatrus 244
 Arcadia, Arcadians 3, 136, 145, 147, 158, 159–160, 162–163, 166, 167, 172, 177, 179, 220, 224, 236
 Arcadian League 12, 14, 15, 17, 22, 133, 135, 163, 168
 Archidamus II 38
 Archidamus III 129, 146, 151, 161, 222
 Argos, Argives 7, 9, 19, 33, 45, 63, 65, 68, 72, 133, 135, 137, 138, 158, 166, 167, 168–169, 172, 179, 236
 Ariobazanes 209
 Aristes, satrap of Phrygia 243
 Artabazus 226, 228, 241
 Artaxerxes 9, 34, 46, 70, 71, 130, 145, 147, 179, 203, 226, 231, 235, 238, 241, 242, 243
 Astyocrates 213, 215, 216
 Athenian League
 First 8, 18, 129, 133
 Second 22, 26, 38, 39, 41, 43, 79, 83, 84, 134, 135, 137, 138, 159, 172, 173, 175–177, 179, 200, 201, 209, 234, 242, 250, 251
 Athens, Athenians 1, 148, 150
 in the Corinthian War 19, 34, 45, 66–67, 128
 diplomacy, general 9, 18, 21, 52, 74, 138, 147, 158, 169, 178, 201, 214, 215, 227–228, 250
 government and internal politics 6, 45, 46, 57–58
 hegemony 71, 74, 81–84, 129, 133, 135, 137, 139, 154, 168
 military operations 21, 118, 119, 175–177, 180, 182, 196, 199, 200, 216–217, 223, 226, 242, 245, 256, 257, 265–266, 267, 275
 in the Peloponnesian War 1, 33, 190, 192, 195
 relations with Macedon 4, 179, 234, 235, 236, 237–240, 249, 259, 268–276
 relations with Sparta 43, 46, 55–56, 68, 75, 79, 127, 141–145, 152–155, 156–157, 158, 220
 relations with Thebes 22, 35–36, 41–42, 77
 resources and military preparation 7, 16, 17, 190, 210
 Attica 28, 36, 43, 77, 80, 191, 275
 Aulis 69
 Autocles 141, 146, 158–159
 Autophradates 209

- Boeotia, Boeotians 21, 33, 34, 38, 41, 42, 43, 50, 52, 59, 66, 68, 69, 71, 76, 80, 141, 180–182, 185, 190, 191, 219, 246, 269
- Boeotian League 28, 41–42, 44, 127, 132, 180
- diplomacy 55, 72, 75, 84, 165–171, 179, 203, 229, 230, 231, 236
- dissolution 87–98
- manpower 12, 17
- at war 63, 65, 124, 217, 225, 226, 254–257, 275
- Byzantium, Byzantines 37, 82, 165, 173, 175–179, 181, 196, 199–201, 207, 209, 242, 271, 272, 273, 274
- Cadmea 76, 77, 88, 89, 143, 154, 158, 170, 199, 207, 217
- Calamus (Mt.) 50
- Calapodion 51
- Callias 141, 146, 148, 158–159
- Callisthenes 37
- Callistratus 143, 144, 146, 149, 155, 158–159
- Cambyses 177
- Cardia 239, 269
- Caria 205, 209, 245
- Carthage, Carthaginians 182, 196
- Carystus 178
- Cenchreae 196
- Cephisodotus 144, 146, 149, 157
- Cephisus 19, 51–52, 54, 61, 225, 255, 256
- Cersebletes 227–229, 234, 239, 265, 269
- Chabrias 36, 183
- Chaeronea 100, 102, 110, 255
- battle of 4, 245, 246, 254–258, 275
- Chalcidice, Chalcidians 12, 73–76, 81, 82
- Chalcidic League 12, 14, 18, 261
- Chalcis 40, 197, 198, 250, 269
- Chares 145, 149, 150, 226, 228
- Charon 89, 90, 98
- Chersonesus 269
- Chios, Chians 37, 74, 81, 165, 174, 175–177, 181, 196, 199–201, 209, 248
- Cios in Bithynia 205
- Cirrha, Cirrhaean plain 214–216, 217, 219, 221
- Cithaeron (Mt.) 35, 36, 79, 80
- Clazomenae 10, 71, 169
- Cleigenes 87
- Cleiteles 143–144, 150, 154
- Cleombrotus 11, 36, 79, 80, 83–84, 92, 97, 112, 115, 122–126, 145, 150, 160, 191, 197
- Cleomenes 96
- Cleon 193
- Cnemis (Mt.) 50
- Cnidus 165, 175, 181, 203–210
- battle of 199
- Common Peace
- of 386: 2, 9, 10–12, 22, 25, 34, 36, 37, 39, 42, 70, 71–75, 81, 83, 84, 87, 131, 143, 265–266
- of 375: 38, 39, 40
- of 371(Sparta): 41, 43, 145
- of 371(Athens): 155
- of 362: 237
- Conon 34, 46, 199
- Copae 171
- Copais (Lake) 60, 61, 63, 65, 102, 103, 104, 107–108, 186–187
- Corcyra 195
- Corinth 2, 7, 9, 18, 19, 28, 33, 45, 63, 130, 136, 138, 140, 150, 151, 155, 196, 234, 245, 246, 249, 251
- League of 173, 246
- Corinthian War 2, 9, 10, 17, 19–20, 24, 34, 44, 57, 90, 127, 128, 138
- Coronea 19, 34, 49, 108
- Cos 176
- Cotys 227
- Craterus 246
- Creusis 185–186, 190, 191, 197
- Crocus Plain 21, 230, 258, 263, 264
- Croesus 118, 177
- Cunaxa 109, 120
- Cyllene 195
- Cylon 46, 47
- Cynoscephalae 106, 109, 139
- Cyprus 10, 71
- Cyrus 63, 120
- Cyzicus 200
- Daphnus 50, 51
- Darius III 243–244
- Delian League: *see* Athenian League, First
- Delium 68, 123, 146
- Delos (Mt.) 101, 102, 105
- Delphi 4, 8, 9, 45, 49, 65, 112, 178, 213, 214–223, 225, 234, 261, 266, 275
- Demades 246
- Demetrius Poliorcetes 198
- Demosthenes
- the orator 176, 185, 207, 230, 236, 240, 244, 246, 251, 259, 267, 269, 270, 275
- stratēgos* in the Peloponnesian War 17, 193
- Dionysius I of Syracuse 182, 196, 250
- Diopithea 271
- Doris, Dorians 214, 215
- Echinus 268, 275
- Egypt 209, 231, 238, 243
- Eleusis 79, 80
- Eleutherae 36
- Elis, Eleans 22, 42, 133, 135, 136, 137, 166, 168, 172, 179, 236

- Epaminondas 20, 41, 42, 43, 96, 109, 112–117,
122–123, 124–126, 131, 133, 134, 135, 136,
139, 146, 152, 158, 162, 165, 166, 167, 170,
174–175, 176, 177, 181–182, 183–185, 191,
199–204, 206–210, 219, 224, 226, 229, 236,
258, 265
- Ephesus 208
- Epirus 18, 269
- Eretria 39, 40
- Erythrae 169, 205
- Euboea 39, 63, 82, 134, 166, 179, 220, 236, 269
- Eudamidas 76
- Euphron of Sicyon 96, 145, 148, 150, 162, 166,
168–172
- Euthycles 130
- Galaxidorus 46, 48, 55
- Gorgidas 90, 95–96
- Gylippus 193
- Gytheum 195
- Halae 186
- Haliartus 19, 34, 59, 68
- Hallonesus 236
- Hegesippus 237
- Helicon (Mt.) 35, 61, 63, 64, 66, 76
- Hellespont, Hellespontines 63, 228, 239, 240, 265,
269, 273
- Heraclea Pontice 175
- Hisemenias 45, 46, 47, 52–53, 54, 55, 76, 88, 170
- Hyampolis 51, 100, 102, 107
- Hyettus 171
- Iasus 208
- Illyria, Illyrians 261
- Imbrus 10, 71
- Ionia, Ionians 63, 214
- Iphiades 205, 206
- Isocrates 90, 127, 129–130, 132, 151–152, 266
- Issus 243
- Ithome (Mt.) 152
- Jason of Pherae 12, 21, 133, 145, 150, 161
- koinē eirēnē*: see Common Peace
- Lacedaemon, Lacedaemonians: see Sparta,
Spartans 1, 3, 24, 127
- Laches 181, 182, 183, 199
- Lampsacus 208
- Larissa 261
- Larymna 186–187, 190, 197
- Lebadea 65
- Lemnus 10, 71
- Leontiades 76, 77, 88–89, 98, 170, 171
- Leuctra 3, 11, 42, 68, 84, 98, 106, 127, 128, 130,
133, 135, 137, 140, 145, 160, 161, 173, 180,
216, 225, 226
- Locris 21, 24, 52–57, 63, 102, 106, 134, 166,
215, 225
- Epicnemidean 108
- Hesperian 45, 48
- Hypocnemidian
- Opountian 45, 46, 49–50, 51, 52–57, 108
- Ozolian 48–49
- Lycomedes 21, 136, 137, 145, 167, 226
- Lycophron 261
- Lysander 1, 19–20, 34, 46, 112, 195
- Lysias 66
- Macedonia 3, 5, 6, 18, 27, 133, 134, 205, 224, 227,
236, 239, 245, 249, 251, 255–258, 261, 262,
263, 275
- Malis, Malians 166
- Mantineia, Mantineans 3, 14, 22–23, 73, 137
first battle (418) 64, 119
second battle (362) 18, 96, 109, 111, 122, 124, 137
- Marathon 198
battle of 119
- Maronea 227, 228
- Mausolus 176, 205, 209
- Megalopolis 22, 216, 220, 224
- Melon 89, 90
- Memnon 241
- Messene 3, 130, 136, 151, 172, 220
- Methymna 37, 82
- Mnasippus 121
- Mnason 222
- Mycalessus 197
- Mytilene 37, 82
- Naupactus 191
- Nemea 19, 34, 59, 118, 124, 125
- Neon 21, 225, 229, 262
- Nobas 206
- Ochus 244
- Olynthus 34, 73–76, 77, 81, 183, 266
- Oneion (Mt.) 167
- Onomarchus 21, 222, 225, 226, 230,
262–264, 266
- Opus 51, 197
- Orchomenus 14, 19–20, 38, 39, 63, 64, 66, 67, 69,
98, 99–100, 106, 107–108, 109, 173, 219
- Oropus 39–40, 191
- Pagasae 263
- Pammenes 224–232
- Parapotamioi 45
- Parnassus 28, 48–51

- Peace treaties
 of Antalcidas: *see* Common Peace, 46
 of Nicias 214, 237, 250, 251
 of Philocrates 4, 179, 234, 235, 236, 237, 240, 260, 269, 271, 272
see also Common Peace
- Peitholaus 261
- Pelopidas 20, 89, 90, 98, 102, 104, 106–107, 108, 112–117, 122–123, 130, 139, 145, 146, 166, 168, 170, 179, 199, 216, 224, 235
- Peloponnesian League 3, 9, 33, 133, 134, 138, 172, 190
- Peloponnesian War 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 10, 18, 26–27, 33, 38, 52, 127, 180, 190–191, 192, 193–196, 197
- Peloponnesus 17, 28, 42, 43, 65, 96, 136, 137, 139, 150, 155, 161, 162, 163, 172, 220, 224, 232, 235, 236, 245, 251, 268
- Perdiccas 18
- Pericles 185
- Perinthus 242, 244, 253, 271, 272, 273, 274
- Persia, Persians 17, 33, 38, 39, 45, 59, 70, 127–128, 129, 145, 160, 182, 199, 202, 208, 231, 240, 241, 243, 244, 245, 253, 259, 265, 267, 268
- Phalaeus 21–22, 234, 266
- Pharnabazus 45, 46–47
- Phayllus 262, 265
- Pherae 223, 261, 262
- Philip II 3–4, 5, 20, 22, 27–28, 95, 139, 158, 177, 179, 215, 218, 223, 224, 227–232, 259–276
- Philoboitos 225
- Philocrates
 Peace of: *see* Peace treaties
- Philomelus 21, 217, 219, 221, 222
- Phlius 73, 137, 145, 150, 168
- Phocis, Phocians 21–22, 41, 43, 236, 239, 268, 274
 border disputes 24, 34, 45–46, 49, 51, 52–57
 diplomacy 134, 166, 167, 173, 214, 223, 234
 League of 13
 Sacred War 225–226, 230, 232, 234, 261, 262–265
 at war 63, 178
- Phoebeidas 21, 34–35, 76–78, 88, 90, 91, 92–96, 97, 170
- Piraeus 1, 33, 36, 80, 83, 190, 191, 195, 216
- Pisa 135
- Plataea 35, 38, 39, 40, 42, 52, 76, 77, 90, 98, 99, 119, 141, 160, 173
- Polyanthes 45, 46, 47
- Potidaea 18, 237
- Priene 205
- Procles 143–144, 146, 149, 150, 153–157
- Prothous 9, 145, 150
- Ptolemaeus of Alorus 134
- Ptoun 101
- Pylos 177
- Pythia, Pythian Games 178, 251, 263
- Rhamnus 198
- Rhodes, Rhodians 37, 165, 174, 175–177, 181, 196, 199–201, 209
- Sacred Band 100, 109–110, 112–115, 116, 254–255, 256–257
- Sacred War(s) 21–22, 23, 28, 173, 179, 216, 217, 218, 222, 224, 227, 229, 232, 235, 261, 266, 275
- Samos 208, 210
- Sardis 9, 44
- Scillus 3, 35, 140
- Scyrus 10, 71
- Sicyon 145, 149, 150, 162, 168–172, 224, 234
- Siphae 186, 190, 191, 197
- Social War 17, 175–177, 223
- Sodamas 46, 47, 55
- Sparta, Spartans
 and the Common Peace 9, 39, 41, 42, 84, 249
 in the Corinthian War 45, 54–57, 59, 71, 73–78
 diplomacy, general 24–25, 52, 72, 140, 147, 151, 162, 201, 214, 234, 267, 274
 hegemony 1, 8–9, 27, 127–128, 131, 133, 139, 180, 246
 military operations 21, 22, 36, 38, 61, 65–66, 67–70, 99, 100, 106–107, 108–110, 112, 118, 121, 124, 125, 135–136, 146, 160, 199, 217–218
 in the Peloponnesian War 183–185, 214
 portrayal by Xenophon 149, 150, 155, 163
 relations with Athens 43, 83, 141–145, 152–154, 155, 156–157, 159, 169
 relations with Thebes 33–34, 45, 46, 90, 98, 130, 145, 220–221, 223
 resources and military preparation 7, 12, 19, 183
- Sphacteria 153
- Sphodrias 21, 36–37, 76, 77, 79, 83–84, 111
- Susa 130, 146, 160, 226
- Tanagra 14, 98, 99
- “Tearless Battle” 161
- Tegea 14, 15
- Tegyra 96, 99–110, 111
- Teleutias 77, 78, 83, 93, 195
- Tenedos 173
- Thasus 169
- Thebes, Thebans 7, 35, 52–58, 65, 76–78, 148, 197
 in the Corinthian War 9, 24, 45, 48
 diplomacy, general 21, 73, 145, 158, 214, 215, 217, 219
 federalism and internal politics 14, 19–20, 39, 40–42, 45–46, 71, 87–98, 150, 169, 180

- hegemony 28, 145, 167, 174–175, 179, 216, 224, 231
- military operations 22, 24–25, 36, 41, 51, 59, 61, 63, 65, 67–70, 99, 106–107, 108–110, 123–124, 127, 155, 160, 185, 195, 199, 207–208, 219–223, 245, 254, 262, 263
- portrayal by Xenophon 163
- relations with Athens 22, 37, 39, 43, 81, 84, 141, 143, 203
- relations with Macedon 234, 239, 252, 266, 267, 274, 275
- relations with Sparta 33–34, 75, 80, 84, 145, 160, 201, 217–218
- resources and manpower 38
- Theramenes 1
- Thermopylae corridor 22, 225, 230, 239, 265, 266, 268
- Thesmophoria 76, 77
- Thespieae 14, 36, 38, 39, 40, 42, 76, 77, 79, 80, 83, 90, 92, 97, 98, 99, 141, 173
- Thessaly, Thessalians 12, 21, 96, 134, 219, 223, 224, 261, 274
- diplomacy 133, 134, 216–217, 219, 230, 236, 267, 269
- League of 214, 266
- manpower 17
- at war 225, 230, 262–265
- Thrace 227–229, 239, 241, 244, 261, 265–266, 269
- Thrasybulus 33, 35
- Thria, Thriasian plain 36, 80, 81
- Tigranes 208
- Timocrates 33, 45, 46–47, 56, 157
- Timolaus 45, 46, 47
- Timotheus 39, 183, 208, 261
- Tiribazus 9, 71, 128
- Tithorea 225
- Tithraustes 33, 45, 46–47
- Tolmides 195
- Torone 193
- Triphylia 136, 138
- Troad 241
- Troy 198
- Truce
 - Thirty Years' Truce 237
- Xerxes 70, 233, 252, 275